"Technology and the ACW" Topic

The ACW was a conflict notable for the introduction of many new technologies: repeating rifles, machine guns, rifled artillery, tinned rations, railways, telegraph etc and a whole raft of naval innovations.
Most/all were not used to their full extent.
Is there one that if properly utilised might have changed or sped the outcome of the war?

I doubt it. The constraint is not the new technology. The constraint is the new technology adoption speed of the human species.

The judgment "they were not used to their full extent" relies on hindsight to begin with.

Repeating rifles.. proven effective and reliable.
The North could make them.. the South couldn't..

Game over.

Paddy Griffith addresses this in one of his book (Battle Tactics of the Civil War I think). Basically the technology was there, but the tactical application wasn't for the most part (on land, the naval war I would argue was highly innovative).

Technology will generally be far ahead of its tactical and operational application. It took until 1917 to actually figure out how to use all this new 'stuff' in a reasonably effective way. 1866, 1870, the Balkan Wars and 1914 just repeated the same dismal activities of the ACW.

The biggest innovation was the introduction of rifled weapons (both artillery and small arms), which utterly changed the face of warfare forever and required rthe development of entirely new force structures and tactical and operational doctrines.

So essentially the answer to the OP is that to win the ACW rapidly, one side needed to train and organise a 1917 style army centred around platoon tactics, fire and movement by small groups, deployment in great depth and dispersion and the whole integrated with neutralising artillery fires. That just wasn't going to happen.

Human resistance to change was the biggest obstacle to adopting new technology. The repeating rifle would cause a radical change in battlefield tactics, but the beauracracy refused to adopt it. "It wasted too much ammunition." The repeating rifle gave Wilder's Brigade the firepower of a full division. But Wilder took out a loan and bought the the repeaters personally, with the individual troopers reimbursed him from their pay. Lincoln had to personally order the Army to begin buying them.

Generals refused to build hasty defensive works early in the war because they thought it would reduce their troops aggressiveness. The troops learned the value of a pile of earth a lot sooner than the generals.

The war history is repleat with similar stories of technology that the generals initially refused to adopt.

The key was, I think, the potential for systems change – technology works best as part of an integrated system, which includes the underlying philosophy – for example, a cavalry equipped with lances that has a machine gun platoon suggests either very unique terrain or someone who has not thought the whole thing out

Civil War command philosophy was heavily dependent on the linear tactics that won the Mexican-American War, which was essentially fought with Napoleanic technology – Martin very eloquently describes what was needed to make the most of the new technology, and the systems imperative to do so was lacking in the ACW – as an example, there was considerable resistance to issuing troops with repeaters on the grounds that they would use too much ammunition!

So – to answer the original question – if a highly placed innovative thinker had been there to change the system, that would have changed the war – but I don't think a single piece of technology by itself would have

It is very hard to put yourself into the mindset or paradigm of people of the past. That is what you have to do when asking the above question, but so few people do it.

I agree with above posts that say the thinking had to change before technology could be effectively use.

There is another aspect that is often overlooked…

The US War Department chose NOT to adopt the new breech-loading and/or repeating weapons and stuck with the traditional muzzle-loading weapon as it's arm of choice. Why?

The easy answer that most folks cost is the worry about cost and waste or ammunition. Certainly there was some truth to that. However, the primary reason for not adopting the new weapon(s) was the availability of the older models. The United States, and also the Confederacy, needed a million weapons NOW.

The arsenals and factories needed to produce these weapons were already in place, and the work was well known and easily contracted out. machinery existed to do the fabrication, and the citizens coming into the army knew about the basics of the weapons.

The United States simply didn't have the time to start up production of these new weapons, and to generate the numbers needed when the war broke out.

Keep in mind that it wasn't just the weapons. There would have to be new cartridge boxes and accoutrements designed and rushed into production.

Then there is the ammunition. machinery would have to be designed to fabricate the new ammunition, workers trained to operate, sort, inspect and pack the rounds, shipping cases fabricated, handling techniques developed, etc.

It all took time, and the two sides just didn't have it.

There's more to the story, but that's a LARGE part of it right there.

Good point, Tim – especially if you actually thought the war was only going to last six months (which a lot of people on both sides did) – if people had realized the war would last five years, I suspect a lot of things would have been done differently, but that requires the 20-20 retrospectoscope

The past is a different country as someone once said (smile), but the earlier comment on the difference in mind set hits it on the head.

It was not just the new weapons, but the inability to train soldiers for them (compare training then to now as a concept), the command mind set based on grouped units, etc.

The comment on that they needed a 1917 army is correct and they could have done so, but no one could visualize such.

There was nothing to have prevented the North to build enough repeating rifles to equip entire units and provide the ammo for them, but that was the easy step. Understanding the changes that such weapons made and figuring out the formations and unit structure was beyond them. Grant could have put tens of thousands of such troops into battle in 1864 if that had been a priority, but they'd still have used the same formations and been commanded as they were using muzzle loaders in 1862.

Dan

Hi

In the first 6 months of the war roughly 30% of both sides were still using smoothbore muskets. Such were still in service to the very end. The idea that anyone could suddenly produce millions of repeaters which cost several times the cost of a new muzzleloader, or the hundreds of millions of rim fire ammo to go with them is just pure fantasy.

Rocky

Both sides had been taught Napoleonic tactics, the trouble is that the new technology was used, but only to support the old tactics

The two new technologies that were best applied and most influential in the outcome were: steam boats (not ships, river boats) and railroads. Without steamboats, not so much as gunboats but as transports for both troops and supplies, most of Grant's campaigns would not have been possible. Try to imagine Henry/Donelson, Vicksburg, or even the seige of Petersburg/Richmond, without steamboats. Railroads filled in where rivers weren't in the right place, but were more vulnerable to cavalry raids and guerrillas. They were even used for strategic movement of whole corps of troops on a few occasions.

The Confederacy's problem with repeaters was not with making the guns, but with making the ammo; it didn't have enough copper to make the brass cartridges. I agree that repeating rifles could have made a considerable difference had they been produced in adequate numbers, but I also agree that even the Union probably could not have produced them in adequate numbers quickly enough. The Union did, thanks to J. H. Wilson when he was chief of the Cavalry Bureau, equip much of their cavalry with Spencers by late '64.

And yet Spencer built 200,000 in less than 10 years starting in 1860 without much effort, as well as there being 14,000 Henry rifles built during the war years also. That is without any attempt to actually manufacture them on a par with the muzzle loaders. Since no other nation in the world was investing in such weapons, or ammo, it is hard to be critical of the War Department.

20,000 Spencer armed troops trained in fire and move tactics in 1864 would have changed the game. That they never happened is not a result of not being able to make them, or their ammo, but rather one of 'group think' and conservative thinking.

Imagine 60,000-80,000 such troops armed and trained in their use by 1863 or 1864. Such could have been done, but it would have taken a leap of faith and a willingness to invest (money and training). As it is, the Spencer was only used by a few mounted regiments and select groups and the Henry was never officially adapted by the US military.

Military men and organizations are by their very nature restraint and conservative. When they are not, they get whacked by their own politicans, as well as by the enemy. A proven weapon is much better than an unproven one. Look at the struggle any new weapon faces, be it tanks or aircraft.

Dan

I still dream that if someone could have gotten McClellan stinking drunk at Richmond, the war could have ended in 1862.

Hi

So, Dan, magically, spencer makes 60,000 weapons and 2,000,000 rounds of ammo in 1860, at a cost several times the cost of the rifled/muskets they didn't have for the musket armed million men…who do you issue these to.

It wasn't conservatism, it was logistics and cost.

Rocky

Dan,

The majority of the Henry rifles went to the civilian market. Even though the war was going on, westward expansion didn't halt, and there was a clear market for these firearms for those heading west.

As to Spencer, the majority of those weapons went to the military post-war, when it had the time and numbers to convert all the Infantry to breech-loading weapons. In fact, a friend of mine owns a converted Spencer carbine that was re-barreled as a rifle as part of the rush, post-war, to get breech-loaders into the hands of the troops.

It initially looks like a standard Spencer rifle, although the barrel and bands were blued, until you look at the breech block (which was case hardened). The arsenal left the slide ring on the side where the cavalry shoulder strap would be clipped when mounted. It was one of 1010 so converted.

Spencer was also, like Henry, selling a large portion of his firearms on the civilian market, and for the same reasons.

How about the use of barbed wire for military purposes?
(interesting discussion BTW. Im taking notes)

barbed wire (razor wire) as we think of it is post ACW. However, stretched tripping wire was used to some effect during the Seven days, Ft Wagner, Mobile, etc. In reality, other obstacles like primitive mines (torpedoes), felled trees, inclined Palisading, etc were more effective during this period. Wire itself came into it's own with the combined use with machine guns.

As for repeaters there is the ugly logic that a Irishman costs $13 USD dollars a month. A Repeater $150. USD Repeaters were good, but were they really worth 10+ men? It took awhile and the postwar lack of volunteers to sway the cost argument.

Even if they'd had all those repeaters, that doesn't mean they would have developed new tactics for their use. They hadn't even adjusted to the rifle-musket yet!

A major problem was that units armed with repeaters tended to fire off all their ammo too quickly, after which those expensive repeaters were nothing but fancy clubs.

The Henry wasn't really sturdy enough for infantry use, and rather heavy (especially when loaded) for cavalry use. The Spencer was the best weapon available at the time.

I never heard of wire obstacles being used in the 7Days. It was used by Burnside at Knoxville, Nov 63 and Butler near Bermuda Hundred, May or June '64. (Both generals usually pilloried for being stupid.) It was telegraph wire, strung close to the ground to trip charging Rebels -- especially effective in foggy conditions.

Hi

And the round the henry shot was so poor that beyond 50 yards it might just stop in a heavy coat!

The spencer is better, though still rimfire. The problem I have with the weapon is that it is awkward! I have owned/shot pretty much everything in the period. Most of them come to sholder the same way and set the sights just to your eye for aiming. The spencer requires an odd "hunch" to get the sights. I suspect this is one reason that it wasn't more popular.

rocky

A major problem was that units armed with repeaters tended to fire off all their ammo too quickly, after which those expensive repeaters were nothing but fancy clubs.

Wilder's repeater armed regiments at Chickamauga were extremely effective. Their ammo problems were no different than any regularly armed regiments.

Although, it seemed the repeaters were best on defense at Chickamauga. During attacks, Wilder's troops were beaten back as easily as others, IIRC.

The spencer is better, though still rimfire.

Spencers are reputed to have been pretty powerful; one theory is that their cartridges contained more fulminate of mercury than was necessary as a primer.

Wilder's "ammo problems were no different than any regularly armed regiments." Any regularly armed mounted regiments, perhaps.

Since, Rocky, I'd mentioned the weapons being in use in 1863 or 64, I'm not sure why you felt that I'd suggest that they'd magically appear in 1860.

Nice that the civilian market trumped the military needs, but if the government had been willing to order them, I'd assume that they'd have been sold to the government.

The real trick with all of this talking is that there was no training for the use of such weapons, nor were there any thoughts on tactics.

As mentioned earlier in another post (not mine), there would have needed to have been such weapons produced and 1917 tactics used to have made a difference. Since 'group think' prevented either, it is a mote point.

Dan

Hi

The issue, dan, wasn't a date quibble, but the simple aspects of the logistics. The cost of these repeaters is much higher than the weapons used. Desptite it all, both sides imported mussle loading rifled muskets, and even by 63 or 4, there were units STILL using smoothbores.

Logic suggests that if they couldn't get everyone a springfield muzzle loading rifled musket, the concept of getting everyone a Henry or Spencer is a fantasy.

The government ORDERED lots of guns. it wasn't that simple.

The spencer was, is pretty powerful. The fulminate wasn't the issue, though it did/does affect the corrosion of the weapon. The issue is that rimfire itself is unreliable. Back then misfires were usually a round per tube(kinda like the M16!), the tubes were fragile.

I have always thought that people getting facinated by this "if only…"things usually require some gap in the idea that ignores the facts on the ground. A friend likes to characterize this as "if only Hannibal had a piper cub" thinking.

Repeaters just aren't powerful enough or reliable enough for military use until the 1880s. I say that as a fan/owner/shooter.

Rocky

As a "fan/owner/shooter" of ACW era weapons myself, I'd say that a repeating rifle that can be used and reloaded from a prone position, used in formations and with tactics suited to it, would have made a hell of a difference in the ACW if ONLY 20 or 30,000 had been issued to qualified units (that would be a corps or better so equipped and trained in 1863 or 64).

So there (smile).

You keep blowing past the thought being offered (or in fairness to you, we both just keep talking past each other), which is that there did not need to be a zillion of the weapons on the first day. Since factories have to be built, workers trained and orders placed, as well as soldiers trained, it would have taken several years at least. With the minimal market that it had, Sharps were still built at the average rate of 20,000 a year during that time frame, so it is easy to assume that they could have 'ramped' up production if desired.

That it did not make many more had much less to do with logistics, or the cost, but an inability of the folks in power (just as today and throughout history) to think outside the 'box'. Few, if any of the powers-to-be had used anything other than a muzzle loader, read anything that did not involve Napoleonic tactics and battles or thought that the war would last long enough to plan anything for the long term. The added side benefit that the Confederacy would have been unable to make or match the weapons was a bonus not understood either.

It would have taken someone with authority to recognize the usefulness of the repeating rifle, visualized how it could be used to the advantage of troops equipped with it and thought out tactical and operational plans for their use to have made it happen.

That is a lot of 'ifs', so I'm not surprised that it did not happen.

The military at that time in this country relied on short term enlistments and militia (30 day, 9 month, 1 year, 2 year, 3 year, etc.), with minimal training a few weeks at most when an unit was first organized (see the 'trained' quality of many Union regiments at Sharpsburg for example) and a 'monkey-see, monkey-do' method for later recruits, and poorly qualified officers who were trained if that at linear tactics and formations early in the war. Hardly any actual training in marksmenship occurred, or even just firing their weapons, as most training consided of formation training at the various levels of command (battlation, brigade, division, etc.).

Managing to keep troops bunched up in formed skirmish lines and firing lines was about the extent of their abilities. Thus a muzzle loading rifle familier to most troops that one could 'train' a new soldier to stand, load and fire in close formation was about the extent of their skills.

Troops trained to move individually and in small groups, using terrain cover, not under direct control of the regimental and brigade officers would have been beyond the imagination and scope of their abilities (except for noted units such as sharpshooters and such).

While the ACW is often discussed as the first modern war, it can also be discussed as the last of the Napoleonic wars (although the Franco-Prussian War might qualify for that term also). Railroads, steam ships and other marvels aside, no Napoleonic commander would have been surprised at the tactics and battles of the ACW until the latter part of the war when troops begin to use hasty fortifications and trenches as veterans reconized the power of rifled weapons and the stupidity of fighting in close formations.

Don't own or have fired a Henry, so would be interested in the comment about it's inablity to penetrate anything beyond short range. I know the Sharps and Springfield I have fired will blow holes though several inches of pine at 3-400 yeards (and damn accurite at that).

Dan

Hi

Oh, ya. The Sharpes and the springfield are, in my hand, capable of putting them all in the chest at 1300yds! But my background might not be typical.

So, we have an enlightened quartermaster who shifts the manufacturers to breach loaders at 5 times the costs, just that alone, consider. If the 61 army on both sides buy the breach loaders at 5 times the cost, how many units become smoothbore muskets?

If we go to repeaters at 10 to 15 times the cost, instead of muzzleloading rifled muskets and converted smoothbores, how many units become, again, 1842 smooth bore only?

Do you start using as a tactic trying to have special mass fire power units? Like artillery?

I don't think it meets the practical test.

To the geek part.

The first version we deal with in what we call the Henry/winchester mechanism, uses a toggle bolt closing the breach. This is actually quick and slick but weak. The later Centennial version had a huge breakage rate on rounds that still didn't quite approach the power of the 61/Minie standard load.

Anyway, the first Volcanic is super unreliable and, in essence, a failure.

The first popular version the henry is a rimfire 44 caliber weapon using 28 grains of powder. To compare:

The 1860 Colt in 44 uses 38 grains. The Dragoon is a 50grain load. The Walker is a 60 grain load. Now, the heavier dragoon loads aren't more effective than the 60 colt due to design losses. But the short version is that the Henry is inferior to a pistol round. Things like the Colt and Remington revolving rifles are much more powerful than the henry. The weakest, the Remington, only a few made, uses a 44 with 45 grains.

Thus, one would argue, that a sholder stocked long barreled remington revolving carbine would be as good a choice and not require the new tooling the Henry does.

The winchester that gets famous is a 44/40.

Even so, I would not use it on Deer or people beyond 100 yards and expect a clean kill.

And I LOVE mine.

Rocky

"The added side benefit that the Confederacy would have been unable to make or match the weapons was a bonus not understood by either."

This fact was well understood and discussed by the Rebel leadership. As well as the fact the Rebels could only produce 2" armor plate for ships vs 6+ for the Union, they couldn't produce a reliable steam engine, the couldn't produce 11 to 15" heavy artillery, etc.

Another factor in repeater (and machine gun production) for the North was ammo production and distribution. The army was afraid any wholesale switch to these high volume weapons would break the supply system. In WWI this fact proved true in late 1914. A supply and production technological breakthrough was required during that later war.

Rocky,

There was a lot of experimenting that went on regarding increasing the rate of fire. In almost all cases, it involved issuing the two (and sometimes four) flank companies with Sharps or Burnsides, etc. Although it was doable, the downside was ammunition supply. Easy enough when everyone has a single type round, like the Springfield or Enfield. In fact, the US Ordnance Department specifically downsized the rounds from .575 to true .570 so as to service both the >58 Springfield & the .577 Enfield. Same with the .54/.55 rounds. Increase the windage so as to service more weapons with a single round.

You see a similar approach in the Confederate ranks. Although some units might have a variety of weapons, they tried hard to limit them to the individual companies, or swapped weapons from one regiment to another so as to lessen the supply headaches that various types of ammunition created.

In the end, after Gettysburg, the AOP ditches all the multi-weapon units and goes with a straight .58/.577 for virtually all the regiments. In fact, it isn't until the Overland Campaign of 1864, that Federal armies are finally completely rifle-musket/rifle armed and smoothbores and rifled-muskets are relegated to rear-echelon & VRC units.

At Gettysburg, there were still more than 40 regiments carrying smoothbores into battle. Made for a paint in the patookas for the Ordnance trains.