"Borodino - Who Won?" Topic

Just watched "War and Peace" battle of Borodino on YouTube. They don't make it clear who won, bunch of crap about spirit and such. Who won?

define 'winning'

link

Sounds like an accurate portrayal of it.

Napoleon won the "Pyrrhic" Victory. Eventually lost the campaign.

A very generous interpretation to call it a victory.

I'd go with a draw, if I were pro Napoleon, and a clear rebuke, if I were pro Kutusov.

I don't think anyone won. Both sides took tremendous losses, neither accomplished their objective, technically since the Russians withdrew and the French held the field, the French "won" but I think it was a very empty victory.

Cheers,

The Bandit

AH, but the Russians chose to withdraw, and were under no harassment to do so, which makes it a withdrawl in good order.

its all in how you define 'winning'

The British.

acarhj is right; Borodino is a perfect example of a Phyrric victory (for Napoleon).

no one the french lost a massive amount of men and horses and not to mention supplies and munitions in a country a long way from france and with rather delicate supply chains(to say the least).

russians suffered more or less the same but were on home soil could regroup and hold out and wait for renforcements. plus there had a lot more manpower avaliable.

Tactical win for the French, strategic win for the Russians

I thought in terms of the time, the side that departed the field, whenever and however, was NOT the victor iof the other side remained.
The Russians left overnight They must have felt that to continue to resist on that field at that time would expose them to eventual moral & physical defeat before they felt they could impose failure on the French.

The side remaining; ostensibly prepared to continue the contest, is perceived the victor.

back in the middle ages, didn't battles have "chroniclers" who would watch the battle and help define or make "official" such assessments?

Clearly the battle was not decisive in that the campaign continued for several more months and rolled right into the war of 1813.

In that respect, IMO, it was a tactical victory and at the same time a strategic defeat for Napoleon.

The British.

No they didn't, Wilson survived the battle

Dave

The French. Tactical french victory, strategic void (the battle itself has no consequance on the rest of the campaign, Malojaroslavets was much more important in the strategic setting).

Kutusov was completely out of touch (and probably drunk for the entire battle… so better to not associate his name to that battle, but again his major plus in the russian imperial army was to be russian opposed to german, scot or georgian, not combat talent… IMHO Benningsen was much better and his handling of Eylau much more akin to a disputed conclusion than Borodino…) and he let the Russian imperial guard being plastered by french artillery at the end of the battle with no reason.

But as I have pointed out Borodino has no meaning for the campaign. French losses were severe, but not yet crippling. The russian got away but beaten. but it was not a stretegic defeat. It was a strategic "nothing", not even a draw beacuse it didn't alter really much the equilibrium of the campaign. Napoleon entered Moscow and there and at the start of the withdrawal he made critical mistakes (inaction in moscow, not pressing toward Ukarin after Malojaroslavetz… much, much worse for the outcome than any "strategic defeat" at Borodino)

granted napoleons losses in men may not yet have been crippling, but i think his cavalry were unable to sustain the huge losses of horses, neither could the horse artillery or the artillery train or any other unit dependent on horses, especially after wargam.

Even losses in horses were not crippling at Borodino, at last not without the cumulative effect of the retreat.

The problem of Borodino, as has been explained by Hotpoulle in "Borodino, The Moskowa" is the fact that nowadays the battle is linked ot the retreat. so its significance is somewhat distorted. Borodino per se is not a strategic defeat. When Napoleon entered Moscow he had still a big and effective army. The problem is what he did, or didn't, with the Army after having entered Moscow. While almost everyone is in agreement to judge the stay in moscow too long, and the emperor handling of the post Malojaroslavetz poor you can establish a connection between the two things. We can argue that setting as strategic objective Moscow instead of saint Petersburg was wrong, yet this how transform the battle itself in a strategic defeat? Of course it suits a completely linked downward spiral of the russian campaign providing an epic backround for a morality tale, but the problem is that military campaign doesn't flow as an uninterupted continuum. After Borodino and his entry into Moscow Napoleon had still several opportinites open to him. His handling of these opportunities consitutes a strategic defeat, not Borodino. Except for a repetition of Austerlitz or Friendland the story wouldn't have been different.

The problem of Borodino is its lack of strategic significance. What happened after sealed the fate of the Grande Armeé. Certainly Malojaroslavetz can be defined as tactical succes and strategic defeat. Borodino can be defined as a last success in an indecisive campaign. Still if Nappoleon has withdrawn from moscow eralier, taken a safer route or even moved aggressively earlier (it did try to move beyond moscow to engage Kutusov again) after Borodino instead of waiting passively for peace proposals…

I view it as a strategic defeat from the fact that Napoleon, after seeking a decisive battle for many weeks; finally achieved it and then did not destroy the Russian Army's ability to resist.

At that point, deep into the country with an army that already a shell of itself at the Vistula, Moscow was more like swimming to a deserted isle to avoid drowning in the vast sea of Russia, than the winning culmination of a military campaign.

That Napoleon was fooled by the mirage, lead to the subsequent decisions, that eventually the mirage dissipated and Moscow became a trap to be fled, not the prize.

when you consider the reasons why Napoleon refused to allow Davout to turn the flank at Borodino, the concept of simply driving the russians from the field becomes a poor one for claiming victoy.

He knew he needed to destroy that Russian army that very afternoon, and could not risk allowing it to withdraw again.

He did not detroy that Russian army, and in fact, it avoided him by offering Moscow as a sacrifice.

Clever old Kutusov…

"When Napoleon entered Moscow he had still a big and effective army. The problem is what he did, or didn't, with the Army after having entered Moscow."
He'd already lost more than half of his army BEFORE Borodino, so although he still had a big army, he had now lost his chance of a decisive victory. It is irrelevant what he did or didn't do with Moscow. He'd captured Vienna in 1805 and 1809 and thought it irrelevant, his target on both occasions was the Hapsburg army. The Russian army was his target in 1812. He potentially had it in his sights, perhaps, at Borodino, and missed his chance. He kept going because he didn't know what else to do, which meant, effectively, that he'd already lost.

" ….. ahh, Davout, you are always for turning the enemy … "

Chouan,

the scenario you describe is strategically indecisive, not a strategic defeat. What transformed it in a strategic defeat is exactly what the Emperor did or didn't after entering Moscow. Also the Russian Army ability to resist was severely reduced after Borodino and before late fall and winter. The IV corps was able to defeat them again at Malojaroslavetz. When Napoleon sortied out of moscow before the withdrawal Kutusov can't engage. Also certaiunly moscow was one of the tergets of the summer campaign, probably secondary over the russian army, but certainly a target. I would also add that 1812 campaign plan was not good like previous actions. Hew tried too much in too little time. My take is Moscow was an objective beacuse he wanted a psichological target both to force the russians to fight for it and to create a morale effect once taken.
Certainly he hoped for a decisive battle of annhilation early on and understimated the distance involved. He could have planned a two year operation or even an advance on Saint Petersburg. Forcing the Zar to evacuate the city would have been a morale effect and certainly Saint PEtersburg was less far away than Moscow.

To be quite honest Kutusov is absurdly overrated by conventional literature. Again this is a reflection to the fact that on the army commanders and high ranking officer of the period he was the only pure russian. Russian, and later soviet, historical literature have created a myth of him (and not only historical writers, Lev Tolstoj docet).

Overall, I believe that Borodino was a French tactical victory, but one that did nothing to help achieve Napoleon's strategic goal of destroying the Russian army.

The grave diggers? They came out on top, as it were. <;^}

The French won the battle.

After the battle, although they (the French) had to lick their wounds, they were capable of engaging the Russians in another major battle, and indeed Napoleon was hoping either Alexander would sue for peace or he could again engage Kutuzov and gain a decisive victory.

The question was who won the battle of Borodino.. the French won..

TW

A draw…Although the French could claim to occupy the field of battle, the brutal frontal attacks lost Napoleon lots and lots of irreplaceble men and horses. While the Russians also lost huge amounts of men they could afford to. Even though Kutuzov didn't want to fight the battle the outcome was more positive for the Russians and hastened Napoleons complete destruction and the subsequent rebellion of Prussia….

Heralds were the Medeival umpires of battles--They would meet up at a good vantage point and give marks on who came out on top and who could claim victory…

I almost think you need to ignore the final result of the campaign when looking at who actually won the battle.

Remember at the time Napoleon didn't need to withdraw.. Kutuzov did.

Napoleon didn't end the battle thinking he had lost the war, and likewise Kutozov didn't withdraw thinking he had won the campaign. Everything was very much in the air after Borodino, and it was Napoleon's procrastination in Moscow instead of consolidating that sealed his fate in 1812, otherwise Spring/summer 1813 would have been fought on Russian soil.

Therefore it was a French victory, regardless of how hollow it turned out to be.

TW

The French drove the Russians out of a strong defensive position and the Russians had to commit every man and gun in their attempt to maintain their position. The French had at least 30,000 men who hadn't fired a shot. Further, French artillery dominated the battlefield.

Napoleon also believed that the Russians would continue the battle the next day, but hurriedly withdrew during the night. In short, the Russians were badly beaten up, were driven out of a chosen defensive position that was partially fortified. In short, they lost.

On the positive side for the French, Kutusov lost another major battle against Napoleon. He would lose another battle against the French at Maloyaroslavets. These actions made him somewhat gun-shy when facing Napoleon. This would affect the outcome at the Berezina in November when two Russian armies under Tshitshagov and Wittgenstein had the Grande Armee trapped, but lost the battle anyways. Kutusov was within supporting distance of his comrades, but failed to support them. In short, he was afraid to face Napoleon again.

Sincerely,
K

True Kevin, but on the subject of the battle of Maloyarslavets; as a result of the action, General di Bouneparte changed his line of march to the north, through Mozhaisk and Smolensk, the route of his advance that he had wished to avoid.

Yes, Napoleon did, not realizing that Kutusov would not risk another fight with the Grande Armee. A very gross error on Napoleon's part.

However, that doesn't change the results of either Borodino or the Berezina.

Sincerely,
K

I'm pretty sure Napoleon was an Emperor until 1814, not merely a "General".

TW

He was also Emperor in 1815.

Sincerely,
K

He was only Emperor because he said he was.

hey Kevin, who/what units other than the Guard, were those 30,000 who had not fired a shot?

off the top of my head, I can not recall who wasn't engaged at least at the division/corps level….

Hehe yes it was always a British thing to never refer to him as an Emperor..

He may have taken the title in 1815, but unfortunately there was no longer an Empire so…

TW

Napoleon's goal was to destroy the Russian army as an effective fighting force and bring Alexander to terms- not just beat it only to have to deal with it again later.

Victory would have been the achievement of this aim. Borodino failed to produce the result Napoleon was looking for.

That being the case, I fail to see how it could be called a victory for the French in any -meaningful- sense, even if the Russians withdrew.

I almost think you need to ignore the final result of the campaign when looking at who actually won the battle.

I respectfully disagree. Battles are sought to achieve strategic goals and are fought for a purpose and in a given geo-political context. I feel that to isolate a battle and look at it's result out of that context is at worst misleading or at best, pointless.

I get where you're coming from.. and I've actually pondered my response to this question alot lately and re-read some of my source material.

The battle has to be called either a Draw, a victory or a defeat, regardless of the degree to which you might apply that title.

It certainly wasn't a Defeat for the French in that they were still a rather potent force at the end of it (potent enough to take on the Ruussians again the next day including an un-touched guard).

Therefore it was either a draw or a victory.

I prefer to call it a victory (very very marginal) as of the day of the battle, because Napoleon thought he had done enough to bring the Russians to the peace table. He was wrong of course, but he didn't know this at the time or he may have behaved differently in the days and weeks after the battle.

I just don't think you can call it a draw therefore it must have been a victory (again, very marginally).

TW

Borodino has always seemed to me to be the beginning of Napoleon's decline as the master of battles.

On the previous evening, Davout had suggested a night march by his corps around the Russian left flank. Napoleon rejected the idea. He was afraid that the Russians would detect the move and withdraw, frustrating Napoleon's attempt to bring them to battle. They had done this throughout the campaign thus far.

Napoleon should have realized that the Russians could not possibly do any more than reposition their forces. They certainly could not allow Moscow to fall without a fight. This was a great misjudgement--his first great misjudgement, at least in terms of battle strategy.

On the grand-strategic level, Napoleon had already made a number of blunders. His age and fatigue were showing. The Spanish invasion was a titanic blunder. The Continental System-that strategy to hurt the British economically, was a failure. The invasion of Spain could not have solved that problem.

Then he was torn away from that theater by the Austrian problem of 1809. And that campaign should have shown him what intractable opponents the Austrians truly were. He should have disolved the Austrian Empire entirely, driven the Hapsburgs into exile. No matter how many times he trounced the Austrians, they would always rise again and return to the battlefield. Instead, he let them off the hook. Strategic error number two.

After 1809, he should have returned to Spain to finish the job, whatever that would have meant. Again, we see a weary Napoleon letting things slip.

And the final blunder--the Russian invasion of 1812. Combined with the previous two, we now see Napoleon defining insanity – repeating mistakes and expecting different results.

It has long been my contention that the dissolution of the Austrian Empire in 1809 would have secured Napoleon's postition for life. No continental power would have dared attack him again, no matter how much gold the Brits were willing to throw around. No Monarch would risk the existance of his crown, especially against Napoleon's battlefield record. All his allies could skirt the Continental System as they pleased, the Brits could not threaten again--except in Spain. If Napoleon had returned to Spain with the army he took into Russia, it would have been a simple matter to chase the British off the peninsula.

So IMHO, Borodino was irrelevant. Victory? Draw? Defeat? Who cares! Napoleon was already doomed by his own faulty decisions.

I guess I'm just a dumn country boy. Napoleon wore down his army and his remaining horseflesh to bloody the Russian army. After this "victory" he was at a strategic dead end, because he was very constrained on where he could go with his army because he was practically out of horses to pull his supplies, had no way of replentishing them, little means of feeding them and in a strange and unmapped country he had no worthwhile calvary to find roads, find the enemy, drive off raiders, or exploit any victory to make it worthwhile (by cheaply riding down a broken enemy). That doesn't sound like a victory to me. He had to completely destroy the Russian army and eliminate the cadre of
"25year men" to win. Napoleon chose where and how to invade, so he is also responsible for defining that victory condition. He knew the story and complained bitterly about it, while blaming everyone else. The Russians just had to fight a big battle with a lot of loses to both sides in order to justify losing Moscow. They did this, kept the core of their army intact, so it could be rebuilt, and had torn enough out of the French and especially the French allies so that it was fatally wounded and thereafter slowly dying.

He was sort of like a WWII army without gasoline and with tanks and trucks with blown engines. Empressed non-native soldiers, who now realize that they are doomed and will now fight only for their personal survival.

The "genius" also was not attacking the center of government, the nerve center of the country, the capital of the country, but rather a nice important city, with a lot of historical and religious significance, but really (at that time) not even the industrial regional center. Moscow is on a land bridge with road access to the headwaters of rivers flowing in all directions. That was a key position when trade was in light, high value goods, but not key before railroads changed things. Considering the condition of the Russian roads, it was not then a linchpin of the economic or government life. Petersburg is where the government was based and where access to the west and money economy was. That was the place to strike to destroy the government's will and capability to resist. Attacking Moscow, just united the nobility and serfs against the invaders.

Wouldn't Napoleon have been better off in Petersburg, connected to the sea and at the seat of government? I think Borodino was a Russian victory because they accomplished what they had to do in order to definately win the war. It was a French defeat, because they failed to destroy the Russian army. (Although it is moot if that would have won the war. The French still had to survive the winter!)

If you are connected to the sea – at Petersburg or anywhere else – you are connected to the Royal Navy and that guarantees that you will lose. The British controlled the Gulf of Finland at the time, as they controlled any other body of water in the world.

The Battle of Borodino was a definite French victory, but was inconsequential in the 1812 campaign because Russia was a far larger and far more resilient foe than Austria or Prussia. As long as the Czar had room to retreat, then Napoleon was doomed. He could not sustain a credible military force inside Russia for more than a few months, given his primitive logistical system. Inevitably, his system of deeply penetrating an opponent and forcing a major battle would prove self defeating in a state where projecting a large army was insufficient to guarantee control of the state and its hinterland.

Given this essential state of affairs, the very fact of projecting so much force so deeply into an opposing state on such a frail and primitive logistical base would prove to be the army's undoing.

As happened with Napoleon, the army itself would necessarily disintegrate in attempting to extract itself from its "victim". The result of individual battles along the way was merely incidental and almost irrelevant.

I think the whole thing was closer to yet another French triumph than several of you give credit for.

Borodino was a victory (albeit a costly one) for the French & led to the occupation of Moscow:spiritual capital of the Russian empire.

Napoleon expected the Tsar to ask for terms.This was a reasonable expectation.

It was only the Tsar's intransigence (& I should add it wasn't totally voluntary on Alexander's part) that led the Great Retreat & French disaster.

Of course that was the correct decision for the Russians but it could have easily gone the other way.

Yes it's a British thing about General Bonaparte. The same can be said for Colonel Gaddafi, General Pinochet etc.

It is inconsistent as Franco was recognised as a head of state but continued to be referred to as General. De Gaulle was frequently referred to as General even when President

I think some posters above are making too much of a pro-French thing that the Russians had a great defensive position at Borodino, so that it was a wonderful accomplishment to have been able to beat the Russians there. It was poor defensive territory. The Russians had rejected a number of previous potential defensive battle sites (Vizama, Dorogobuzh, Usviate)and were running out of room.

A topo map showing the lack of viable terrain is at:

An overview of a model of the battlefield is at: link

and pictures of the terrain of the battlefield can be seen at:
link (note: you have to enable "popups" to see the whole article).

My point is that this was not a highly defensible position, since the land was flat, with no rocky hills, steep slopes, stone built-up villiages, stonewalls, big swamps or unpassable rivers. It wasn't rocky Spain or the Lines of Torres Vedras. The defense was not at a great advantage.

Some comments about the extent of the hasty field works that the Russians were able to construct are given in the TMP thread:
TMP link

The sandy soil and lack of rapid terrain elevation changes made rolling cannonballs fully effective.

The Perry Bros, Front Rank, Steve Barber… All the Authors and all the Publishers, who ever penned a word on the subject… and of course us, who now have something to do while our wives and girlfriends watch X factor or someone's got no talent on the telly.

Rabbit

I did not expect that map to print in the posting!