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"Reconnaissance or "Who are you guys"" Topic


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431 hits since 2 Nov 2009
©1994-2009 Bill Armintrout
Comments or corrections?

darrenwalker9202 Nov 2009 6:37 p.m. PST

I have just started reading John Gill, Thunder on the Danube.

With the large amounts of light troops and light cavalry available it strikes me as odd the utter lack or good intelligence by either side. For the Austrians it could be explained somewhat by the astonishing (or not) lack of vigor shown by many of their commander. Certainly the French cope much better, have better intelligence and a willingness to come to grips with the enemy, superior low level tactics when fighting where both sides are (at least partially) blind.

I would be interested in other peoples experiences / readings in regard to general level of military intelligence in the major campaigns.

malcolmmccallum Supporting Member of TMP02 Nov 2009 6:42 p.m. PST

Wouldn't it be the case that if both sides effectively used their light troops, then both sides would be operating nearly blind since it was as much the role of light troops to screen as it was to reconaissance?

Personal logo Der Alte Fritz Supporting Member of TMP02 Nov 2009 9:18 p.m. PST

I've been reading the Gill books. Finished the first one and have just started the second one following the campaign from Regenburg to Aspern-Essling.

I find that you really need to have a map in front of you when you read Gill, as he goes into a lot of detail on the movement of various troops, making it hard to keep up with what is going on. If I'm that confused, think how difficult it was for the French and Austrians.

Try reading Arnold's books for a better overview, then go back and read the Gill books for the details. At least that is my strategy.

Theword02 Nov 2009 10:25 p.m. PST

Remember there's a huge difference between intelligence and information.

The chances of the recon guys of the day seeing much more than a few units before they themselves were spotted was probably low. Therefore someone has to take that "information" and turn it into "intelligence".

Intelligence (note the capital I) as we know it today just didn't exist back then. So not only did you have the issue of very slow communications (i.e. someone having to ride firstly to a div/corps/army commander possibly in that order), but you had to actually get it to a commander who knew enough about the enemy (information) to actually understand what it meant (intelligence).

We're spoiled these days to have trained personnel to carry out that function.

Cheers,

TW.

malcolmmccallum Supporting Member of TMP02 Nov 2009 10:42 p.m. PST

Generally true but reading de Brack's Light Cavalry manual, there is a pretty thorough section given to interpreting and reporting what is seen, including how to count campfires and ways to determine if they are false or true, how to question prisoners, how to employ local guides and spies, instructions on field map making, interpreting footprints, how to read reflections from weapons (very bright they face you, dim they face away), determining if the enemy is trying to hide its strength or trying to effect greater numbers, tips on how to inerptret the actions of cossacks (if they attack at night it is to try to stop you from sleeping rather than trying to break through). He talks about such things as, if Russian or Prussians send patrols out in the same direction over several days they are certainly about to march that way.

nsolomon9903 Nov 2009 1:18 a.m. PST

With specific reference to the early Bavarian phase of the 1809 Campaign can I say that the ground is very difficult. I spent several days driving around the area in 1998 and was astonished at the density of the forest everywhere through that part of Bavaria and the sparesness of the road network. It would not have been easy to (a) conduct reconnaissance and then (b) turn the data into intelligence.

hos45903 Nov 2009 3:03 a.m. PST

Besides the ability to analyze dats there is the level of 'actionability' of even the best data.

A report that a given enemy is at X has a half-life of usability. The decision to act on that data may be taken at least a few and upto 24 or 48 hours of that point in time. Is it still true? Is it still actionable?

Daryl.

malcolmmccallum Supporting Member of TMP03 Nov 2009 3:26 a.m. PST

When player's in my campaign complained about the lack of intelligence in 'adjacent' towns (one day's march away) I would do this little exercise:

1> Imagine a small town approximately 20km away from you.
2> Is there a stadium full of people gathered there?
3> Right, imagine telling someone to bicycle off to that point, seeing if there is an army there, and waiting for them to return to tell you what he saw.
4> How close would he have to get his bicycle to see a stadium full of people?

Sending piquets up the road to scout seems so easy until real land and distance and time starts getting factored in. Yes, thousands of soldiers are always out there doing their scouting jobs but even putting out piquets 10km-20km in all directions involves real men travelling real distances, riding back and forth, perhaps trying to keep up with the army's movements while doing so and still having to meanwhile find food for themselves and their horses and navigate and sleep.

A cavalry screen isn't, I don't think, best envisioned as a circle surrounding each army element. Its not radar. You only see what someone has specifically spent a day trying to see with a not inconsiderable amount of resources.

Personal logo Martin Rapier Supporting Member of TMP03 Nov 2009 3:34 a.m. PST

Commanders were being surprised by the presence or absence of huge bodies of troops well into the twentieth century. The lethargy of the French cavalry in 1914 has been well documented, and it is a complete mystery how the Prussian Army managed to lose contact with Benedeks 250,000 men on the road to Koeniggratz in 1866.

terry195603 Nov 2009 3:35 a.m. PST

hi, sorry statements like reports not being used for Intelligence are wrong. Napoleon had a large index file chest that was used to collate intelligence to assist in analysis of enemy formations etc. this also included any further information on enemy commanders. This chest can be seen in paris in the napoleonic section of the miltary museum.
Now thats Intelligence.
terry

Personal logo Martin Rapier Supporting Member of TMP03 Nov 2009 7:24 a.m. PST

In war everything is simple, but the simple things are very hard.

Like finding out where the enemy is, and in the more extreme cases, where your own troops are as well.

Cacadores In the TMP Dawghouse03 Nov 2009 12:41 p.m. PST

terry1956 03 Nov 2009 3:35 a.m. PST
''hi, sorry statements like reports not being used for Intelligence are wrong. Napoleon had a large index file chest that was used to collate intelligence to assist in analysis of enemy formations etc. this also included any further information on enemy commanders. This chest can be seen in paris in the napoleonic section of the miltary museum.
Now thats Intelligence.
terry''

Didn't help him much in Spain, though, did it? He lost Moore twice and in the end gave up.

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