"Napoleonic logistics" Topic

The French corps d'armee system is supposed to have enabled France's armies to 'live off the land' in the field. By dispersing the army's various formations over a wide 'front' (100 miles or more), troops could draw on local resources (generally, taking without paying) rather than relying on supplies brought up from the rear. Hence greater speed; hence the ability to manoeuvre more adroitly against Allied armies, as in the Ulm campaign (1805). (Obviously, in sparsely settled or backward theatres, like Spain and Russia, this wasn't possible; hence French difficulties.)

But what happened when French armies CONCENTRATED? Did they in fact *routinely* carry supplies (biscuit, salt meat, etc) with them in bagagge trains that they drew on ONLY when they concentated? If so, how much?

And how did the Allies manage, when generally political considerations prevented them from unleashing their troops on the local population (ie, Wellington in Spain, or Archduke Charles in Bavaria) in the way that French commanders seem to have done?

Is there anything other than Martin van Creveld's essay in his 'SUPPLYING WAR' that focuses on this admittedly wide-ranging topic in a relatively accessible way?

Thanks in advance for any comments/advice.

I recommend you read Rick Schneid's book on the 1805 campaign. He gives a sense of the massive scale of Napoleonic logistics. The French army, allegedly so fast because it "lived off the land," was in fact laboriously supplied, with thousands of men supporting its operations to make sure that things like grain, leather, ammunition, etc., was all moving with, and sometimes ahead of, the army.

The "living off the land" part was a bonus; i.e., looting!

I mean think about it: how much could any large army really depend upon impromptu foraging? You can get some food, at least for the most advanced formations in the line of march, but that's about it. For everything else you need, you've got to requisition it, have it produced locally and arrange its transport, or bring it with you.

I thought the intent was to increase mobility by allowing the various formations to make better use of the road net instead of marching in one giant column and then concentrate once the enemy was located.

I didn't think logistics had much to do with it. Magazines were still required, bakeries had to follow their units etc. regardless…

If I understand you both correctly, you're saying that, during the 1805 campaign, French troops were still being supplied more or less *daily* by commissaries with the regulation field rations (presumably bread/biscuit & salt meat & alcohol), which were carried with the army as it marched? i.e., hardly much had changed since the SYW, except taht no tents were employed.

That's *not* how I understood this epic march (or any other, for that matter) to have been conducted. As I understood it, as far as food went, French troops were more or less left to their own devices, at least until the army *concentrated*.

Any other views?

Napoleon was pretty good at logistics. Cities on the route of march would be stocked piled with food and munitions. Supplies were also brought with the armies and followed them. The living of the land theory shouldn't be taken at face value. Troops did live of the land but only to a degree. Troops would use the supplies they carried and supliment them with local produce. They would run out and go hungry until their own supply train caught up with them or they captured or found a friendly settlement. Troops did live of the land but the Generals weren't stupid and knew how important providing food and supplies were. Had Napoleon kept his army in good order in 1812 his army could well have returned from Russia in good shape. Napoleon had stockpiled several cities with more then enough food for his army. Unfortunatly he made a few wrong turns and a few bad decisions that allowed those supplies to be either captured or pillaged and wasted by his own men.

1805 large amounts of flower was transported along with bricks to make ovens. The french also captured huge amounts of supplies in vienna. There was also a huge supply chain which at one point came close to being captured by the austrains. The number of wagons, horses and mules used is quite staggering.

Living off the land might be possible for a few days assuming you already have other non-food supplies. But where, exactly, are you going to find half a million musket balls when you need them "on the land." The same is true for bread.

I think the phrase has grown into a myth – as if Napoleon;s army could somehow procure military hardware from peasants on the fly. Rather, Napoleon was more willing to march harder and run far ahead of his logistics in the quest for speed. But he didn't do away with supply wagons, he just outmarched them…

[ French troops were still being supplied more or less *daily* by commissaries with the regulation field rations]

Well, I think you've read a bit more into that, than was written. Nobody spoke of "daily" or "regulation field rations."

The point we're making is that the "living off the land" imagery has often been exaggerated or misunderstood, and that there were some simple logistical laws that no army could break. The Napoleonic French, particularly in the early-war period like 1805, were just better at doing these tasks, than most of their opponents were. That advantage in logistical scale and efficiency, combined with some very aggressive commanders and veteran troops, resulted in the army moving very quickly when it needed to.

And let's not forget the importance of operating in a friendly (and fat) country. Taking the 1805 campaign to Ulm, for instance, nearly 100% of that oepration was conducted in France, or allied states, where Napoleon could arrange in advance for a million rations of bread to meet the III Corps when it arrived in Dingbatsdorf.

Contrast that with the operations in Spain or Russia… and you can see that "living off the land" is a very poor substitute for having a proper supply network in place.

My understanding of the term "living off the land" basically is that the French were good at (in the early days) making say 14 days rations last 21 days. Where as many other forces by day 21 would have been 7 days without a bite.

TW

Jonspaintingservice (now that is a mouthful) makes excellent points – as an example, at Minsk alone Napolean had stock-piled 22,000 bushels of oats, 6,000 quintels of hay and 3,600 firkins of flour – unfortunately, the garrison commander, a chap named Mikolaj Bronikowski, abandoned the stores and the town to Admiral Chichagov – if he had not, well, there is Jonathan North's story in "The Napoleon Options"

So, despite his bad reputation, Napoleon did indeed think a lot about logistics – certainly the standards of 1805-14!

Or consider in the early days of the 1809 Danube campaign, as Napoleon is ordering his commanders to make strenuous forced marches to get into position. He orders Massena, for instance, to leave behind all the supply wagons, except, "Carry as much bread as you can." (He's planning on holding some important points, and the rest of the supplies can catch up with them in a couple of days.)

The last thing in the world you'd want, in a situation like that, would be an army that had to live off the land, along the route from point A to point B. The delay, dispersal, and potential loss of discipline (not to mention local intelligence given to the enemy) would be a severe handicap.

To the OP Get yourself a copy of Elting's "Swords Around a Throne" There are whole chapters detailing logistics,food, remounts, marches,camps etc.The rest of it is quite good too.
Pete

So Napoleon's instruction to Massena in 1809 to "Carry as much bread as you can" presumably means: issue several days' bread (biscuit?) rations to your troops, which they themselves can carry in their knapsacks/haversacks. And if the s want meat to go with it, they can find (steal?) it themselves or buy it from local sources. Hopefully, your baggage wagons will catch up in a few days' time, when you can resume issuing bread rations as normal.

Is this about right?

A lot of the "living off the country" stuff was carefully fostered mythology that post-dated the Napleonic era. It allowed the French government (Royalist, Bonapartist, or Republican) to avoid speniding money on the army's logistical base and to make plans that flew in the face of reality.

Even after the debacle of 1870, which saw French troops suffering lack of provender in France and unable to advance more than a kilometer across the border, the myth continued to hold sway, with the Radical Governments of the 1890's and early 1900's all but disbanding the commissary and transport services. Luckily for France, there was a reaction in the ten years prior to WW1 that saw at least some of this capacity restored.

The failures of living off the land were certainly well-known after the winter of 1806-7 in Poland, as Davout attests, and his preparations for 1812 reflect that lesson. 3rd Corps suffered greatly in the days leading up to leaving their cantonments for Eylau; logistics were the very cause of the French dispersal (and with Wellington in 1815). Davout, being a disciplinarian, did not tolerate miscreant behavior. Yet, foraging became necessary, and, when it came down to a choice between his men's necessities and the peasant's hidden stores, Davout sided by necessity with his men, and even embraced some rather heavy handed methods of extracting food from a starving and hapless population.

The whole logistical dynamic is widely misunderstood, and miniature campaigns often become totally unrealistic when that dynamic is misunderstood. Zucker's series of boardgames
got a good bit of it right, from what I remember.

It would be interesting to see where the "living off the land" myth started. And, there is a difference perhaps between looting the treasures of Italy as policy, and foraging as necessity to avoid starvation. There's a lot of nuances here.

An army starves when it reaches the end of it's logistical tail. Desertion and foraging ensue. Winter is particularly harsh. Kutusov saw the effects of that in 1805, and foresaw that given enough distance, even Napoleon's logistical methods would crumble, (and they did, earlier than anyone really would have expected).

Again, Davout's Journal and Elting's book are among the best reads on the subject, Creveld is well worth it as well. Also, I would take a look at Christpopher Duffy's various works on the Seven Years War to see how the Old Order operated.

Matt
militaryhistorypress.com

They were not well supplied with food, read for example the memoires of Fesenzac who gives a good account on the lack of everything (other than ammunition) in the 1805 campaign.
The main problem was the lack of draught horses, Davout for example had to leave 120 waggons behind – and all his 12 pound guns in 1805.

As long as the soldiers could plunder and find food – they could survive, otherwise they starved.
Already the winter campaign of 1807 collapsed because of the ineffcient service de l'arriere, needless to say the same happened in the Syrian campaign as well.

One should read as many memoires (preferably up to the rank of capitain) as possible, Morvan is quite good as introduction as well.

A very good book about the service de l'arriere is :

Lechartier : Les Services De L'Arrière A La Grand Armée En 1806 – 1807, Paris 1910.

Actually that would be a good book for Military History Press, but I fear, despite being the state of the art on that subject – not a best seller.

Actually I was wrong in the number of waggons and guns Davout left behind in 1805

Le général Songis à l'Empereur:

Ludwigsburg, le 13 vendémiarie an XIV (5 octobre 1805)

Le corps de M. le maréchal Davout a laissé à Mannheim (nota bene Mannheim and not Mainz / Mayence, von Winterfeldt)

6 pièces de 12
6 pièces de 8
3 obusiers
27 caissons de 12
14 caissons de 8
9 caissons d'obusiers
60 caissons d'infanterie
3 caissons de parc
9 forges
21 chariots

Total : 158 voitures

A lot of the "living off the country" stuff was carefully fostered mythology that post-dated the Napleonic era. It allowed the French government (Royalist, Bonapartist, or Republican) to avoid speniding money on the army's logistical base and to make plans that flew in the face of reality.

True but the French army of the Revolution were poorly supplied at best, given nothing at worst. It was no wonder that Napoleon gave his speech in his first campaign in Italy about raping the lands and taking what they could…

The French army was never well supplied but Napoleon "DID" take steps as did many of his subordinates such as Davout amongst others to make sure the men had some kind of supply train. It was when the enemy was beaten and ran away that the French army would chase them. This in itself created problems for the supply columns who could not keep up with the main army.

Subsequently the front line units were forced to live off the land as such until these supply columns caught up once more or a halt was ordered. So I would factor into your games or campaigns rules to show these situations which will happen when one side is chasing the other and even the retreating army will suffer the same problems.

Regards,
Shane

Let me address what appears to be a widespread misunderstanding about MHP, particularly since this audience posesses such obvious passion, knowledge of the right sort, and talent.

We at MHP are anxiously awaiting the first translation that comes across the transom from German, Italian, Spanish or Russian sources. I have asked several Germans and German speakers to consider tackling some of the classic works…no takers. Wouldn't it be lovely to have a series of
translations from more of the war's participants?

Please consider being a part of the solution. I hope to encourage the entire Napoleonic community to find and bring us translations, and titles to consider. Our books are in many ways about sponsoring the long hours and hardwork that translation entails. We feel that if the work is not done now, in our lifetime, there may never be the requisite interest in the period.

Furthermore, there is a perception that we only publish "francophile" books. That misperception is a self-fulfilling prophecy that we'd like to break free of….

Happy Bastille Day,

Matt DeLaMater

(yes, that was a deliberate little joke there)

Now, Matt, that's a "put your time where your mouth is" challenge!

I'm re-reading my copy of Napoleon And Russia by Michael Adams at the moment, and a few lines about the logistical preparations Napoleon organised made me think of this discussion.

Initially his troops were only required to carry 4 days rations, with an expectation that the supply wagons would resup them (I'm assuming every four days roughly).

It seems this campaign was organised in such a manner so that his troops would not be expected to actually live off the land.

Considering half the troops weren't French, and many would not actually use French doctrine of the time it would have been hard for them to have separated themselves from their supplys.

It is interesting that they were only expected to take 4 days rations. That doesn't seem to give you much flexibility, as you can't pursue an enemy on an empty stomach, and Napoleon had researched previous campaigns in Russia enough to know exactly what issues previous armies had whilst taking on the Russians in Russia (Swedes)

This discussion has motivated me to read more on the logistics of the period.

TW.

Okay…… But what about Massena in Portugal in 1810? Did the French logistics network survive the guerrillas?

And how about forage generally for the horses. Cavalry logistics took far more carts than human logistics right up to WW1. Did this totally break down in Russia and Portugal when horses died by the hundred?

It broke down in Russia as soon as hostile soil was entered, oxen drawn waggons did not keep up, army coprs "obtained" their own flocks of cattle and waggons to grant food for their troops, which slowed down the mobility of the army.

The basic question is: How far away from its depots or supply hubs ((terminal railway staions), harbours, rivers) could an army operate in the first half of the 19th century if it wants to be self sufficient?

Later (ca. 1900) an German infantry corps was able to supply itself up to a distance of around 120 km. However, the percentage of the supply volume for ammunition was much larger after 1870, so in the first half of the 19th century I would guess an army could operate around 150-200 km away from its depots, if enough roads were available/the size of the army not too large.

Was the Russian campaign doable for the French in one year if the Russians destroy all supplies on their retreat?

BTW: Units were already out of supply when they marched through Poland in summer 1812, so we have a more basic problem.