"Prussia 1806-Reasons for the Collapse" Topic

Now we're getting somewhere…

aye, thanks Kevin, enlightening stuff.

Shane,

It's a great book and very informative. I highly recommend it.

Sincerely,
K

Kevin:

Yes, that is a great find. I sure didn't see it reading White. That looks like what Milo was asking for.

The one caveat is that Scharnhorst wrote the sheets referred to as" Nachlass Scharnhorst" specifically about "a commission of officers from all arms of the service" to prepare new Reglements based on the "actual state of the art of war."

So when he is speaking of using the "French model as a foundation to build a doctrine", he is speaking about a new set of regulations--Milo's X--as a door through which other aspects of the Army might be reformed. p.38

It is not clear who actually saw the papers before 1806…certainly not the king who was intended recipient. White says it was circulated in the officer's association Militarische Gesellschaft, but when and to whom is not said, and that is the end of it until it is brushed off and the commission process Scharnhorst described is used to develop the Regulations of 1812.

So he did write it, but who was privy to it before 1806 isn't clear.

Bill

Bill,

As the Militarische Gesellschaft was composed of a considerable number of Prussian officers, including generals, it appears to me that Scharnhorst was not only not afraid of who saw it, but intended it to be both read and debated, which was the purpose of the organization to begin with-education is discussion and exchange of ideas.

Sincerely,
K

Kevin:

Yes, I know. As I said, it is not clear who saw it. There is no indication that the King knew about it. [White says this, page 37] As the Queen's brother, members of the King's family and counselors were all members, and there is no written critiques of the work [which was also a norm for the Militarische Gesellschaft group with papers presented to it], it appears:
1. It wasn't formally presented/read during an association meeting.
2. It 'probably' wasn't circulated to the entire Militarische Gesellschaft.
3. It 'probably' wasn't shown to anyone who had access to the King, and there is no response from the king written or recorded by others--remember it was written specifically to the King as a request for the Commission.
4. It is not clear when it was written and circulated.

Which is a long way of saying it appears to me that Scharnhorst's proposal wasn't read and debated by the whole association, nor seen by those who would mention such an 'original' proposal to the King.

I don't know why this would be, and I have no idea what Scharnhorst might or might not have been afraid to do.

Scharnhorst obviously had the support of the King and Army to gain the positions he did in the five years before Jena.

White does document several instances where Scharnhorst chose to tread softly during this period. He was fairly new to the Prussian army, having joined in 1801. The Militarische Gesellschaft had already formed when he became a member, and then director…so I don't think fear had much to do with his actions.

Bill

And Kevin:

And having said that, it still is a great catch, to find a primary source--Scharnhorst--saying exactly what you were looking for. Doesn't happen often. ;-j Look at the King's quote by Rottemburg. No idea where than might be found among the scores of books listed in his book. In other words, it's simply lost.

Bill

Even if the Prussians would have had copied the French tactics completley in 1805 or ealier, that would not have prevented their downfall in 1806, the leadership was almost non existend.

However – their tacitcs used in 1806 were not that obsolete and not 7YW like – than it is believed.

To play down the defeat of the Prussian Army by the absence of skirmishers or linear warfare is much too simple.

[ it still is a great catch, to find a primary source--Scharnhorst--saying exactly what you were looking for…]

Well, it's a good lead, but we're not there yet. It's not the source, just an abbreviated reference to a source in a secondary work. There are several collections of Scharnhorst-Nachläße. I'm not sure which one this refers to, but I'm spending this whole week at the GS-PK in Dahlem, so if it's there, or in Potsdam, I can go see for myself, in the man's own pen, which would be nice.

I don't have Chuck's book with me, obviously, so if anybody does have it handy, and can please save me some time by going to the Biblio and specifying which collection, exactly, in which archive, we're talking about, I'd appreciate it.

For example, is it at the GS-PK, under "HA. IV Militärgeschichte" ? (If so, I'd be surprised, since they have virtually none of Scharnhorst or Gneisenau's Nachläße there.)

Is it in Potsdam? at the AKA?

I'll see if I can find Chuck's email address from here.

Currently, Scharnhorst's bequeathd documents are being published in a series, the transcription being made by Tilman Stieve:

Gerhard von Scharnhorst – Private und dienstliche Schriften
Veröffentlichungen aus den Archiven Preußischer Kulturbesitz, volumes 52,1 to 52,5

4 volumes already were published, the next one, dealing with 1808/09, will appear in the next month, it seems.

PS. Accidentally, I will be in the archives in Dahlem from 5 to 9 October – will you still be there so that we shall meet ?

Best send me an e-mail: sans-souci@gmx.de

'To play down the defeat of the Prussian Army by the absence of skirmishers or linear warfare is much too simple.'

No one is doing that. The only person that keeps bringing that up is you.

The reasons for the Prussian defeat have been listed on this thread and others ad nauseum. Perhaps you should reread them and then perhaps you will understand.

And, no, it is not a complex problem. It is quite simple. The only person that seems to make at attempt at making it complicated, again, is you.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Kevin wrote:

"And, no, it is not a complex problem. It is quite simple."

Kevin:
Make that two people. It's not a problem, but the reasons for the Prussians' collapse aren't simple. That's why Paret is still writing about it…

"--failure in battle. Much of the literature dealing with this subject has tended to oversimplify what is in reality a complex and complicated phenomenon."
—Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes:
Anatomy of Failure in War. page 1

Best Regards,
Bill H.

Hey Oli !

Yes, I'll still be here. I'll send you an email privat. Wär' schön, wenn wir uns treffen könnten!

PS – didn't look at the Findmittel today; I was too busy with my own stuff.

At Saalfeld, at Auerstädt, and at Jena, the French were victorious. But even, though men like Lannes, Davout, and Napoleon led them, and if at Jena they had superior numbers of men, these victories were aquired only after fierce struggle.

We come here to a topic much debated, but up to now only superficially examined and which deserves to be cleared up. As we have already said, we can state that the elemenatry tactics od the Prussian infantry did not place it, a priori, in a noticeable inferior position vis – à – vis the French army. Otherwise winning would have been much easier, and the struggle would not have lasted so long, nor resulted in such heavy losses.

The fierceness in the struggle during thes battles proves that the thesis supported by General von der Goltz, after so many others, in his work Rosbach et Iéna and d'Iéna à Eylau, stating that the Prussian Army had declined in 1806 but improved in 1807, is absolutly false. The troops deserved the same praise in Jena and Auerstädt as at Eylau and Leipzig. From 1807, the only thing that changed were the commanders.

When we think that the vanquished of 1806 were the same who inflicted upon us setbacks in 1813, 1814, and 1815, and when we see at Jena and Auerstädt the energetic attitude of the old survivors of the true Frederician era, like Field-Marshal von Möllendorf, we cannot help but think that the same army commanded by similar me would have met with a totally different fortune.

Bressonnett, Napoleon's Apogee, page 333 and 337

Bill and Oliver,

I guess I just don't see the difficulty in 'discovering' what happened to the Prussians in 1806.

My senior year at West Point the Jena Campaign was the campaign study we conducted and it was quite thorough. The course was entitled 'History of the Military Art' and the Napoleonic period was a subcourse in the year-long course.

Seems to me to analyze a campaign and the reasons for success and/or failure does take time and some digging in various source materials. But maybe the difficulty for some folks lies in the lack of professional training. I personally don't think that is the case, but it does take some familiarity with research methods, which have to usually be taught, and some familiaity with how armies work.

That being said, I do not agree that there is a great degree of difficulty in studying, analyzing, and making sournd conclusions on a military campaign regarding methods, success or failure, or understanding what went on. Napoleon probably said it best: 'War is like everything that is beautiful and simple-the simplest moves are the best.'

The same can be said for the study and analyzing of historical events.

Sincerely,
K

That sounds an awful lot like "If you don't agree with my opinion, then you're ignorant and need more schoolin'"

No, it isn't. Sorry if it sounded that way, that is not the way it was meant.

I just don't believe the study of something you're really interested in is that difficult. There's a lot of work, but it isn't difficult.

Sincerely,
K

G'day.

Vendome, I do believe you have a point.

Oli said: 'To play down the defeat of the Prussian Army by the absence of skirmishers or linear warfare is much too simple.'

Kevin's reply: No one is doing that. The only person that keeps bringing that up is you.

Kevin, that's just not true. Every time the subject of 1806 comes up the same old tired, incorrect example of Grawert's division getting shot to pieces while standing immobile gets trotted out by you, Kevin. How many times has it been refuted, by how many different people, now? Yet you keep posting it on every new discussion about 1806.

Why?

Stop repeating the same old story and you won't keep being corrected. Being corrected seems to upset you, judging from your terse reply to Oli.

As for military service being a prerequisite for properly understanding military history, which you imply above, I don't believe that's correct (and I have served, as you know). It may help with understanding some facets, such as the difficulty for individuals to maintain alignment when moving in line, but equally it can be said that today's experience in uniform, especially if you never reached staff rank (that's you and I), probably has no bearing on understanding what happened 200 years ago. It may even make understanding more difficult, because our experiences seem to be pertinent. But insights gained from our service in the latter quarter of the 20th Century (and in the early 21st, in my case) are very, very different from the experience of serving 200 years ago. So how helpful is modern service, really?

Dal, who wandered in hoping for a good book review. Instead I'll probably get DH'd again.

I do not agree with you Vendome or Dal,

I also served but never reached a staff rank. However, I do not think this hinders one from understanding the way soldiers fought 200 years ago at all. If anything it allows you to have a sense of understanding for their difficulties that civilians could not possibly begin to know, especially in the field or on campaign. There is a multitude of facets of military life that a modern day soldier can relate to with his 200 year old counterparts…

Also, I do not think Kevin for a second is implying what you are accusing him of. What I think he is implying is that having military service research training or some form of formal civilian training in how to research and study in an academic format allows you to better understand what to look for, how to analyse information and evaluate it.

I myself am currently doing a masters degree and I can assure you, what I have learned this year has really helped me better understand how to conduct research. I only spoke to a mate last night explaining this to him. I have not picked up a Napoleonic book in months due to the amount of study I am doing. However, understanding methods how to research has made me very determined and excited about the prospect of hitting the Napoleonic books when I am done. This is because I know I have learned a great deal from understanding researching methods, how to analyse, conduct evaluations of information and draw conclusions. This is something that cannot be understood without formal training unless one is naturally gifted or went on to higher studies.

It does not imply superiority, just understanding how. In saying that, anyone with a bit of push in them could pick up books on how to conduct research, read them, learn from them and apply their knowledge and understanding to conducting research if they tried. There are so many ways to learn how.

Shane

G'day, Shane.

If Kevin was making a point about research, why was he making it to Oli? Oli's qualifications as a historian would match those of just about anyone on TMP, I believe, and his books, articles and information given on various boards indicate he knows how to research a subject. Or if he was making it to Bill? Does he know what Bill's qualifications are? Reading Bill's posts, he seems to be competent enough in researching- his excerpt of Bressonet was more detailed and referenced than Kevin's, for example.

And why bring up West Point and Kevin's military service as part of his argument? Unless……..

As for military service giving us an insight into how the military of the Napoleonic Wars operated, I've been on both sides of that argument. If you have time, can you tell me exactly what insights we'd get that a good, solid historian wouldn't? We'd understand more about how an individual is likely to deal with certain situations, perhaps. But really, how is our experience today really going to allow us to understand the military of Napoleon's time?

Think about this- if we put a veteran of Long Tan into a section of 11PL, 6 RAR today then he'd be scratching his head and struggling to not just understand the technology, but also how today's diggers think and act when it comes to doing the job.

Cheers.

Dal.

Gentleman:

I am very interested in everyone's background, so I am glad to get it. There are some fascinating people with wonderful experiences on TMP that I'd never get to communicate with otherwise.

I received some excellent training as an historian. BA, and then masters. I also have a master's in education. I have been a history teacher in high school, and both a history and education adjunct professor in community colleges and universities in several states, including Alaska State University system, University of California and State University systems, San Diego University, Grand Canyon University, AZ, Long Island University, Washington State, to name a few. I have put together Graduate degree Social Science and Teacher training curriculum.

I have also received training as a simulation designer and training game designer, creating them professionally for over ten years while a designer of training courses for education and business.

I have also published articles on military and other 19th Century history, simulation design, and education. I designed a published board wargame "Napoleon's Triumph" by Simulations Canada, as well as been a contributing editor for Fire and Movement and the old Campaign/Panzerfuast. I have provided articles for every major wargaming magazine in the United States over the last thirty years. I have also done the graphic components and boxtops for a number of wargames including "Destroyer Captain" and "Grant Moves South". I have also taught numerous workshops on line and at writer's and educational conferences on historical and simulation topics. I have presented at every major educational conference in the US.

However, while that might tell you something about me, it doesn't mean much at all when speaking of historical evidence. In fact, I get very suspicious--and frustrated-- when a question of historical evidence is answered with someone's credentials or whether a particular historian is trusted or not.

All we know about history is from the historical evidence, and everyone, regardless of their credentials, has the same general access to the evidence [with work, of course].

Historical evidence is the great leveler, and there are many 'amateur' historians that are doing great work. A professional historian may have more time, access, and training to get great evidence, but it is still the evidence that counts, not someone's credentials.

I know that my education and historiographical training for just my Bachelors in history was better than some doctorate degrees from my experience with universities, developing curriculum, and then earning my Masters from another institution. That doesn't mean a thing here. It's what I do with it that counts.

And all historians can be wrong, and being human, are at times. For instance, I have a great deal of respect for David Chandler. I devoured his Campaigns of Napoleon as a teenager. However, I know that when he wrote:

"In doctrine, however, the Prussian army was hopelessly outdated in its concepts. Everything was related to the days of Frederick the Great, and deviations from the Master's precepts were not countenanced."

He is wrong. What he concludes simply isn't born out by the evidence. What is surprising is that the evidence establishing this is extensive and easily found.

Historical conclusions can be simplistic because they are conclusions from a large number of facts/interpretations.
It certainly is true that the French beat the Prussians in 1806 because they had a better army, or that Napoleon was a better army commander, but that doesn't really tell us what we want to know--the whys. That takes us back to the evidence. I really appreciate the sources and evidence that have been provided here--as well as folks' background. I learned a lot.

Best Regards,

Bill H.

Perhaps, this is a point to add the voice from a participant in the 1806 campaign. I believe this witness is reliable as he served on the Prussian staff and participated in the action on 14 October 1806.

While the experience of Auerstadt was still fresh in his mind, Gerhard von Scharnhorst wrote about the following reasons for the Prussian defeat (my rough translation and summary) as follows:

- Prussia, in the west, had few fortified places to rely upon;

- Prussia and its allies fielded a force in the campaign was not more numerous than half that of their opponent;

- the most important of all, the French had fourteen years of uninterrupted experience in three major wars in contrast to the Prussians who had only participated to a limited degree in some campaigns;

- the experience of the leader of the French army was not limited to war but included victory over a variety of other armies which was missing from the Prussian army;

- the Prussian leaders were not used to experience of being under fire and missed a bit of the aptitude (he wrote "Geshiklichkeit" = Geschicklichkeit = skill, facility, cleverness, aptitude, knack) for leadership in war which one can learn through the experience of war;

- the French army had men leading divisions, brigades, etc who had talent, record and experience in war at an age where their power in body and spirit was at the highest;

- in contrast, the Prussian army had army commanders, and at nearly all levels, who were in no revolutionary condition, having achieved their rank through years of service (he notes the one commander was 70, and most of the others over 60, years of age);

- the courage of the men at the head of the Prussian army was not that of their younger opponents as it was more of a passive form and he goes on a little more about their age.

Document 294. Aufzeichnumg dated ?, nach 14. Oktober 1806 [placed between a document estimated to be from from 1807 and one estimated to be from 1808] in:

Gerhard von Scharnhorst: Private und dienstliche Schriften. Band 4, Generalstabsoffizier zwischen Krise und Reform (Preussen 1804-1807). Johannes Kunisch, ed. Köln, Weimar & Wein: Böhlau Verlag, 2007.

Several comments previously posted cover s few of the points in this piece from Scharnhorst. Others, such as manpower and the method of raising them, are referenced indirectly by Scharnhorst.

In this piece, not one word about tactics, let alone about skirmishers or French tactical methods unless one strains the "experience in war" comment.

His view appears to come down the French having better leaders more experience with the ability to observe, orient decide and act (to use John Boyd's concept of OODA) – and to act decisively in the heat of action – than the Prussians.

Now, Scharnhorst was at Auerstadt, not Jena.

Yet, I have seen nothing in his correspondence for the rest of the campaign in 1806 and 1807, that he thought the Prussian army could not fight as well as the French tactically (he was L'Estocq's chief of staff and served during their success at Eylau).

Thus, I would suggest he may well have thought that until the leadership issues (including making the right decision at the right time) were solved, the tactics and training of the troops would go to waste. – R

Such a shame that it seems you now have to list your credentials when posting on the forum. It always comes down to the same old arguments in the end just go through past debates it's such a shame. BTW I have no military experience no educational experience no teaching experience no published works but I do enjoy the subject.

Wagram

Yes its easy Wagram even you can do it, just buy a few recent books (in English of course) and then quote from them, adding a few choice phrases yourself, this can be maintained for the next 10 years or more..

No way Wagram! You`d be "rumbled" by someone or other… their status and/or credentials would not matter much, they would only have needed to read a few more and better researched recent books… I`m not sure the language they`d have been written matters much either, but I guess that we get Bretlach`s drift!

Wagram:
It is a shame, though I am certainly interested in folk's background. I would think that enjoying the subject should be more than enough.

Ralpher:
Napoleon's conclusions on why the Prussians lost is very much the same, though far more derogatory concerning Prussian Leadership.

Graf Bretlach: Yes, anyone can do it, either to get a clearer picture of history or as one-upmanship. Certainly folks of similar interests can disagree on interpretations.

Graf Brelach,

I think that I will pass on trying to write anything on the subject my book collection is quite modest (quite like collecting uniform plates) and I doubt very much if I have the required knowledge to perform the task. I think that I will stick to reading the books and digesting the expert information provided by the TMP pages and it's contributors.

Wagram

If you have time, can you tell me exactly what insights we'd get that a good, solid historian wouldn't?

For a start I think you can start with the teaching in many military schools which discuss the campaigns of the era to their young officers. This alone gives the Lieutenants an insight into military difficulties of the time and what was done. Why else would this be taught at military schools all over the world? It's done to set a solid foundation of how things were done to act as a ladder for aspiring officers to better understand the evolution of warfare, you have to start somewhere.

Also, the broad grand tactical and tactical principles of that era are not unlike what occurs today but only on a grander scale. First you have both sides conducting scouting, then the battlefield is established and preliminary bombardments begin. Then you have attacks conducted once the artillery softening process has been done. You then see the breakthrough which pierces the enemy line and the resulting push to take advantage of the gap and so on. This is not unlike many battles all throughout the last two hundred years, the only difference being technology and radio communications etc.

Granted, today's technology of push button ICBM's and aircraft etc is way different to that of Napoleon's understanding of warfare but that is not the point. You still need combat soldiers to conduct battlefield tactics to take the ground and hold it. The training and tactical principles established by for example the 95th rifles of fire and movement are still the basis for infantry tactics taught in most established armies of today and it was not just the 95th that understood skirmish or open warfare as individuals. Many other units of the period were very adept at fire and movement, it has just taken us 200 years to refine it.

Guerilla combat was well understood during Napoleon's day, it was learnt the hard way but it was understood and became part of the principles of warfare of the time. It was and still is a dirty war but one which a many combat soldiers over the last 200 years would be able to conduct. I believe a French Voltiguer from the Spanish campaign would be right at home fighting in Afghanistan if implanted there, all he would need (over the shock of being there) is time to learn the technology which brings me to you other point:

Think about this- if we put a veteran of Long Tan into a section of 11PL, 6 RAR today then he'd be scratching his head and struggling to not just understand the technology.

Granted, but a I said, this would just take time and adjustment. Like any soldier, they adapt and learn, but they would still have a grounding to identify with…

but also how today's diggers think and act when it comes to doing the job

I do not agree, combat today in squad tactics has not changed so dramatically as to make a veteran of Vietnam redundant as to today's style of combat. Technology might have changed and advanced but the principles on the technology of the soldier had not altered so dramatically as to render the same veteran superseded and non-effective. I am sure even a soldier in Napoleon's army could pick it up with ease who has combat training.

Shane

'Also, I do not think Kevin for a second is implying what you are accusing him of.'

Thanks very much Shane for your vote of confidence. It means a lot. As usual, you're right on the money.

Sincerely,
K

If you have time, can you tell me exactly what insights we'd get that a good, solid historian wouldn't?

Shane has covered a number if points, but I'd like to add a few.

Good solid historians don't necessarily research what wargamers want to know or have as interests, so there are any number of topics that wargamers discover that are generally outside the focus of academic historians.

For instance, the whole issue of how brigadiers controlled their brigades, with a regulating unit, or that Napoleonic armies arrayed themselves in very specific orders, are not things that historians have been aware of, let alone interested in.

There are a number of unique topics covered in Pen and Sword's Inside Wellington's Army that military historians have not investigated at all. Often professional academic historians are more focused on the battle narratives and politics rather than how an army was actually moved or the details of why certain decisions were made.

That is why in the last two years alone five battle narratives of Albuera have been published, adding to the dozen already on the market, each describing what happened in a very similar format, but only one book has been published how the British army actually functioned, why the organizational methods used at Albuera to move troops influenced the battle.

I know that another wargamer, not a historian, has shaken up academic circles with his unique discovers on Republican Roman legion organization, by sussing out information that any number of academic historians have overlooked, because they were focused on other topics.

Military history as a discipline also has its own unique problems. Jeremy Black's Rethinking Military History details some of them--which also opens the door for new insights outside of the discipline.

This doesn't mean good, solid historians can't discover such things, it's that they just don't because of other interests, other research priorities.

For instance, only recently have a handful of historians, mostly amateurs, been investigating the number of woman that have fought dressed as men in the Napoleonic wars and the ACW. The authors Deanne BLanton and Lauren M. Cook--neither professional historians--wrote They Fought Like Demons have discovered more than 2,000 different reports of women masquerading as men in Union and Confederate regiments. Six women dressed in confederate uniforms were found among the dead at the rock wall after Pickett's Charge. This information has always been available. The sources, including newspapers, military reports and journals have always been around, but no one was looking for it until two amateurs got to work.

I'd be glad to list any number of books written by amateurs and wargamers turned authors that describe military topics that are rarely considered by academia, if at all. That isn't a bad thing or some failing of good solid historians, but simply that they have been looking for different things.

With solid research, wargamers and amateur historians do have unique insights to bring to the table.

Bill H.

Well said Bill

Bill,

Without any irony at all, given posts a few lines above, could you post the names and authors of those two key citations – on alburera and the roman republic.

I am interested in looking those up myself.

"but only one book has been published how the British army actually functioned"
…
"has shaken up academic circles with his unique discovers on Republican Roman legion organization"

G'day, Shane & Bill.

Sorry for the delay in replying, but I've been up at the property, spending time with my horses and dogs. I then went down the coat for today. The weather, as expected, did not cooperate. Who turned the clock back to "WINTER"?

For a start I think you can start with the teaching in many military schools which discuss the campaigns of the era to their young officers. This alone gives the Lieutenants an insight into military difficulties of the time and what was done. Why else would this be taught at military schools all over the world? It's done to set a solid foundation of how things were done to act as a ladder for aspiring officers to better understand the evolution of warfare, you have to start somewhere.

That's a good point and one I'm happy to concede, to a point. If you talk to any ADFA or RMC graduate they'll all tell you that the main focus of their military history lessons were concerned with the logistic and strategic concerns, less with operational and tactical matters. They're taught for the reasons you mention, but perhaps not to the depth, especially in the tactical matters that sparked my initial response. Bill's comment on wargamers focussing on that area, where others may not, is a good one.

Also, the broad grand tactical and tactical principles of that era are not unlike what occurs today but only on a grander scale. First you have both sides conducting scouting, then the battlefield is established and preliminary bombardments begin. Then you have attacks conducted once the artillery softening process has been done. You then see the breakthrough which pierces the enemy line and the resulting push to take advantage of the gap and so on. This is not unlike many battles all throughout the last two hundred years, the only difference being technology and radio communications etc.

Not prepared to concede this one, though, as the study of the of operational and tactical methods isn't greatly emphasised. (Corollary- at least not in the last 30 years in Australia. Kevin and others who were fortunate to have Elting and Esposito teach them at West Point, or those lucky to have Chandler, Duffy and others teaching at Sandhurst, may have covered those areas more thoroughly.) So I think someone, whether they be a historian or just a committed enthusiast, is going to have the same chances of building an understanding as a member of the military. Perhaps more so, as the OC TSP in my last unit (ARes, though that's not an issue) was very interested in military history and bemoaned the emphasis on logistics at the expence of tactics and operational issues, when he was at RMC. He was mainly interested in the ACW and particularly annoyed that the lessons on Gettysburg didn'
t even mention the main features of the battle, but concentrated on why Lee went north, the battle started and Stuart's failure to keep Lee informed. Apparently they never even mentioned Ewell's failure at Culp's Hill or Sickle's handling of III Corps.

Unfortunately none of the officers I work with now are interested in military history, or I'd ask them if things have changed in the last couple of years.

The training and tactical principles established by for example the 95th rifles of fire and movement are still the basis for infantry tactics taught in most established armies of today and it was not just the 95th that understood skirmish or open warfare as individuals. Many other units of the period were very adept at fire and movement, it has just taken us 200 years to refine it.

In '75 they were still teaching us skirmishing, though they described it as "fighting by buddy pairs". Particularly useful for "diversions" and fighting through bunkers. By '83 it was no longer taught in the battalions, being deemed as "useless, as you lose control of your section" when I asked about it. Tactics seem to have fashion cycles as well.

I do not agree, combat today in squad tactics has not changed so dramatically as to make a veteran of Vietnam redundant as to today's style of combat. Technology might have changed and advanced but the principles on the technology of the soldier had not altered so dramatically as to render the same veteran superseded and non-effective. I am sure even a soldier in Napoleon's army could pick it up with ease who has combat training.

Sorry, mate, things have changed that much- the old section and platoon structures are gone. I'm not sure how much is in the public domain so I can't be more specific, but a digger from my time would be totally confused by today's organisation and even basic tactics. It would take him about six months to feel confident again. His basic skills would still be valid, but the way a section and platoon works would be foreign enough that he'd nearly have to go back to IET's. We're having this discussion on the history board of the Defence Network at the moment and some blokes from my generation are all saying the same thing- Infantry has changed in the last 10 years and old ts like myself would be lost in today's battalions.

And yes, I do feel extra old when my ex-diggers are now WO1's or LTCOL's!

Bill, thank you for your background. I'm just an enthusiast with no formal historical training. But I do have an opinion or two, as you may have noticed.

Take care, gents.

Dal.

To:
Santa
c/o The Elves Toys, Games and Book Department,
Lappland,
Arctic Circle.

Dearest Santa,

You must know that I have been reasonably good lately. Well, considering…. and considering too that I was educationally disadvantaged in only being taught French till the age of 14… and that I had no option to learn German.
However, I`m hoping that you will compensate me for all this in some way, maybe?

Well… I would very much like an English translation of "Das Preußische Offizierskorps und die Untersuchung der Krieg Ereignisse, Berlin 1906" … but in particular pages 151-181.
Its not really too much to ask… my poor eyes and brain are aching; I have struggled for hours now with a google copy of the aforementioned book, the squiggly gothic script and every other page is all nasty and blurry and what`s more, altavista babelfish translator doesn`t get on very well with those odd, early nineteenth century german military terms.
I guess you probably don`t get attacked by French or Bavarian napoleonic battle arrays very much in your line of work but what d`you think an "abbott healing" might be?
If only I had ease of access to all these things Santa… the games I put on would not be so unfair to the Prussians!!!

Michael.

xxx

P.S. reading French ain`t so bad… it`s much easier to fathom out as we were successfully invaded by them once; you know… ruling classes replaced and so we inherited a lot of their posh words for things… but kept all the ordinary and naughty swear words …. but you remember that though, surely?

When I earned my MA in history 20 years ago there was an emphasis on addressing what the sources tell us and being prepared to discard whatever we thought we knew based on the evidence, if necessary. Otherwise the whole activity is pointless. Research is an ongoing process of discovery, the easily accessible source materials are only the tip of the iceberg and cogent analysis in the end is just reasoned opinion based on available facts, meaning that any analysis needs to be reconsidered as new facts (the stuff that's NOT easy to find) are brought to light. Maybe they don't teach this anymore?

Seems to me that if you think it's easy, you're not doing it right!

Oh, and Michael – an "abbot healing" is babelfish-ese for Abtheilung = column. Babelfish will also describe French pomegranates defending a nipple in battle, which gives a whole new twist to things (those randy french)!

If you need a good online German-English dictionary, Leo is the best: dict.leo.org/?lang=en

Keraunos wrote:
Without any irony at all, given posts a few lines above, could you post the names and authors of those two key citations – on alburera and the roman republic.

Keraunos:

What two key citations are those? I don't remember citing any sources. Or did you mean something else?

Bill H.

[…but you remember that though, surely?]

If you're going to write to Santa, then surely you know that Herr Claus' mother tongue is Deutsch! (German kids get their presents first, followed by Austrians and Swiss, although Geneva has to wait… but they're so freaking rich, they don't really care.)

[Seems to me that if you think it's easy, you're not doing it right!]

Now THAT is the best summation of historical research that I've read thus far on this thread.

(If I have to decypher one more line of 200-year-old scrawl in incomprehensible faded Fraktur, my eyes are going to boil and melt out of their sockets. Fortunately I was saved by the batteries dying in my illuminated magnifying glass.)

This ain't easy.

If only they were all as good, careful penmen as Goethe. It would be a joy to read something this clear:

picture

"If you're going to write to Santa, then surely you know that Herr Claus' mother tongue is Deutsch!…"

OK then, so how did he know that I wanted a train set in October 1968?
Clearly, either he understood my letters in English, or someone on his general staff of elves did, otherwise my request would not have been processed quite so efficiently.

I still believe.

[OK then, so how did he know that I wanted a train set in October 1968?]

I hate to break this to you, but every little boy wanted a train set in 1968. That was a No-Brainer, even in the days before Asian sweatshops.

Thanks Vendome, … I`ll give it a try!

"I hate to break this to you, but every little boy wanted a train set in 1968."

Well possibly, but not every little boy wanted the exact, same steam locomotive!

Bill H,

I thought that I was being particularly clear – as I took the trouble to repeat the lines orignally posted which attracted my attention.

Perhaps if I rephrase.

You said with reference to Albruera

"…but only one book has been published how the British army actually functioned"

and you said with reference to the Roman republic

"…has shaken up academic circles with his unique discovers on Republican Roman legion organization"

I would like to know which two books / papers you are referring to, so that I amy read them myself, as they sound particularly interesting.

Santa been verra verra good to me. But then my family came from Germany! I didn't want a train (my dad already had one that he let us play with (once in a blue moon under close supervision). Not quite the same as having your own, but close.

In 1968 I got lots of Lincoln Logs, set up under the tree as a fort – two blockhouses, a lookout tower and stockade fence all around, defended by assorted Am Rev colonials under attack by redcoats – Britains swoppets, later deemed deadly choking hazards, although I never once tried tried to eat one (kids must have gotten much dumber than we were).

Ah, the golden age of toys!

More evidence for the existence of a man called "Santa" who gave toys to small boys (well, in 1968 at least).

If we can leave Santa to rest for a while… until the 24th December perhaps…

In the meantime, I was wondering which "French system" exactly was being referred to earlier.
Which one was it that the Prussians wished to imitate or were reacting to?
Presumably a system in use before 1805 (we`ve heard of letters and documents by Scharnhorst in the first few years of the C19th). Maybe it was the earlier military practices used against the Prussians themselves back to 1794?

Keraunos:

Gotcha. I was thrown by your use of 'citations'.

The Book is "Inside Wellington's Peninsular Army 1808-1814" from Pen and Sword, particularly the large chapter on "Order of Battle: Customary Battle-Array in Wellington's Peninsular Army, pp. 84-171. Authors Rory Muir, Robert Burnham, Howie Muir and Ron McGuigan. Howie Muir is the author of the chapter, and uses Albuera as one of the major examples of battle-array and moving troops.

The second one, "…has shaken up academic circles with his unique discovers on Republican Roman legion organization."

He is an Australian named Steven James, and he is working with academics in Ancient studies there to publish, so I don't have any details on that other than the fact that the papers are to be read around this time and a book will be out next year--and the professors he is working with were surprised by his discoveries and excited about it. I will have to get back to you on the Aussie University publishing it and any more details that Steven might want to share.

Steven has posted on the Ancient's discussion board before.

Best Regards,

Bill H.

Michael:

Yes, I am not clear one what 'French System' we are talking about, other than the last minute changes that the Prussians made in 1806.

Scharnhorst himself says in 1811 that the French weren't conscious of their own system. If true, how do the Prussians learn about it? From what source? The Prussians and Germans in general were producing lots of books on military subjects, the French very few after 1790. Guilbert and others had been translated in to German by then, but I am not sure those writers defined 'the French system.'

Bill,

Du Teil's Usage was still the current French artillery doctrine being employed in the field. Thiebault's staff manual of 1800 was translated into German and English. Artillery manuals were being produced in France continuously with their favious editions-both d'Urtubie and Gassendi's were in multiple editions. Others produced material also.

What Scharnhorst might have meant when referring to the French system was that they really weren't aware of what they were developing overall, but that they might have considered it a 'natural' development of what they were practicing on the battlefield. It should be noted (again) that the French never produced an army-level reglement for the employment of troops in open order in their various uses.

Producing something in writing is not necessary for practices to be employed. For example, in the French artillery schools for some time after 1765 there were no texts used or issued. The students made their own texts for their use and study from the instructors' lectures. Yet the instruction was uniform as the curriculum had been prescribed for both officers and NCOs.

However, divisions were organized and modified and became standard prior to 1800. Without a formal staff manual before 1800 the French staff organization functioned very well and was the most advanced of the period. The two staff manuals came after the practices were instituted. Corps were formed and organized without an official reglement and were ordered by either order or decree. Yet, all of these practices were institutionalized and became known by the other major powers. Scharnhorst was a student of his profession and the comments by him and his contemporaries on how the French were organized and fought were quite accurate. Scharnhorst did a study of the Marengo campaign and while some of his information was incorrect, the gist of what he found and wrote about was quite good (again see White's book for an overview which is quite good). 'Know your enemy' is an ancient military truism.

Sincerely,
K

From what I can tell the French system was the evolution of the system first developed long before the revolutionary period but shelved because it meant officers lost control of their men to an extent during the days of the monarchy.

When the revolution finally came this system was dusted off and tried in the field from that time on and refined by the late 1790's and perfected by 1805 during the previous war. When it came time to hit the Prussians in 06 it was at its devestating best as a tactical system of warfare.

It was not that the Prussian system was so bad but that the French system was so good. The Prussian system was still very much Linear in concept which suited the monarchy's of the day well due to the heightened control it gave them and the French Columnar system suited their style of warfare so well because it suited the fervor and enthusiasm of the men capturing it in a way that made the most of it, ie; attack columns.

Yes the French still fought in line also but the coupling of both Lines and Columns in the field and the flexibility it gave the Divisions was a system the Prussian Linear system could not match. If the Prussians needed to change to a developing situation they could not so easily do so due to the length of the lines in the Divisions and their deployments but the French, with their adherence to more flexible columns could.

Thus reaction to enemy movements was an advantage to the French way of conducting war but equally on the other hand the Prussians were still at a disadvantage when reacting to French movements on the battlefield. If you are in a tactical situation where the enemy has a distinct tactical advantage in reaction to movements over you then you will be on the back foot constantly until you lose all sense of equilibrium under pressure. Couple this with being outnumbered 2 to 1 and you are doomed to lose as the Prussians did.

The Prussians were a very professional army but incapable of effectively countering the French momentum. However, if you look at the 1807 campaign at Eylau you see Lestoq's command going toe to toe against the French and fighting extremely well. With a year's campaigning behind them and all the experience that brings to a formation and the weeding out of the sick and lame you end up with a fighting formation that is far superior to those that marched out originally in 1806.

This honed fighting machine was able to account for itself very well at Eylau and really took the fight to the French in a very professional manor actually getting the better of them during the fight. It shows that the Prussian army was not ineffective at all but simply needed experience and time to evolve into an effective fighting formation that it became. This is clearly evident from the 1807 campaign.

If the Prussians had taken a leaf out of the book written by the French during the second half of the 18th century and modified and adapted their own style of warfare to a more columnar style of combat they too would have gained advantage in battles against the French but this was not to be. The adherence to Linear style warfare was not due to duty and tradition to maintain what was known but to keep total control of the men in the formations under the officers who commanded them, who were mostly related to the monarchy. Remember, these men were the guardians of the king and treated like automatons to do his will, any semblance of free thinking was out of the question, this would lead to loss of control, a situation the officers feared most.

Not so with the French, the revolution was all about free thinking and nationalism and all that. Trying new things and also trying systems that were previously shelved suited them much more and thus the old was beaten by the new. This to me is simply evolution of warfare similar to what happened in 1814-18 and 1939-45. Things change in warfare and new concepts are adopted, if you fail to take advantage of new ideas you get left behind and suffer for it.

Shane