"Limber, Caisson Footprints?" Topic

Adkins' book Waterloo Companion shows the deployment of Napoleon's grand battery at that field taking up a depth that varies from 300-400 meters along the line. The line of limbers is 20-30 meters behind the guns, then their are 3 lines of caissons behind that. 12 pounders have more caissons than lighter guns, so can use the 3 lines. Lighter batteries would more likely have 2 lines of caissons stretching back 200-300 meters.

Several of us got together to play a game this past Saturday and this issue came up in that infantry squares deployed directly behind two batteries of Russian guns in one area and in another several squadrons of Russian cavalry charged through a friendly battery into approaching infantry.

Both were allowed without any argument, it was a learning game among friendly parties. But on inspection, little of this seems to stand or at least it leads to questions:

1. Formed infantry directly behind batteries (directly behind ≠ 200-400 meters behind the guns) was able to form square when enemy cavalry charged through the battery, the gunners took safety in the squares. Had limbers and caissons been represented what would the effect have been on the attacking cavalry? What happened in real combat? Would the cavalry have ever contacted the infantry square?

2. The Russian cavalry that charged through a friendly battery to attack advancing French infantry battalions. We had a short chat about how the "wargamer" thing to do would be charge through the battery and wheel 90º to strike some French dragoons in the flank, we both agreed that was outlandish. Instead the Russian cavalry charged through the battery directly ahead. That said, I don't think in retrospect they would have. The only written accounts I have read are of cavalry and infantry charging through abandoned guns to *retake* the battery, not charging through one that is in operation.

Thoughts on both of these are very welcome. And I would stress an interest on history over what "plays well." If it were fair, it'd be Checkers.

Cheers,

The Bandit

As I typically have limbers and caissons in my wargames behind the cannon, I let the charge go through unformed and slow it down a bit. The cavalry have to negotiate through all that sfuff. I would imagine the debris on the ground (buckets, ramrods, boxes of ammo, etc, could trip up charging horses. So it seems logical to slow it down and unform the chargers.

Aside from that, going straight up the nose of a battery seems to be a desparate attempt. Assuming the gunners stand the test of being charged, a close range cannister volley would add to the mess the chargers would face.

For me personally, it doesn't seem right for a cavalry charge to go through a battery formed and at full charge speed.

Back 'in the day' I used to run track and field. A straight dash down a field or track was a breeze. Going over hurdles or an obsticle course certainly could not expect the same result.

Another consideration this plays to is how fast a battery can realign to a new frontage and what respect the support personnel behind the gun play into this. It would seem likely (as discussed here: TMP link and please forgive me posting "access" vs "axis" …) that changing the axis of a battery is more work than withdrawing the battery.

Thoughts?

Cheers,

The Bandit

I would think that squares would not interfere when formed behind the battery. The alloted distance behind the battery is not a continuous line of stuff. There is the limber, then the first caisson, then the rear caissons. A square could be in that space, with the assumption that artillerists would work their way around the square when replenishing ammunition to the guns.

Friendly cavalry charging forward through the battery would be considered unformed, as previously suggested. IF, however, the cavalry is moving laterally through the rear area of the battery, then I would think they would be DISORDERED. No manouvering should be permitted in that "limber" area.

Just an opinion.

Widowson,

It seems like you were describing there being an open space between the guns and the limbers and in there the square could setup. That caused me to run through the train of thought below. I suppose all of it begs the question: how much empty space is there because …

How much space does a square take up?

An infantry square is ~75 meters on a side for a battalion of ~720 men per 1:60 basing and the LoG ground scale (1" to 50 meters). Is the space between the guns and the limbers more than 100 meters?

I am thinking that the factor is not the distance of 75+ meters but rather that there must be some space between the square and the battery and the square and the limbers, formations were not folded into each other so I'd suspect more than ten meters on each side of the square so we are around 100 meters. Now consider that 75 of that 100 meters is 75 meters *of soldiers* not empty space. Moving ammunition boxes for a 12lb gun 100 meters through 75 meters of men does not seem very successful, so the supply team would have to go around the square – this begins to feel likely to fail.

Besides, in this scenario the square becomes like the furniture you built a room around, when you go to move into a new home you have no way of moving the furniture back out because the door is too small. How would the square actually operate? At the least they certainly could not be considered to have any awareness of events outside of the battery (to the front beyond the edge of the guns, to the rear beyond the beginning of the limbers, or to the flanks where all these supply troops are hauling ammunition). Thus the "supporting" artillery couldn't react to any threat against the artillery until the threat had come through the artillery …

Sorry if I sound like I am ranting, I am just thinking through this out loud and it feels very problematic.

Cheers,

The Bandit

I respectfully disagree with Widowson's comment about squares being able to form square in the middle of a battery's deployment area and only somewhat hinder normal operations. A similar argument was made on the Carnage & Glory group recently… since units 'could' theoretically fit in the gaps between the limbers, cassions & guns, the idea was floated that depending on the relative angle of interpenetration, units in column could move with varying degrees of difficulty… get yer protractors out.

Moving through or deploying in the midst of a battery on the field would be (to my mind at least) a tactical expediency rather than standard operating procedure. While such things may have happened, making things too easy on gamers just encourages bad habits.

Bart

Sorry for the confusion. I would expect a square to be able to fit in the space between guns/limbers or limbers/caissons, but would NOT expect to see a square directly behind the guns. Rather I would expect to see them to each side and behind. How far to the side might vary. I guess that means it doesn't matter. The distances between rtillery echelons would be irrelevant if the square is to the side of the battery.

Bandit, check your math. A full-strength French battalion of 720 men in square would occupy about 33 yards of width/depth. 720 men/3 ranks/4 sides of the square x 20" per man/36" per yard = 33 yards.

As for the position of limbers, that would depend on the mission. In a defensive or fixed battery posture I would expect the limbers to be far in the rear, except that British limbers held more ammo than others. I don't know how ammo was delivered to a battery in action. Seems like a caisson would stay back from the battery and the ammo would be hand-delivered round by round, but that doesn't seem very efficient.

In any event, a scale 350 yards for depth of battery and vehicles would not seem out of line. Depth distortion is common to every infantry and cavalry unit in a miniatures game. Why not artillery? And I would add that this is less distortion than the typical infantry or cavalry unit would display.

Widowson,

As far as the math goes I am using the space taken up by the stands on the tabletop and scaling it per the rules in use.

720 men = 12 figures @ 1:60
Thus 4 figures per side of a square (with one figure being counted twice for being the corner).
Ground scale of 1" = 50 meters
One side of the square taking up ~1.5"
1.5" = ~75 meters

Not sure its accurate, just scaling up from the tabletop ground scale.

As far as having a square form off the rear flanks of a given battery that does not seem an issue. The concern I was speaking to in earlier posts was "supporting from behind" the guns.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Bandit,

With respect, if you don't care about the difference between 75 yards and 33 yards for the side of an infantry square, what's the difference for artillery depth?

I suppose it is possible for an artillery battery to be deployed, with only it's limbers in close proximity, and then have an infantry battalion find its way into the rear area and form square. Of course the artillery ammo would have to be carried around the square, but very little is absolutely impossible.

If limbers, caissons, and their drivers and animals, etc. can get out of the way for trees or rocks… then surely they can get out of the way for some infantry.

I think we have an unrealistic assumption that just because our miniature bases are fixed and inflexible, that the historical units must have been, too. But all of these units conformed both to terrain idiosyncrasies, and to the deployment of friendlies nearby.

Widowson,

I'm didn't say I don't care about the difference, I was explaining that I used the ground scale of the rules I play in order to estimate the space taken up by a square.

Why do I care about artillery battery depth? Because I am trying to figure out if their depth should hinder the movement of other friendly units.

Milo,

I actually wonder about the reverse. Often times our miniatures run around the battlefields with little regard for terrain or formation restrictions, obviously not everyone and obviously not all gaming groups, etc. But often times. Wargamers often deploy artillery in locations where the limbers and caissons could simply not travel or exist – such as with the back of the guns to a river. That is something that simply would not have happened. If anything I think the infantry should be yielding more to the artillery rather than the reverse.

Cheers,

The Bandit

I would not be unduly worried about the caissons etc forming the rear echelons of the battery when deployed. Infantry and cavalry expect to be able to cope with obstacles whether formed by friendly troops or by minor terrain features.

When you have a battery on the move on a road it is another matter – the battery takes a lot of road space and forms something of a linear obstacle to any other troops seeking to cross from one side of the road to another.

At Waterloo you have squares of infantry close behind the gun line.

Interestingly the French Reglements of 1791 plate 40 shows caissons being used in the intervals between battalions in a multi-battalion square.

There is a Waterloo Letter (53 Taylor 10th Hussars) in the previously Unpublished Letters (Glover) describing (and with a sketch) how the 10th Hussars in open column of half-squadron were to the right and rear of a deployed battery. If you imagine the battery formed from left to right across a clock face from 9 o'clock to 3 o'clock (but only taking up the middle of the clock face) then the cavalry column is about the 5 o'clock position heading for 3 o'clock.

The half-squadrons turn threes left so we now have 6 half-squadrons in little columns three horses wide. These trot towards the gun line and then wheel a little (still in these narrow columns) and pass between the guns and move forwards untill the last horses are clear of the guns. The half-squadrons now wheel back into line so we now have a column of half squadrons in front of the battery facing to move towards and beyond 3 o'clock.

There is no indication that this is in any way problematic.

"At Waterloo you have squares of infantry close behind the gun line."

How close?

This raises an interesting question about Waterloo – Wellington told his gunners to scramble to the protective safety of the adjacent squares just before they were overwhelmed by the French cavalry. Mercer, decided against this, because he thought it might destabilize the poor young Brunswickers who were supposed to offer his crews safety. Okay – so he stayed put – but the others, to my knowledge didn't. Are we to suppose that the limbers and first line caissons also sought shelter within the squares. If not – where were the limbers and caissons [horses and riders] in this moment of immediate peril. Presumably they'd been drawn off to the rear and the artillery park. Anyone have any knowledge of first hand evidence of where the limbers and caissons were during the French cavalry attacks?
I seem to remember reading that earlier in the day, the Union Brigade did some serious damage to the personnel of the train d'artillerie, that were in rear of the Grand battery to the east of the highway – so presumably they hadn't pulled out when threatened by the British cavalry. But I don't remember reading about the same fate occurring to the British and allied train personnel.

The limbers and caissons would certainly not have sought shelter within squares as there wouldn't have been enough room.

Captain Rudyard of Lloyd's battery left a reasonably good description of what actually happened:

"My horses, ammunition waggons, were in rear of our guns under cover of a little hollow between us and our squares of infantry. The forge cart, artificers' stores, and such like were in rear out of the fire. When ammunition was to be replenished, a subaltern conducted such waggons as could be spared. They were supplied from the depot in the wood and returned without delay….The cuirrassiers and cavalry might have charged through the battery as often as six or seven times, driving us into the squares, under our guns, waggons, some defending themselves."

So if Lloyd's men were sheltering under the waggons, it appears that they remained in position. No doubt some batteries' limbers and waggons may have retreated at times, and this is what perhaps prompted Wellington's dissatisfaction with his artillery at Waterloo.