"Better General: Gustavus or Wallenstein?" Topic

Yeah, Gustavus won at Lutzen, if you can call that bloodbath a victory, but he was also prone to take risks. At the end of the battle, the Empire still had Wallenstein, the Swedes no longer had Gustavus, and the "Swedish Phase" of the war was effectively over.

Obvious who I think was better. Others will doubtless differ.

Wallenstein.

Hands down.

mjc

Well, the Swedish army was still around and still winning in 1648. So Wallenstein far from finished it off.

I am relying on the much-criticized Guthrie for my info and therefore, I could be talking absolute blather. But Wallenstein was more famous as an organizer than field general. His dispositions at Lutzen held firm thru most of the day. OTOH, he was caught with his pants down and Pappenheim a half-day's march away. There is a pretty good argument that GA would have smashed his left flank, were it not for the fog and resulting confusion.

"Well, the Swedish army was still around and still winning in 1648. So Wallenstein far from finished it off."

You need a really strong Protestant bias for that statement to make sense. They were badly, BADLY beaten at Nordlingen and never recovered.

Sure, they won a few battles late in the war, but they were never again a serious threat to the Empire. That was left to the French.

Gustavus was a great tactical innovator, but I don't see where he was that good of a general. He almost got his clock cleaned in Poland. In Germany, he waited to intervene until there were no real competitors on the Protestant side. Then he managed to get himself killed acting like some new lieutenant who wanted to get mentioned in dispatches. I think he had a better PR firm than Wallenstein.

Wallenstein was a great organizer, but a poor general. The Imperial army fought well at Lutzen in spite of him. They lost because Wallenstein decided the campaign season was over for the year and sent away a good chunk of his army even as the enemy was approaching the battlefield.

You need a really strong Protestant bias for that statement to make sense. They were badly, BADLY beaten at Nordlingen and never recovered.

Sure, they won a few battles late in the war, but they were never again a serious threat to the Empire. That was left to the French.

Well, the "few battles" were several and major and ended up with the Swedes besieging Prague and being unable to seize it because they had insufficient infantry. Sounds like a pretty serious threat to me.

As far as Nordlingen ending the Swedish threat, you have actually heard of the Battle of Wittstock? Two years after Nordlingen? Major Swedish win?

GA. His intervention in Germany saved it from Hapsburg control. At least he died in combat leading an army that cared for him not chopped to bits in his bedroom by his own officers, which was only a few years after Lutzen. GA's untimely death probably saved the Hapsburgs in Germany by the by. Brezinski not the sadly-maligned Guthrie.

Let's take a look at the facts.

Did the Swedes recover their pre-Nordlingen power, no. But that had very little do with losses in that particular battle and everything to do with the economic situation. Between the collapse of the Heilbron Leauge, the treaty of Stuhmsdorf which avoided war with Poland-Lithuanian but cost the wealth of Prussia and the increasing devastation of the German provinces there was simply not the resources to rebuild the pre-Nördlingen position.

Despite this lack of resources and the fact that former allies like Saxony and Brandenburg were now fighting alongside the Emperor the Swedes were not defeated. Instead they went on to become arguably the most dominant force on the battlefields of Germany.
Wittstock 1636: Baner defeats the main Imperial-Saxon army which loses 5000 dead and 2000 prisoners.
Chemnitz 1639: Baner defeats Mazzarino who loses 40% of his army.
Brandeis 1639 Baner routes Hofkirchen, only the fact that the Imperial stroops ran away so fast prevents them from losing more than 1500 men.
Wolfenbüttel 1641The Swedes repulse Piccolomini & Archduke with assistance from the Weimarians
Schweidnitz 1642 Torstensson destroys the Imperial-Saxon army of Duke Franz Albrecht who suffers 70% casulties.
2nd Breitenfeld 1642 Torstensson defeats Piccolomini & the Archduke who loses almost 40% of their army
Jankow 1645 Torstensson inflicts a crushing defeat on Hatzfeld's Imperial-Bavarian army which lost at least 53% KIA or POW.
Zusmarhausen 1648 The Franco-Swedish army beats the Imperials yet again.

The fact is that after Nördlingen the Swedish main army never again lost a battle. Indeed Nördlingen was the only time the main Swedish army was routed of the field of battle with decisive losses.

Indeed the Swedes could send of their main army to prey on the Danes in 1643-1644 without suffering any significant loss of ground or defeats in Germany. When Gallas went after the Swedes with 20.000 men in 1644 his army was utterly destroyed by Torstensson in a brilliant display of manouver warfare wich relied on the 'small war' and 'stomach strategy' to defeat the enemy. Gallas got away with barely 3000 men.

The balance of power by 1648 is well illustrated by the fact that the Swedish army in Germany numbered over 60000, perhaps as much a 68000, a force which was larger than that fielded by the French, Bavarian and Imperial armies in Germany together. Swedish garrisons were found across most of the Reich including the Baltic provinces, Westphalia, Alsace, Bavaria, Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia.

As for the French their entry into the war was noted for it's startling lack of initial success not to mention that the Imperial-Spanish counter-invasion got within 20 miles of Paris. (How close did the Imperials get to Stockkholm?)
The main adversary of French Army of Germany was the Bavarians who were able contained the French until the Swedes joined forces with Turenne in 1646. Indeed after the death of Duke Bernhard the German front was mostly the scene of French defeats like Tuttlingen & Mergentheim or Pyrrhic 'victories' like Freiburg and Allerheim.

Cold Steel,
On what do you base the statment

"He almost got his clock cleaned in Poland"

?
The defeat at Honigfelde/Trzciano 1629? The Swedes lost less than 10% of their engaged troops KIA&POW in that battle and the Poles and their Imperial allies were unable to exploit the victory as the fortified Swedish postions in Prussia proved to strong to take. By August the Swedes were back in the field in strenght and repulsed the Imperial corps at Reichenfelde.

As for 'waiting' to intervene there was the small matter of Sweden being at war with Poland-Lithuania since 1600. Were would he have found the troops to intervene with in Germany?
Swedish troops were fighting the Empror in Germany from 1628 but raising and equipping the army needed for a full scale intervention took time and resources that was not available until after the end of the wars in Prussia and Livonia.

And the alledged waiting hardly gave Gustavus any advantages. By 1630 there no major Protestant forces in the field and he took a considerable risk when he went to war with an army of 38.000 men against the Imperial-Leaugist alliance who fielded over 120.000 men.

As for Gustavus

killed acting like some new lieutenant who wanted to get mentioned in dispatches

I was not aware that new lieutenants acted like wing commanders or at the very least squadron commanders ;-)
The fact is that Gustavus found himself in a situation were the senior command structure of the local units had collapsed at the very same time he faced a crisis in the battle. Furthermore the poor visibility made it necessary to move right up to the point of crisis get a grip on the situation. There was nothing rash or unusaly risky about Gustavus actions in this situation, it is how all good army commanders of the TYW acted in similar situations. (Tilly, Aldringen, Baner, Torstensson, Conde and Turenne to name the most well known).

Battlefield command was risky even it you did not get in close and personal in the fighting. Turenne and Tilly were both killed by long range artillery fire and Gustavus came to close to being killed by an enemy sharpshooters firing at long range at Dirschau in 1627.

Wallenstein was brilliant on an operational level, always able to force Gustavas into fighting on ground of Wallenstein's choosing.

After that?

Wallenstein could also create armies out of thin air but then they seem to have dissipated just as quickly in combat.

At the end of the battle, the Empire still had Wallenstein

Who increasingly was not asset to the Imperial cause, late stage syphilis was increasingly destoring both his health and his mind. Wallenstein's judgement was poor in late 1632, wether this was due to a lack of military ability or due to the brain damage he suffered from is impossible to tell.
In 1633-1634 Wallenstein was increasing makign more and more poor judgements, his performance in 1633 was not good even with the victory at Steinau taken into account. His belief that the army would favour him over the Emperor cleary shows that he had lost contact with reality by 1634.

Daniel, is there any proof of W's syphilis – aside from the likelihood that many important figures would be infected in the 1600's??

I always accepted W's behaviour in 1633-34 to be "normal" egotism. A man who had essentially made himself the most powerful figure in Europe might be prone to losing touch with reality, even without a disease of the mind.

As for 1632, I always thought this was just normal fumbling from a guy who was more suited to a "minister of war" type role than a field command. He certainly threw together a new Imperial Army very competently after Breitenfeld and there was nothing crazy about his performance at Alte Feste.

huevans "As far as Nordlingen ending the Swedish threat, you have actually heard of the Battle of Wittstock? Two years after Nordlingen? Major Swedish win?"

Not in the same league. Prior to Lutzen Gustavus -to his credit- had managed to turn the war around, and the Catholics were on the defensive. Had Lutzen been a major victory instead of an extremely Pyrrhic one, they would have been set to threaten Vienna, and Ferdinand might have had to sue for terms.

Daniel S "How close did the Imperials get to Stockkholm?"

In fairness, the proper answer to that question is, "Why bother?" The Swedes had a tough army and won a lot of battles, but they were far from being a major power player after Nordlingen.

So having the single largest army in Germany by 1648, an army wich outnumbered the combines armies of the 3 other major powers and having garrions which controlled vast areas of Germany is "far from being a major power player"?

If the Swedes no longer were a "major power player" how come the bulk of the Imperial forces, not to mention the Saxons, Brandenburgers not to mention the occasional Bavarian corps were required to face the Swedes?

The Swedes could not have gone after Vienna after a victory at Lützen for the same reason they could not do so after Breitenfeld. The field armies of Tilly & Wallenstein only represented a part of the total Catholic forces which combined with the logistics of 17th Century warfare made any "blitzkrieg" against Vienna impossible. As long as you had an army in the field you could always fight on. The Empror did not sue for peace when the Bohemians threatend Vienna at the start of the war and his psoition was much weaker then. The Bavarians did not sue for peace when the Swedes took Munich in 1632, Frederick & Mansfeld fought on even though the entire Palatinate had been overrun and so on.

Even if Gustavus had managed to kill or capture every single Imperial & Leugist soldier inside Saxony in late 1632 the Imperial & Leaugist armies would still have had over 70.000 men in arms.

Btw if threatening Vienna is the measure of being a serious threat to the Empire the French did not even get close to doing that. OTOH the Swedes led by Torstensson were at the gates of Vienna by 1645. The Emperor did not sue for peace…

Inquisitor Thaken wrote:
The Swedes had a tough army and won a lot of battles, but they were far from being a major power player after Nordlingen.

Daniel already mentioned famous Swedish victories after 1634, so I can only add – have a look at Swedish gains after Peace of Westphalia. Sweden received an indemnity, as well as control of Western Pomerania (since then called Swedish Pomerania), Wismar, and the Prince-Bishoprics of Bremen and Verden. It thus won control of the mouth of the Oder, Elbe, and Weser Rivers, and acquired three voices in the Council of Princes of the German Reichstag. That can easily be seen as example of Sweden emerging as major power after TYW (thanks to link of its military victories under Baner, Torstensson and Wrangel).

Regards

Michal

Daniel S "So having the single largest army in Germany by 1648, an army wich outnumbered the combines armies of the 3 other major powers and having garrions which controlled vast areas of Germany is "far from being a major power player"?"

Ya know, I read stuff like this, and I begin to wonder why the Swedes didn't just rush down through Vienna, knock out the emperor, head to Rome and make the Pope bark like a dog, wipe out Catholicism forever, and then build a spaceship and attack Mars.

It never ceases to amaze me how many feathers the Thirty Years War can ruffle three and a half centuries later.

Kadrinazi"…have a look at Swedish gains after Peace of Westphalia. Sweden received an indemnity, as well as control of Western Pomerania (since then called Swedish Pomerania), Wismar, and the Prince-Bishoprics of Bremen and Verden."

I'm not saying that the Swedes ceased to be formidable, or that they couldn't make trouble in Northern Germany, they certainly could.

But the fact of the matter is that after Lutzen (which was such a Pyrrhic victory as to amount to a defeat) and then Nordlingen they were largely a spent force as far as any hope of winning the war was concerned. That the Empire was bled white of troops throughout the war is another issue.

You have to remember that the Thirty Years War was neither a Protestant nor a Catholic victory. It was simply a meat grinder that devastated Germany. Remember that, by the time it was over, many Catholic AND Protestant princes were allying with the Emperor just to get the damn foreigners off German soil, and keep them from wrecking things still further.

By 1648 the lables 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' was indeed a bit pointless as the religion was no longer the dividing line of the war. However as the edict of restitution had been revoked and the peace of Augsburg upheld the Protestants had certainly won major concessions. Furthermore Protestant states like Sweden, and Brandenburg gained significant amounts of territory, considerably more than that gained by Catholic France and Bavaria. The Emperor gained nothing except peace.
On top of that the Swedes got 5 milion Thalers to pay off their mercenaries.
The war had very clear winners and losers in 17th Century terms, wether or not the price at which victory was purchased was worth the gains is a diffrent question. Even at the height of Swedish success members of the Swedish Royal council was questioning this. "We have take the lands of others and ruined our own".

While significant parts of the Empire suffered terrible devastation one should keep in mind that there were large areas which suffered limited or no devastation. North-western Germany, Austria and Tyrol came through very well compared to areas like the Pommerian or the Palatinate.

Well Inquisitor Thaken you certainly give the impression that Swedish (or is it Protestant?) success in the TYW is a very sore point with you. Otherwise I see no ruffled feathers.

The size of the Swedish army and the location of it's garrisons and hence it power is a matter of historical record. As is their gains in the treaty of Westphalia Why try to deny it?
The same applies to the campaigns of the Swedish army post-1634 which often took place far outside any area covered by the loose lable "Northern Germany". When the Swedish army is rampaging across Bohemia or Bavaria it is clearly makign trouble far outside "Northern Germany"

The 17th Century was not a period of "blitzkrieg" style victories as I've already explained in a previous post, Even Napoleonic style victories were impossible for the armies of the day against a major power.
On top of that the Swedes were no more interested in overthrowing the Emperor and wiping out Catholicism than the Cahtolics were out to exterminate the Protestants. Modern study of the war have long since discarded such notions about the objectives of both sides.

Huevans,
His bones show extensive damage of a kind which is typical for the endstage of syphilis, his handwriting also show traces of neural damage that is typical of that stage of the disease. (Used to be a German website with showed the step by step detoriation with dated samples of Wallenstein's signature but I can't find it at the moment.)

While Wallenstein's basic personality certainly played a part I think that the damage cause by his disease played an important role his increasignly poor decision making.
Whiel did not have the experience of Tilly or Gustavus Wallenstein did have a solid military background and had seen action in both the Hungarian and Friuli wars (though not above regimental rank)
Dividing his army to go into winter quarters while surrounded by converging enemy forces is however sign that Wallenstein completly misjudged the siutation he was in, in a way that was very diffrent from his previous operations.

While Wallenstein's operational performance at Nürnberg was good his tactical handling of the situation at Alte Veste was marked by a lack of initiative and the inability to exploit success. Most of the action at Alte Vestewas handled by Aldringen who did very well with limited resources in a very strong position.
The lack of a "killer instict" and an inability to spot and/or exploit advantages can be seen at Lützen as well. None of the Swedish set backs were exploited and the Swedes were given valuable time and space to reform and renew the battle. The death of Pappenheim and the Fahnenfluch seem to have robbed Wallenstein of any offensive spirit though he kept up a very stout defence.

The problem is identifying which part of Wallenstein performance was due to his abilities of lack of them and what was cause by those ability beging increasignly degraded by a destructive disease.

Let's take a look at the facts.

On TMP? :-0

Well, neither were as great as Napoleon! Oops, wrong war.

Daniel S

OKAY, NOW I'M GOING TO EVISCERATE YOU LINE BY LINE. THE GLOVES ARE OFF PAL! ( Just kidding!)

"Well Inquisitor Thaken you certainly give the impression that Swedish (or is it Protestant?) success in the TYW is a very sore point with you. Otherwise I see no ruffled feathers."

Do I give that impression? If so, unintentional. I tend to see the break-up of the Empire as a negative thing, but I am well aware that it was long ago.

"The size of the Swedish army and the location of it's garrisons and hence it power is a matter of historical record. As is their gains in the treaty of Westphalia Why try to deny it?"

I'm not denying the facts, only their relative importance. Northern Germany had been lost to the Empire by this period, and, culturally it had been lost long since. All the Swedes really did was move into a power vacuum. The Emperor was becoming far more concerned with the threat from the Turks. Remember, it would not be long before Kara Mustafa would be beating on the Emperor's bedroom door, with a threat greater by an order of magnitude than the Swedes had ever posed.

"The 17th Century was not a period of "blitzkrieg" style victories as I've already explained in a previous post…"

The Sultan thought otherwise, and nearly proved it.

Daniel S "While Wallenstein's basic personality certainly played a part I think that the damage cause by his disease played an important role his increasignly poor decision making."

Wallenstein may have been a sick man by this time, but remember that Gustavus was the only Protestant general ever capable of giving him a solid fight. Before he met the Lion of the North, he had swept all before him.

Also remember that the conflict between the two was by no means one sided. At the Battle of the Alte Veste, Wallenstein gave Gustavus a nasty bloody nose. At Lutzen, both sides made mistakes, but the loss to the Swedes was ultimately far worse.

My answer: Turenne

Rich

Turenne is an odd choice considering that he lost all major battles in the TYW were he was in command by himself. He was only victorious when fighting alongside Conde or the Swedes and both Freiburg and Allerheim were fairly Pyrrhic victories.

Turenne was one of the great captains of the 17th Century but his abilities only fully matured after the TYW, probably because of the lessons he learned by the hard knocks suffered in that war. He certainly learned from his mistakes like no other general of the period.

What break up of the Empire? The areas who were recognised as indenpendet had often been so for a long time, centuries in many cases. (I.e Switzerland & Milan)
The German parts of the Reich were untouched except for the French nibblings which were really confirmations of conquests that were close to 100 years old by 1648.
The King's of Sweden held their German provinces as Princes of the Empire with the rights and duties that entailed so those provinces were hardly lost either.
All in all the Peace of Westfalia did not break up the Empire, it did however restric the Emperor to his constitutional powers, no more and insured the freedoms & rights of the individual states within the Empires borders.

The Ottomans had always been a major threat after the fall of Hungary as there was not much strategic depth to the Imperial defences so that was hardly news. Not to mention that Ottoman war aims were entirely diffrent. Indeed it was the peace in the 'east' won in the Langer Türkenkrieg which allowed the Emperor to wage extensive war in the 'west' and Kara Mustafa would appear on the scene 34 years after the end of the war.

A power vaccum in Northern Germany? Hardly, not with 30.000 Imperial troops in the costal provinces alone. By 1630 Imperial rule in Northern Germany was stronger than it ever had been before between the vast army of occupation and the edict of restitution. Saxons, Brandenburgers and Pommerianian were all compliant for various reasons. The power of the Lower Saxon Circle had been broken in the war of 1625-1629 when it tried in vain to upphold it's lawfull rights with the aid of Christian IV.

The Ottoman threat is rather OT but the strategic situation on the Danube was entirely diffrent. There was almost not strategic depth to the Habsburg defences and the Ottomans hard only a short LOC. Yet they failed to take Vienna in 529 and 1683 and even if Vienna had fallen it wouls not have meant the fall of the Empire, nor probably the fall of the Habsburg state. 17th C states didn't work that way, just look at Poland-Lithuania which was overrun during the Deluge, or Denmark later on in the extension of that war.

As for Wallenstein sweeping all before him it was easy to do so when he left all the hard work to Tilly & the Leugists. Neither Mansfeld nor Christian stood any chance of defeating Wallenstein.
While concentrating superior forces against the enemy is an essential part of good generalship my point is that Wallenstein did not face a significant military challenge at either Dessau or Wolgast.
The reconquest of Silesia was well planned and excecuted but a great commander would not have lost it in the first place. Let alone allowed his enemy time to build up an army of 20.000 men.
Wallenstein can't take much credit for Alte Veste, it was very much Aldringen's victory. Sure Wallenstein had chosen and excellent position wich was fortified with great care but on the day of battle he failed to exploit Imperial success and did not even harass the withdrawing Swedes the next day.
At Lutzen he once again established a strong defensive position but failed to exploit the advantages he gained from it. The only reason that the Swedish loss was 'worse' was the loss of Gustavus. And even with Gustavus gone Wallenstein failed to defea the disorderd and exhausted Swedes.
Had Tilly been in command at Alte Veste Gustavus would have been in the fight of his life. And given the same opportunities as Wallenstein at Lutzen Jean T'serclaes would have routed the Swedes utterly.

"Had Tilly been in command at Alte Veste Gustavus would have been in the fight of his life. And given the same opportunities as Wallenstein at Lutzen Jean T'serclaes would have routed the Swedes utterly."

LOL! I think that Gustavus WAS in the fight of his life, literally, considering how things ended

"Wallenstein can't take much credit for Alte Veste, it was very much Aldringen's victory. Sure Wallenstein had chosen and excellent position wich was fortified with great care but on the day of battle he failed to exploit Imperial success and did not even harass the withdrawing Swedes the next day."

Okay, I think this has come to the point of nitpicking things to death. You have the field, sir. Like Wallenstein, I'll leave to fight another day, even if my officers DO end up hacking me to death.

Peace.

What do you fellas use for resources? I'm mighty interested.

GA was certainly as good in organising than W. After all, he turned Sweden and its army into the formidable fighting force it was, and that was no easy task given the economical status of his country.

Wallenstein hated to fight battles (as they seldom brought a decision) and when forced to relied on good defensive tactics/positions with considerable success. He definitely lacked Tilly's aggressiveness in battle. I believe he did not really miss many opportunities at Lützen. It's just that his troops were so depleted and exhausted in the lulls that he considered it foolish to abandon his defensive perimeter. Moreover the Protestants were outnumbering him.

If GA should have acted foolishly, it was rather his rushed attack on prepared positions then him leading a cavalry wing when a commander was badly needed.

I also agree with Daniel that in those days (especially on a rather small battlefield like Lützen) no commander was very far from the frontline. W was near to be killed just as well!

I see GA's rôle in the TYW more political than military, as he was killed before he could have fought (and won) many battles (in the TYW that is :-)!). He allowed himself to be trapped at Nürnberg though!

To be commander in the field is a tough business and most if not all generals made mistakes.

Neither GA nor W count among "my" best generals, but both were outstanding personalities.

The Syphillis theory about W is new to me. He does not seem the type to me, but everything is possible. His Podagra, the countless permanent problems with the Emperor's faction and the strong medications he was taking over a long period would probably be enough to explain his weakening mind!

Cheers

Romain

Romain, what is "podagra"?

I think that the fog element is perhaps an overlooked reason why both W and GA were less than totally effective at Lutzen. Neither of the two generals really knew what was happening on the other side of the lines. GA was willing to attack and rely on his instincts and the quality of his veteran troops and to take chances. W probably felt quite the opposite. Much of his cavalry was raw and the late offensive by GA had taken W by surprise. W likely felt that his best recourse was waiting for all of Pappenheim's troops to arrive and to hold fast.

As both Daniel and Romain have referred to Tilly in their posts, I would ask either if he felt Tilly would have fought W's or GA's side of the battle differently.

Podagra literally means stirrup and it designates a form of gout that affects in most cases the (first) metatarsophalangeal joint, but sometimes other joints in the leg or hand as well. It got its name from the fact that due to the excessive pain the patient is hardly capable of putting his foot into the stirrup.

In the meantime I have done a bit of research and it seems that W was indeed suffering from Syphilis, contracted as early as 1605 which means that during his generalship he would have been in the final stadium including deterioration of the neural system.
Given that and the bouts of excessive pain he was doing quite well indeed! :-).

Let me add one point to the discussion around Lützen:

Wally did not disperse his command for winter quarters. He did NOT send Pappi away, he reluctantly let him go back to his former campaigning in the Palatinate, where the Protestants had gained the upper hand since he had been ordered to depart and rejoin W's main army.
Other corps were guarding the approaches against the saxon contingent.
Moreover, the year was drawing to an end, and GA's offensive move was unexpected (after his attitude so far) to say the least. Moreover it could have ended in utter disaster (drawing troops "in the open", away from winter quarters and their supplies).

Apart from Stralsund I cannot see a major flaw in W's military leadership. In his difficult position (army commander versus imperial camarilla) he did very well indeed.

He was not murdered by "his" officers. Most of the subcommanders in his army had not been his choice, but rather the Kaiser's (like Gordon f.ex.). Aldringen and Piccolomini (who had their own aganda) were merely rats leaving the sinking ship. The loyal officers like Trcka died with their general.

Whether Tilly would have acted differently is an interesting question that is hard to answer. He might not have ended where W was…and Lützen would not have happened. In the actual situation, he would probably have done the same, i.e. built a good defensive position and fought it out. Whether partial offensive moves were possible remains open. As you said, visibility was poor, the battle was vicious and confusing, part of the imperial troops were raw….very tricky! I personally don't think he could have changed much.

Interested to hear comments on this issue though!

Cheers

Romain

I see GA's rôle in the TYW more political than military, as he was killed before he could have fought (and won) many battles (in the TYW that is :-)!).

IMHO it's not possible to separate GA's political role from his military role. His political impact was entirely due to the impact of his military operations

With regards to fighting battles I guess it depends a bit on how one defines a "Battle" (Schlacht)as opposed to an "Action" (Gefecht/Treffen). A lot of ECW "Battles" would just barely qualify as TYW "Actions". Below I'm definine a battle as a military engagement involving at least 20.000 men.

Gustavus waged war in Germany for roughly 29 months measured from the intital invasion to his death.
In that time he personaly fought in the following "battles"
The battle of Breitenfeld 1631(victory)
The battle of Rain am Lech 1632(victory)
The battle of Alte Veste 1632(defeat)
The battle of Lützen 1632(undecided at time of death)

GA was also involved a number of "Actions" of which the more well known and sizeable were
The Action at Burgstall 1631 (victory)
The Crossing of the Rhine 1632 (victory)
The Action at Burgthan 1632 (victory)

That's 4 battles and 3 significant actions in 29 months, and that's not counting things like the storm of Frankfurth, the assault on Greifhagen and the other siege warfare operations conducted by GA. And Frankfurt and Alte Veste are not that diffrent given that both were assaults on fortified positions, the only difference is that at Alte Veste the fortifications surrounded a military camp while at Frankfurt they protected a town.

To be commander in the field is a tough business and most if not all generals made mistakes.

I fully agree, I'm certainly not claiming that GA made no mistakes. Engaging in blockade & counter-blockade warfare with Wally at Nürnberg certainly was a major one.

I known from my own experience that even in peace time the friction involved in military operations will cause mistakes to be made. One of my less proud moments a young officer was getting in a fire fight with the very engineer unit my company was supposed to protect. (A case of mistaken identity as every one involved was wearing the same uniforms)
In war time it get's much worse. Victory usualy goes to the commander who makes the fewest mistakes while exploiting those of his enemy.

Wally did not disperse his command for winter quarters. He did NOT send Pappi away, he reluctantly let him go back to his former campaigning in the Palatinate, where the Protestants had gained the upper hand since he had been ordered to depart and rejoin W's main army.

You are correct that Pappenheim was not sent away due to going into winter quarters, indeed Gallas larger corps had been summoned to replace Pappenheim's 5000 men.
But with regards to the winter quarters I'm wondering what source you are basing your conclusion on?
I'm not aware of any new research which has invalidated the evidence which exists such as Wallenstein actual plan for how the army was to be dispersed into quarters which is dated to the 14th.
picture is the map reconstructed by the Swedish General Staff using the plan in question. The 6600 men at Grimma is Gallas' troops which had yet to arrive.

Daniel:

there is maybe a misunderstanding as to my statement meaning merely that he did not carelessly dilapidate his army with the enemy in vicinity (as suggested in one of the posts above). After all, Gallas was supposed to replace Pappi.

I certainly don't deny the fact that the organisation of the imperial forces in Saxony was a strictly defensive one, small outlyling contingents being outposts and guarding strategically important places such as bridges or fords against a possible move of the saxon forces.

But that was typical of Walli, wasn't it. No aggressive move if not necessary. Outmanoeuvring beats fighting.
A sound principle! Look how precarious GA's position had become in 1632. Lines of supply cut, army starving, etc. Nearly as many casualties as per a battle with no losses on his side.

Naturally the bad season required good quarters in order to preserve the army from disintegration. Walli's quarrels with Tilly over Halberstadt and Magdeburg clearly show the importance. Moreover most regions would not be able to feed the whole army, so a dispersal was mandatory.

I just refuse the idea that Walli was as careless a blunderer before Lützen as sometimes described.

Cheers

Romain