"1814: lost because Bonaparte ''failed to communicate?''" Topic

Did Bony lose the 1814 campaign in France because he ''failed to communicate'', i.e. failed to communicate his plans to the various corps properly, failed to let his marshals in on his strategy? And was that why his marshals mutinied at Fontainebleau?

This, by the way, is the thesis given by Claudio Innocenti, the ''winner'' of the first ''Napoleonic Historical Society Prize'' for the ''best paper'' on Napoleonic History written by a cadet at West Point. link Although The N.H.S., confers on Claudio little status (West Point is clearly the body conferring cudos here, not the other way around), I was interested by the fact that he was put forward at least by his West Point history lecturer.

'The marshals were fed up with Napoleon's failure to communicate, and they betrayed him in order to stop the war' and ''Napoleon's miscommunications prevented the marshals under his direct command from winning decisive victories'', Claudio writes. Well, isn't that a bit thin? I confess to knowing next to nothing about this campaign, but mearly from looking at the initial dispositions and the looming Allied superiority in numbers, Bony's strategy had to be pretty reactive didn't it? And he seems to have done a great job.

What do you reckon?

I know it's been suggested that Napoleon lost the 1815 campaign because of poor communication. In particular, neither Ney at Quatre Bras nor Grouchy after Ligny were given much in the way of direction about what they were supposed to be accomplishing.

But I can't comment on 1814. As I recall, the marshals revolted because they recognized the situation was past retrieving and they didn't want to see France destroyed.

I think he got the award for a novel analysis of the facts, that doesn't mean he is correct!

well how does he support the assertions:
1. The Marechal's were fed up with his "failure to communicate" and that failure was what led them to "betray" him. [vice: a.just being tired of war after so many years b. the potential loss of all they had gained or c. the consequences of France being invaded and losing the war on French soil vs fighting in Germany or elsewhere.

2. That Napoleon's poor communication skills prevented Marechal's directly under his control from winning decisive victories.

Are they supported from research and interpretation of the records from those events?

rmcaras
''well how does he support the assertions:……Are they supported from research and interpretation of the records from those events?''

He has a biblioraphy. Here's the link if you want a look:
link

To me, the thesis just seemed a bit thin – elsewhere he seems to blame Bony for leaving Soult in the Pyrenees (where he was dealing with a British invasion!)

As for evidence, Claudio gives this example:
''Throughout the campaign, marshals commanding small corps were left to their own devices, while Napoleon was off elsewhere trying to achieve a decisive battle……Napoleon wanted to launch a frontal attack on the Prussians, while Marshal Edouard Mortier's 10,000-man Old Guard attacked the Prussian rear. Mortier's original orders from Napoleon, dated January 27, had him marching either southeast to Bar-sur-Aube or northeast to Vitry, depending on where the Old Guard was when the letter reached Mortier. While Napoleon was flexible with his orders and gave Mortier some latitude on which direction to go based on when the marshal received the order, this letter simply prevented a confused Mortier from marching to Brienne in time to attack the Prussian rear. When Napoleon finally did revise his orders and clearly specified that Mortier should come to Brienne, only one messenger was sent, and he was captured. Field Marshal Gebhardt von Blücher, the Prussian commander, extricated his men from the trap at Brienne, suffered only a minor defeat, and concentrated his forces away from Napoleon's main body. ''.

and this:
''the Army of Silesia was halted with Napoleon's army to its southwest and Macdonald's corps to its northwest. Napoleon, writing to Marmont, claimed that Macdonald was fighting his way east to Montmirail and would soon appear in the rear of the Prussian army there. Instead, Macdonald's isolated corps had to cut through Prussian forces just to reach Napoleon, and it could not arrive in time to cut off the retreating Prussians. As a result, Montmirail was simply another indecisive French victory: although Napoleon drove back two Allied corps, the Allies lost just 3,300 men while the French lost 2,100. Napoleon failed to make a conscious effort to instruct his subordinates on his plan of operations, but he still expected his marshals to do what he wanted without really telling them.''

Does he have a point or not?

As for the rebellion of his Marshals and them forcng peace, I would have thought the simplest reason, was that most thought that they were going to lose anyway.

Frankly, I always thought the threat of civil war was the chief reason the Marshals revolted. Head had rolled before and perhaps they might again if things got out of hand.

Napoleon's plan to abandon Paris and conduct operations against the Allied supply lines was nothing short of brilliant and probably would have worked to a certain extent -- this assumes public support for his cause of course (a rather huge assumption on my part).

mjc

I suggest reading "The Fall of Napoleon" by Michael Leggiere. It is a intimately detailed description of the opening of the 1814 campaign. Leggiere provides a sometimes tedious narrative describing the day by day maneuvers of the French and Allies. Central to Leggiere's thesis is that Napoleon failed to communicate his need for the marshals to delay the Allied advance in order to buy him time to reconstitute the army at Paris. Instead Marmont and the others undertook a weak delaying action, with the goal of preserving their meager forces rather than taking actions to frustrate the Allied advance. Of course since Napoleon designated no one as overall commander the marshals ego's prevented them from coordinating their actions.

Leggiere writes, "Equally at fault, the emperor attempted to implement from Paris a plan that required a confidence and a drive that his marshals had long lost. His demands required the marshals to exhibit an ardor and a diligence that quickly yielded to weariness, indifference and despair. Napoleon should have acknowledged this and assigned more authority to officers who still had reputations to gain such as Grouchy and Milhaud as opposed to the spent marshals, who increasingly felt they had nothing to gain and everything to lose."

"Napoleon assumed the subordinates whom he entrusted with independent command had gained sufficient knowledge for this awesome responsibility through experience. On many occasions, but particularly in 1813 and 1814 they proved him wrong.In the empires hour of need Napoleon's commanders demonstrated they had little understanding of his strategic and operational principles of war."

db

From my readings on the winter of 1813 and 1814 campaign I believe its a fair charge to state that Napoleon was fixated on what was immediately in front of him and felt that his detached commanders were only good for holding off the enemy till he could arrive to set matters right.

The loss of confidence road ran both ways. It's pretty clear that most of the Marchelate had lost Napoleon's confidence, and with some justification. Some of them really only were fit for high level command under his eye. Very few were capable of truly independent command, which isn't really a slam on them because only a few are ever born or made that way.

As for the mutiny: perhaps communication if you factor in how Napoleon dealt with everyone regardless of position, but I believe that those who have stated a war weariness and desire to see France not experience what they had seen elsewhere were the real motives.

A good question for discussion.

"Napoleon's plan to abandon Paris and conduct operations against the Allied supply lines was nothing short of brilliant and probably would have worked to a certain extent -- this assumes public support for his cause of course (a rather huge assumption on my part)."

It would have been a lot more brilliant if he had anticipated it a year and a half earlier, when it crippled the Grande Armee.

As a thesis it has some value; however, where I believe that it errs is in claiming that the lack of communication was the reason for the failure of the campaign. There were many reasons why the campaign failed (the odds were too long, France was exhausted and really only wanted peace, the Marshals had had enough, the recruits were too young and ill-equipped for the hardships of campaigning etc etc) and poor communication may well have been one of them but it was certainly not THE reason.

This thesis most persuasively demonstrates the historical tendency of historians to read current concerns and debates back into their analysis of everything which occurred before them.

"Command and control" is a modern bugbear: we could as easily pile up the victories of Napoleon which were due to the failure of his adversaries to properly organise their defence. Communication problems were as challenging for the Allies as for Napoleon--perhaps moreso for the Allies, since they had to coordinate amongst speakers of numerous different languages.

21eRegt 04 Nov 2009 8:37 p.m. PST
''… Napoleon was fixated on what was immediately in front of him and felt that his detached commanders were only good for holding off the enemy till he could arrive to set matters right.''

Micro-managing.
Wellington was the same: he said of one of his most trusted independant commanders: ''The best of [General] Hill, is that I always know where to find him'', which hardly suggests that Wellington expected initiative.

And to use a previous case, Messena had already proved himself a brillient commander in the Revolutionary Wars, even getting Bony out of a scrape or two. But as soon as he got blocked in Spain, Bony took him out. However, Bonaparte expected initiatve – certainly more than Wellington did. Too much 'communication' and Bony would end up stifling his commanders, as he did in Spain.

Could Bonaparte really have acted in any other way?

It seems that these days anybody who wants to make a name in historical circles needs to come up with a 'fresh' view – Hamilton-Williams, anybody?

For my money anything worthwhile has already been said, and when I was young I was always taught that given the circumstances Napoleon's 1814 campaign was one of his most brilliant. Of course to some people unless it's a resounding win it cannot be admired, but I very much doubt anybody else would have come nearly as close.

Old Bear
''For my money anything worthwhile has already been said,''

Cynical, OB? The Napoleonic Wars left so much writing behind – there's plenty of it left that hasn't been looked at properly and there's always room for more sifting of the myths. Look at Maida: always thought to have been decided by a firefight, now it seems it was a case of volley and charge.

I confess to a lot of cynicism when it comes to the current crop of historians. Undoubtedly the occasional piece of value may show up but frankly for me it will be so mired with all the guff that I doubt its veracity will stick.