"Compare Austrian 1809 to Early ACW (McClellan)" Topic

I am reading James McPherson's book 'Tried By War', which is about Lincoln as commander in chief. It is very good, though nothing new for ACW experts, I believe.

It did make me wonder about a comparison between Archduc Karl of Austria in 1809 and McClellan of the Union in 1862. Movement paralysis in both cases is what came to mind.

Why is Napoleon able to be so agressive and fearless against Karl and the same for Lee against McClellan? I just finished reading 1809: Thunder On The Danube and I kept thinking then 'why can Napoleon move forward when Karl cannot?' and now with the current book, I ask the same questions of ACW armies.

I am looking to begin a discussion here of the comparison. But, if you completely disagree with my thesis statement, I would like to hear that, also.

I only hoped I expressed myself clearly enough in what I am questioning.

Craig

The generals who move choose to move. Those who don't move choose not to move. I would say in McClellan's case he convinced himself that his enemy was larger than it was and what he had was never going to be good enough, so why move into contact with the enemy when you know you are going to lose?

At some point command just comes down to guts. Do you have the guts to order your troops to move?

You'll see the same dynamic played out in all wars at all levels. Some NCOs get their guys doing the right (but potentially dangerous) thing, some don't.

Another factor might be that the Austrians had decades of ingrained timidity to their style of generalship that does not bode well for going on the offensive. On the otherhand, the Army of the Potomac generals at the corps and division level were still trying to move up the learning curve and master their craft (generalship) – that might have made them more hesitant to advance agressively.

Finally, having an inspirational leader (Napoleon or Lee) does wonders to one's confidence to move ahead. I've been reading the Thunder on the Danube series as well and author goes to great pains to describe the initial confusion and disorder of the local French command and how everyone's morale changed for the better once the word was out that Napoleon had arrived to take over. ("Now things were going to get better").

Based on the psychology demonstrated in playing my miniature campaigns with extreme fog of war, the default position, the one that most generals would have, is the belief that the enemy is everywhere. Trying to be somewhat cautious means that you surrender the initiative and wait until you have a perfect picture.

Part of this is amplified if you believe that your enemy is more agressive or has more intelligence than you. You start to assume that your enemy is always one step ahead of you so you daren't move too rashly for fear of falling into a trap.

An aggressive commander, operating in the blind environment, does not assume that the enemy is everywhere. Instead, while deploying for reasonable contingencies, he advances boldly into the unknown with the intention of forcing his opponent to react to him. I've not yet had a player that acted this aggressively. I tried it with great success.

I was shocked to see how players that would have been entirely aggressive in a game where you can see everything, completely locked up in a blind environment. One-stacking is another aspect of this cautious mindset.

Good point – in our campaign games, players whose sole tactic for on-off games is the full-out charge are much more restrained

As to George McClellan, he had three major problems in moving aggressively, IMHO

1) It was all about him – he got a little too much attentiona little too early

2) He wanted everything perfect – which is why he was great at organizing troops, just not at using them

3) He was badly let down by his intelligence service (which, for the Army of the Potomac, represents a true oxymoron) – poor old George kept getting reports that he was outnumbered, and Lee's conduct certainly reinforced that impression

Frederick.
To expand, McClellan was imbued with the "classic" or badly retold Napoleonic battles. He want one grand sweep to win everything. That doesn't happen. He mis-handling, such as Seven Days, was from his inflexible devotion to this concept as being the least costly, men and money. It wasn't.
Somewhat disagree on the "lack" of intelligence (either kind) in AOP. Some of the correspondence between Pinkerton and McClellan seems to have a subtext: these numbers are accurate but how many do you want me to actually report?

Not a bad idea, but I don't think it's unique to them. Although I haven't studied either of them in detail, it's not unusual to find reluctant commanders who, for a variety of reasons, are afraid to act forcefully.

I think Grant's a good example of a commander who realized this factor the first time he went to move against a confederate commander. In the end, the two small armies did not contact each other, and Grant realized while he had been worried about fighting the enemy, the other guy was just as worried about contacting him. It was a principle he took to heart; the idea that the enemy was just as afraid of him, and that he could use that to his advantage.

In the history books and on the battle maps the situation appears much clearer than it could have been to either side in the battle itself. Rusty Musket's question is one that has come to mind from time-to-time in several battles. At Perryville 1862, why didn't Thomas's wing counterattack and crush Bragg? At Chancellorsville, why couldn't the unengaged Union right wing counterattack Jackson? Frederick won a overwhelming victory at Rossbach by attacking the French as they marched across his position, yet a month later he marched across the Austrians' front and defeated them at Leuthen. Is a trait of superior commanders that they are willing to attack even if they don't have perfect knowledge of the enemy's strength, position, and intentions? Yet at Cold Harbor Grant is criticised for doing exactly this. By the time the lessons of military history are passed down to us centuries after the fact, they sound like they've been carved in stone. It might be a healthy alternative, when possible, to take another look at these battles, and examine their strategic and tactical decisions in response to what they believed the situation was. This is far easier to say than to accomplish.

In Duffy's most recent book about the Austrian army in the Seven Years war, there is a suggestion that the Austrian army put an inordinate amount of attention to protecting their artillery. In this sense, with their artillery superiority, they are much like the Union Army of the ACW. Frederick and his brilliant subordinate field commanders seem more like the Conferates, and both the Prussian and Confederate artillery may be considered inferior. I do not know if this protective trend carried forward into the Austrian army of 1809.

GdeP

Do you think I am correct in seeing comparisons in Karl and McClellan or am I creating comparisons when the reasons for their seeming inertia of rest were totally different?

Thanks for the answers thus far. They are interesting.

There is an old saying about audacity, especially for cavalry officers, which is usually countered by the line that "there are old soldiers, and bold soldiers, but no old, bold soldiers".

The way I see it, you need to be aggressive enough to be willing to attempt to impose your will on the opponent. The flip side of that is you have to have a plan for what happens when you bump into the enemy in a place you didn't think he was.

Then again, I've read way too much Sun Zi and Musashi. Need to get caught up on my Clauswitz and Machiavelli.

Wasn't Little Mac was very popular with his troops? I wonder if that popularity and his close association with them helped him decide he didn't want to take chances with the lives of "his boys", and cause him to visualize "phantom" Confederate Divisions and Corps.

Command of real lives is much more difficult than most who've not been in that position realize. That is a part of the reason there are two paths for US Army officers: commanders and staff. I have witnessed the two types in the field and there is a HUGE difference in their ability to handle situations where casualties are probable. A "commander" will send men into combat knowing there will be casualties, but his duty to achieve his objective and follow his orders sits foremost in his mind. A "staffer" doesn't always get the job done even though his duty is the same. Staffers often get bogged down in branch plans, second guessing, and self caused delays. But that is just my personal experience talking… Will

Good debate- DAF's description of The Austrian malaise vis a vis the union malaise rings true.
That said though I expect both Napoleon and his army felt that the Austrians were quite agressive enough at Aspern and Wagram thank you very much….

Aspern and Wagram could be cases that demonstrate the problem. As soon as the Austrians had definite information, they pounced with everything they had, being entirely aggressive. The difference between how they act when they know where the enemy is and how they act when they do not is the critical distinction.

I think Karl was much better than McClellan. He ordered a simultaneous coordinated attack at Aspern-Essling. The pack of corps commanders he had executed it piecemeal, Hiller moving off 5 or 6 hours late.

Little Mac never ordered a coordinated attack. He was always holding most of his army back to guard against the huge reserves he 'knew' Lee had.

Just to note: Hooker had a complete and accurate list of Lee's order of battle from his intelligence service. So it could be done. Fightin' Joe blew it by waiting for Lee to attack him. But he had no false idea about respective strengths.

Another point on the Austrians. In a very real way, the Army WAS the Empire. It was THE Imperial institution. Had it been destroyed, the whole ramshackle structure would have collapsed. Karl (and every other Habsburg commanding general) lived with that knowledge and acted accordingly.

It was true in 1809 and just as true in 1866, which is why Bismarck and Moltke to everything possible to defeat the Habsburg army without destroying it.

RE: Little Mac's Intelligence Director: "Either Mr. Pinketon is delusional or the 1860 census is a damnable Confederate lie!" – Charles Adams, US Ambassador to the Court of St. James, 1862