"Austrian reforms 1792 - 1815" Topic

Hi all,

As most of you know, we have been discussing the relative merits of the reforms the Prussians gained after their 1806-07 eventual defeat. It is also understood that the Prussian army was undergoing modernisation prior and during the 1806 campaign but circumstances prevented this from being completed.

Now, with the Austrian army they too were undergoing several changes or modernisations over the years, especially during the 1805 to 1809 period and some of these changes were discarded as well.

OK, so my discussion point is, if the Prussian army complete rebuilding was undertaken in 1808 onwards culminating in their new doctrines and systems for 1812 – 1815 (which was still being modified) towards a much more columnar style army was this also the case for the Austrians?

We know the Austrian propensity for Lines and a somewhat dislike for skirmisher tactics and yes, I do understand they also formed columns in battle over the entire period but did this go as far as the changes that came about in the Prussian army or was it really half-hearted because the older heads refused to completely give up the Linear style of warfare for the Columnar style with most armies post 1812?

I know this is a very broad series of questions but I would like to get a feeling from those out there who might be much more adept at analysing these questions than I can. Personally, I do not think the Austrian army of 1813 was anything near the same as the Prussians in regards for a propensity for using columns on the battlefield in 1813-14. I actually think the high command took retrograde steps backwards towards a more lineal method of warfare compared to 1809 for example.

I would like the opinions of those who might know better than I.

Regards,
Shane

I would agree with your assessment that the Austrians did not advance in columnar tactics as the Prussians did. The 1809 campaign came as they were going through important conversions and the campaign prevented the changes from being implemented. From there I am not sure.

Dear Shane
This is as complex a question as that I faced writing the two books on the Prussian Army. The Austrians adopted under Archduke Charles columnar tactics.

Their use of the dense square dates back to the 1780s at least as a result of the fighting against the Turks and their superior cavalry numbers.

There was an increase in the numbers of regular light infantry and use of the third rank. This replaced the Grenz that was less important. Also which is lost on most people was the loss of the recruiting grounds in 1805-1809 as this became Illyria.

The tactics used seemed to depend upon the commanders to a greater extent than the Prussians. It should be remembered that Bulow still attempted linear tactics in some early engagements even with Landwehr and got beaten for this.

Stephen

Shane,
Rather than the term 'columnar' warfare, I think Brent Noseworthy described the new minor tactic methodology as the 'impulse' system. His book 'Battle Tactics of Napoleon and his Enemies' did a great job explaining what he meant by this new concept in warfare, which supplanted 'lineal' warfare.

The column was important, but so was the line, in this form of 'impulse' warfare. Chandler, in 'Campaigns of Napoleon' states that, and I paraphrase, …..even for the French it was axiomatic that they deploy to line for combat purposes. I remember this statement because I had to look up the term axiomatic [evident without proof or argument].

Its my understanding that the essential quality of the impulse system was to employ distinct tactical groups, of combined arms, that are relatively independent of one another. These elements maneuver in column, and once in engagement range, protect themselves with skirmishers, and adopt line or remain in column as circumstances require. The idea of a long unbroken line, common to the 'lineal' period, was no longer important, in fact they were practically impossible to achieve, given the size of Napoleonic armies.

The French were the first to perfect this approach, but eventually it was adopted by a majority of their opponents, some with equal success.
I can't comment on how adept the Austrians were at this methodology, but I think it's safe to say, that from 1807 onwards, they were definitely interested in the merits of an 'impulse' system, and how they could use it to counter and engage their French opponents.

Shane,

I think Ligniere makes a key point in his distinction between the tactical and operational level of tactics when comparing Prussian and Austrian approaches.

By tactical, I generally mean unit/Bn level decisions, and by operational I mean Bde or Div level decisions.

My impression is that the Prussians laid down pretty strict guidelines, indeed regulations, up to the Bde level about which formation was appropriate in any given set of circumstances, which for most Infantry units would have been either column or skirmish order, dependent on their position within the Bde.

I suspect that the Austrians were much more relaxed about allowing the Bde and Div commanders flexibility about what the Bde deployment could be, but were a little more controlling as to the Bn level.

And as Ligniere points out above, both these systems were in stark contrast to the C18th concept of Linear warfare – which controlled how the ENTIRE army deployed, much less Bde or Bn commanders.

I think its possible this is where some napoleonic wargamers can muddy the waters when refering to '18th C Linear' tactics being clung on to by the Austrians. The late, great Gunther Rothenburg has clearly shown that the Austrians had indeed made a clean break with attempts to control the whole army's deployment – the linear approach – by devolving the flexibility and responsibility down at least one level, to Bde or Div, if not to Bn – impulse warfare.

Kind Regards,

Sparker

Thanks so far guys,

Yeah, I understand the concept of the "Impulse System" discussed by Nosworthy, I have his book also, good read. He states that the French in 1805-07 won not because they used columns but because their divisions were much more flexible and capable of acting on multiple axis in combat and so on…

With the Prussians, they were, I think, shocked into understanding the merits of the columnar, or, "impulse system" and completely re-organised their own army to adapt to this method of warfare. But with the Austrians I am not so sure, I feel that because they were never crushed in battle like the Prussians were that they did not learn significant enough lessons to merit change in such a dramatic way. The Prussians basically did a 180 degree turnaround from Linear to Columnar style tactical deployments but the Austrians were to me much less willing to concede the merits of columns or at least the combination of columns and lines on battles.

The British also because they were never crushed by the French did not change either and with good reason. Their Linear style tactical doctrines suceeded where all others had failed so there was no need to change a winning formula. But as the Austrians were defeated many times they did take on board it seems several of the French ideas. However, not to the extent that these changes dramatically altered the overall style of the army.

1809 with Charles is an interesting time where it seems he tried to change things but the defeat of the army in that year I feel halted progress of those changes and by 1813 what was learned in 1809 was unlearned to a certain degree in 1813 battlefields where the Austrians were concerned. From what I have read, although they continued to utilise columnar concepts to an extent the use of Lines dominated the tactical thinking of the army commanders once again until the end of the wars.

As stated, certain commanders in the Austrian army might be more prone to using lines while others more comfortable using columns but I am not sure which commanders used which method predominately? I think this could be a good subject to investigate…

Shane

I also think that what Sparker said is true, wargamers can muddy the waters on this topic but the evolution of the armies during this time is a, as yet still grey subject for many, including me with the Austrian army.

I know they made changes in their style of warfare but many officers were still veterans of the previous century and desired for nothing more than to carry on fighting in the same style. I want to gain some clarity as to where the Austrian army was as a whole in this regard and who led the push for reform and who opposed it also.

Shane

Not only did the prussians suffer a more total defeat but they also suffered much more severe peace conditions. They were basically occupied. Also, the whole German nationalism/revolutionary conversion never seemed to happen in austria to the same extent.

Perhaps its as simple as this. Austria = conservitive. Prussia = progressive. Certainly that seems to be the case later in the 19th century.

Also I think its fair to say that austria played a much smaller role in the 1813 campaign. They didnt have the same incentive for aggresive tactics which is what the impulse style is all about I think?

Dear Blucher
The foolishness of reparations were not learned with the treaty of Versaile in 1919. The cost of the French occupation caused the death of over 5000 children in Berlin alone in just two years.

The burning revenge of the Prussians can be directly related to the French greed. Maybe Prussia should have been wiped off the map but Napoleon wished to have a buffer state against his next target Russia.

The contribution of soldiers by the Austrians was higher than the other combatants but they were playing a different game to the Prussians and Russians who wanted to hang Napoleon. They had an Austrian princess as Empress of the French and designs upon Italy and the Balkans rather than Western Europe.

Stephen

It is difficult to establish exactly what 'reforms' entailed. For instance, all of the 'reforms' that Scharnhorst advocated were practiced on the parade ground before 1806--but how well or how many parade grounds is the question.

The Austrians certainly had column formations before 1809 and used them for movement on the battlefield. The Battalion Mass and Division Mass formations were extensively used in 1809--but how often and how well is the question.

The Russians used the column extensively as a combat formation, both offensive and defensively, but they never attempted the extensive tactical reforms the Prussians and Austrians did.

The Prussians had from 1808 to 1812 to 'reform', the Austrians were fighting in 1805, 1809 and then 1812 and on. They were trying to change the tire while the car was moving in comparison to the Prussians. The Russians were constantly at war from 1805 on, with France, with Turkey, with Sweden.

Hard to compare 'reforms' under such different conditions.

Bill

Ref the subject matter of this thread I would recommend a good book by Gunther E. Rothenberg, 'Napoleon's Great Adversary: Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army 1792-1814'.

cheers
Edward

Shane,

I came across this passage quite by accident whilst searching for other information, but I thought that it might be useful to you. It was written by George Cathcart who served as an ADC during the 1813 campaign, and so he speaks from personal observation. I know nothing about the Austrian army, but I presume that this is accurate information for this period:

"When the forces of the Austrian Empire joined the Alliance the comparatively small armament they had at immediate command was in a high state of systematic discipline, and their tactical doctrines were those that the author has described as line movements, and primary formations having reference thereto; in fact, a system similar to that which forms the basis of Her Majety's Regulations at this day for the British Army.

"Some new Bohemian levies were hastily brought into the field at the commencement of the campaign, and not being incorporated into other experienced corps, a measure for which there would have been no time even if the long-established system of national organisation of corps in that service had not precluded the possibility, they cannot be placed on a par with the regular army of that period. This is mentioned here, because they had not the time to be rendered capable of the system previously described, in a degree that could safely be attempted in presence of an experienced and enterprising enemy; and that of Napoleon [ie a more columnar system of manoeuvre], more applicable to new levies, not having been substituted for it in an emergency, they were soon brought into trouble. In consequence of this a disaster occured at Dresden, which when explained, affords a useful example, and reflects no discredit upon the state of the discipline of the regular Austrian army."

So, at least in my opinion, this means that the Austrians in 1813, including recruits not capable of such a system, were still a linear type army.

G'day Cptn,

This is great, thank you, I would like to find out more about this snip-pit of information. Information like this helps me build a clearer picture for understanding the structure of armies like the Austrians.

My feeling on them is that they are principally a, "Linear" army right up to the completion of the Napoleonic wars but dabbled in "Columnar" style doctrines at least during 1809. When that war was over the analysts decided to throw the baby out with the bath water so to speak and missed the real point of column style warfare.

I know they continued to use columns to move around the battlefield in 1813 etc but they still predominately used lines to engage the enemy I feel. I also think it depended on the particular commander as well, and which camp he stood in, some preferred lines while others did see the merits of columns but to tow the party line I think the ideas of these guys were suppressed in the end.

I dunno, I would like to learn more and truly understand and grasp the reasons behind Austrian doctrines of the time.

Shane

Shane:
I used to have a partial translation of the Krieg 1809 study by the Austrian Army. Unfortunately, I loaned it to a friend and it disappeared… but I retain some notes.

For the entire war, Austria operated in the red, and their efforts to reform the army demonstrate some of the same lack of uniformity the impoverished Prussian army did before 1807.

Even so, At Essling, May 21, 1809, General Hohenzollern's twenty-two battalion corps advnaced in two lines of battalion columns at deploying intervals. On the 6th of July, at Wagram, the Austrians employed double-company columns at deploying distance, covered by a thick light infantry screen. This is noted in the Krieg, E. Gachot's 1809, Napoleon en Allemagne 1913 and even Steven Ross's From Flintlock to Rifle

The 1807 Exercier Reglement fur die K.K. Infanterie introduced the double-company column for battlefield maneuver. The Austrians also at that time created nine battalions of jagers and designated fourteen men from each line company as skirmishers [schutzen…] which, with a six company battalion, that is 84 men, or about the size of a French light company.

After Wagram the Austrians were forced to reduce the size of their army to 150,000, so reform was easier and at the same time harder. Fewer men, but a preponderance of the 'old guard'.

From what I have read about 1813-1814, with an army of 310,000, the Austrians had a force of mixed ability, rather than any demonstration of uniform doctrine on the battlefield. Even so, the Austrians were neither ignorant of or incapable of carrying out columnar maneuvers with skirmish cover in the French fashion. As for line formation. Like most all nations, column was for offensive actions, line for defense--for the most part. That seems to be the norm if not doctrine in the Austrian army after 1808.

Bill

thanks Bill, that information has helped me also a great deal.

Regards,
Shane

In 1809 columns of all kinds were used – particularily the Massen, it was even advocated to use any sort of cover to minimize loss from enemy fire.

The Austrian army could use columns and lines – according to tactical circumstances from 1807 onwards.

I think it helpful to differentiate between macro and micro recoganisations .

Macro
- corp structures, semi permanent divisional assignments, divisional generals being encouraged to exercise initiative in the field.

Micro
- extensive use of skirmishers to proceed the final advance, rapid advances by batallions in (dual company frontage) column to the enemy, then forming battle line just outside engagement range (@200 paces) then rapid engagement – close to 100 paces, fire and charge,
rather than the fire, step forward, fire, step forward, fire approach:
i.e. changing to 'impulse' systems is a micro change

I recall Gill emphasising that Charles was seeking to introduce macro changes (and knew they were not ready for 1809).
Further, Gill emphasises Austrian records showing regiments being re assinged repeatedly over the opening stages of the campaign, of comanders failing to excercise initiative, and of bodies of troops failing to coordinate prior to the battlefield – all the things Charles was attempting to correct, as evidence of how ingrained the old ways were.

Focussing on the last 500 metres of the battle field, the micro stuff, and asking 'did they advance in column or not' is, I think secondary in this respect.
Gill is at equal pains to point out that where not confronted by a tactically poor position (a micro failing), the Austrian troops performed more than adequtely.

If you look back 50 years to the Austrians at Hochkirk, they advanced on the battle field in 5 separate columns, producing multiple points of attack against a static Prussian line.
The problem was, they seemed to want to keep trying this against a much larger and more rapidly responding french force (who didn't wait without a scouting screen, as Fred did), and it was changing this that was the primary focus of Charles efforts through 1808/9 – all Macro failings.

We focus too much on the micro, as that is our game. Further, our game has a legacy of 'column vs line' which does not reflect reality.
The most appropriate micro option was clearly being used according to tactical circumstances, once the break had been made (which was circa 1805/6, as von W says.)

Its just a question of how well the micro was being used, in this respect – the French here did it very well, the other powers not so well, but improving.

Something which reflects time spent in training camps, more than doctrine.

I continually read about how the Austrians used Columns in 1809 for attacks but what about 1813? Did they revert to a more linear style of micro management again in 1813 or were the use of columns just as prevalent as they were in 1809?

Shane

Armies on the Danube by Scott Bowden has a good section on the Austrians and I believe basically confirms what has been said above. Charles tried to reform, met resistance but ploughed on regardless, however once the 1809 campaign ended things stopped and the Aulic Council reimposed control. With Austrians I don't think it really matters what formation they used; their command ability (with Charles as an exception)was appalling, officer corps were without initiative and so on. The soldiers were brave and fought well but without the leadership element a column, line, wedge, horns formation will not work…..:)

cheers
Jon.

Bill -

Are the 'double company' columns you refer to divisionmassen? As others pointed out, the Austrians used a variety of columns in 1809. Battalion columns, battalionmassen, half-battalion columns, and divisionmassen formed with 2 or 3 massen. In all they were quite flexible when one factors in their use of the third rank as skirmishers or to extend the line. Do your notes from Krieg also have anything on tactical arrays?

Tom:
Yes, I was referring to the divisionmasse when I said 'double company'. And yes, the Austrians had the same type of column formations in their arsenal as the French and Allies--just with different names. For instance, massen is the Austrian term for 'closed column' and Manovrir-Kolonnen for 'open column' or colonnes a distance entiere, or at full intervals.

Battalionmasse is the equivalent of the French term 'masse de battalion', a closed column of divisions found in any army. In the Austrian Exercier-Reglement in the introduction to Part II, section I refers to columns [colonnen] and not until section II is Massen introduced, the introduction saying

"If the intervals of the (successive subdivisions) of a Kolonnen are closed up to the distance of a rank, a Masse is formed."

As far as I can tell, the Austrian Bataillonsmasse looks just like the French colonne serree par division.

The Austrian Divisionmasse was simply a column formed of a division. There are three divisions to a battalion, of two companies each. It was formed on a half company front, and could be formed with all three divisions arrayed 50-60 paces apart. It was a small formation, and fairly unique to the Austrians from what I can tell.

Here are a few examples of its use from the Krieg 1809 KiK Kriegsarchiv, Vienna, Seidel & Son, 1910.

Page 244 --fighting at Urfahr:

"The 2nd battalion of IR K. Schroder occupied Katzbach with one division while the other two deployed to the north of the road and town. Soon the third ranks of these two divisions were drawn to extend the skirmish line of the Grenzers and Jagers." [three divisions from the 2nd battalion]

Page 302 --fighting around Schwartzlackenau

"A deployment (of IR Kerpen) on a broad front in the overgrown and often cut-up terrain was not possible. Therefore, the 1st battalion was split up into three groups of two companies each, the 1st division was to advance on the right and try to win the Hubertus dam. The 2nd through the middle of the island, led by Major O'Brian. The 3rd division along the right bank of the schwarten Lacken. The general direction was toward the Jagerhaus. The divisions formed themselves into small columns of half companies were to advance at the same level."

In Vol. V covering Italy, page 80--fighting at Pordenne

"GM Schmidt meanwhile had the 2nd battalion of the 1st Banal (Grenz) Regiment form divisionmasses. The center division commanded by Col. Boxich was directed against Roraigrande while the right enveloped the town, the left was to advance against the road leading from Pordenone."

Bowden in his Armies of the Danube says that Austrian officers disliked the Divisionmasse and didn't use it unless Archduke Charles was present. He wasn't present during any of the above examples.

That's what I've got. Way back in the early 1980s, Eagles, Empires and Lions had a long-running debate on the Austrian formations of 1809, starting with issue #43.

I hope that addresses your questions.

Best Regards,

Bill H.

Thanks Bill, it does, however, I am still waiting for an answer to my question posted the other day:

I continually read about how the Austrians used Columns in 1809 for attacks but what about 1813? Did they revert to a more linear style of micro management again in 1813 or were the use of columns just as prevalent as they were in 1809?

I would dearly love to find out it the doctrine had changed by 1813 either formally or informally?

Regards,
Shane

Shane:
I'll dig, but what makes you think doctrine could have changed by 1813, particularly when there is no effort to establish *more* reforms? A regression? Not sure why that would happen either, particularly with the massive build up of the army after 1812, but I suppose it could have.

Bill

I remember reading that after 1809 and Charles being given the boot that Francis and certain men in the Austrian hierarchy wanted to also kick out the reforms he built and tried to implement back in 1809.

I want to know if this is true and if so how much did these guys take out.

As for where I read this I cannot tell you, but it did stick in my mind.

Shane

Why should doctrine have changed in 1813? An unfound bias.

Rothenberg's book is not to be recommended – too many mistakes, the only English authors who cope with the sources are seemingly Duffy and Hollins.

And yet Hollins usually refrains from critisising Rothenberg's book, I've heard him say that it is the only decent work on the Austrian army available in english. I think he even worked on a corrected edition in the 90s (I know he disagrees with some of it, just saying Hollins never discarded outright the whole book).

Yeah, there are relatively few good books on the Austrians for this period, even Nosworthy's book speaks about this lack of information. 1809 is covered fairly well but 1813 it seems to be a distinct lack if information.

I wish I could find the quote I am speaking about but sorry I cannot. I would be interested to see what changes there were because I remember reading that Charles had his detractors who could not wait for him to go.

Nosworthy talks about the reforms of 1809, some of them are:

– The formation of battalion masse for second or third line troops as a, "defensive" formation only to repel cavalry.

– That the formation for attack was to remain the, "Line"

– Third rank skirmishers were to proceed in front of the lines during the attack

– The first use of the Corps system but this proved to be poorly done due to a lack of understanding by senior commanders how to handle large formations and how to combine all arms

– First use of concentrated artillery (grand batteries)

and so on…

Basically the army was still very Linear in its style using Lines for attack and columns for defense but they were heading in the same direction as the French albeit slowly.

Interestingly Charles was acquainted with a small pamphlet called, "Resume des principes de lárt de la guerre" in 1808 while taking baths at Warmbrun by general Walmdem. In this pamphlet, written by Baron de Jomini Charles learned about the use of French attack columns which were occasionally also known as, "bataillon en masse". He states that Charles thus incorporated almost the same columns in 1809 onwards known as Bataillonsmasse. Charles actually met Jomini in 1814 and they discussed the wars and the pamphlet and its contents…

As far as I can tell, the Austrian Bataillonsmasse looks just like the French colonne serree par division.

The exception being that the Austrian version only had a "single" company frontage.

Shane wrote:

The exception being that the Austrian version only had a "single" company frontage.

There seems to be some serious debate about that. I would vote for the single company verson, but most writers insist that it is two companies wide--Bowden for instance shows it as two on page X of his Armies on the Danube. Even the debate in the EE&L never resolved it. I said that because it is the majority view as far as I can tell. Personally, I don't have that section of either the Exercier-Reglement or the Abrichtungs-Reglement that discuss the Battalionmasse--which as frustrating as it is, I can't confirm or deny. I tend to think it is only one company wide because a French Colonne serree par battalion is one company wide. It is what the French used for an attack column after going over to six company battalions, about the same time that Charles was writing his 1807-8. Dempsey in his book on Albuera describes the French single Company front [actually two half-companies as with the Battalionmasse], in connection to the V Corps formations.

About your question. The Austrian government was broke after the armistice of 1809. They actually issued new money and took in the old to control inflation. [They had printed money to pay for the 1809 campaign which helped wreck an already impoverished economy.] Which is to say that any changes that would have cost money--such as training--probably didn't happen in any substantial way.

There was some regression. For example, the Austrians abandoned the corps organization after 1809 and went back to two wings and a main body. That proved untenable very quickly in 1813, so they 'reverted' to Armee Corps.

Concerning tactical changes etc., this is what Rothemberg says in his book Napoleon's Great Adversary page 234:

Austrian strength increased steadily throughout 1813, but less than one third of the troops could be considered fully trained, the bulk, in Radetzky's words, were 'peasants in uniform.' Clearly the regiments were unable to perform the complicated manoeuvres of the 1807 manual and simpler tactics had to be adopted making the column attack and not the fire of the line the main element of combat. Already at Wagram the Austrians had relied heavily on attack columns and Schwarzenberg and Radetzky continued this trend. One 12 August, the Fieldmarshal issue new tactical instructions. "While it must be left to each of the generals and independent formation commanders how to deply his troops,", the instructions read, "it is my wish to lay down certain basic principles." In contrast to Charles who had considered the line as the normal combat formation both for the attack and the defense, Schwarzenberg preferred masses and columns for both situations. Offensively these should be screened by skirmishers, while for the defense he suggested deployment in chequer board formation so that the second line could provide both fire and shock support, and if opportunity arose, the units of the first line not engaged could fall or fire on the flanks of an advancing enemy.

While Rothemberg is not trusted by some, this is pretty much what Schwarzenberg's instructions say, the same instructions that warn that it is not necessary to deploy whole battalions as skirmishers. ;-7 Nafziger's Lutzen & Bautzen describe the Austrians using these very same tactics at those two battles. Of course, once I translate enough of the Krieg 1813/1814 I have, I might be able to speak to this in more detail.

Best Regards,

Bill H.

Again, thank you Bill, your information is invaluable. I will continue to find out more in this for 1813 also.

Regards,
Shane

Also Bowden is best to be ignorned for the fine print on the Austrian Army

Die Masse von einem Battailon wird daher am füglichsten mit halben Divisionen oder wenigstens mit halben Compagnien, jenes eines Regiments mit ganzen Divisons oder doch nicht mit kleineren Abtheilungen als halbe Divisions zu formieren seyn, und eine aus Zügen formierte Colonne muß, bevor sie in Masse geschlossen wird, wenn es anders Local=Umstände nicht hinern, erst in größere Abtheilungen aufmarschiren.

So Battailonsmasse – has a frontage of one company or half company while a Regimental Masse one of two companies – one division or one company only.

Source : Exercier – Reglement 1807, page 80

oohh, thanks Winter, that explains the confusion regarding the two company frontage argument does it not?

Shane,

I think you have misunderstood the research into line and column.

I am happy to be corrected here – and would appreciate specific source references if that is the case – but all of my readings confirm for me the following:

Line was always the preferred attack formation.

The change, was that instead of forming line at a distance from the enemy (typically over 500 yards away) and progressing with a more methodical attack – i.e. linear warfare – the French put into operation a newer emphasis which stressed rapidly advancing to the enemy combat zone (@200 yards), swift deployment into line and then a swift attack.

In this respect, the column was used to march up to about 200 yards from the enemy, at which point, a rapid deployment into line was made, and then the attack pressed with speed (ideally, one volley and a charge to chase the defender away).

This was misunderstood until fairly recently as meaning an attack was made entirely in column – which sometimes did occur in the open field, but rarely by design; usually, it happened because either the defender surprised the attacker before they had time to redeploy, or the attacker felt that both his troops were insufficiently drilled to perform the change to line within a threat zone and his opponent was insufficiently motivated to resist a pressed attack.

The date at which any book you read on tactics was written (unless a primary source) therefore, is important in colouring how that author interprets his material, particularly if that author is not referencing the primary sources – failure to do so being the reason why the misunderstaning was perpetuated for so long.

Thus tactical considerations and the technical ability of the troops involved dictated whether the 'attack' was in column or line, not doctrinal ones.

Remember also, if you come from a stereotypical situation where the army forms a parallel line to the enemy, under the eyes of the commanding general, and then advances along this frontage, only your two end most units have exposed flanks, and your colonels and majors are required to exercise minimal initiative.
If you instead advance as independent batallions until the last few hundred yards, each of those batallions has exposed flanks, which requires those batallion commanders to be able to react according to their immediate circumstances – i.e. it requires them to exercise initiatve, something emphasised by the Frnch during the Revolutionary wars.
This stereotypical battle of parallel lines, however, was not common to the Seven Years War, despite our perceptions. Sucessful engagements in this period always came from swift attacks on an unexpected point – whenever the attack was telegraphed by methodical deployment, the defender usually sucessfully reinforces his line in advance of the attack, or in extreme cases even perpares field defences. For example, successful Prussian oblique attacks always result from rapid redeployment onto the flank of the defender. Unsucessful ones always result from that defender having reformed their line in advance of the attack being delivered.
Equally, the next 'stage' on from obliquely skirting the defenders line to hit a single point of attack can be seen in the Austrian attack at Hochkirk where multiple columns of approach came up on the Prussian defences from 5 sides.

The 'new' tactical addition in the Napoleonic period, was a change in emphasis on this more fluid attack from the more methodical earlier approach, from the greater initiative allowed to lower level commanders (which this preferenece necessitated), and from the greater importance placed on skirmish screening in advance of the attack and long the full field itself.

But the real changes were not at this lower tactical level, rather they were at the higher organisational level – which was where the French properly excelled. The independent corps with its semi permanent divisional and brigade assignments and staffing, gave a settled 'team' who knew each other. The ability to leave each corps to its own devices for long periods, enabled more rapid strategic aproaches along separate roads – the Carre system. And of paramount importance, was the granting of initiative to lower levels in the chain of command, rather than in deference to the higher 'plan' developed by the all knowing commander in chief.

Gill gives clear examples of where the Austrians in 1809 did not apply these macro changes.
Both sides were utilising the micro ones according to the circumstances at the tactical level.

Columns as an attack formation, therefore, are really only 'normal' when assaulting defences and built up areas – where the ability of ready troops to plug immediate gaps in the 'head of the column' are required – Or when the troops themselves were not considered to be sufficiently well drilled to execute the manoevers quickly enough whilst in the Combat Threat Zone (@ 200 yards).

Remembering the real difference (aside from width and manoeverability) between a French regiment deployed in column and one deployed in line, is that the line deployment has its local reinforcements 300 yards behind it (the second batallion), whilst at column level has the next reinforcing company about 40 yards behind it.

Further, Austrian Battalion Masse were simply closed up columns, a technique unique to the AUstrians from their encounters with Cavalry heavy Ottoman armies. Its nothing more than a closed column, i.e. a formation highly vulnerable to roundshot, but appropriate for rapidly forming square. Its 'preference' comes not from its superior attacking qualities, but from the ability its narrower width gives to faster movement to the point of attack for less trained troops.

Training not doctrine, again, is the factor here.

In short, you are looking for a doctrinal change which does not really exist, although you may find something on the use of the third rank for skirmishing.
To prove or disprove a linear : column doctrine, you would need to find a battle where the Austrians formed a line (of at least a brigade width) over 500 yards from their oponent and then began an advance in that extended linear formation with well trained troops who upon reaching effective musket range, proceeded to fire, advance, fire, advance, fire…

I do not think you will find such a thing.

sorry that was so long

WV:
Thank you for that clarification. However, this confuses me:

So Battailonsmasse – has a frontage of one company or half company while a Regimental Masse one of two companies – one division or one company only.

For the Austrians, a division was two companies at the battalion level. So what does it mean 'one division, or one company?' If it was a front of one company, that would be a battalionmasse…

I think the one company front is one company or two half-companies. As the frontage defined the kind of column it was, to say a Battalionmasse is one or one-half company, or a regimental masse has a frontage of two or one company is confusing. A one company front is a battalionmasse.

What am I missing here?

Bill H.

I agree with Keraunos that orignally the column should deploy and one finds a lot of examples and possibilities how the differnt columns had to deploy into line.

However – also the Austrians used the column intentionally as a force of shock which was not designed to deploy, you can read about this philosophy or "doctrine" in

Anleitung zum Selbst = Studium der militärischen Dienstwissenschaft, Dritter Band Manövrirungskunst im Felde, Wien 1809, namly on pages 289 – 292
and also how to cover those columns with skirmishers.

I would recommend this book to all who are interested in the Austrian Army and how it worked or what the author of this work (an Austrian officer) thought about it.

Of possible interest:

"Die Infanterie im Kampfe gegen Cavallerie. Eine historische Skizze. (Mit einer Tafel Nr. 17.) Die franzosischen Revolution – Kriege (1792) bis zum Jahre 1866" (End of Series) by Lt. Kuberth. Found in Streffleur's Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, Jahrgang 13 (1872), Vol 4, pp 173-189:

link

Title page for Vol 4:

link

I am afraid I have no German to reference those works.

But my question is, this Austrian shock column.

How much training did the troop require to perform it on the field?

When was it developed, and can we have a couple of examples of it being used in the field please.

Hi Keraunos,

Actually, you might have misunderstood me, I am not talking about the French here, I already understand the tactical doctrines they used for lines and columns etc, this is not what I am trying to understand.

I am looking at this from an Austrian point of view, they began to utilise columns more in 1809 due to Charles discussions with Walmdem in 1808, this came about due to the pamphlet written by Jomini according to Nosworthy…To me it seems that Charles mentality for 1809 was, "I you want to beat them you must fight like them". Meaning, he decided to adopt French style tactics which were better understood once he discussed them with Walmdem.

Shane

Shane,

no misunderstanding at all, that is exactly what I thought you meant.

I await with interest the details VW and Stephen posted to see if I need revise my opinion to include some sort of open-field battering ram doctrine from the Austrians.

I'm expecting to find it was a tactic recommended for hasty raised conscripts though – which is entirely fitting with my current opinion, just a little fleshier around the detailed specifics.

I cannot say anything about battle field examples, here Bill Haggart is more into the 1809 campaign, all I can say is what an Austrian infantry officer writing a handbook for officers in several volumes did say.

Those columns – pressing home for an attack, were not surprisingly seen by the French and taken as example – not as a sinlge tactical doctrine – but when terrain and other sound tactical doctrine – such as artillery superiority or silencing the enemy artillery befor attacking was approbriate.

This has nothing to do with conscripts at all.
Seemingly this was not a tactic due to poor conscription but just for infantry in general.

Perhaps the use of the column – whether Austrian, Prussian, Russian or French – as a 'shock' element, that actually didn't deploy to line in the 'threat' zone, was seen more and more in later years simply because the defending forces didn't have the training or the morale to hang around when confronted by an apparently more enthused opponent.
From the attacking generals perspective, if it looked like his opponent was already shaken and about to disintegrate, there was no need to deploy. But the idea of slamming his column into the face of a formed and disciplined line would probably not be the best policy – and in that case he'd have to deploy and engage in a firefight – before pressing any advantage and charging with fixed bayonets.
The bottom line was not to actually cross bayonets, but to break your opponents will to stand and fight – and this was best done, after much hard work with cannon and small arms fire [skirmish and/or volley], before rushing forward with the bayonet, in order to seal the deal.

@Ligniere

Yes – absolutly – but despite there was always the basic idea that a column should deploy (the colonne d'attaque was designed for that) – columns were used successfully to brake through (circumstances permitting) – and in case timing and preperation were not right – it was disastrous for the attacker.

As Clausewitz calls it – it was not to physically batter the enemy to to batter his morale.

Demian, Johann Andreas (1770-1845). Manövierungskunst im Felde: (fur Officiere der k.k. Osterreichischen Armee). Wien: Katharina Gräffer, 1809. 176 S. mit Kupff; 8vo. Also: Neue, verb. Aufl. 1812.

I could accept this late war assault column was not based on your own troops inability to deploy, and instead was based on trusting that you opponent's troops will not have the experience and training to stand a detemined advance.

but I still think an example or two is required. (I'm prepared to wait for Gill to get to 1812-14 for it, BTW)

certainly, late war, (post the Berezina) when everyone was exhausted, and regimental guns were being re introduced to bolster moral, and so forth, it is plausable.

I'm not sure this is what I think Shane was originally seeking information on though.

No, but interesting all the same. My own opinion is the same as Ligniere's, I always felt that the use of columns was a psychological weapon against the enemy but it was not designed originally for that purpose. It was designed to enable more flexibility to get to the enemy more quickly then deploy closer in order to fight it out in the traditional style of volley fire. It just happened that in many circumstances the enemy, became he became so intimidated by the column, sometimes wavered thus columns commanders in these situations continued to advance causing the enemy to panic and break.

From that point on the column took a life of its own with seemingly limitless opportunities against an enemy who did not use them also. But as nations adopted the same tactics this forced a re-balancing of the natural order of things and battles once again became more bloody with less opportunity for advantage of one side over the other.

What still amazes me is that the British army did not let themselves become intimidated by the columnar tactics and Wellington himself said, "If what I hear about the French tactics is true I think it a false one", "I at least will not be intimidated by them"…and so on. Instead of using the same French tactics to counter them he instead adapted the Linear tactics to best counter the columns…

Jomini said that the doctrines of the linear style of warfare were a thing of the past and that columns were the modern way to fight but he said this in 1806 before Wellington went to Spain. So I think by 1813 he might of wanted to eat his own words.

I think this is why the Austrian high command decided not to use columns for anything other than a defensive posture, "columns of waiting" (most of the time) to repel cavalry. Which would then deploy into line if engaged, but continue to use lines to attack an enemy as per the usual traditional method.

Yes, I have read they also used columns for attack but how prevalent was this? Was this a tactic used in 1809 and onwards right through to 1813-14 or was this not used at all? Nosworthy states it was only a defensive tactical formation for the Austrian army…

Basically I am looking for what the changes were in 1809 from previous doctrine which I have pretty much found now, but of those changes what was changed in 1813? The Austrian army did not evolve so rapidly as say the Prussians in its reforms, it seems to have been a slow progressive change so as not to upset the apple cart so to speak. I want to understand how this army evolved in 1813.

I read that the corps system of 1809 was a failure according to Nosworthy and that they went back to the wings and main body etc but quickly went back to the corps system again early in the 1813 campaign for one reason or another. Probably because the Prussians and Russians had done so…and this is at a macro level but my interest is for alterations made at the micro level.

Shane

From Demian there must exist either a third volume or a second part of volume 2

Zweyte Abtheilung

Die allgemeine Gefechtslehre

What you see is what I got! <;^}

See:
link

Die Gefechts, und Manövrirungskunst im Felde: Erster Band, welcher die Vorkenntnisse und die allgemeine Gefechtslehre enthalt. Published in 1807. 384 pages.

Demian, Johann Andreas *1770-1845*; Rittig von Flammenstern, Andreas *1777-1818*. Handbuch der Waffenlehre: zum Selbststudium über die Einrichtung, Wirkung und den Gebrauch der … Waffen aller Art: für k.k. Officiere / nach Demians erster Ausg. zu, 2. Mahl umgearb. u. verb. von A. Rittig von Flammenstern 3. verm. Aufl. Wien: Straß in Comm, 1823. XII, 299 S.: 5 Ill. (Kupferst.); 8vo.

Demian, Johann Andreas *1770-1845*. Manövrirungskunst im Felde / von Demian. Wien; Leipzig: Gräffer, 1809. 176 S.; 8vo.

Demian, Johann Andreas *1770-1845. Waffenlehre. Wien: Gräffer, 1808. [18] Bl., 372 S.; 8vo. Anleitung zum Selbst-Studium der militärischen Dienstwissenschaft / [Demian] ; Bd. 1.

Demian, Johann Andreas *1770-1845*. Anleitung zum Selbst-Studium der militärischen Dienstwissenschaft: mit Kupfern / [Demian]. Wien : Gräffer, 1808.

Handbuch der Waffenlehre: Anleitung zum Selbststudium der militäärischen Dienstwissenschaft / Johann Andreas Demian.

Demian, Johann Andreas. Handbuch der Waffenlehre: zum Selbststudium uber d. Einrichtung, Wirkung u. d. Gebrauche d. in d. k. k. Osterreichischen Armee eingefuhrten Waffen aller Art; fur k. k. Offiziere ; mit 5 Kupfertaf. / [Johann Andreas Demian]. Neue umgearb. u. viel verb. Aufl. Jahr 1812. Wien: Gräffer, 1812. XXXII, 299 S. Gen. Fußnote. Fruhere Aufl. u.d.T.: Anleitung zum Selbststudium der militarischen Dienstwissenschaft, Th. 1 Waffenlehre. – Spatere Aufl. u.d.T.: Handbuch der Waffenlehre / Andreas Rittig v. Flammenstern.

Und …:

Demian, Johann Andreas *1770-1845*. Terrain und Gefechtslehre / (Demian). Wien: Gräffer, 1809. Mit Kupff.; 8vo. Gesamttitel: Anleitung zum Selbst-Studium der militäärischen Dienstwissenschaft / [Demian]; Bd.2.

Shane wrote:

Yes, I have read they also used columns for attack but how prevalent was this? Was this a tactic used in 1809 and onwards right through to 1813-14 or was this not used at all?

Shane:
That will require a survey of primary sources, otherwise you are having to accept others' generalizations or make conclusions on a few antidotes. It may be my advanced age, but I have become very leery of generalizations made on one or two examples, or by authors, even ones that I respect, if I don't have a good idea where they got their information. All too often [@50% of the time] I find the generalizations don't match the facts, Jack.

Shane wrote:

I read that the corps system of 1809 was a failure according to Nosworthy and that they went back to the wings and main body etc but quickly went back to the corps system again early in the 1813 campaign for one reason or another. Probably because the Prussians and Russians had done so…

From what I understand, the corps system wasn't a failure in 1809, but that because the Austrian army was forced by the French to disband all but 150,000 men, it was simpler to dissolve the divisional/corps system altogether and keep all the regimental cadres intact.

The Austrians were also reacting to French pressure. It wasn't lost on Napoleon that the Austrians were getting better and part of the reason was their 'copying' French methods. There was also some Austrian pride involved, not to be seen as simply trying to emulate the French.

As for going back to the corps system. Once the Austrians rebuilt their forces to @300,000, they found it difficult to not only control such numbers with only divisions and four wings, but it didn't work well in the Allied system agreed upon. The Russians, Prussians and Austrians had agreed that to thwart any effort by Napoleon to isolate and defeat one of them, all armies would have forces from all three Allies. So, there were several reasons for going back to the Corps system by September 1813.

Even so, the Austrians attempted to give these corps a different name: Armee Abtheilungen. But they were functionally corps formations and the term 'corps' crept into official reports and inner-army communications.

Bill H.

In der zweyten Abtheilung, nämlich der Gefechtslehre, sind einige vorzügliche gute Sachen …

Yes, I agree absolutly