"how do you model Russian tanks with no radio" Topic

How do you model Russian tanks with no radios, Maneouver Group does this rather crudely by not allowing the command element to hand on commands to elements below platoon if they are more than 60m appart. This is very crude and would not seem not all that representative. However what would be representative? For instance the Russians are always taken to task abaut shooting on the move. However with no radios: if one tanks stops to shoot it could easily be left behind while the others get round to noticeing its stopped. So what are the real limitations of no radios in yanks below platoon leaders,and how do you model them? Needless to say this level of complexity is not in the rules but it helps to understand hisory.

It was noted by another book that the Italians who were in the same situation, that if the Platoon commander issued "Follow Me" orders chaos followed if he was taken out.

I just don't stick an aerial on them

The physical modelling is easy, as the Cardinal says. From what I understand the tanks had everything bar the actual radio and aerial – even the holder for the aerial.

The rules are a different thing.

Needing to stay close, and perhaps do more or less the same thing as the commander, and added confusion if the commander is out of action?
Needing line of sight to the commander tanks flags to be able to function more or less properly?

The 'crudity' is dependent on how much time end energy you want to spend on each tank. How much should this bog down the game?

Depends what scale you're representing.
You could say that the lowest level of granularity for taking orders was the company.
So you have 10 tanks which have to drive round in a big mob.

How do orders work in whatever system you're talking about?
If you have modes then only the company commander can initiate change to mode.

Just kust making it harder to turn is another thing to consider.
Perhaps your unit can turn at the start of it's move only. Excluding conforming to terrain etc etc.

Loss of the commander probably ought to make the activities of his subordinates somewhat random. Not a popular mechanic for the owning player though.

I would presume that the tank commanders would need to spend a quite lot of attention at following the actions of the platoon leader, meaning less time to look for enemy. Also the platoon leader will need to spend time and effort in giving the signs and checking that he is being followed.

So if the rules feature some sort of spotting rules, I would give the Soviet tankers an additional penalty to spotting while on the move.

"how do you model them"

In the sorts of Eastern Front games I play (grand tactical, operational) I usually downgrade the tactical efficiency of tank units with these sorts of problems, but it is just one factor among a host of other things.

In a 1:1 tactical game, then the same approach as for WW1 tanks (who didn't have radios either) – have a plan, a clear chain of command if the HQ tank is knocked out and then 'follow me' based on the signal flag commands. How you model it in a game depends on how many player you've got, how many vehicles and how much of a role play it is. My regulars are generally fairly gentlemanly, and if presented with a buttoned up radioless tank with orders to 'advance' and no way to countermand it will happily continue to advance it to its doom while laughing along the way. If faced with a halted, buttoned up radioless tank, they will have to present me with some plausible method of communicating with it (like hammering on the turret with a rifle butt until the comamnder opens the hatch, or standing in front of it waving).

It will depend on scale you play at but no matter the scale one easy fix is that each element, whether it is a single tank, platoon or company must spot targets for themselves. Unlike some rules where once a unit is spotted all elements may fire on it without radios each element must spot for themselves.

For 1:1, use part of the Crossfire C&C rules. Tanks from a platoon, or perhaps a company, cannot make a move unless they begin their move with a clear LOS to the command tank. They must also end their move in clear LOS of the command tank.

This can really make small formations a PITA to coordinate.

Also, if you use spotting rules, radio equipped tanks are able to see spots made by others, while non-radio equipped tanks must all make the spotting roll successfully if they wish to fire. Like Marc suggests.
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Tim

cannot make a move unless they begin their move with a clear LOS to the command tank

Couldn't they follow the lead of other tanks in their group if they could see the ones in sight stop or move? They might be several seconds behind in responding. They would assume the others have LOS to the commander.

So depending on how tactical your game is. Within a minute or two all (most) tanks in a group would be following the same orders. Radio or not. So LOS to command element shouldn't be an issue. That all tanks move as a unit is a better model. They just can't be going off on their own mission without a radio.

I'm away from my books but my memory of the flag signalling is that it's pretty basic – consisting of about three commands.

Deploy into line.
Advance
Engage the enemy.

That may not be 100% accurate but it captures the flavour.

Unfortunately the flag commands were deleted from the 1944 Instructions for Tank Troops, the only definite source I have in print, as there were sufficient radios by then not to need them.

Making some educated guesses if out of comms they'd attempt to fulfil their mission. In the absence of anything definite they'd probably form on the furthest forward unit – this last is SOP for the Red Army whatever your arm of service.

Arc of Fire has it so the tanks must always remain in line of sight of the command tank as well. It makes it somewhat tricky to run them sometimes.

"flag signalling is that it's pretty basic – consisting of about three commands."

My recollection for WW1 tanks is that there were two more – 'follow me', and 'broken down' !

You don't need any more commands than deploy, advance, engage as in pre-battle formation the Russian tanks would be in column following the leader. The key command decision is forming line then initiating the assault. They would also have a plan or SOP beforehand.

The CF command rule is a game mechanism, but it is very simple to use in play, and produces annoyingly realistic outcomes. Trying to command a platoon of tanks where they have to start and end their move in LOS of the CO is really quite challenging in any sort of semi-congested terrain.

If you want really simple modeling, make the basic maneuver unit for the Soviets the company, instead of the platoon. Makes them less flexible with very few rules added.
-Kle.

Maneuvering a tank platoon or tank company in formation, and engaging targets designated by fire by the commanders, without radios or under radio listening silence, is far from the disadvantage that wargamers assume that it is.

Allen

where they have to start and end their move in LOS of the CO is really quite challenging in any sort of semi-congested terrain.

And in my opinion quite gamey. Supposing each tank unit in the company is constantly watching what's going on with the command tank. I can't buy that. If a visual order is given and missed by a tank he will just do what the others are doing. As Russians probably should be run as companies there are plenty of other tanks to take clues from.

Mid war non-command Russian tanks were issued receiving radios so they could at least hear the command orders.

Even German tanks with radios often did not use them or used them for very short messages so as not to give away their position or situation.

In one case a German tank which had its gun damaged sent a brief message to its command tank out of sight that it had "nothing to lock". In case Russians were listening.

If the platoon leader is buttoned up the subordinate tanks must follow the leader – taking a parallel path to the leader's and remaining within 100 m of their command tank. They can only shoot at what the command tank shoots at unless they are in or about to be in a melee with other clearly visible enemy tanks. If the leader and subordinates are unbuttoned and the leader does not direct fire or fire himself (in the case of one or two-man turrets) then he can direct independent movement and fire from subordinate vehicles so long as they remain within 100 m distance of the leader at the start of their movement.
Rod Robertson.

Oh come on – the communications in WWI were quite inventive and could be used by the Russians. Check this photo:

picture

I regularly make the Russian tanks make a morale test to do anything if the command tank is dead. You could institute a table for each tank to roll on if the command tank is destroyed something like:

1. Tank continues to follow last order – attack, advance, hold, etc.

2. Tank continues to follow last order unless fired upon – if fired upon – halt and return fire.

3. Tank moves forward at full speed to get in close with the enemy to assault them if ordered to attack, may fire on the move with all guns, otherwise halt and fire upon closest visible enemy model.

4. Tank halts and unbuttons to check to see where command tank is and moves toward command tank to check out whether the commander is alive or dead.

5. Tank halts and does nothing.

6. Tank retreats a full normal move toward last known position of high command. May be halted by Battalion command, Kommissar, or higher command level within 6 inches.

Two man turrets further complicate the matter. If the tank is firing the commander is too busy with shooting the gun to see any signals or friendly movement.

Since neither Russian tanks nor British squads have radios they should naturally be operated the same way.
Regularly make the British squad make a morale test to do anything if the platoon/company command element is dead. You could institute a table for each squad to roll a D6 on if the command element is destroyed something like:

1. Squad continues to follow last order – attack, advance, hold, etc.
2. Squad continues to follow last order unless fired upon – if fired upon – halt and return fire.
3. Squad advances forward at full march to get in close with the enemy to assault them if ordered to attack, may fire on the move with all arms, otherwise halt and fire upon closest visible enemy infantry.
4. Squad halts and sends runners to check to see where command element is and moves toward command element to check out whether the commander is alive or dead.
5. Squad halts and brews tea.
6. Squad retreats a full normal move toward last known position of higher command. May be halted by Battalion command, highest command or, Lord Mountbatten within 6 inches.
:-)

Just curious: how many tankers here? Two, that I know of.

I've spent an awful lot of time in decades past teaching US tankers and mech infantrymen to operate in Soviet tactical formations, relying on flag signals and SOP instead of radios. And I've done it myself. And "died" a few times doing it, as well.

Drivers have the primary responsibility for keeping formation, as well selecting the route for their own vehicles. It's not hard, with minimal training. Commanders and gunners focus on the direct fire fight. The company commander has far less to do than his Western counterpart: he doesn't have to herd cats; everyone just follows his lead and knows their place.

Laser engagement simulators aren't real weapons, but it's not possible for me to count any more the times I've observed "Soviet" tactical formations overwhelm "Western" ones in training, using the simplest command and control mechanisms--and initiative. Rarely have these been with optimal correlations of forces, either: far more often at 1:1 than 3:1 or more.

Since, oh, about 1977, when I first started to play with this sort of thing using real tanks, I've come to the conclusion that if I had to go do this for real, I'd rather have a "Soviet"-style tank company under my command than another, all other things (liek equipment capability) being equal. You can concentrate combat power far more effectively with it than with decentralized Western tactics.

It's worth looking at maneuver during the First Gulf War to see how US tankers actually fought in the desert, when push came to shove. It looked a whole lot more "Soviet" than what the Iraqis were able to carry out--not only at the operational level (which was "new" to us), but at the tactical, small-unit level as well.

Maybe it's time to lose this old myth. Look at accounts like Dmitri Loza's, or any of a number of excellent Soviet tankists' memoirs on line, and see what they truly did. We don't give the Soviets credit for tactical initiative, because we're still stuck in the self-serving lies the Germans we hired to write the history told us.

Allen

"Maybe it's time to lose this old myth. (…) We don't give the Soviets credit for tactical initiative, because we're still stuck in the self-serving lies the Germans we hired to write the history told us"

Amen. To the extent that the U.S. Army/NATO tried to draw conclusions from the Eastern Front, we should have paid a lot more attention to the victors' accounts of the battles, rather than the losers.

But, to be fair, since it was the losers who were integrated lickety-split into NATO command structure, and it was the losers who wrote all of the detailed memoirs which were translated, it was through their eyes that we saw the Eastern Front. And the post-war Soviet accounts were not exactly thorough and objective, either.

The irony is that exactly now, after there has been sufficient time to absorb the various memoirs and what's come out of Soviet archives, the paradigm of modern warfare has changed from tank-centric high intensity combat to counterinsurgency warfare, so nobody cares to reexamine the eastern front.

And in my opinion quite gamey.

In the context of Crossfire, it's not at all gamey and makes perfect sense. It also matches my own military experience quite well, actually, at the platoon level as a platoon leader. It was also very intuitive for military personnel for whom I ran a wargame as a TEWT.

Supposing each tank unit in the company is constantly watching what's going on with the command tank. I can't buy that.

It's very true – if you can't buy that, then I have to tell you this makes perfect sense to me. It's what we did, even when there was no radio silence – in any operation that has a radio frequency set at the company level with no freqs at the platoon level (an absolute luxury) it's very difficult to get an word in edge wise for controlling your call signs. There's just too many people wanting to transmit, so hand signals are a vital part of, any manouvring.

Here's an example I've told here before of what happens when your junior call signs do NOT watch what you are doing – on one very long exercise, my platoon (4 tanks in two fire teams, me – 21 – and 21B in one and 21A and 21C in the other) had been in a supporting position for some time and had been given the order to carry on advancing. I signaled for the other team to begin moving forward. The junior commander, 21C, shrugged helplessly as the vehicle he took his cue from, 21A, didn't move. I waved and yelled myself hoarse and got no reaction from 21A. Worried, I jockeyed back from fire position and scooted over to his vehicle and parked behind it and yelled some more. Still no answer. I finally threw a thunderflash onto his turret rough and up the crew popped in the hatches wiping their eyes – they'd fallen asleep.

I was getting run roughshod over on the radio for not moving and it was because one of my call signs was not looking at me.

You've got your arcs to cover, yes, but also must keep your eye on the commander as well. There's a lot to learn as a tank commander while a soldier learns this stuff gradually, it's murder on an officer candidate who is expected to learn how to do everything before he arrives at his first platoon – the Canadian armour officer course had a 40% failure rate in the 80s. You have to keep your eye on everything and if you ignore your commander, your head will be ripped off.
--
Tim

Allen, in all fairness, you were obviously part of the enemy force at that fantastic training ground US battalions went to – NTC, right? But your OPFOR guys were legendary, even to us. I have to respectfully disagree with this statement:

Drivers have the primary responsibility for keeping formation, as well selecting the route for their own vehicles. It's not hard, with minimal training.

I don't know about regular US units, but our "slate" changed every year. New drivers, new commanders, or at least different crews. A driver who could perform what you describe was usually an experienced soldier. A crew commander who did not have to describe the best route to the next position because his driver could pick it out was very lucky. It takes a while to gel like that and some people designated as drivers have no talent for it.

And I know I'm not talking out my rear, because I worked with quite a few units from the US on exercise in Canada (including the For KNox training battalion or they called themselves a Squadron even though they were not cavalry – a captain Dana was the CO, this was in 1989) and in Germany at Hohenfels and the German country side. And these folks all had similar issues to us. It was from these guys that I heard the whispered horror stories of how the OPFOR guys like you at the NTC usually chopped them into little bits in the first go round.
--
Tim

"A crew commander who did not have to describe the best route to the next position because his driver could pick it out was very lucky."

Was part of this that the TC was looking at the world from about 2 feet higher elevation than the driver, and could therefore read the terrain better?

"It was from these guys that I heard the whispered horror stories of how the OPFOR guys like you at the NTC usually chopped them into little bits in the first go round."

I have heard of the generally much better performance of OPFOR at NTC, and it makes sense, with their built-in advantages. It's good for training though, if units frequently (not always) get beat up by OPFOR at first, it gets their attention and makes them try harder.

As GM, I had a lot of fun setting up that problem for the Russians in a couple of online games I ran. The company commander could only radio his platoon leaders (non-player characters), who could receive but not send. And he could only communicate with other tanks (below platoon leader) via signal flag. When using those he was limited to a small number of pre-arranged signals, which the tank it was intended for might or might not notice, depending on how busy he was at the moment! It made for a very unwieldy mass of tanks. Meanwhile, the Germans had transceivers in every panzer.

Actually, I started providing the OPFOR for testing the M60A3 (TTS) with our ordinary US M60A1 tank company, at Knox. But we had a couple of days' training in Soviet formations and flag signals and were able to successfully use them in both day and night exercises. Well, there was "one* ditch at night…

Then at Hood, with TMPer Col (Ret.) Bill Gray, we put together the training program for the then-brand-new OPFOR at the NTC. We went out, trained them, and they began their reign of terror over the Mojave Desert from '81 to… about '01, when things changed, finally. In various jobs afte that, I sorta "watched over" them and made sure they were doing things right, both at the NTC and at Hohenfels. There are a number of TMPers who *were* OPFOR fighting crewmen at the NTC; they may have some stories.

There was also the operational test of the "Sergeant York" DIVAD, where I got to run about a motorized rifle battalion's worth of OPFOR (from the CDEC Armor Company at Ft. Hunter-Liggett, CA) up and down the California Central Coast valleys.

Yes, the NTC OPFOR had decided advantages in knowledge of the terrain and simple practice. The CDEC OPFOR had their own institutional knowledge of the terrain and the instrumentation.

But I have to argue with you on driver proficiency. It sounds like the Canadians were much like the US; we took pretty low aptitude folks as tank drivers; and when *I* was a platoon leader, just post-Vietnam, it was probably as bad as it got. In my case, I was extremely fortunate to have a platoon in a company that had enlisted together and gone through basic armor training together, just before the unit was re-activated--much like a COHORT unit: so by the time I got to them, all my drivers were buck sergeants, and the unit had fantastic cohesion.

But the Soviets were a little different. The driver-mechanic was *the* technical specialist on the tank. He usually was selected because he had expertise on motor vehicles already, and probably what we'd call today high aptitude scores: in short, a bright young fellow (or lass).

Look through Soviet narratives: just like in my platoon, you'll find sergeants as tank drivers. Oh sure, not in every case, with replacement drafts and newly-formed units. But the Soviet system depended on that position, especially, for technical competence. So I wouldn't discount Soviet drivers' ability to read and navigate the terrain, especially with a little exerience under their belts.

How much field time did you get in a Canadian armored unit, Tim? I know we got very little at Knox. I'd guess a Soviet crew or unit with two weeks in the field would have had more time than we did in a year.

And yes, the TC's perspective is much better than the driver's. But I still maintain that it doesn't take long for a driver to learn to keep station in the formation and still select his route. Bob Henry, you have both BMP and BRDM experience, I believ. What do *you* think?

Allen

You might want to peruse this previous thread about radios in games:

TMP link

There's another dynamic, as well. Everybody knows, I assume, that in modern combat, only a relatively few individuals are truly lethal; many provide fairly ineffective fires, or are just "there", maybe keeping their heads down.

It's the same thing with vehicle crews, and it's well documented in the U.S. Army's training environment, where we've accumulated massive amounts of data from instrumented exercises. There are "killer" crews who simply put do most of the killing.

In WWII, these were "Panzer aces" and "Heroes of the Soviet Union" on the Eastern Front. We pay a lot of attention to the German tankers, of course. In a Soviet formation, like anybody else's, it was not essential that every vehicle and every crew be perfectly effective; what *was* important was that the "killers" got into the close-range knife fight, where they could do the most damage. These were the crews who would take the initiative to actively find and destroy the enemy. You could say the same about American or British or Italian crews, too; but this factor is often overlooked in modeling the RKKA. (Enter the FoW Hero!-- a rara avis in the Soviet lists…)

Allen

"You might want to peruse this previous thread about radios in games…"

That was sufficiently vitriolic that I had stayed away from it. There were some good points made, though.

I would still maintain that radios are not essential to effective control of a maneuver formation. In fact, they can be detrimental, as once you learn to depend on them, you are dependent on them. Do anyone's gaming rules provide for an individual tank, properly netted-in to the unit radio frequencies, being *out* of control? I bet not. But I assure you it happens all the time. That's when tanks "freeze": when they can't raise someone on the radio to tell them what to do next.

But go into battle *knowing* you don't have radios; but with a plan, clearly communicated to every trooper so that each one knows the commander's intent; with alternative, effective means of control; and adequate training: it can be a frighteningly awesome thing to experience.

Allen

My understanding was that Soviet radioless tanks (only up until about 1943….) would "simply" follow the order they were given.

they would form up befroe an attack in a given formation, be told where to dorve to and what they could stop to shoot at (or not to stop) and they would do that.

flags would be used for last minute deployment changes, or post attack redeployments ("Come here") etc, rather than during any actual attack or combat.

If the attack was successful then the commanders would hold an o-group to figure out where to regroup to, etc.

If the attack was not successful then most of them would be destroyed so no bother there either.

I would still maintain that radios are not essential to effective control of a maneuver formation. In fact, they can be detrimental, as once you learn to depend on them, you are dependent on them. Do anyone's gaming rules provide for an individual tank, properly netted-in to the unit radio frequencies, being *out* of control? I bet not. But I assure you it happens all the time. That's when tanks "freeze": when they can't raise someone on the radio to tell them what to do next.

However, the Germans never said, "We have radios in all of the tanks, but they're breeding dependency. Let's get rid of them."

If anyone is interested, you can find the 1944 Combat Regulations for Tank and Mechanized Troops in print; the volume for the battalion/regiment/brigade level has been translated into English. I don't think the platoon/company has.

A review of those would make a lot of this a great deal more clear.

Allen

I would like to tank folk for their contributions to this thread it has beem most thought provoking, particularly about the relative ease of command and control with no radio.

The "Book" always says tanks should not be used in "Penny packets".

That being the case then with a Phd in hidsight ;-), there would not be that much room for extreeme cleverness anyway in an attack. In a relatively small space, watching what the bulk of the crowd do if your PC gets taken out is reasonable.

My final thought is that the rules for no radio we use may be too severe rather than not severe enough. That in itself is real food for thought.

Like the rest of technology generally it is helpful but not of itself a war winner.

Thanks

I've also been told that post war the Soviet's expected to be on a battlefield where radio communication was next to impossible due tio jamming etc.

And they intended to do just that to us.

"Do anyone's gaming rules provide for an individual tank, properly netted-in to the unit radio frequencies, being *out* of control? I bet not. But I assure you it happens all the time."

That is one of the problems really. As wargamers we are used to 'telling' units what to do, so perhaps over emphasise any problems to do with lack of comms. Things like SOP and having a decent plan require more effort to model, so we tend to underestimate the effectiveness of formations which can do that well.

I took part in an interesting multi-player game in the summer modelling the activities of a half squadron of Churchills (thanks John D Salt!). Like a multi player version of Pattons Best. My troop organised a plan with our infantry beforehand and we didn't touch the radios throughout the entire op apart from the intercoms in the tanks themselves. The other troop, well, lets say that radio comms aren't necessarily all they are cracked up to be in the absence of any sort of plan at all.

Maneuvering a tank platoon or tank company in formation, and engaging targets designated by fire by the commanders, without radios or under radio listening silence, is far from the disadvantage that wargamers assume that it is.

Well, the Soviets did pretty well IRL, too.
-Kle.

"In a relatively small space…"

A key point that I forgot to mention. The offensive frontage for a tank *brigade* was 1000-1500m, as prescribed by the 1944 combat regulations. Nowadays, that's perhaps a company. There was no problem figurung out where everyone else was going!

"I've also been told that post war the Soviet's expected to be on a battlefield where radio communication was next to impossible due tio jamming etc."

Almost immediately postwar arose the assumption that combat would be taking place under nuclear conditions. Solid-state radios wouldn't be working. Tube radios still could. Now who had what type, again?

Allen

Even now tank companies may not be that spread out. I am only an armchair general so can only draw on official data but. The write up from global secutity on best tank tactics says that tanks with an alternate position 75yds appart dis better than those 50 yds appart. However with two alternates close this only gives about 150 to 250 yds between tanks. Tw3o alternates is as far as Ican se a dream 1 alternate is more likely so frontage is more like 100 to 150 yds. So a tank company (say 10 tanks) takes about 1 to 1.5 km just about fits on a 4 ft board for 12mm tanks at 1mm = 1m. As the attackers dont want to be shot by too many enemy they will need more tanks (but not lots more) in about the same area.

Given that command and control may not be too bad lots of tanks and lots of targets. Fought a few battles like that, probably more realistic than my typical battles with fewer tanks supporting infantrty.

The next question is are radios more important at the FEB where there is much less kit doing the screeing job?

"Since neither Russian tanks nor British squads have radios they should naturally be operated the same way." -- an early contender for most amusing comment of November! I almost sprayed my monitor with tea.

I'm certainly not a tanker, but I think it would be a pretty poor officer (or XO, anyway?) who didn't train the squadron on what to do if he is rendered _hors de combat_.

See para 49:

link

By the way, what is strictly forbidden in para 50, I've received in the U.S. Army as a FRAGO!

Allen

Ooooh, that looks interesting. Bit of a steep price though!

Having read

link

(which you have to read with a moderate level of 'Devils Advocate' in mind). The book is pretty unique in being the recollections of the Crewmen themselves. A few things to note….

The second in command of the Tank was the Driver. The Driver usually picked the spot to shoot from (while the TC was laying the shot). The commands were simply 'Drive where I drive, shoot at what I shoot at' by the platoon commander.

If the platoon commander's tank was taken out (but the crew survived), then the platoon commander would grab any tank available, and order the old crew to guard the knocked out tank.

If the Platton Commander was injured/killed, then either of two things happened. Another Platoon Commander would take over the remaining Tanks and merge both Platoons, or the second most experienced Crew would assume the platoon command. There would be very little instances of 'leaderless' Russan Tanks following the last orders received like an automaton.

The platoon didn't disperse like Western Forces might have done.

The Crews were a lot more flexible than 'experts' give them credit for. The 'go where I go' was usually issued due to the fact the crews were new (to give you an idea, acceptable losses in tanks were 2/3rds for a new unit assaulting an objective.) Although a lot of thaks were KO'd, from the accounts a lot of crews survived an engangement (or part of the crews). Ranks within the battalion were simply issued on time served in a Tank crew (it seems). As tanks were knocked out from the battalion, the newer crew were sent back for replacement Tanks (or if Tanks weren't available, sent to new units).

As the Battallon suffered Tank losses, then the ratio of experienced Crews would go up. When the Battalion was judged to be no longer effective, the remaining crews and Tanks were dispersed to new units (a bit like some of the Union Infantry Regts in the ACW). Of course there were exceptions (like the Guards Units), to this 'use it till its broken' organisation.
However this 'ad hoc' command structure in itself did lead to units command structures being flexible and used to change.

Battalion Commanders had the Radio, and used flags to communicate to the platoon commanders.

How to model?

Battalion commander has a TC with flags, Platoon commanders have the TC. Everyone else is buttoned up.

…well its simple

BTW the book also tells you the favorite tricks used by Crews to get your Tank knocked out and survive. A hit to the left side of the Tank would usually mean some questions asked…..

But I have to argue with you on driver proficiency. It sounds like the Canadians were much like the US; we took pretty low aptitude folks as tank drivers

No, I don't think so. The standard practice for all armoured regiments (all four of them in the regular force! ) was that new recruits would go through basic training. 13 weeks, I believe. From there, they would be parcelled off to infantry armour, air force, navy, supply tech, etc, etc. The armour regiment would receive about 40 brand new guys at a time, usually at the end of a Summer.

The unit would then run a basic crewman course – I was course officer overseeing one of these (of course, the NCOs did all the heavy lifting compared to a lieutenant with just over a year at his regiment) – of about 2.5 months. Drill, regimental history – I made damn sure my guys could sing the regimental song at the drop of a hat – I'm a soldier in the Queen's army, I'm a galloping 8th Hussar! (yes, it was a really gay song and the guys always looked embarrassed when they sang it – to my delight), small arms training (SMG, GPMG, grenades, LAW, Carl Gustav), driving course to qualify as a driver for Iltis (think jeep), 5/4 ton and 2.5 ton truck (culminating in a very long convoy trip) and basic infantry section tactics and field craft. The crescendo would be a very rough field exercise (which I orchestrated – it felt strangely like being a dungeon master).

After this course, the graduates would be divided up and half sent on a driver course (for the LAV thing we operated) and the other half on a gunnery course. These were about 4-6 weeks, I think, or maybe just 2. Hmmmm, I did run a driver course shortly after my crewman's course but I honestly can't remember how long it was.

But as far as I know, there was no evaluation of aptitude as to who went where. The goal was to have a crewman "cross trained", ie qualified gunner and qualified driver within a year or two.

Getting back to the driver's skill – as I said before, the slate changed every year. An experienced driver was rare in my time in my regiment, but thinking back, I think much of that was simply because my regiment had most of its skilled soldiers skimmed off before I arrived because the regiment in Germany (I served in Germany, but my regiment was based in Petawawa with the Special Service Force) had expanded by a squadron (company) so we really had very few experienced drivers.

A driver does indeed learn to do the things you describe, but in my experience, which wasn't as long as yours (I became diabetic in my third year with the regiment and that ended my armour career in the field at least) of course, that does take a while. In my second year my driver for a little while was a 17 year old kid that didn't even have his civilian driver's licence. That lead to some pretty white knuckle experiences in the commander's hatch with our very top heavy wobbly LAVs!

But I have worked with experienced drivers and even amongst these, there are some that shine above others. Part of the crew commander's appreciation we train our CCs to do while they are in a fire position to figure out their next destination and best route (driver can't usually see anything except the ground in front of him as the vehicle is going to be in a hull down position) and describe it to the driver. I remember one driver who didn't require anything but that and I could trust him to pick the absolute best covered route and you'd be guaranteed that you didn't have to worry about him turning broadside to the axis of advance – when we came under fire, he could almost instinctively know exactly where to dash to.

But drivers like this were rare in my experience. Again, my years in the regiment were with young soldiers. In fact, I prided myself in that at 22 when I came to Petawawa, that I was older than most of my troop's (platoon) troopers (privates) except for one who was the same age as I was. All through RMC and armour school, we were told that as an officer, your platoon's soldiers would probably be mostly older than you, which would be one more obstacle in addition to all the usual baggage that your stereotypical dopey new 2nd lieutenant carries that makes his soldiers' eyes roll. It didn't matter, but for some reason, it gave me a bit more confidence in those early first days at my unit.

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Tim

Better communication helps a force operate at a faster tempo than its opponent. There aren't many rules that attempt to model that.

Better communication helps a force operate at a faster tempo than its opponent. There aren't many rules that attempt to model that.

Interesting idea. How would you do that? Let them move farther in a turn? give them an extra movement phase within a turn? what?

Tim, I'm surprised that you had so many young guys. The only Canadian regiment I trained with was 21 RBC, just back from Cyprus (no tanks!) in 1978; a squadron visited us at Knox, and we trained them on M60A1s to act as the OPFOR for our sister mech battalion's ARTEP. They seemed a bit older. Man, you could tell they were used to light armored cars and Jeeps; they put the pedal to the metal on our tanks.

I don't see a correlation between communications and the tempo of operations. Good communicastions helps you redirect a plan in the middle when it's gone pear-shaped, but it doesn't let you move any faster.

Allen

There aren't many rules that attempt to model that.

Our rules (Maneouver Group) go some way (which is how this thread started). Not ideal for no radio tanks, but probably not as bad as I thought.

Great discussion.

aecurtis wrote:

I don't see a correlation between communications and the tempo of operations. Good communicastions helps you redirect a plan in the middle when it's gone pear-shaped, but it doesn't let you move any faster.

Probably best if you don't mention that in the presence of some of the more excitable enthusiasts for NCW/NEC, who may feel the urge to have you burnt as a heretic.

Although "increased operational tempo" (which is not technically the same thing as moving faster, but never mind that now) has long been one of the claims made for digitization of the battlespace, any actual evidence of this is quite hard to come by. I can see an argument that, if you can redirect pear-shaped plans on the fly, then you might be able to get away with less lengthy planning before crossing the start-line in the first place. I suspect, on the other hand, that what will happen in practice is that the improved comms are used to involve more and more widely-dispersed "stakeholders" in the preparation of the plan, thus resulting in the op order not quite being ready when it is time to start the operation.

As I'm sure aecurtis knows better than most, the real masters of operational tempo (a term invented by Tukhachevsky, I think) were the Russians, who would spend an awful long time a-planning, but, once they got going, went like the clappers.

All the best,

John.

Isn't "operational tempo" what "blitzkrieg" was all about?

Yes, at least to some extent, but what Blitzkrieg was really about was to advance faster than the defenders could react at a Grand-tactical level. The individual company-sized encounters would be a different story, but if you can't get the company or battalion into contact with the enemy it really doesn't matter that your company can stop the enemy *once you get into contact*. The US Army tank doctrine was pretty similar, but the Germans had a better execution of it in the early part of the war than the US did in 1944-45.

Even playing 40k, I have gotten inside my opponent's decision loop and thoroughly trounced him (at least until I ran out of maneuvering room). I haven't had the same success playing Flames of War, probably just due to less playing time.

FoW uses a rule called 'Hen and Chicks' for the russian tanks, where each tank needs to be within 2" of the next, instead of the 8" for the Veteran rated germans, *and* uses 5-10 tank companies as the smallest maneuver element instead of 3-5 tank platoons.

The two of those together have made the Russian army play very differently than the others (since Germans pretty much operate like Americans, who operate like the Brits… at least in terms of the armored forces.)