"Scenario Research: Was Soult at Golymin Dec. 26, 1806?" Topic

I'm starting to work on some scenarios for Legacy of Glory and am beginning with the dual battles of Golymin & Pultusk. My reading of Petre and Arnold have French forces present at Golymin at 5pm as follows:

Davout's III Corps
-Morand
-Friant
-Marulaz
-Rapp's 2nd Dragoon Division (attached to III Corps)
Elements of Murat's I Cavalry Reserve Corps
-Klein
-Milhaud
-Lasalle
Augereau's VII Corps
-Desjardins
-Heudelet
-Durosnel

Yet when I consult Napoleon's Finest – Scott Bowden, he shows Soult deployed across the Ciechanów road, a position occupied by Augereau according to Petre & Arnold. Bowden's map has shifted Davout east to the Pultusk road and Augereau south to the road running towards Garnowa.

Soult had about 20,000 men at Ciechanów on or about the 26 Dec. where Napoleon had met him with the Guard. Had he marched on Golymin one would almost expect Napoleon would have accompanied him to observe the flanking move against the Russian right. Regardless, Soult's presence would have had an impact as it would have increased the French strength by something like 50%.

Can anyone clarify my understanding a bit regarding this rather large inconsistency?

Cheers,

The Bandit

If it helps, Digby Smiths OOBs show:

Pultusk – Lanne's V Corps, Division Gudin (III Corps), plus assorted Light cav and Dragoons

Golymin – Augereau's VII Corps, assorted reserve cav plus only one regiment of III Corps (13 Legere, Division Morand)

Hourtoulle confirms that Gudin was at Pultusk and notes that Friant's Division was still marching up, leaving only Morand at Golymin. No mention of Soult.

…And Martinien doesn't seem to show any officer losses for regiments in Soult's corps.

Soult's corps was under orders to march in support of Davout, Augereau and Murat. However, he was held up short of the battlefield by the poor state of the roads and countryside.

I have not seen the Bowden text yet but it does seem to be out of kilter with contemporary sources.

I will reexamine Napoleon's Finest, it is possible the map presented is meant to show the *intension* of the plan rather than the actual result. Otherwise, I am very confused why he'd include something so contrary to … everything else. I checked the Napoleonic Data Book, it also shows the same forced engaged as Petre and Arnold.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Just to add to my previous post, many years ago, when I was researching the December 1806 operations, I read just about everything in the French archives on this battle. Nothing indicated that Soult was present. From memory, as my notes on this campaign are in storage, Soult's reports were clear in stating that he never made it to the battlefield due to the appalling conditions.

I just looked back over Napoleon's Finest and sure enough the map that Bowden includes has Soult's IV Corps deployed across the Ciechanów road, Augereau's VII Corps deployed in front of Garnowa facing Golymin, and Davout's III Corps shifted slightly right deployed across the Pultusk road.

This is confusing as all get out to me. The positions Bowden's map gives are noted as 26 Dec. 5pm. There is no mention in the text that I have come across on the preceding pages. For those who are curious, I'm referring to page 134. I have only skimmed over the proceeding pages so it is possible I missed something. If someone else is more familiar and has an explanation please share.

It is a little worrying to me to find what appears to be such a massive error.

Cheers,

The Bandit

I included the map (that showed where Soult approached and stopped short) in part to explain references in the Journal about extending the 3rd Corps to cover Soult's right flank.

I believe we consulted, in part, a period Russian map as the basis for the Golymin map; I will look into it because it was about four years ago that I had the maps commissioned, and life has been a bit crazy since then.

The Journal is clear that Soult did not fight at Golymin.

The Journal is also clear in stating that Morand's Division fought at Golymin (p128), but the 2nd Division only arrived that evening (evidently at the same time Soult had halted his approach) and took no part. The position of Soult may make it even clearer why the Russians left in great haste the next day for Makow and Ostralenko. "[The enemy] abandoned its artillery and baggage to the Grand Duke of Berg's [Murat's} cavalry."

As the Journal indicates, Morand's Division lost 9 killed and 213 wounded that day. Golymin was more of a combat than a full fledged battle. It does make an interesting scenario IF more forces are engaged.

The Journal describes that in the unusual unseasonable mud, of that day, a division could only march about 2.5 miles in two hours, or at about half speed from normal conditions.

Sorry Shane if this map caused more confusion than clarification and I appreciate your questions. Any fault attaches solely to me; I'd hate to have a map I approved detract from the clarity of the Journal rather than enhance it.

Best Regards,

Matt DeLaMater

Matt,

Thanks for the clarification, I had been kinda in denial as to the book having a great error like that so it is nice to know the details behind including the map and that the text is clear on his involvement. I am now scrambling through source work to see if I can lift my confusion :-p

I was aware that Friant showed up only at the close of the clash and had no forces engaged, in fact it seems Morand had few battalions engaged.

The main confusion I had regarding the map is that it shifts Augereau so far south. This appears solved with a closer reading of other sources.

Arnold shows Augereau approaching from the southeast (p133, map 7, time unstated but it most be post 2pm as Rapp is engaged as is Morand, and Heudelet is moving on the flank) via Ruskovo with the Russians deployed mostly south of Golymin and that does seem to line up better with your map as it allows for enough space for the north that Soult could approach and deploy should he arrive later in the day. In both of Arnold's maps (p130, 133) the Russian line runs essentially east-west and is south of Golymin, had Soult arrived via Ciechanów road he would have marched directly into the rear of the Russians. This makes sense with Napoleon's general plan for a drive from Ciechanów by Soult, supported by the Guard. Arnold notes specifically that Heudelet is ordered to flank the Russian right by way of cutting the Ciechanów road at Wadkowo (3pm, p132)). The only disagreement between Arnold & The Journal seems to be if Soult finally arrived after the conclusion of the fighting or if he never reached and field, and second if the Russian line repositioned to cover the Ciechanów road.

Petre, however, has Augereau deployed as if he had approached by the Ciechanów road and deployed across it (Map 7, 5pm shows Heudelet's 2nd division bisecting the Ciechanów road, Desjardins's 1st division to the south of it, and Durosnel's cavalry to the north of it). Yet, Petre's text cites that Augereau marched from Kaleczin (p107) which would have placed him on a direct approach to Golymin through Garnowa and then turning north to Ruskovo (p109). Petre's text is clear that Heudelet is ordered to flank the Russian right by way of cutting the Ciechanów road at Wadkowo and is unsuccessful at doing so, however, his map suggests that the attempt is successful. Petre's map (#7) also causes one to wonder how the Russian cavalry under Pahlen had hit Heudelet's division on the flank during their attempt to reach Golymin from Ciechanów. Had Augereau been positioned as described in Petre's map the Russian cavalry would have struck his second division square in the rear!

So, after some clarification and a lot more reading & cross referencing the map provided in The Journal makes a lot more sense with respect to Augereau's position as it largely agrees with the text of Arnold and Petre (just not Petre's map!).

My only question now is, did elements of the IV Corps *ever* reach the field as indicated in The Journal's map? Even post engagement?

Oh, and this isn't Shane, it's David – and I really appreciate you joining in the conversation.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Slightly more (edit was denied by the message board before I took too long to do it):

So, after some clarification and a lot more reading & cross referencing the map provided in The Journal makes a lot more sense with respect to Augereau's position as it largely agrees with the text of Arnold and Petre (just not Petre's map!). Augereau may be a little too east in The Journal's map as it seems that his 2nd division should be west of Ruskovo even after it fails to cut the Ciechanów road.

Soult himself spent the night in at a chateau in Ciechanów with Napoleon (Arnold 141). According to Petre's text (p115, note 4)Soult's divisions never reached the battlefield of Golymin with the 1st & 2nd divisions just outside Ciechanów to the east and with the 3rd division at Paluski (5 miles east of Ciechanów and perhaps 3-4 miles north and west of Wadkowo).

My only question now is, did elements of the IV Corps *ever* reach the field as indicated in The Journal's map? Even post engagement? Arnold does not explicitly say though Petre states they did not.

Cheers,

The Bandit

My only question now is, did elements of the IV Corps *ever* reach the field as indicated in The Journal's map? Even post engagement?

It seems unlikely. Soult's report of 27 December (in Foucart) indicates that the bulk of his corps marched eastward from Ciechanow towards Makow, no indication of anyone being near Golymin (or between Golymin and Ciechanow). Positions at 8 in the evening on the 27th were given as: the light cavalry was at Raczkie with outposts towards Mosaki, 3rd division was at Kolaczkowo, 2nd division at Kolonowo, one brigade of 1st division approaching Kolaczkowo. 2nd Brigade of 1st division was at Ciechanow. It was slow going for everyone, it seems doubtful that Soult's forces ever "turned the corner" at Ciechanow to head towards Golymin. Of course the folks at Golymin were expecting him to turn up at any moment, thus his flank needed to be covered.

Soult's arrival is one possible variant. Of course, if road conditions had been better, everything would have been different. Had Kamenski not gotten lost (or fallen asleep or whatever) the entire Russian army would have fallen back on Golymin. Or if road conditions had been better but Kamenski still needed a snooze, Golitsyn would not have been at Golymin at all – Bennigsen's intention was to stand at Pultusk with all forces (probably not the brightest thing to do, but plainly his intention). And what if Buxhowden had been a bit bolder and supported Doctorow? Nah, that last one is too far-fetched.

I was hoping to create a small(er) scale scenario for play by 2-4 players. Figured these were decent twin scenarios for it.

I'm wondering how well they'd play out based on the historical setup.

Had the Russians at Pultusk realized they were only fighting Lannes they could have attacked and if successful destroy and isolated corps. The French could not have succeeded without changing the battle plan dramatically (supplying more troops to the fight) or the Russians committing a terrible error.

Growing either battle into a much larger affair would be an easy scenario concept but keeping it smaller seems to be more difficult.

The objectives at Golymin seem decent for it: the French are fighting against time, the Russians are fighting for time. The question is, can the French get underway fast enough or is it a forgone conclusion that the Russians will hold until nightfall and slip away?

At Pultusk an aggressive Russian player could turn against Lannes but what does the French objective become? Don't get wiped out by twice your number?

Cheers,

The Bandit

I think that it is most unlikely that the French could have moved any faster at Golymin. All of their reports are very clear about the extreme difficulty that they had in moving. Any realistic scenario would have to include the movement problems and I feel that these create an inevitable result.

At Pultusk, the Russians could have turned on Lannes, who was in a very tricky position. I suspect that your proposed French objective for Pultusk is about right…survival!

The issue for the two battles was the French staff had the main Russian force in the toward Ciechanów, while Dokhturov's command (Büxhowden) had turned back by the day of battle (Chaplits units were the original advance guard).

Bennigsen took over command from Kamenski and ordered Büxhowden to join him at Putlusk (also to where Kamenski ordered Prince Golitsyn V to retire upon, but he felt cut off). In the event, Soult marched on Ciechanów was in occordance with the French staff view. Büxhowden did not move to either battle field, although Dokhturov agreed to support Golitsyn.

Napoleon played up his victory at Golymin while Bennigsen played up his success at Pultusk.

As to the effects of mud, you may find bits in this snippet of interest from a piece on artillery for which we did not have enough room to include as a separate appendix (elements were in the text and footnotes). – R

* * * * *
The batteries assigned to the divisions with Bennigsen match the numbers ordained in the new brigade organization. His force was fresh. Over time, Buxhöwden's divisions moved toward the ideal numbers, but at any point from October on, they used whatever cannon available. For example, at least initially, the Eighth Division contained no light batteries, only one horse and four heavy batteries. During the campaign, Prince Karl von Mecklenburg stated his command included three regiments and 18 cannon, implying the commanders distributed the cannon of the heavy batteries to the regiments.

Although heavy and horse batteries should operate in the field with twelve pieces, during the retreat from the Wkra River line to Golymin and Pultusk, Bennigsen's troops lost 52 pieces either during the fighting or by their being left behind in the muddy roads. Using the horse artillerist Yermolov and his experiences as a guide, battery commanders found themselves forced to leave a few cannon behind as they hitched more horses to the teams to move other pieces along the difficult and muddy roads. In this fashion, each battery lost a portion of their cannon. The greatest loss occurred in the heavy batteries. Kamenski's aide at the time, Prince Eugen von Württemberg, said the difficulties applied mainly to the heavier cannon. Yermolov reported the same. (Soult reported of the twelve cannon left behind in his march on December 26, eight were his twelve-pound cannon.)

The Russian Seventh and Fifth Divisions left approximately forty behind in their retreat after the battle at Golymin, mainly heavy pieces (this according Yermolov who fought at there as part of Chaplitz's command). The only artillery brigades to avoid such losses were in Anrep's Fourteenth Division across the river from Pultusk and in Essen's Eight Division with its four heavy batteries (explaining its languid march west).

Using comments from Russian officers, they lost roundly ninety field pieces of all types. Napoleon reported that his army captured eighty cannon. A review of reports and accounts with specific references, one can reach the sum of seventy cannon (Augereau captured 6 from Barclay, Friant took 3 from Osterman, Marulaz and d'Aultanne of Davout's corps found 40 from various units – 14 discovered near Moszyn said to be from Sacken's division, Dahlmann picked off 2 from Pahlen, Durosnel reported 4 from Chaplits and Zapolsky, and Murat gathered up 15 following the Russians retreating from Golymin).

Given these events, the numbers in each of Bennigsen's fighting batteries counted more reasonably as ten, rather than twelve, during the battles. The losses explain why regiments fought with four light pieces rather than the intended half-battery strength of six guns. Sherbatov's Kostromo Musketeers at Golymin are an example.
While Bennigsen's artillery park at Tykoczyn would contain some spares, it is unlikely he replaced all of the cannon lost before he began his winter offensive. Wilson states Bennigsen had 500 cannon, excluding the Sixth Division (it had thirty pieces), at that time: suggesting he may have restored a quarter of the loss. All battery commanders did not manage to replace cannon uniformly. For example, while Yermolov had two full batteries each with twelve cannon for the fight on February 7, when he took three horse batteries to oppose Davout the next day, together they had thirty cannon or an average of ten each. Thus, except possibly in the Eighth and Fourteenth Divisions, each heavy and horse battery marched with ten or fewer cannon during the Eylau phase of the campaign.

When giving the number of cannon, the main historians used an extrapolation of the number of batteries times the number of assigned cannon. In doing so for the Russian army in 1806, Höpfner's list of batteries times twelve gave the number of artillery pieces reported by him (although his text acknowledges the assigned total of fourteen cannon to the heavy and light batteries). The 492 sum for Bennigsen (23 batteries with 276 pieces) and Buxhöwden (19 batteries with 216 pieces) was before the start of the campaign and prior to the December losses.

Lettow-Vorbeck noted the detachment of two cannon per heavy and light battery to the jagers, but – like Höpfner – calculates totals using twelve per battery. Petre used the organic 14 pieces whenever he writes about a battery and does take account of the regimental cannons. Sir Robert Wilson participated in the campaign and Baron Jomini served in the Russian army after 1813, writing on many aspects of the battle. Jomini stated the armies started out with 504 cannon. Wilson penned the Rusians had "above 500 pieces of field-cannon.". He also stated that Bennigsen had 500, excluding the Sixth Division, when he began his offensive. It is unclear whether he included the cannon with the Prussian batteries in this total.

Reworking the numbers of cannon assigned to the batteries gives an establishment total of 550 pieces. Reduced by the December 1806 loss of 80 cannon, there remained 470 Russian pieces before any resupply and excluding the 28 pieces in the three Prussian batteries.

* * * * *

Ironically, now that I recall, it was the Petre map that we primarily based our map on.

I don't know where Soult comes in…who were Augereau's Division and brigade commanders?

Thanks guys for all the help on this one. Particularly interesting is the discussion on the abandoned Russian guns, and the average 10 guns per battery.

"Lettow-Vorbeck noted the detachment of two cannon per heavy and light battery to the jagers, but – like Höpfner – calculates totals using twelve per battery."

It depends on if one counts the pair of 3 lb 'unicorns' assigned to each battery which were to be provided to the Jagers. This is where the 12/14 gun batteries are calculated – if one does NOT count the 3 lbers, there are 12 guns in a battery, if one DOES count the 3 lbers, there are 14 guns in a battery.

The comment was in calculating totals (as in all pieces). So, in calculating total cannon (all pieces) one should use 14 per company (battery) not at 12 as Lettow-Vorbeck and Höpfner did (they had no addition for the light pieces with the jagers).

Thus, they correctly use 12 as a battery (after the light pieces are taken from the company to operate with the jagers).

Clear? – R

Matt DLM, you asked, "I don't know where Soult comes in…who were Augereau's Division and brigade commanders?"

In terms of the battle of Golymin itself (taking a focused view of the battlefield), Soult never arrives as he goes up the road to Ciechanów in accordance with the orders Napoleon gave him for his IVth Corps. It should be noted that Napoleon moved from Lopaczin to join Soult later in the day with the Imperial Guard's 6,500 combatants as the Emperor thought that flank would be the decisive one. (Both Soult and Napoleon spend the night of 26 /27 December 1806 at Pałuki.)

As events transpired, the Russian rear guard left Ciechanów on the 26th before Soult arrived (Chaplits command of Pavlograd Hussars, Ingermanland Dragoons and Malakov cossacks and of Dokhturov's Seventh Division) as part of Buxhöden pulling Dokhturov back toward Markov.

Bertrand actually wrote to the Emperor from outside Ciechanów at noon that "Sapin" commanded there with hussars and cossacks and the Russians were leaving (the infantry having left earlier – I summarize heavily here). It is not clear when this communication arrived at the Imperial Headquarters.

In the event, by the time Soult arrived, Chaplits is gone from Ciechanów. This Russian force arrived in time to effect the Golymin action on the French left of that battle (Augereau).

Soult's corps had 26 infantry battalions, 9 squadrons of cavalry, 4 foot batteries and 2 horse batteries with roughly 27,000 officers and soldiers present under arms, perhaps 20,000 combatants considering the roads (see the previous post for the effect on the cannon).

Marshal Augerau's corps is below. – R

1st Division of the VIIth Corps – Desjardins
1st Brigade – Lapisse – 16th Légčre (3 bns) & 14th Ligne (2 bns)
2nd Brigade – Lefranc – 44th Ligne (2 bns) & 105th Ligne (2 bns) Regiements

2nd Division of the VIIth Corps – Heudelet
1st Brigade – Amey – 7th Légčre (3 bns)
2nd Brigade – Sarrut – 24th Ligne (3 bns)& 63rd Ligne (2 bns)

As a final note, Augerau's corps cavalry "arrived" after nightfall (at Watkowo at 10 at night) as it was ordered tp cover the space between the roads to Golymin (Augereau) and Ciechanów (Soult):
Light Cavalry of the VIIth Corps – Durosnel – 7th Chasseurs ŕ Cheval (3 sqds) & 20th Chasseurs ŕ Cheval (3 sqds)

Ralpher,

Please contact me at militaryhistorypress@hotmail.com
at your earliest conveniece. I will be leaving for Historicon to debut Napoleon's Apogee (thank you by the way)
so it isn't urgent. Look forward to hearing from you.

Matt

E-mail posted. Enjoy Historicon. – R