"The "Command Radius"" Topic

I/S wrote:
"This thread's original point dealt with command radius, which translates in reality to "time" or perhaps "ease of communication radius" if that is easier to visualize. It is a measure of the time it takes for a commander to exert his will on the formations under his command. Gamers want that to be instantaneous, but in reality it wasn't."

The thread started with the question of whether or not the 'command radius' concept could be discarded and the whole table therefore be equally accessible to the influence of a commander – and that if one side was to superior to his opponent, his individual units could just be made more powerful or efficient in some way to still gain the same game effect as command radius:
"So I'm throwing this out for discussion: could we dispense with the concept of a "command radius" altogether. Is there really a compelling reason for it?
Wouldn't it be a lot simpler (and perfectly within historical logic) to say, simply, that whatever "battle" we're doing is encompassed by this table. Obviously, the forces set up on this table are the ones the generals have chosen to fight in this area, and thus the ones they must have some confidence in, with regard to command & control… if we want to note that some armies, in some circumstances, perform better than others, that seems to demand that command ability be worked into individual unit performances in some way – not simply by measuring the distance to Army HQ".

So I think the original question is based on the idea that all the gamer wants is to have a winner/loser at the game's end and that the mechanics in the game do not matter as long as a win/lose situation is reached. If one wishes to "weight" the odds in particular of a one side or the other it doesn't matter which game mechanic you choose to modify – command and control (ie command radius), or combat results tables, or movement distances, etc etc – as long as something is modified. They are all equally meaningful and equally meaningless.

If that is the design philosophy, then I agree "Command Radius" is not necessary. In fact, NO particular mechanic is by definition "Needed", or need be favored over another one, as long as at least one action can determine the game's outcome (ie, two armies meet, roll a die, highest number wins).

A different design philosophy gives you something else. If a designer believes it is important to show "…a measure of the time it takes for a commander to exert his will on the formations under his command. Gamers want that to be instantaneous, but in reality it wasn't" then some sort of historical study needs to be done to see how communication and command and control worked. From there appropriate game mechanics have to be figured out.

NedZed, you are the "end user" of any set of rules and can do whatever you want when it comes to using commercially produced rules. You've purchased, downloaded, copied, or borrowed someone else's ideas how communication on the battlefield takes place so you may determine what you want to use and what you don't want to use. If you ignore the rules writer's ideas about command and control you are changing how command works within that rule set dramatically, changing the way he/she visualizes their system works and what they are trying to accomplish, …but that is your choice.

It is my opinion, however, communication between a commander and his command is not a "given", especially on the Napoleonic battlefield "after the commander issues his initial orders for the conduct of the upcoming battle," …any changes to those orders take "time" to progress through that specific army's chain of command, based on whatever criteria you or the person who wrote the rules determines.

All a reasonable person needs to do is read the accounts of battles within the period to reach a reasonable conclusion regarding the efficiency or inefficiency of the different National combatant's staff organizations. The French were pretty good at it, …the Austrians not so good, as examples.

The group I game with (30mm Napoleonic CLS modified) requires players to write orders for two segments of a turn before the beginning of that turn for the units (Battalions, Cavalry Squadrons or Regiments depending on election, and batteries) to follow their written orders during that turn to the best of their ability subject to the rules.

Sending an order change to a subordinate commander requires a written order sent with a figure that moves at the speed of light cavalry on the table with its own written orders sending the courier to the command figure of the player in question. This takes time via the turn system. It's a reasonable system for a tactical game under the rules the group follows. It is not a perfect system, but it works for us. I/S

I/S wrote:
".. If you ignore the rules writer's ideas about command and control you are changing how command works within that rule set dramatically, changing the way he/she visualizes their system works and what they are trying to accomplish, …"

NZ: I absolutely agree. In fact, there are many rules which, if modified, can lead to unintended consequences in a game which players sometimes to fix with yet another modification. That is why it is helpful to gamers (many of whom are inveterate tinkerers anyway) to have designers notes that explain the mechanics so one can see, the math or rationale behind them.

"It is my opinion, however, communication between a commander and his command is not a "given", especially on the Napoleonic battlefield "after the commander issues his initial orders for the conduct of the upcoming battle," …any changes to those orders take "time" to progress through that specific army's chain of command, based on whatever criteria you or the person who wrote the rules determines."

NZ: Again, we are in absolute agreement.

"All a reasonable person needs to do is read the accounts of battles within the period to reach a reasonable conclusion regarding the efficiency or inefficiency of the different National combatant's staff organizations. The French were pretty good at it, …the Austrians not so good, as examples."

NZ: Some agreement here, but with large reservations. First, there were situations in battles or in a campaign where such efficiency had no effect on an outcome. For example, suppose we were to agree that the French were to need 3 hours to get something acted on and the Austrians 5 hours. If that "something" was to begin in 3 hours, the French would have an advantage. But if the event were 6 hours away neither has an advantage. Sometimes this kind of reasoning is applied in a game to always penalize the Austrian in all situations.

Second, if we are unaware of how the communication system actually worked, and our historical sources or knowledge is biased or incomplete, we might get the wrong idea of which side was more efficient, because we would be looking for examples in the wrong places, or mistaking other processes for "communication" processes. For example, if I think Generals are always running all over the field while their units "commanded themselves", but in reality the general stayed with his unit and it was someone else's responsibility to do something, I might misinterpret what was going on and that might be reflected in my rules.

"The group I game with (30mm Napoleonic CLS modified) requires players to write orders for two segments of a turn before the beginning of that turn for the units (Battalions, Cavalry Squadrons or Regiments depending on election, and batteries) to follow their written orders during that turn to the best of their ability subject to the rules.

Sending an order change to a subordinate commander requires a written order sent with a figure that moves at the speed of light cavalry on the table with its own written orders sending the courier to the command figure of the player in question. This takes time via the turn system. It's a reasonable system for a tactical game under the rules the group follows. It is not a perfect system, but it works for us. I/S"

NZ: I joined my first Napoleonic group with a photocopy of CLS in hand that was sent to me by Fred Vietmeyer in the late '60s. So I am familiar with that set and remember many of those engagements fondly. However, there was enough I found I disagreed with later on (after a lot of reading) that impelled me towards writing my own rules. (I note you have a modified version so it may have taken care of whatever I thought I saw in it). But that set was definitely an important foundation for many of us.

Our Group has re-written the original CLS rules titling them "Ulm to Waterloo" and though they remain similar to the original in spirit and turn structure they have been modified considerably to satisfy the needs of larger games and campaigns without Fred's homage to the French Cuirassier.

We are currently in the beginnings of the 1809 Campaign in Bavaria having completed a couple of early games leading up to our annual June extravaganza: "Aspern".

As part of our research for the early battles I've read John Gill's works on the subject of the 1809 campaign. His detailed recounting of the workings of the Austrian command system lends weight to my original assessment. The Austrian command structure lacked almost all of the flexibility of the French command structure "once Napoleon is at its head". When Napoleon isn't in charge the same kind of screw-ups can occur within the French structure as occurs within the Austrian staff most of the time. It is also quite obvious from reading Gill that the Austrians didn't fully understand "intelligence gathering" to the extent necessary to conduct a large military operation.

It is very hard for players (gamers) to content themselves with the restrictions necessary to duplicate the idiocy of many of the staffs of the Napoleonic period. Most gamers would like to win Waterloo as the French, Austerlitz as the allies, or any one of the battles against Napoleon when it was the structure of his opponent's command system and the decisions of the commanders within that system that allowed Napoleon to win in the first place.

Poor decision-making skills within an inflexible staff system hastens defeat… I/S

>>>>>It is my opinion, however, communication between a commander and his command is not a "given", especially on the Napoleonic battlefield "after the commander issues his initial orders for the conduct of the upcoming battle," …any changes to those orders take "time" to progress through that specific army's chain of command, based on whatever criteria you or the person who wrote the rules determines.<<<<<

This is entirely what I use CR's for, nothing else…so for me, the use of a CR is both important and realistic.

Once again.

The closer you make the tabletop wargame mimic what actually was done…..The better chance you have of making the game represent what actually happened. Without a lot of fudges to "make it come out historic".

High level generals took a lot of time to gather new information to change orders. They took time to get these changes down to the divisional level and the the brigade level. This time delay should be replicated in how the wargame operates.

Lowe level commanders did not have ESP and knowledge of what was happening elsewhere. They couldn't see this stuff. They were not in the chain of people who had this infor related to them. 200 foot tall brigade generals didn't exist. Chief de Battalion did not have an instantaneous map of the location and intentsions of friendly and enemy troops at their fingertips. Duh. They followed the orders of the Divisional general who didn't have much of this info either.

Is this so hard to understand?

Bill G. wrote:
>>>> Example: Richard Hasenhauer claims in his introduction that his "Fire & Fury" wargame is "Historically Accurate", yet as far as I can tell he has never once explained what the hell that means or how his design achieved it. He claims that making a game both playable and historically accurate is difficult, but that he achieved both together. How he did that, or why it should be hard to do both is something else he has never explained. <<<<<

Well, since he and I discussed the Command Radius concept from F&F at length when I was designing AOE, I can give an explanation of that part of it if you are so inclined. Otherwise, such explanations are indeed welcome, but not to the extent I'd want the extra page count to drive up the cost of the rules :).

Bill G:
You don't have to explain Rich's rules, particularly as I wasn't commenting on his use of Command Radius.
Two points though:
1. Regardless of the explanations about the his use of command radius, HE would still have to explain how they are both 'historically accurate' and 'playable.'

2. But, I haven't read anything he has written anywhere or been quoted saying that sheds any light on those two, obviously important, game qualities. Yep, those extra pages can destroy the marketability of the game rules.

During the 1809 Campaign there are many examples of Austrian staff deficiencies. Here is one as outlined in John Gill's Thunder on the Danube series…

"Charles dispositions for the 19th specified that III Corps detach a brigade to cover its left and rear. After some discussion, the choice fell on GM Thierry. Thierry, a Luxembourger by birth, was 56 years old in 1809, had severed the Habsburg crown for more than three decades, and had especially distinguished himself by his courage at the siege of valenciennes in 1793. His capacity for independent command in dicey tactical circumstances however, was questionable. He had little understanding of the enemy situation that April morning or of the operational content in which his brigade was to perform a crucial role and, in the words of an Austrian historian 'it is nearly impossible to grasp the degree of naivete and the unmilitary appreciation of the situation' that he would display over the next two days."

Thierry was sent on his mission without a map, having to rely on a staff officer, Oberst Richter von Binnenthal, for his directions, even going so far as to rely on said staff officer for prime guidance, which may be partially responsible for Charles' later comments lamenting general officers 'unconditionally paying homage to staff's remarks' and effectively turning over the command of their formations (in this case Thierry's brigade).

Binnenthal (Richter) and Thierry walked a portion of their brigade into an almost untenable position against Prince Ludwigs' Bavarians leading Thierry later in the day to make the comment: "I was so upset that I was incapable of making any decision and needed, but did not receive, help from Oberst Richter, who ALONE knew the dispositions and orders".

Thierry's requests for assistance from adjacent commanders, even the Archduke himself, all went unheeded until it was too last to stop the "very cautious" Bavarian advance.

Depending on the scale of the game Thierry's command would have been within visual distance of the overall commander, Archduke Charles, who as a "gamer" would have sent reinforcements when in reality the Austrian Commander did nothing of consequence to respond to a very dangerous situation should the Bavarians have been as aggressive as most gamers would have been… but that's only my speculation. I/S

Scotsman, have you read all of page 6 of this thread? I/S

Then again, idiotsavant, Rosenberg got orders at Wagram to attack with his corps at 3am and was underway 2 hours later. Hardly a lackadaisical performance, organising a corps level attack in two hours. Of course at least they had a staff that was generally sober and trained as such. And Boney had his fair share of intelligence cockups, Aspern being the most glaring in 1809…

Thierry's case is more interesting because of his apparent dependence upon the staff officer, Richter, who he was more than willing to palm off responsibility to because he was 'of the staff'. Richter may have known little more than Thierry did but became a convenient scapegoat.

This is not unusual in any army where you have career officers. The desire to avoid responsibility for problems and rush for credit when things go right is depressingly familiar in the military as it is in other fields.

I have in my rules a command radius, a staff rating for command levels and rates of movement for couriers.

Primarily the CR is not as critical as the ability to genrate ordrs. These are card-based and can be rolled for by all officers based on their staff rating, whilst the overall commander draws a number of orders equivalent to his staff rating. These are in all cases randomly drawn order cards. Orders are passed down the chain of command and can be duplicated at the lower levels by the number of commands they are responsible for. For example, the AoC draws an attack card and passes it to a division. The division may then order any or all of its brigades to attack on that single card, but it must order at least one to do so.

K

Perhaps the example of refusing a flank was a bad one, as there was a SOP for it. My point was how to get different bits to do different things, and the answer was "You send a rider/ride over". How do you represent this, as it begins to look very much like a CR?

Now I can see a set of rules that says "a unit is in command if a) it is with in 2 inches of the Regulating Bn, or B) it is within 2 inches of a bn that is itself in command. So how do you model the one unit being ordered to do something different?

I/S:

Thanks for all the background on what you do, and the pictures. I have seen some of them before. I hope you'll forgive me for saying that they 'look' like fun, particularly the tabletop wargames [or simulations?].

I just wish the hobby [or at least I] could afford the nifty props the US Army can. The game you described 'playtesting' at the wargaming convention--is that a wargame or a serious simulation? I ask because you said it had some visceral elements, though I know games of all sorts can be visceral in the way you describe it in your post--if I understand you correctly.

Aside from the neat radios, available acres and equipment, numbers of people involved etc., are there any simulation methods used in your simulations that can or should be employed by our tabletop wargames if they are going to simulate battlefield aspects of Napoleonic warfare?

It sounds as though your changes to NB, your "Ulm to Waterloo", does capture those wargame qualities you feel are necessary for a simulation, if it is not going to be boring?

How did you change NB?

I/S:
I agree with your comments to Ned [Which he agrees with too] concerning simulations for the most part, and from all I have heard from Military men, communication is at the heart of unit function.

Have you read Thierry's account of the 19th? Gill's account gives a far different spin on events, when the two agree. I think you [or Gill] are being a bit harsh on the old boy… He was not politically well-connected, and was used as a whipping boy for several officers' failures, before and after the 19th. And he had been successful in a number of engagements before that time--so he wasn't a complete nimnod.

That doesn't absolve him of responsibility, but it is a more complicated picture.

Communication is a matter of expectations and attitudes as well as procedures and equipment. I do find it fascinating that with the advent of the radio and technology, the support/staff system of the average army has grown a hundred-fold from Napoleonic period. You'd think that the radio would allow for leaner communications processes, not a huge increase and complication in the process.

As I said, within the system, it is how things are communicated and the expectations around them that make the difference. I remember the story of a US battalion commander in the Gulf War who refused to advance until command control radioed him nearly a half hour later, though satellite data, AWACs and all the communication systems between them, to tell him what was on the other side of the berm he faced. He didn't move because he was ordered to keep casualties to a minimum.

I was reading the first memoirs written by Alexander, Lee's artillerist. At one point, he discusses how artillery battalions were deployed by seniority, like line companies and how important that was. He also mentions how Walton, being the senior artillery battalion commander in Longstreet's Corps reserve, always led the battalions on the move. [!]

Anyway, Alexander says some fascinating things about communication in regards to Longstreet's move to the Union left flank on the morning and afternoon of the second day:

From "Fighting for the Confederacy" (edited by G Gallagher), p236:

"I do not remember looking at my watch this whole day, & all my ideas of the hours are guesses, but it seems to me that before 11 a.m. I had gotten my battalion down the valley of Willoughby Run, in a few hundred yards of the school-house, where I had to wait on the infantry & Cabell's & Henry's battalions before going further. I had come there by a short & direct road, which at one point passed over a high bare place where it was in full view of the Federal signal station. But I avoided that part of the road by turning out to the left, & going through fields, & going through fields & hollows, & getting back to the road again a quarter mile or so beyond.

Then I recall riding back for something, & finding the head of one of our divisions of infantry standing halted in sight of the signal station. It had been put on that road to march, but told, as I had been, to keep out of view. Finding that the road brought them into view they halted & sent back for orders or a guide. Finally, after a delay which must have been much over an hour, orders came, and, I believe, a guide to lead them by ‘Black Horse Tavern.' I've never forgotten the name since. And that, I see by the map, was apparently four miles to get less than one.

"That is just one illustration of how time may be lost in handling troops, and of the need of an abundance of competent staff officers by the generals in command. Scarcely any of our generals had half of what they needed to keep a constant & close supervision on the execution of important orders. And that ought always to be done. An army is like a great machine, and in putting it into battle, it is not enough for its commander merely to issue the necessary orders. He should have a staff ample enough to supervise the execution of each step, & to promptly report any difficulty or misunderstanding. There is no telling the value of the hours which were lost by that division that morning. Of course I told the officers at the head of the column of the route of my artillery had followed—which was easily seen—but there was no one [p.237] with authority to vary the orders they were under, & they momentarily expected the new ones for which they had sent & which were very explicit when they came after the long, long delay.

"It has since appeared that if our corps had made its attack even two or three hours sooner than it did, our chances of success would have been immensely increased. The key to the whole position was Little Round Mountain, & the enemy's 5th Corps, which alone prevented our taking it, was barely arriving on the field when our assault was finally made; & was barely raced to the position in time to encounter our attack, by Gen. Warren who, fortunately for them, visited the signal station opportunely & discovered our approach. I have already said that I don't think Gen. Lee could have ever ordered or expected an attack by our corps at sunrise, for the preliminary detail for any attack seems to have been left till morning. But, by ten, or eleven o'clock at latest, it was entirely practicable for us to have delivered our attack in good shape. And Confederate writers, with almost one accord, put the blame of whatever delay there was on Gen. Longstreet."

Fascinating that Alexander sees the issue of communication, not one of relaying messages per se, but rather an issue of how many staff are available to the corps to *supervise* the 'on site' communication and implementation of the orders already delivered. While the head of the column already HAD a guide and Alexander was there with a easy route that would continue to hide the column, the choice was to wait for orders and another guide.

During this time, Longstreet was chatting with Hood, riding in the middle of the two Division column because "Lee had instructed the guides leading the column", so he was not needed.

Again attitudes and expectations shaped the speed and effectiveness of the communication rather than just the procedures and forms.

Considering how lean Lee's staff remained during the war, even compared to the Union, it would be interesting to compare the French staff numbers to the Allies, including Wellington. As an Army general, I believe he was given allowance for six aides, but paid for several times that number out of his own pocket.

>>>>The game you described 'play testing' at the wargaming convention--is that a wargame or a serious simulation? I ask because you said it had some visceral elements, though I know games of all sorts can be visceral in the way you describe it in your post--if I understand you correctly.<<<<

At this point the wargame we playtested at Little Wars is just a game, or perhaps it really should be considered a tool in the development of the HVT (High Value Target) extraction simulation we are developing for a series of upcoming exercises. My task is to provide the "friction" that enters every military operation in uncontrolled areas of the world. We are developing a series of characters our interactors will portray that will interact with the commanders involved from "higher command", "competing organizations", "UNHCR", the "Press", etc…, all of whom play a part in planning and executing missions of this nature.

The elements I refered to had more to do with how the players interacted with each other and how "gritty" their performance was. In this case the individual playing CNN almost caused a "physical" conforntation with the US commander as he played his part. Both were very in character, as were all the participants by the end of the game. By the time it was over everyone had worked up a sweat, including me…

This game will become a simulation when we combine table top insertion, live fire real time extraction, then return to the table top to complete the mission testing the exfiltration plans. I/S

I/S:

Okay, I understand you now--I think. The difference between the wargame and the simulation is your set of goals for the overall exercise. The wargame is only part or component of the overall simulation you designed which includes role playing and the live fire real time extraction.

I know that technically the part, the wargame, could be a functional simulation, but in this case you see the wargame component as just a part of the larger simulations design. Correct?

>"The key to the whole position was Little Round Mountain, & the enemy's 5th Corps, which alone prevented our taking it, was barely arriving on the field when our assault was finally made…"<

Except that Lee ordered Longstreet to attack northeast up the Emmitsburg Road, as he was still intent on taking Cemetery Hill. Lee had no interest in Little Round Top, then or later. Had the attack started before Sickles advanced from Cemetery Ridge to the Peach Orchard, the attack most likely would indeed have gone up the Emmitsburg Road -- and probably have been hit in the flank by Sickle's 3rd Corps, and maybe by the 5th Corps as well. (The latter had been over by the Baltimore Pike for a while, so was "on the field" sooner than Alexander knew.)

However, what Alexander wrote about Lee's lack of staff officers was an excellent point. And Lee made his problems worse by giving verbal orders most of the time -- seldom written ones. So his subordinates had nothing to refer to later but their own memories of what was said and of when it was said.

Don Lowry wrote:
"Except that Lee ordered Longstreet to attack northeast up the Emmitsburg Road, as he was still intent on taking Cemetery Hill. Lee had no interest in Little Round Top, then or later. Had the attack started before Sickles advanced from Cemetery Ridge to the Peach Orchard, the attack most likely would indeed have gone up the Emmitsburg Road -- and probably have been hit in the flank by Sickle's 3rd Corps, and maybe by the 5th Corps as well. (The latter had been over by the Baltimore Pike for a while, so was "on the field" sooner than Alexander knew.)"

Don:
True. Lee's plan of attack was to have Hood swing north, with his flank in the air facing the Union line and attack towards Gettysburg between Emmittsburg road and the ridge. He didn't think the Union as south as Little Round Top. His plan was based on faulty information. Hood realized this and though he protested Longstreet's insistence on following Lee's plan, Hood swung Laws' brigade and with it his whole division wide towards Little Round Top. It unhinged the whole attack to a large extent because everyone was in position to execute Lee's orders.

>>>>However, what Alexander wrote about Lee's lack of staff officers was an excellent point. And Lee made his problems worse by giving verbal orders most of the time -- seldom written ones. So his subordinates had nothing to refer to later but their own memories of what was said and of wwhen it was said.<<<<<

Yes, it does raise some interesting issues in command and communication. Lee may have given verbal orders, but it is clear that 1. he had drawn out a plan of attack which was copied for the I Corps officers. One of them survives today. 2. It is also obvious from the after action reports that the brigade commanders were aware of what Lee wanted them to do, had prepared to do it, and then had the whole thing go pear-shaped. It was a miscommunication of sorts, but at least in this case didn't seem to suffer from a lack of written orders--just other kinds of screw-ups, Lee's and Longstreet's lack of involvement and a major change of situation between when Lee ordered the attack in the morning and the actual attack in the late afternoon.

Scotsman: Exactly! I hate to admit we even use some flight "simulators" to tie in "air support" as well as real live fire CAS on the ranges at Fort Polk and Yuma to allow far flung units the ability to participate in the same mission at the same time.

It is extremely complicated at times… I/S

Just thought I would share this with you guys :

I remember years ago, circa 1992-94 I Designed, Umpired and participated in a campaign of the Napoleonic wars starting in 1805 and finishing in 1807. The campaign went for two game years and funnily enough, went for two real years as well. It consisted of over 13 individual players each of which controlled an entire Nation each. We had plenty of non-player Neutral countries which were factored into the setting either controlled by other players if invaded or surrendered if the enemy was too large to resist.

I spent nearly the entire previous year setting this campaign up, researching every aspect of the wars that I could, from strategic consumption rates, Attrition rules, recruitment levels of each nation. Designing each and every army to correspond with what the real armies of the day had. In fact, I even drew up all 8 maps all of which covered an area of around 6ft x 12ft when laid down on a separate table where is remained for that two year period.

Our system revolved around actual men, not figures and as very detailed in this respect, the system I developed creates casualties in men, not figures so there is book keeping etc. I also wrote up very detailed, some would say complex Command Control rules which we still use today which gave every commander of the era statistics for his use on the field and on the campaign maps. Rating for such things as Attack / Defense Morale, Charge Modifiers, CV's (Command Values), Initiative values, Routs levels for both Attack and Defense and even abilities for various levels of command if he had to step up or down a level.

All the troops had proper march rates per week, national characteristics for every troop type and every other rating you could think of. I even had unit ratings for btlns which increase in experience once they became seasoned veterans or even crack/Elite if they qualified for that level. I developed very detailed rules for supplies, ammunition, campaign movements, lines of communication, foraging, and even troop replacement or conscription via troop cities which would march to the front etc.

One section of the rules I did not finish, because of the impatience of several players to begin, was the Political rules. We went into the campaign with just about every rule possible for any and every eventuality I could think of except this particular area. I had no idea what was going to happen and thought, oh well, we will play it by ear as we go. It turned out this was the best thing I could have possibly done in the entire campaign rules structure. Other than a basic outline of the current political situation, guidelines for each nation as to their priorities and international interests based on my reading and research of the period 1800-1805 I managed to wing it for everyone involved.

The amazing thing that occurred was that each player actually began to take on the role of the monarch at this Political level and actually became concerned to the point of every seriousness in making sure they protected their interests, watched and observed every other player and what he might be up to and even threats were made to those who became aggressive in any way that might cause the opposite number to lose control of his own interests.

The results of this were truly amazing, each player actually did such a great job of taking on the role he was to play and were so involved politically that words, treaties, pacts, alliances and every other facet of the political stage grew and flourished without the need for me to even set one single rule in place. The guys actually worked to their own interests and controlling them to the point where they also played for political gain at the expense of others and more often than not this did not lead to immediate war but instead, reprimands, threats, puling out of treaties, compensation elsewhere and so on.

I remember The Austrian player in a war room meeting with his Russian counter part at one stage pleading for help along the Danube, his forces were becoming hard pressed by my French and he was becoming very worried, he felt that the Russian player was dragging his feet (I did not tell him of the calendar disparity) but it was also known (or felt) by everyone else that the Russian player was indeed holding back somewhat to let the French and Austrians fight it out and they (the Russians) would come in and clean up. The Austrian player suspected as much and threatened to call of the alliance and make peace with France if he did not push his men.

Eventually the Russians did come but it was too late. The Austrians capitulated near Linz and the Russians promptly retreated back towards Poland. The Austrian player lost Italy and as a consequence, large recruitment areas etc. He retired to inner Austria to spend the next couple of years rebuilding his shattered army. The war went on but he was crushed.

On another interesting note, the Russians, Danish and Swedish players all signed what they called, "The Baltic Alliance" which combined their fleets if needed against any aggressive behavior shown by Britain and her powerful fleet. This proved to be a coup for Russia who brokered the alliance effectively undermining the French influence as well. The British player, incensed by this apparently aggressive behavior of the Baltic nations against him actually began to plan sea borne actions against these nations but was very restricted by the winter. The British player was losing his Baltic Sea ports for trade, one of the prime sources of his trade points for production. The Austrian player began to complain to the Russians because British gold started to dry up and so on which led to ill feelings between them and several troop movements and repositionings.

This campaign has so much going on and so much follow on events, consequences and side effects from certain actions and counter actions of the leading nations that it was mind boggling. We all agreed that the events that began to occur and set in motion could not be properly learnt or understood in a book. It was only possible to understand and comprehend fully by actually playing at it in a campaign simulation like ours. Where as many of the real parameters, tools and situations that could be implemented as possible to allow us to surprisingly, see and understand the complexities of the political tug of war that occurred in the real wars.

Although our on set parameters and tools could not hope to encompass everything and every factor there was enough to open our eyes to the problems and complexities that these political figures must have faced.

And all this was just from the Political level, let alone the Operational Level and the Tactical Level.

Regards,
Shane

I went back to the original question posed by Teddy The Vehement Oyster which I extract as "So I'm throwing this out for discussion: could we dispense with the concept of a "command radius" altogether. Is there really a compelling reason for it?"

I think the challenging of orthodoxy is extremely healthy and will allow wargame rules to develop so a big thanks to Teddy for initiating this thread. The conclusions from this discussion could include dispensing with the notion of the command radius or keeping it but with a better understanding (perhaps) of what it really represents.

From a wargame history perspective there was a time long ago when games did not have command radii or activation dice rolls for commanders or PIPs or chits etc. There were downsides to the lack of constraints on the players so the command radius (CR) and some of these other mechanisms were seen as a positive way to control the excessive freedom of the player as commander.

One of the great benefits of the internet is that it has allowed access to material that would have previously only available to the academic or perhaps locked away in some private collection. I believe this thread well illustrates how reading and interpreting material such as drill manuals along with "tactical snippeting" (extracting snippets from memoirs etc.) gives us better understanding of the practical aspects of handling larger formations on the field of battle. The opportunity (and challenge) is to see whether we can use this knowledge to introduce some newer forms of constraint to the player as commander.

My current thinking on this is that design of the game needs to consider the player level of command and simulating the lower level. Typically this is set at "two down" so for an army commander orders may be written to corps commanders with some definition of what should be done with one or more divisions. For command at this level then there is a need to consider the distance between the commanders and the difficulties of the ground and the position of the enemy etc. when it comes to the transmission of orders and information about the battle.

What I am also coming to is that the figures and how they are based also needs to follow the "two down" approach. If the division is represented battalions then they can scatter and become a collection of "zippy little battalions" which in my opinion is not relevant to an army level game. If the division is however represented by bases of figures that allow it to take up configurations representing the division as deployed, massed in assembly (or reserve), moving tactically on the battlefield or moving strategically (road column) then the command radius at the division level is not an issue, the division is limited in the configurations that it can adopt. I do not necessarily mean a single block base for a division, rather a number (around 4) bases that must be kept in contact and must form a line, double line or block of reserve.

For the army level game I am thinking 6mm figures or even 2mm blocks with figures based for the different deployments of the division (which does mean more figures to buy and paint).

If the command level of the game is lowered to Corp command then 15-28mm becomes feasible. Two-down from Corp gets to the level of brigade both for command and for basing. I would argue for brigade bases made of a number of sub-bases again bases that must be kept in contact and must form a line, double line or block of reserve. Given that a brigade will typically contain 4-6 battalions then the potential arises to base at battalion level but these again may need multiple representation as line, column etc. The danger is that basing battalions leads back to the "zippy little battalions" problem.

Keeping the lower level bases within a small number of defined configurations removes the need for command radius at the lower level but it allows other rule mechanisms to be used for command and control at the higher level. This could be a simple radius, a distance based on courier movement and perhaps involving written orders.

I accept however there are plenty of examples of small forces being used to assault a particular point in the line. For this I would allow the staff of a division or Corp to have a number of senior staff officers (from zero to a maximum of two) who could be ordered to take a single base from a low level formation as a detachment and make the attack. Casualty rates among these officers should be high. Where the command has no senior staff officers available then the divisional commander may want to take the risk.

Finally some thoughts about the implications of understanding the regulating battalion.

I can see where the regulating battalion would have been essential for the grand tactics of the linear armies during the period where most of the time the army as a whole and its component parts were deployed in line of battle most of the time. (I do not refer to divisions and corps here as I am thinking about the warfare prior to the French revolution where the brigade was the basis command unit and the division had yet to be developed). Not only was the line of battle the normal method of deployment (and manuals refer to movement of the line [of battle]) but column was used to move the army to the point where it was to deploy. The column would be led normally by the right flank unit (the terminology being "right in front") and deployment would involve the units wheeling into line once arriving on the ground for deployment. The deployment would be a form of procession with the flank unit deploying first and the others taking station based on this unit.

I would argue that by and large the British doctrine used this form of manoeuvre throughout the period and the Prussians up to 1806 or perhaps the later reforms. The continuing use of the Line of Battle would benefit from use of the regulating battalion.

For the French it is very different. The loss of the officer class due to the revolution would have resulted in a loss of knowledge of managing the line of battle. There was also much debate in the French army about the preference of the deep order as opposed to linear prior to the revolution with the perhaps more support for the linear order amongst the traditionalists forced to flee the revolution.
After a succession of defeats the French discovered that they could hold their own in more broken terrain where linear tactics could not be used so effectively and the combination of skirmishers and battalion columns becomes the successful tactic. When the French venture back into the open terrain the doctrine has changed. The column is now the preferred formation and not just for the battalion but there are manoeuvres for managing the deployment of a division of eight to twelve battalions. Deployment can take place on the head of the column to the correct side of the head of the column as before (no inversion!!) and the newer "column by the centre" also allows the head of the column to arrive at a point of the enemy line and deploy on both sides of the head of the column. With the French not using the line of battle to such a great extent then the regulating battalion is perhaps less important. What really matters is leading the column to the decisive point. I am thinking here predominantly of a brigade or division in column and not a division in a line where each battalion is formed in column.

When you get to the high point of French tactical behaviour the division becomes a highly flexible entity with battalions being used for point attacks supervised by the divisional or brigade commander or a trusted senior officer on his staff. This has its roots in the experience of the commanders who survived the earlier wars with experienced battalion cadres. The French can also perform the more classical line of battle manoeuvres but often in division sized bodies as at Austerlitz.

For wargaming the tactical flexibility of the French system does in some way bring back the notion of the "zippy little battalion" at least until the decline starting in 1809 where the loss of experience leads to the mentality of mass column.

By way of a footnote I believe that the term "tactical snippeting" is originally attributed to Paddy Griffith.

I/S wrote:
Exactly! I hate to admit we even use some flight "simulators" to tie in "air support" as well as real live fire CAS on the ranges at Fort Polk and Yuma to allow far flung units the ability to participate in the same mission at the same time.

It is extremely complicated at times… I/S

I/S:
Yeah, I have talked with at least two simulators who have been forced to do the same thing. One developed at least five separate simulators to cover a simulation of satellite operations and navigating. Another was a Weather simulator that had a central simulation process linked to twelve [!] sub-simulations.

Simulations have a limit to complexity as do wargames, much for the same reasons--goals are lost and participants end up spending their time administering the simulation procedures rather than 'playing' the game. OR the system used simply can't handle the number of variable deemed necessary to achieve the simulation goals.

Those wargames are simulations, just not the over-all simulation design, but even if it is only a few items, they still are simulating something, or you wouldn't be using them.

Mike wrote:
"By way of a footnote I believe that the term "tactical snippeting" is originally attributed to Paddy Griffith."

That is correct. This is back to just before his "Forward Into Battle" book.

Is there any chance that responses could be kept to a couple of short paragraphs? After 6 or 7 pages of this thread, I'm not inclined to want to read overly long responses. Perhaps the reponders could stick to one point and make other points in additional postings.

Mike wrote:
The column is now the preferred formation and not just for the battalion but there are manoeuvres for managing the deployment of a division of eight to twelve battalions. Deployment can take place on the head of the column to the correct side of the head of the column as before (no inversion!!) and the newer "column by the centre" also allows the head of the column to arrive at a point of the enemy line and deploy on both sides of the head of the column. With the French not using the line of battle to such a great extent then the regulating battalion is perhaps less important.

Miike:
There was no change in the importance of the directing or regulating battalion with the French column formations--at all. The classic French formation of two or three lines of battalion columns still all moved on the regulating battalion on the right. The supporting lines would regulating on their right hand battalion, while the regulating battalions would regulate on the first line's regulating battalion.

As for 'zippy' little battalions, where do you see these? I can think of some examples of flexible maneuvers by a line of battalions, but the only examples of zippy little battalions is either where a battalion has been sent on a specific operation, or it has lost contact with the other units in it's brigade and is trying to find a home. The two examples I can come up with right now are from Austerlitz:

1. Thiebault sends out one of his battalions to take the village of Pratze. They are ambushed by a Russian infantry battalion and Theibault expresses his unhappiness with the battalion commander because he didn't send out skirmishers to cover the battalion's front.
2. The 1/14 Ligne becomes unhinged from the St. Hilaire's division and wonders around until it finds a place to light, on the other end of his line.

I can't comment on the command observations you made as I am not sure what is the central processes for Corps and Army command and control.

Mike the Mug wrote:

"The column would be led normally by the right flank unit (the terminology being "right in front") and deployment would involve the units wheeling into line once arriving on the ground for deployment. The deployment would be a form of procession with the flank unit deploying first and the others taking station based on this unit. I would argue that by and large the British doctrine used this form of manoeuvre throughout the period"

Mike,

I think that George Geoffrey championed this idea in Tactics and Grand Tactics of the Napoleonic Wars. It is, however, very far from the truth as far as the British army was concerned.

It was British policy to form line at a distance from the enemy, mainly to reduce casualties inflicted by artillery, but processional deployments were not normally employed. Columns could be right or left in front depending on the mission. If the intention was to deploy to the front, then the columns would be closed up to quarter or close distance and the companies filed into position. Deployments were often made from contiguous close columns (contiguous referring to a line of battalion columns with little or no lateral space between battalions)and any company in the brigade could be chosen as the one to deploy on.

The British army was every bit as flexible as the French, with respect to the variety of columns and methods of deployment used, apart perhaps from not employing columns formed on the centre. All this can be found in the regulations and there are also plenty of actual examples to back it up.

Mike wrote:
From a wargame history perspective there was a time long ago when games did not have command radii or activation dice rolls for commanders or PIPs or chits etc. There were downsides to the lack of constraints on the players so the command radius (CR) and some of these other mechanisms were seen as a positive way to control the excessive freedom of the player as commander.

Mike:
Yes, though I think we can agree that rules that control excessive freedom are not the necessarily same as simulating any real environmental constraints.

The assumptions that both CR and PIPS or Command Points are based on remained flawed. They simply are not based on real command processes or constraints from the history I have seen.

For example: From what I have read, Command Points or PIPs are based on the idea that a Corps or Army commander and his staff had a limited amount of time to make things happen, get orders out, relay them etc, and that finite ability is recreated with CPs and PIPs. However, if you look at how Corps and Army commanders spent their time DURING a battle, they never seem pressed for time, or challenged to get everything done in an hour's time [for instance]. In fact, it is difficult to tell if they did much of anything during a battle.

Even when changing orders for his entire army, Wellington rides down the line of his divisions in march columns, verbally giving his orders to each divisional commander, and accomplishes it fairly quickly [in an hour, give or take]. It might have taken MORE time to actually send messages with couriers. There isn't any sense that Wellington is pressed for time or finding it difficult to get everything done that needs to be done, even when doing it himself. Certainly he wants to act quickly, but there doesn't seem to be a limit to what he can accomplish when he wants to get it done.

After that, Wellington doesn't seem to do much of anything, but stop by a couple of places during the battle. Now, CPs or PIPs can certainly represent more than just the activities of the Corps and Army commanders and staffs--in fact would have to, to be a reasonable mechanic--but what do they represent?

The same is true of the activation rules. What all do they represent? Do they have any relationship to processes or outcomes in Napoleonic battle?

Shane:
Thanks for your campaign report. Actually, it isn't surprising that your players began acting 'the part'. I would have been surprised if they hadn't.

That's a major component of any simulation with real participants: Human nature. Human nature + a reasonable recreation of the political military situation/environment created the interplay between the participants that mirrored what human nature created with the original situation. No surprise there. I will point out that once you had a meaningful campaign environment, you didn't NEED restrictive or channeling rules for their behavior.

It certainly helped that the players probably knew the original history to some extent--which would have also directed their actions. But you can't do anything about it.

You *should* get the very same kind of 'in character' behavior from players with a wargame of a Napoleonic battle IF the simulation has captured the environment correctly. I noticed that with your campaign, no one appears to have used Lawyer's tricks or unexpected ploys within the rules [Partly because there were so few rules to begin with!]

Mike,

Scotsman beat me to it but there was no difference in the use of Regulation, just because more columns were in use.

The requirement to keep force cohesion was just the same and the practicalities of order transmission did not alter.

Line of Battle is formed from what the French called a Grand Body of Troops (Brigades/Divisions)it has no real meaning in terms of how the battalions themselves were formed, that's just another doctrinal level with in it.

There was always a First Line of Battle and could be a Second or even a Third. This was around as a concept for centuries.

It is easy to think in terms of Line of Battle = Lines = 18th Century Warfare but that's not the case, it would have been equally valid to have an entire Line of Battle in Columns, although not tactically advisable in most cases.

Captain Snort wrote:

"I think that George Geoffrey championed this idea in Tactics and Grand Tactics of the Napoleonic Wars. It is, however, very far from the truth as far as the British army was concerned.It was British policy to form line at a distance from the enemy, mainly to reduce casualties inflicted by artillery, but processional deployments were not normally employed…"

A major source for George's book was John Macdonald's translation of the French 1791 Rules and regulations, including Macdonald's introduction where he went into detail about what he called the "Prussian system" and the 'French system", especially concerning the fixed pivot (Prussian System) and the moving or floating pivot. One of the reasons Macdonald thought his translation important was so British officers could see what advantages the French regs had so the British could adopt them. The translation was published in 1803, but I assume Macdonald had been working on it for a while and that British practice evolved and improved between the French Revolutionary period (which is the time frame Macdonald would have been making comparisons) and post Peace of Amiens methods. Most, if not all nations changed drillbooks or improved methods over the years. George's work is best viewed as an introduction or an opportunity to begin a discussion, and open to modification based upon better information as it became available

Guys,

Gosh, I return and we are headed towards 400 posts, some of which actually deal with the topic and the era. Keep it up, I want to be 400.

Read Clausewitz, he'll tell you why columns were used and if you want the long version read Jomini.

Now for me. After 1809, on the continent, columns predominated because the training was so poor. In any event the Russians used columns as formations of combat throughout the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era.

In the Peninsula the French got in the bad habit of bullying Spanish Armies with large columns of battalions. In a way it made sense. It ended battles quickly with few French casualties. Of course when the Spanish didn't run things tended to go wrong and on occasion the Spanish won.

Good gaming.

Bob Coggins

Just a short response to The Scotsman about zippy little battalions. I do not see these in memoirs or battle reports either but they happen on the wargame table unless the rules constrain the player to keep within a grand tactical formation. I suspect (hope) we are in agreement on this.

Not part of the command radius discussion, but I think worth mentioning.

The Scotsman wrote:

"During this time, Longstreet was chatting with Hood, riding in the middle of the two Division column because "Lee had instructed the guides leading the column", so he was not needed"

That's right. Longstreet was exactly where he wanted to be and he knew exactly where that was. As Lee himself said, at minimum he wanted the Peach Orchard taken and Longstreet delivered it to him. Mission accomplished. As I recall, Lee was pretty clear about where the "embarrassment" was for any Confederate failings during the Gettysburg campaign, and that person was not named James Longstreet.

>"Is there any chance that responses could be kept to a couple of short paragraphs?"<

No.

Mike the Mug wrote:
>>>>Just a short response to The Scotsman about zippy little battalions. I do not see these in memoirs or battle reports either but they happen on the wargame table unless the rules constrain the player to keep within a grand tactical formation. I suspect (hope) we are in agreement on this.<<<

MTM: I think so. If there are zippy little battalions in the game, but not on the historical battlefield, obviously the rules don't do the job of portraying Napoleonic movement and maneuver. If the game mechanisms and environmental dynamics matched the history portrayed, so would the battalion movements. [As in Shane's campaign game, more or less] You can't blame zippy battalions on the players, regardless of how contrary or clever--its the rules that allow it.

Bottom Dollar wrote:
>>>>That's right. Longstreet was exactly where he wanted to be and he knew exactly where that was. As Lee himself said, at minimum he wanted the Peach Orchard taken and Longstreet delivered it to him. Mission accomplished. As I recall, Lee was pretty clear about where the "embarrassment" was for any Confederate failings during the Gettysburg campaign, and that person was not named James Longstreet.<<<<<<

BD:
I wasn't suggesting anything different, only that he didn't see himself 'in command' of the two division column, but rather Lee's guide. It is easy to see that poor communication, regardless of the causes, leads to blame being passed around…

Ned,

With regard to George Geoffrey's book, as far as I recall he stated that armies using the "Prussian System" could not, or did not, move the companies in file and so were committed to processional deployments. This is one of the most misleading statements that I have ever seen.

There is good evidence that the British army had adopted the moveable pivot to some degree throughout the army by the time of the Peninsula war, being referred to as "shoulders forward", rather than wheeling, in contemporary memoirs.

With regards to zippy battalions on the field I think most people are talking about the sudden and separate intelligence that appears when a player moves a single btln or series on single btlns on missions or movement orders totally out of sync with what the rest of the formation is ordered to perform and carry out.

For example,

A btln suddenly or seemingly races out on an exposed lank to deploy and cover that flank against some perceived threat. Race off in another direction to occupy and hold some point away from the rest of the brigade. Suddenly deploy into a defensive formation or carry out an individual attack away from the rest of the formation. The list goes on.

I have seen this in many games I've played and participated in, I have even done this myself, and all of us have who play games at this level. However, when picked out for doing this the opposite player tries to exclaim that that was not in realistic or in accordance with how individual btlns would perform in a larger formation. This statement and others like it really make me laugh because these players forget that btln commanders "do" have the ability to perform manoeuvres and carry out individual missions if so ordered by their superior commanders such as Brigadiers etc.

The players who disagree cite their reasons for not liking this display of "individual" thinking as somehow way too much for a Brigadier to be able to accomplish but personally, I fail to see why? I think these players feel that the players carrying out these little missions are getting some unfair advantage through some artificial extension or expansion of the intelligence pool a Brigadier should really have. Basically saying that there is some kind of threshold or maximum level of Intelligence or Order ability that they feel is allowable for any individual commander.

Personally I find their thinking so strange, these people feel that a Player who is commanding an entire army of say 5 corps cannot be allowed to also command individual btlns because of the level of coordinated intelligence needed. For a player to simultaneously command an Army made up of several corps which are made up of several Divisions, which are made up of several Brigades which are then made up of several Regiments and Battalions is way too much control for one single player. They gain such control and manipulation of the battle that is unrealistic, leaving nothing to chance or trust to the multitude of subordinates a real General of an army would need to rely on and trust to carry out his orders.

Being both Order giver and Order receiver with such synchronization to be able to use the exact same mind and picture of what is in the mind of the order giver is way too much telepathic intelligence. This is why players who prefer games systems where the lowest unit formation is say the Division or Brigade do not like systems where the lowest unit is the battalion. Systems were you are Both Army commander and Battalion commander is simply way too much control.

As much as I tend to agree and understand what they are saying I put it to them that this is why such lower level systems such as my own and literally hundreds of others like mine have so many stipulations, limitations, parameters and controls down at the lower levels of play. The use of CR's I think is only one way some rules designers try to force players in btln level games to conform to the limits placed in order to avoid these artificial intelligence situations.

Now look at a game system where the individual unit is say a Brigade or even a Division. They might not have CR's but if the system uses a "single" basing structure or blocks of bases that are for no other reason other than to represent the size of the formation and cannot act on their own then you have created an artificial CR anyway. The mere point is that by placing these formations on single blocks (or groups of blocks) means you are controlling and manipulating, setting parameters and limitations on the players that do not allow them the ability to break off stands or part thereof in order for them to act individually. This is a form of control forcing the formation to only have control over the actual space the stand uses up. This act is exactly the same as using a form of CR except the individual parts of that formation cannot break off at all even if they wanted.

As explained earlier, individual btlns "did" perform separate tasks and orders given to them from Brigadiers to carry out such as security of a flank, taking of a position to secure it or form up somewhere other than where the Brigade was in order for the Brigadier to best carry out other tasks with the rest of the brigade. I agree with the use of individual btlns but refuse to use the term "Zippy", for me it is nothing more than carrying out an individual task that the Brigadier feels best protects the formation as a whole.

Like I said, I do agree that if you are both Army commander and individual commander of every btln on your side of the field you are going to have telepathic command and an advantage over the guys on the other side of the field. I do not see how this can be fixed, it is a problem I know but one that is an inherent flaw in games such as these in our hobby. I do prefer games where you have multiple players because this coordination of troops and formations via telepathic command drops significantly but I think that many players do not have that luxury.

This is why systems have to have limitations, parameters, regulations and other mechanics set in place to force players to act in a military way and not one single entity with super powers of coordinated intelligence and reasoning. I don't mean saying that you have to restrict them so much that they cannot carry out commands but to set limitations or parameters that they can still act and react within.

For example, if a single player wants to break off a btln to carry out a separate task such as secure a flank, carry forward and take a nearby village, or halt and form a rear guard somewhere should be allowed too. However, if this "separate" task is so far away as to be seen as on the moon then the player is getting carried away. I personally think that a Brigadier wants to keep and maintain contact with every formation in his command simply from a security point of view. If a commander sent a unit away and lost contact or eyesight contact with it and that btln was lost, annihilated or captured then what do you think he will suffer after the battle for their loss? He would be in a world of hurt from his superiors. This alone is incentive to watch over them and cover them even if given some task away from the rest.

I see the only viable reason for a Brigadier to break off a btln for some task outside of eyesight as one where the unit is broken off to cover a rear such as a bridge, a crossing, some defensive position or somewhere along the line of march that allows the commander a place to retreat to if hard pressed. Covering a rear or flank for security reasons is totally realistic for me and quite legitimate. It is when players send off btlns to distances that cause them total separation from the rest of the formation.

I think this is where some rules designers bring in their CR rules to stop or avoid this occurrence from happening and if so I have no problem with that. I personally think that it is, although restrictive, a viable way to stop these unrealistic situations. But if the CR is used to herd units and stop them from acting on their own then I do have a problem with their use and would not play that kind of system.

Regards,
Shane

Scotsman, …I hate to disagree with you, but it IS THE PLAYERS who wheedle, finagle, connive, and try their best to find any holes in the rules they can that will allow them to beat the system, and it is the "competitive" rules systems and the "need to win" in some gamers that has fostered it. Just like the need to cheat in baseball with steroids many, many players want to find an edge, even if they have to cheat to get it.

We saw it in the "Janus" sims at Leavenworth and elsewhere when the "cheaters" had to transport hundreds of soldiers by helicopters that in reality would not fit because the helo could lift the weight, …but not the volume. In my world those officers would have been minefield testers, …but I digress.

My ever-present philosophy is "play the period"…, but to do that you must "know the period". Which, sadly, most Napoleonic wargamers don't. I/S

>>>>>My ever-present philosophy is "play the period"…, but to do that you must "know the period". Which, sadly, most Napoleonic wargamers don't. I/S<<<<<

I strongly disagree with that statement and take that personally!! the word "most" says to me that you are saying "you" I/S do know the period but "most" of the rest of us do not???

That my friend I will personally take insult from, I know the period very well thank you and would argue with you about telling me I, in all probability fit into your "most" catagory…

careful what you say my friend.

I/S wrote:

it IS THE PLAYERS who wheedle, finagle, connive, and try their best to find any holes in the rules they can that will allow them to beat the system, and it is the "competitive" rules systems and the "need to win" in some gamers that has fostered it.

Ever play Johnny Reb III ?

I/S wrote:
Scotsman, …I hate to disagree with you, but it IS THE PLAYERS who wheedle, finagle, connive, and try their best to find any holes in the rules they can that will allow them to beat the system, and it is the "competitive" rules systems and the "need to win" in some gamers that has fostered it. Just like the need to cheat in baseball with steroids many, many players want to find an edge, even if they have to cheat to get it.

We saw it in the "Janus" sims at Leavenworth and elsewhere when the "cheaters" had to transport hundreds of soldiers by helicopters that in reality would not fit because the helo could lift the weight, …but not the volume. In my world those officers would have been minefield testers, …but I digress.

I/S:
Well, you certain can disagree with me. I didn't mean that there weren't players like that, but what you've described are 'cheaters', someone consciously 'breaking the rules', not a rules system that allows it purposely. If there was a body limit on the particular model of helicopters, why wouldn't everyone know what that is? Sometimes it is a matter of what the rules actually say as opposed to what they intend to say.

What does that mean, "play the period?" If the game is designed well, i.e. portrays the period effectively , they can't help but do that. I don't have to know 19th Century Business history to play Railroad or know the theories of Capitalism and free enterprise to play Monopoly. It certainly can help, but that's the point. If the wargame effectively portrays elements of Napoleonic warfare, then knowing more about it will help play the game successfully, OR they will learn it while they attempt to win playing the wargame.

What I hear is you suggesting is that players have to 'play the period' to produce a historically reasonable game, because the wargame doesn't provide that experience on it's own.

Do we 'play the period' to avoid:
1. Cheaters who break the rules?
2. Players who use the rules in unexpected or unhistorical ways?
or do we "play the period", because if we don't, the game experience won't mimic actual historical processes and outcomes?

If it is:
1. Then no amount of knowledge or rules will eliminate them.
2. That is one purpose of simulations and wargames: allow for new ideas and a variety of solutions to tactical problems. If the environment works on a historical level, so will the successes and failures of any 'new ideas.'

If you are 'playing the period' because that is the only way to get the wargame to work, there is something wrong with the wargame design.

If most Napoleonic wargamers don't know the period, what does that say about the games they play? I think Napoleonic wargamers would know more about the period if the wargames they played actually portrayed the period.

Shane wrote:
>>>>Personally I find their thinking so strange, these people feel that a Player who is commanding an entire army of say 5 corps cannot be allowed to also command individual btlns because of the level of coordinated intelligence needed.<<<

Shane:
You're right, they can. At Eylau, when Davout realized he was being outflanked late in the day, he ordered a staff officer to take one battalion and a battery and go met the threat. Moore, the Army CinC at Coruna, gives permission for a single battalion to send out a single company and directs the battalion commander to attack the village before him.

And that is a simulation problem with Napoleonic warfare: Unlike the ACW and later wars, General officers often did step through levels of command and sight batteries and lead battalions etc. when it suited their purpose. As battalions were the basic building block of all battlefield infantry formations, it stands to reason they would send them on particular missions.

Yet, it was done in particular ways and in particular situations. The question would be IF that was something the design was supposed to simulate, did it provide the same processes and options as the real situations?

The exact meaning of 'zippy little battalions' wasn't articulated, but it certainly could encompass what you suggest.

I have been fortunate to be able to play wargames all over the world for more than 50 years. I've gamed under too many rule systems to remember both commercial and home made on every continent, with most professional militaries, and with many wonderful Saturday night beer and pretzel groups. Some provide very fond memories and others give me heartburn just remembering I participated…

Most of the latter heartburn inducing memories were caused by players who were "rules lawyers" and argued every small point until whatever fun there would have been was lost in the heat of the argument, …or the so called "expert" who knew everything and anything contained within the rule set we were using, when in fact knew less than most but had a really good line of BS and just enough knowledge to be dangerous… thus ruining the game for those of us who were willing to play by the written words contained within the actual rule booklet or collection of papers.

To the adults on this thread I offer my sincere thanks for an excellent discussion. I think there have been some excellent points made worth sincere consideration as my team works to formulate worthwhile decision-making games and simulations. And by the way, Shane, grow T/F up… How in gods name could you even imagine my comments were directed toward you. I'd also suggest you grow some thicker skin especially after I've been defending your premise in most of my commentary.

au revoir et salut I/S

In my own system, if a Commander such as Davout, or any for that matter is directing an individual unit or group of units down inside his own chain of command he is restricted from carrying out his normal functions, whatever they may be? as you said, what really does a high level commander do other than watch what happens "after" he has already handed out his orders. It stands to reason that if an allotted amount of time is spent doing nothing other than watching his orders being carried out before him that he then has the time to leap down the chain and personally direct units just they way he wants them.

In my system we allow this and often you will see commanders climb down inside their own chain of command and control an individual unit or units. What else could he possibly be doing if not physically capable of lending a hand to ensure that what he has in his minds eye is carried out as he personally perceives it should be.

Like I said, when you do this in the system you are leaving his seat unattended so to speak, if all the orders are sent and in the process of being carried out this should not be a problem. It is when things go wrong and or situations change that suddenly commanders such as Davout or Moore or whomever have to quickly put back on their Generals hat and race off to put out the next fire or correct, modify or even completely change orders to adapt to the ever changing situation.

You see this in big business all the time, it is the little people who do all the work and carry out the requests from those above who in turn carry out the requests of those above them and so on. Those at the top level are not really worried about how much copy paper is left in the cupboard but if it runs out the issue becomes highlighted. You will often see managers of the top levels climb down to the little people to check what is happening, see and ask questions of their staff, find out their needs and issues and assign lower level managers to deal with the problem or simply do it themselves if their own calender is open.

It is very natural and realistic, the real problem is that if a General so climbs down to the lower levels he creates a situation where his own life is put at great risk. Sometimes doing so causes injury, capture or even death. You see and read about this all the time, those generals who just cannot forget that they were once grenadiers themselves and become caught up in the actual fighting where they should not be but cannot help themselves.

It is situations like these that balance the picture and cause those players who do this to risk the loss of important generals but the bonuses of doing so is very enticing because such generals can sway the outcome of a battle. I personally am all for it and actually encourage it in my own group, the modifiers some generals give is in some cases enough to tip the balance and give one side a small advantage over the other or the difference between getting off a morale check or charge or failure. These make for the most fun and realistic battles because the players are taking great risks to force an issue or situation hopefully into their favour at the risk of that general.

So giving individual units or small groups of units separate missions is the right and correct way to go in battles and the failures and or dividends can be huge. The term "zippy" btlns might be better regarded as btlns on a "mission", an order that is different from the rest of the command they are in. Instead of arguing that it is wrong, a farce or unrealistic maybe those that don't like it should think about it a little more.

Designing a simulation is for me all about using tools in a military context, such as books, eyewitness accounts, memoirs and historical documents to build a set of parameters around that if used correctly portray what it is you are trying to achieve. Creating a balance which does not balance the game but balances what happened as it should be balanced.

for example, with the new WWII game, "Flames of War" it is popular because it has been aimed towards the "game balance" not the "historical balance". The problem I have with this is that does not simulate actual documented parameters set by the performance of the individual weapons of the period, what is does balance is a game setting that allows an exact equal 50/50 chance for either side to win the "game".

This might be great for some who want to play a "game" but for me I would prefer to play a simulation which portrays the "historical balance" of the period. i.e. shows the limitations or expectations of the weaponry, shows the complexities of command, shows the limitations of time and motion and distance and moulds it all into a playable system that one, when he plays the system feels like he is actually witnessing something real.

I had a situation like this just last week, a new player advanced over a ridge line with his hidden British in 4 ranks to halt over the top and pour a volley into an advancing French btln which did not know of their presence. The French were totally surprised and in the course of the quick two volleys suffered 175 casualties. The sudden impact of the surprised sighting and the following carnage wrought by the British firepower caused the French btln to fail their Morale roll and immediately panic and rout back down the hill losing more men to desertion.

The player, who although new to my system was very experienced in his own reading of the period, he was totally shocked and excited by what he had achieved simply because he knew through his own reading what should happen and in the system did just that. My design allowed him to actually achieve what he knew should be achievable in that situation and the result was what he expected it to be. He was not shocked at the outcome of his firepower, but shocked that my system portrayed it so succinctly for him in a a very realistic set up and procedure.

Needless to say he is now an advocate of realism and simulation over other sets of rules that do not even account for little situations like this. I do think many rules designers have gone far away from simulation and realism because they are in the chase for the Grand Tactical systems which don't bother to look at minor tactical situations. This is the crux of the problem and cause of so much drama in our period, in the search of the ultimate grand tactical rules people have lost the search that once was for simulation of tactics and actually simulating it.

Shane

>>>>>And by the way, Shane, grow T/F up… How in gods name could you even imagine my comments were directed toward you. I'd also suggest you grow some thicker skin especially after I've been defending your premise in most of my commentary.<<<<<

Wow, such a strong reaction from someone who, with a statement about the majority of war gamers not knowing the period. I never implied your statement was directed solely at me but the statement was offensive and needed to be adressed. You have responded in a tone which seems you are very offended and possibly child like indeed when given at little back. Your coments were aimed at, as you say yourself, :

"Which, sadly, most Napoleonic wargamers don't. I/S"

Yes, I took offenseand maybe I do need thicker skin but you are also aiming your comments at "most" others here also, including me, I just stood up for myself.

If you have a problem with that you might want to take some of your own advice….

Shane wrote:
>>>>In my own system, if a Commander such as Davout, or any for that matter is directing an individual unit or group of units down inside his own chain of command he is restricted from carrying out his normal functions, whatever they may be?<<<<

Shane:
Why? Who says that Davout wasn't exercising his 'normal functions' with that battalion? It was his corps that was being threatened. The assumption that his work with the battalion would take him away from his normal functions needs some substantiating, I would think.

>>>As you said, what really does a high level commander do other than watch what happens "after" he has already handed out his orders. It stands to reason that if an allotted amount of time is spent doing nothing other than watching his orders being carried out before him that he then has the time to leap down the chain and personally direct units just they way he wants them.<<<<<

Yes, it could be. I am always leery of the phrase 'stands to reason' when it pops up in discussions of history. How many on this list felt a directing unit 'stands to reason?' Lots of things done by men and women two hundred years ago don't make much sense today in a different age. For instance, why would Italian farmers have breakfast at the first hour [1 o'clock am] of the day and Lunch at the sixth hour [six o'clock pm] of the day during the Napoleonic wars, but go to bed at the 16th hour [four o'clock pm]? The Italians set their clocks that way.

>>>>In my system we allow this and often you will see commanders climb down inside their own chain of command and control an individual unit or units. What else could he possibly be doing if not physically capable of lending a hand to ensure that what he has in his minds eye is carried out as he personally perceives it should be.<<<<

I am not sure what you are asking here. What else could he possibly be doing if not physically capable of lending a hand? I can think of lots of things, from using his authority to pull in other commands, cutting through the time constraints on accepting and passing on orders. Looking stern and telling everyone to 'hurry up.' What are you describing here?

>>>Like I said, when you do this in the system you are leaving his seat unattended so to speak, if all the orders are sent and in the process of being carried out this should not be a problem. It is when things go wrong and or situations change that suddenly commanders such as Davout or Moore or whomever have to quickly put back on their Generals hat and race off to put out the next fire or correct, modify or even completely change orders to adapt to the ever changing situation.<<<<

Do you have some historical examples of this?

I/S wrote:
>>>>Most of the latter heartburn inducing memories were caused by players who were "rules lawyers" and argued every small point until whatever fun there would have been was lost in the heat of the argument, …or the so called "expert" who knew everything and anything contained within the rule set we were using, when in fact knew less than most but had a really good line of BS and just enough knowledge to be dangerous… thus ruining the game for those of us who were willing to play by the written words contained within the actual rule booklet or collection of papers.<<<<

I/S:
So the real issue 'playing the period' is simply avoiding those 'personalities'? I agree with the sentiment. They are no fun to play with. Personally, once I commit to a game, I play it. I may share my thoughts on a particular game's validity if and when folks are so inclined, but I don't question the rules or fuss over the small stuff while I play. I see it as committing to the process and enjoying it for what it is--and that is regardless of what I actually think of the game as a game or a simulation.

Having said that, I can't imagine someone not playing a game to win, when that is the entire premise of a game. It's like doing a jigsaw puzzle with no intention of completing the picture. It is the premise of any historical battle and the goal of the soldiers that gamers are supposedly role playing. Certainly there are other reasons to play also.

Of course, that doesn't mean I enjoy the "win at all costs" players or the emotionalism that seems to go along with it.

Even so, these folks don't have anything to do with wargame design or simulation design, anymore than an idiot pounding live shells with a hammer has anything to do with the successful design of the hammer.

Shane:
Why? Who says that Davout wasn't exercising his 'normal functions' with that battalion? It was his corps that was being threatened. The assumption that his work with the battalion would take him away from his normal functions needs some substantiating, I would think.

Okay, look at it this way, the natural commander of a btln is the major (depending on the army), the commander of a Regiment is the Colonel, the comander of a Brigade is the Brigadier and so on. Davout, being a Marshall and Corps commander is dealing with his level of command within the chain of command, this is why you have these lower ranks, to deal with the commanding and control of the formations under their direct command. If Davout is stepping down to command a btln up at the front then he is not really performing his true function as Corps comander. He is only seeing the present smaller picture and may miss what is happening in the overall picture in the grand scale of things. Directing a btln and focusing on it leaves less time and focus on the continually changing situation around him and elsewhere.

My reasoning for this is thus :

If Davout is up in the lead with a btln directing it or commanding it personally into the fray he is risking his life while doing so, he is not as what might be considered his post and others looking for him for new orders or to hand over new orders might not be able to find him. An aid of Napoleon's for example, sent to Davout to hand over important new orders to swing his corps through 90 degrees and face a new threat gallops up, cannot find him, loses time searching for him and asking questions, risks his own life unnecessarily to gallop up to the fight after finally given directions as to where he might be and dies doing so…

Say Davout is shouting out orders like a chef d'battalion coordinating the companies of that battalion to deploy from column to line. Say this took 45-60 seconds to complete when suddenly an enemy cavalry regiment was sighted on the flank, he suddenly is caught with his pants down having to spend more time quickly re-forming the battalion back into square for the next 30 seconds. While doing so the threatening cavalry regiment now becomes the least of his worries, the enemy infantry to his front fire a devestating volley into the companies while changing formation or after they form square. The devastation is horrific, Davout is now wounded in the thigh and the now distant trumpet sound heard is that of the enemy cavalry who see the btln in difficulty. Things are going downhill fast. All this while time keeps ticking away…

What happens to those orders and when do they eventually get carried out? if at all now, Napoleon loses his opportunity or the chance to face the new threat and his army as a result collapses and the battle is lost…Now, it is a given that Davout is a bad example but several commanders indeed did this and caused all sorts of grief for all concerned by charging off into the gun smoke…

This is why there were lower levels of command and middle management, to keep the higher commanders or managers from having to deal with things at these lower levels. It is when commanders do go to these levels that valuable time and significant risk to both body and command may be suffered. It might not happen often but it can happen, when it does and the commander is reduced to a smaller focus and picture of events happening to him rather than around him in the larger picture that the situation for his overall command can become critical to the point where he might even lose it because of his impetuosity and misplaced bravery or mistrust of subordinates.

That is why subordinates are there, to carry out the functions given to them and their level of command and to to have to worry about those above them taking over when there is probably no need to. But like I said, some commanders just cannot help themselves and do this more often than not, these are the Generals with 20+ war wounds or more. This does not mean what they achieve personally in physical combat and fighting enhances their reputation as a high level commander, many of these generals with this tendency have lower or poorer reputations as a result.

Shane

>>>>>I am always leery of the phrase 'stands to reason' when it pops up in discussions of history. How many on this list felt a directing unit 'stands to reason?<<<<<

Okay, if you do not like the phrase, 'stands to reason' then I will use another, "most likely" or, "more than likely". It was just a term, nothing else.

Shane

>>>>>I am not sure what you are asking here. What else could he possibly be doing if not physically capable of lending a hand? I can think of lots of things, from using his authority to pull in other commands, cutting through the time constraints on accepting and passing on orders. Looking stern and telling everyone to 'hurry up.' What are you describing here?<<<<<

Hang on here, even you said in one of your previous posts that once a commanders orders were sent he probably had little to do…did you not?

I hardly think, "Looking stern and telling everyone to 'hurry up." is doing a great deal. It might be but how long is a piece of string? Things are getting a little pedantic here.

What I am saying is that once the orders are sent he has little to do, as you yourself declared. So, given that this might be true, then he is in all probability making himself useful doing other things like stepping down inside his own chain of command. I was not asking a question but seeking agreance from others, including yourself that this is the most likely scenario given the orders are all committed too and being carried out already.

Shane