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"The French offensive on 1813. Failing intelligence?." Topic


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Armand09 Nov 2009 3:16 p.m. PST

When Nap began his offensive against the Allied on 1813, he order Oudinot and MacDonald Armies to atack against odds which had a very hight number of soldiers. Much more than his own.

Oudinot began his offensive against Bernadotte with 62.000 while the French/Sweden Prince had 152.000 at his dispposal.

MacDonald march against Blūcher (Katzbach)with 70.000 while the Allied had 110.000.

So, it was a mistake because Nap didn't know how many troops the Allied had in front of his Army or he think that they were a punch of militia which would fly?.

It's difficult to understan why Nap atack with so less soldiers and even more when much of them were recruis.

Amicalement
Armand

The Black Tower09 Nov 2009 4:38 p.m. PST

I think he was trying a pin and punch tactic with the limited resources he had available

Armand09 Nov 2009 4:52 p.m. PST

What a gambler!!.

Amicalement
Armand

21eRegt09 Nov 2009 9:47 p.m. PST

Unfortunately the chips he gambled with were the lives of his men. In 1813 I suppose he had a chance if he could break the alliance, but after that (even Leipzig) there is little excuse except ego.

Personal logo Dye4minis Supporting Member of TMP09 Nov 2009 10:34 p.m. PST

Perhaps he felt he was facing the same old crew? The track records of the Prussians weren't all that good. Remember, just a year ago he commanded some of them and experienced problems with their "coordination". The Sweedes….fair to say that they were an "unknown" factor?

Also, have you studied any of the command, control and communications of Oudinot and MacDonald's handling of their commands?

You can find many instances where a smaller army beat a larger one, so numbers are not a good indicator of how well (or poor) an army will perform! The experience and abilities of the staff can be a better indicator of capability than simple numbers! After all, it remains under their control to get the right forces to the right place, at the right time, and in a condition to fight! Not an easy task!

Best
Tom Dye
GFI

Old Bear11 Nov 2009 3:38 a.m. PST

"Unfortunately the chips he gambled with were the lives of his men."

Is that something of a unique feature in a general then, 21eRegt?

summerfield11 Nov 2009 8:48 a.m. PST

The Prussians fought well in Russia in 1812 and extricated themselves with over two thirds of the men. The Russians were weak and had not had chance to re-organise even with the Armistice.

Stephen

Fanch du Leon11 Nov 2009 11:58 a.m. PST

Probably, the average, if not worse, quality of his light cavalry in 1813 didn't give him the right intel.

summerfield11 Nov 2009 2:12 p.m. PST

The French cavalry had lost horses, experience and the officers to be effective. To think that the best of the cavalry were the cadres drawn from Spain.

Stephen

FatherOfAllLogic14 Nov 2009 8:52 a.m. PST

As noted, the French lacked cavalry which impacted their knowledge of the enemy. Secondly, Napoleon probably had a low opinion of the Prussians, especially since a large percentage were Landwehr. Next, he was off his game a bit and made several bad decisions. Finally, well, no guts no glory. Napoleon often felt that boldness was a virtue and could substitute for superiority in numbers.

rpardo15 Nov 2009 5:04 a.m. PST

Hi
Napoleon was also the head of state, so his acts must be also studied under the politic side. He rejected many Allied offerings of peace based on unaceptable demands. So he was forced to attack, in order to maintain his ruling on german allied
Regards
Rafa

Rustveli15 Nov 2009 10:52 a.m. PST

Armand, there is a very good book that will answer your question and provide additional insights:

Michael V. Leggiere, Napoleon and Berlin: The Franco-Prussian War in North Germany, 1813 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2002)

Amicalement,
Alex

Armand15 Nov 2009 3:10 p.m. PST

Many thanks Mr. Rustveli!.
And Rafa… what a pleasure to read you here!.

Amicalement
Armand

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