"Defence in depth and the poor SOBs left out on a limb" Topic

Ive always had a british squares at waterloo understanding of defence, ie you stay with your unit and mitigate against the enemy getting behind you.

My misunderstanding of WW1 trenches was similar in that i thought the idea was to create an impenetrable line. but reading more about it the first line might be lightly defended. Ive always thought of WW2 as being a much looser front line but a common tactic seems to be to allow the enemy to advance through then hit them from the rear or surprise follow up units.

But i cant help thinking about the men who would be right out front and deliberately left behind when the attack comes in. Would it be a job for fanatics or volunteers? Or in the wide open spaces of the real world and the confusion of battle is it not as precarious and sacrificial option as it sounds?

It was only later in WW1 that the idea of defence in depth was truly adopted and nearly perfected by the Germans---In WW2 the typical 2 up 1 back or even 1 up 2 back would be rotated in an ideal world…Unfortunately if it was your turn on the day of a big enemy attack to be in the front line……

In WW1 during the 1918 Spring Offensive whole battalions of the British Army were destroyed in the front line---It is just bad luck!!!

On the 20th century battlefield artillery caused about 80% of all casualties. The idea of defense in depth is: 1) to minimize casualties from artillery fire by having less men in the front line and 2) to have a force behind the front which can be deployed to shore up weaknesses in the line or counter an enemy breakthough. If you put all of your troops in the line, then there will be more casualties from artillery fire and you will not be able to react to an enemy breakthrough. The idea is to be able to slow down the enemy using the frontline troops and reinforce them with reserves so that the front could be held. The front line troops were not just sacrificed, though it was definitely not the safest spot to be! I hope the ramblings above are close to coherent and helpful.

-Mike

One more "proof" of that 80% casualties due to artillery number is the development of body armor.

With shrapnel wounds from artillery (and to a lesser extent mortars and grenades) causing such a HUGE majority of the casualties – something had to be done.

Every time in the 1980's & 1990's when a civilian asked me why didn't the military issue bullet-proof vests, I marched out the statistics… because in modern history, bullets are actually a very small percentage of the casualties.

Which is why, to this very day, infantrymen don't wear any protective armor. Oh, wait … !

Don, I believe you missed his point. Infantry are wearing ceramic armor, not bulletproof vests. The ceramic provide protection from shrapnel and from high-powered rifle rounds that "bulletproof" vests usually couldn't stop.

Don, notice I said in the 1980's and 1990's.

As modern warfare has changed and evolved, so the ratio of casualty causes have evolved to the point where yes, there is increased protection now.

Even in the 80's & 90's, bulletproof vests WERE issued – to those doing specific duties where the likelihood was much higher for a bullet to take you out than shrapnel. We had them when I was assigned to MarDet, USS Ranger (CV-61) from 1985-1987.

If you want to learn about the evolutionary development to elastic defense in depth, I highly recommend "If Germany Attacks" by Wynne.

link

It's a great book for WW1 gamers. It can change your attitude about the Western Front.

Infantry are wearing ceramic armor, not bulletproof vests.

Wow, do all US infantry grunts get body armor?

When I was doing military service in my country's army (South Korea, btw), all we had between our skin and a potential bullet/shrapnel/etc was a green cloth uniform… or at most some padding during winter.

Wow, do all US infantry grunts get body armor?

Regardless of MOS, all US Army troops going into a Hostile Fire Zone are issued ballistic armor consisting of:

Vest of some sort
Ballistic plates for same (front, back and side)
Helmet
Groin protector
Shoulder protectors

My groin pad made its way onto the mount for my Mk 19 so spent casings wouldn't hit me in the giblets. It was highly effective. The shoulder protectors were only worn when anybody important was watching.

If you're in the front line on the day the enemy launches a major attack against your position, you're screwed. Luck of the draw….there's a reason why many soldiers become a bit fatalistic.

As raylev says, the very front line was not a good place to be, however it was entirely possible for strongpoints right at the front of the battle outposts to hold out for some time. This was particularly true of the attackers inflitrated between the gaps, and the forward positions were designed to hold out against simple direct assault. The idea wasn't they they were sacrificial lambs, but that the front line would eventually be regained by counter attacks and the surviving garrisons relieved. Within the defensive scheme individual units were rotated between frontline, deep and counterattack duties. The Germans made regiments responsoible for the full depth of their defensive sectors, so they rotated subunits within those ie the Regiments were deployed side by side in depth, not in successive lines. This allowed much better cordination of counterattacks.

A good examination of the development of defence in depth (and its tactical counters) is 'Command or Control. British and German Army Battle Tactics 1888-1918' by Samuels.

As mentioned above, defence in depth was developed to reduce the effect of artillery fire, the packed single line HKL Somme type defence caused horrendous casualties among the defenders, it also made the defensive positions much harder to identify. It only really worked due to the higher allocations of automatic weapons which allowed the defenders to build defensive fire barriers from interocked flanking MGs, coupled with much greater devolution of initiative to platoon and even section commanders to conduct local counterattacks and the more efficent planning and operation of artillery defensive fireplans.

It was very successful in preventing overall breakthroughs if adequately manned, but was horrifically vulnerable to infiltration if not adequately manned (one division per 3000m ideally) and no-one found a tactical answer to bite and hold tactics which just aimed to break into the system, not through it, and destroy the defensive counterattacks as they came in – essentially what Montgomery termed the 'grinding' phase in WW2 terms.

After the German offensives of 1918 failed the new front line was nowhere near as developed as it had been for the previous four years. In the area around Villers-Brettoneaux where the Australians were based they started something called 'Peacful Penetration'.

Basically they would sneak out through no-mans land and get behind the forward outposts and either take prisoners, so that when the relief arrived there would just be an empty trench (not good for morale) or actually capture the outpost and advance the line slightly.

An attack even had to be cancelled once because the land it was supposed to regain had already been captured by the Aussies through this method.

In ww2 there were frequently not so many wide open spaces. So long as you weren't in the desert or steppe.
It wasn't unknown for elements of the false front to just hide and watch the enemy roll by rather than do anything heroic.
The forward posts were likely targeted for silent elimination by scouts.
They were also likely to find themselves forward of a planned artillery barrage. When deployed as a delaying false front the idea was to shoot and scoot.
Not an ideal place to be but not complete suicide.

Pinching out front lying outposts doesn't really help much if your mission is to penetrate the depth of the defensive zone. These defences were anything up to 10km deep in WW1. Post WW2 Russian defensive zones were 25km deep.

Utterly wiping out the Germans front line (not even just pinching out a few outposts) didn't help the British much during Operation Goodwood as they still had several more kilometers of defences to fight through.

I agree with Martin, but wish to add a few details:

The security troops on the extreme 'front line' were only to prevent surprise and perhaps delay awhile (if practicable). They should have established maneuver/escape routes (providing at least some concealment) that lead to new positions or stronger rearward positions. These routes could even be lateral (moving to another unit along the flanks). The idea, as I see it, was for these guys to remain well hidden and then loose an ambush/fusilade at the approaching attackers. Ideally (and likely) the attackers in the area take cover and begin a firefight as they try to figure out what they are facing. During this pause in the advance the screening troops would slink off (perhaps one by one) along an already known hidden maneuver/escape route as directed by their leader.

Was it risky? Sure, but it must have worked at least some of the time because soldiers kept doing it and the tactic became universal doctrine. And I don't think the troops in the main-line-of-resistance were much safer. I recall reading that Germans in the main line of resistance would often come forward into the security zone to avoid the crushing Allied bombardments. They *chose* this kind of fighting against huge numbers over their 'safer' rear positions. I think this is not a reflection of warrior attitude but a simple realization that it was safer than their current position.

If you want to game this, you have to have a good hidden troops rule that prevents the attackers from *easily* identifying their precise positions and bringing their overwhelming firepower to bear. In a skirmish type game I suggest very low undulations in the terrain (not shown on any map and known only to the defenders before game start) that block attacker LOS enough to provide crawling/crouching defenders maneuver routes.

'He who defends everything, defends nothing.' – Fred the Great.

This book by Glantz about Soviet defensive tactics at Kursk is a good description of defence in depth.

link

The story of the 78th Rifle Division's combat is instructive for what can constitute a successful defence.

The division absorbed the full force of two attacking German panzer divisions and shattered under the blow, but only after two days of heavy combat that exacted a toll, in time and lives, from the two German units and provided the 7th Guards Army with the time necessary to bring new units to bear on the German advance. In a narrow sense, the defense failed , although the Soviets claimed the division disabled about fifty German tanks. In a larger sense, operating as an integral part of the 25th Guards Rifle Corps' defensive plan, the 78th Guards Rifle Division's defense was a greater success. The combined efforts of the more successful 81st Guards Rifle Division and the 73d Guards which prevented the timely linkup of the III Panzer Corps with the II SS Panzer Corps in the Prokhorovka area.
…
The 78th Guards Rifle Division paid a severe price in the operation, with casualties probably amounting to as much as 40 percent of its initial force of over 7,000 men. (Three weeks later, after some reinforcement, the division strength stood at almost 6,000 men.)

"I recall reading that Germans in the main line of resistance would often come forward into the security zone to avoid the crushing Allied bombardments."

Yes, the MLR was so easily plotted for artillery fire that dispersed crater positions were often much safer – and which against massively increased the footprint of the defended locality and made it correspondingly harder to locate the individual positions, particularly when the latter were moving around constantly.

This sort of thing is very hard to game adequately unless you go for a very high level abstract approach, or you use some form of hidden deployment/movement in lower level games.

In games though I have seen some players pull off astonishingly successful defence in depth against overwhelming forces including selective counterattacks etc which eventually unsettled, wore down and halted the attackers. Others just line their forces up for the mincing machine and get crushed.

Interestingly the German approach to defence was about as effective as a sieve when faced with Soviet recce tactics.

One of the ways the Red Army learned to exploit this was by mounting a 'razvedka boem'. This would be carried out by reinforced razvedchiki groups to sieze parts of the outpost line and penetrate into the tactical defence zone. Or to set up their own strongpoints within the German defences to assist the forthcoming assault.

The Red Army did defence in depth as well though. Depth implies dispersion, which in turn will leave gaps to be exploited.

The effectiveness of any defensive system depends on its density, depth, level of manning and coordination of the forces assigned to defend it.

Again I agree with Martin. It is hard to game, as the strength of the approach lies in stealth and mobility, staying one step ahead of the attacker's decision cycle. If done right, the attacking enemy (and in reality, one's own division HQ) will not be able to precisely locate the defenders who carry out a series of hit-and-run ambushes and local counterattacks and then sneak off before the attackers can bring their superior strength to bear.

To game this one must compartmentalize the battlefield into a series of disconnected sectors (tables) perhaps .5 to 2km across (terrain determines size) that have little or no view of each other and allow only local (company, battalion, possibly regiment) commanders to sit/stand at each table. Defenders can pass from table to table (possibly changing command from player to player). Messages can pass between the senior sector (table) CO and Division HQ who coordinates artillery, but can't 'see' the sector clearly.

The larger battle would end up a series of inter-related but only somewhat coordinated smaller battles with higher HQ directing artillery into obscure targets and feeding reinforcements forward based almost soley on whatever messages get through.

Under this model, a local sector defending commander, seeing he was completely out-gunned, could launch a few hit and run ambushes and then withdraw both to the rear and laterally off his table (into the unknown, I should add), perhaps leaving a few well hidden squads behind to rise up later. This would cause his command to be scattered but not destroyed. He could counterattack later with a scratch task force of troops recieved from neighboring sectors (which could include some of his original command) and from rear HQ feeding forward reinforcements.

Meanwhile each attacking sector commander would be very concerned about their flanks since they can't see their neighboring sectors clearly (tables separated at distance or screened). If their neighbors were held up or defeated the defenders could attack them in flank. I forsee the attacking sector commanders sending out flank patrols and lots of messages to flanking sector HQs asking about developments. It would encourage a slow, methodical advance that consolidates the defense with each new sector captured. Of course, one can take chances and not worry about flanks.

I took part in a game rather like this one, it was played with 6mm on the floor of a very large (ballroom sized) room so the local commanders got tunnel vision, and as we were all standing up, it was very hard indeed to see infantry units concealed in broken terrain. The higher commanders had to stand at the back and attempt to direct operations. Plenty of scope for ambushes and hit & run and it even managed to generate some blue on blue incidents too.

It is also possible to do it in a less grandiose setting with hidden movement, either via a players vs umpire type approach or with gentlemanly players (although an umpire still helps!). I generally have the attackers deployed in these circumstances, with the defenders hidden, although if covering multiple days, hidden overnight movement for both sides works very well and is essential for some types of operations (like opposed river crossings). I usually just get the players to sketch their overnight dispositions and resolve any conflicts if they arise.

How did the players avoid stepping on units?

The 'terrain' was mainly done with carpet tiles. It was easy to see stuff on the open floor between the tiles, we were just careful not to step on the carpet tiles at all, or on the things on the floor we could see.

The umpires kept it moving at a cracking pace, which added to the confusion and meant there wasn't a lot of time for looking around. It was mainly meant to model differences in command styles betwen NATO and Warpac. We had a plan (I like plans!) and centralised support assets while NATO did all their wishy washy mission directed command stuff and had decentralised support assets.

Just going back to an earlier comment in this thread about webbing, or battle-rattle, which troops wear today versus earlier times.

There has been a sea change of sufficient magnitude, from the introduction of new webbing and armour systems that even someone who was a soldier 12 to 15 years ago would find there knowledge looking outdated.

For instance I have a cousin-in-law who can't get his head around the changes from British webbing he was issued and the American ALICE system he had come across while serving, with the kind of kit and expectations that the young men and women have when they take to the field today.

Technology shapes the battlefield and tactics evolve over time. So what was reasonable in WW1, and by the end of the war British platoon tactics were to be the foundation of all the modern drills, would now days be seen as rather stilted. This is down to improved communications and better gear from technological advances over the ensuing years.

Wargamers often have the habit of meta-gaming, by using their knowledge of modern approaches to solve problems in older periods, and unfortunately this happens where the rules don't prevent non-historical tactics.

I remember a game based on the book "The Defence of Duffers Drift" where one group of players decided to solve the tactical problem the book presents by using German WW2 tactics, to much amusement during their presentation.

Anyway, the point is that today defence in depth, with scattered forces has a different perspective than it would in WW1.