"The "Command Radius"" Topic

Being a mug, I'm going to attempt to give a view on the Scotsman/Shane disconnect. Which will probably mean I end up confusing them and everyone else but here goes.

Apologies in advance but at least it will clear my thoughts if it doesn't help the rest of you!

To date we have explanations from the Scotsman as to why you don't need CRs to hold formations together, there being a way of doing this via Regulation.

Historically, this was also a conduit for orders and a method whereby couriers could hope to find generals with new orders, by seeking out the Regulating unit first and heading on from there if the general was absent.

Two points of my own on that last bit.

1. Regulating battalions were supposed to be the only unit in a brigade that had the drums beating so all concerned knew which one it was. Making life easier for couriers as well as constituent battalions.

2. Words have been said about the general being absent, however it was up to him to tell the CO of the Regulating unit where he was going, so at least messengers arriving at the Regulating unit would have a place to start hunting from.

Now around this point is where things are getting lost debate wise (in my view).

Shane, being a sensible bloke, doesn't necessarily use CRs in formational role but he does in terms of order transmission, as a tool for delay and confusion etc. Modifying the base line he has set in physical distance with adjustments to an Activation role. (I think)

Downside to this is that it appears to take ‘as the crow flies' as a starting point but what the heck!

Scotsman's view appears to say you don't need to do this as command and control goes – Army to Corps (both of which should be near static locations) – Corps to Division (one near static, the other known through Regulation and having some delay if the generals not there) – Division to Brigade (Regulation and its location effects apply). Below Brigade it doesn't matter, as Battalions pick it all up through Regulating Unit.

Scotsman claims two bangs for the Regulating buck – formations staying close and a transmission path for orders.

Shane's looking more for a command and control – order response and delay tool.

So I assume that Shane's World distances are measured, ‘CR' modifications applied and dice thrown, ending up with a known transmission time from Commander A to Commander B and a game time/turn when whatever order happens

I guess in Scotsman's World you could, for example apply a known speed of courier move and do a point to point measure between commanders and/or put a messenger marker on the table to show its progress.

I would also dice in some form for possible delay each turn as Shako 2 does, to take any prior knowledge of arrival down a step or two.

I would also add that gamers probably send far too many orders. It was a hard job getting things to alter in mid action.

This shows up particularly in Kregspiel where regular table top players tie themselves in knots with a stream of commands, as they try to micro manage the way they do on the table and find it just makes things worse!

OK that's enough we are getting message fatigue with all these long posts (good though they are)

Bottom Dollar,

>>>>A division of four brigades is advancing against an enemy line. They are in line abreast with the right brigade serving as the regulating unit. The division commander is with that brigade. The left most brigade is headed directly for a sizable farm house--say a chateau--with its attendant buildings, walls, hedgerows, etc.. so that, even prior to coming into contact with the enemy line, some adjustment of the brigade line will have to be made to through that sector and that means a loss of some time. <<<<<

That's not a reason for paralysis. Assuming the Division is intended to reach the other side of the chateau, depending on its relative position to the Brigade front, the Brigade commander could, on his own initiative, form columns to reduce frontage and either pass to the inside (nearest the rest of the Division) the outside, or both. He would then have to reform line on the other side and recover his alignment.

>>>>The question is, will the divisional line need fixing ? If so, how is it fixed ? What if the player controlling that division decides that time is of the essence and there won't be any slowing the advance of the other three brigades to "fix" or straighten the alignment and therefore, the 4th brigade will simply have to catch up as quickly as possible. What are your penalties to either the 4th brigade, the other three brigades or perhaps the division as whole ? If any ? <<<<

Yes it will, as per my comments above. It would be the responsibility of the 4th Brigade Commander to ensure he got back on line asap, so time lost in formation changing would have to be made up by speeding up the pace in the columns.

As rules tend to give only one movement for column and one for line you would have to slow the rest of the Division in most rules (that would have been a real option too) depending on how big a difference there is in your movement speeds.

You could also have a fatigue or disorder penalty on the 4th Brigade if you wanted.

>>>>The 4th brigade is about to be heavily engaged, how does your division commander assess the situation ? What is the correct alignment now or how is it corrected or fixed ? What if your divisional commander thinks the 3rd Brigade can support the 4th in fending off the counter-attack, while the 1st and 2nd brigade plunge ahead into a thinned enemy line ? Can two regulating units be created the same brigade or division ? Is this possible under your system of regulating commands ? If so, how does you division commander go about accomplishing that task ? <<<<

Yes it is possible to create more than one Regulating unit.

In ‘Battle Array' terms, the Division would have been lined up (from left to right going forward) at the start of the action.

2 – 4 – 3 – 1 in terms of the seniority of their Generals.

The Division will have always deployed for battle in this way – like Regulating, all armies did this, going way back to the Romans.

So your 4th Brigade (#2 above) would become the Regulating unit for 3rd Brigade (#4 above) and 2nd and 1st Brigades (#3 and #1) would continue as before.

This is where the Divisional Commander would earn his pay, by getting all this in place on the fly via aides and personal communication. Brigade Commanders would be familiar with the requirements and know who was going to be commanding the Brigade next to them so it's not quite as horrendous as it may appear to us!

Final point, once engaged with the enemy Regulation went out the window, until the enemy was driven off. Obviously units tried to hold the line as best they could but the strict requirements were suspended in favour of preserving the units themselves and defeating the enemy.

Trajanus

First I do not think that I specifically referred to examples quoted by Scotsman. I neither do I think I critcised his outline of command and control.
I will however, clarify my remark.

Unless I am totally confised, Scotsman set out what I thought was a clear outline of his views of how command and control, etc should/did work. On the basis that I accepted his views (I think I actually said that), then I was suggesting that these could be viewed as 'norms' of structure, heirarchy, communication, etc. that could be taken as given when looking at the change in emphasis I was suggesting.

Obviously, if those 'norms' are not a realistic represntation of command and control, then the current emphasis rules give to commander ratings probably fails.

My point about the examples of variations from those perceived 'norms' was that most of those quoted (by several posters by the way) were, in my opinion, of such an extreme nature that they cannot be adequately embodied in the general content of rules. In fact, I think I made the point that such extreme variations from perceived norms were probably dealt with in scenarios.I am not sure I need to quote examples in the above context, as they are already included in these posts. My comments were a general observation as to whether or not such extreme examples helped the debate.

Scotsman was (or at least I thought he was) attempting to set out cleafry and concisely an outline of how command and control should work. In that you have to start from a basic methodology of command and control that represents what actually happened, I do not disagree. Given Scotsman's experience and his apparent dissatisfaction with present systems, I would be interested to know how he represents the problem in his games.

Pete

PS Since this is the third time I have had to clarify my views, perhaps next time I should use a Thesaurus and give examples of every meaning of the words I use, just so that there is no confusion!

Scottsman,

I would be curious if you have played Legacy of Glory and if you liked or hated its command & control methods.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Traj,

You summed it up pretty much.

>>>>Since this is the third time I have had to clarify my views, perhaps next time I should use a Thesaurus and give examples of every meaning of the words I use, just so that there is no confusion!<<<<

Pete,this time it appears it was me!

Too many worthwhile long postings and too late at night after a day of getting paid to look at a screen!

Apologies!

Teddy The Vehement Oyster

''So I'm throwing this out for discussion: could we dispense with the concept of a "command radius" altogether. Is there really a compelling reason for it?''

It's one thing to send two companies out to a churchyard and some others to another point two miles away. It's quite another to expect them, spaced out as they are, on the word of command one hour later, to then advance together in a co-ordinated attack.

Hense command ranges.

"It's one thing to send two companies out to a churchyard and some others to another point two miles away. It's quite another to expect them, spaced out as they are, on the word of command one hour later, to then advance together in a co-ordinated attack.

Hence command ranges."

There's a lot more to it than that. I think you need to read the other 250 posts in this thread.

Trajanus

No problem.

My comments were obviously somewhat general in that I admit to accepting each development in command and control from the year dot, as set out in various rules (not necessarily Napoleonic) as an improvement. In doing so, I probably haven't bothered to question if they are in any way flawed.

The last 15-20 years have been spent contentedly gaming with a friend, covering several different periods and between us possibly contentious issues don't really arise.

When I started gaming CnC simply involved writing an order for every unit you had covering movement and firing, this under simultaneous movement conditions. The only arguments then seemed to be whether or not it was possible to change orders within the 2.5 minute turn lengths! Once you had 'told' each unit what to do they would then move off 'into the wide blue yonder' to create mayhem! I'm sure many of us started this way and in some ways what we have now, however flawed, is an improvement (at least I think so).

I am not sure I have much more to contribute, but will continue to follow the discussion.

Cheers

Pete

SOME EVIDENCE OF COMMAND CONTROL PROCEDURES:
It may appear to Shane that the procedures I described are 'herding sheep', but it is no more herding sheep than a drum major directing a marching band. And it isn't 'my notion'. It's the way it was done. Any command control rules should take into account how command control was exercised….

Bottom Dollar:
You mentioned tradition and doctrine in shaping army practices. Here is Houlding's comments in Fit for Service, pp. 161 about Dundas's Rules and Regulations—which themselves were shaped by the Prussian regulations:

Up until the issuance of Britain's 1792 Rules and Regulations, most of ‘the elaborate and extensive repertoire of close-order ‘manoevres' were not detailed by authority,' but ‘were taken from the army's store of "customary" practice; and being customary, they were not specifically laid down in the regulations.

Dundas introduced the handling of the "Movements of the Line" in his RULES AND REGULATIONS 1792 p. 282, with the assertion that:

"The movements and manœuvres of a considerable line are similar to, and derived from the same general principles as those of the single battalion; they will be compounded, varied, and applied, according to circumstances, ground, and the intentions of the commanding officer; but their modes of execution remain unchangeable, and known to all. The greater the body, the fewer and more simple ought to be the manœuvres required of it."

In other words, the methods for moving a battalion were the same in practice for moving a brigade or division.

In 1826, Wellington was recorded to have observed, with respect to managing an army that:

"One must understand the mechanism and power of the individual soldier; then that of a company, a battalion, or brigade, and so on, before one can venture to group divisions and move an army. I believe I owe most of my success to the attention I always paid to the inferior part of tactics as a regimental officer."

Croker (Pool, [ed.]), The Croker Papers, p.94.

This was common practice for Napoleonic armies AND common practice for Civil War Armies, starting with the battalion:

Hardee, RIFLE AND LIGHT INFANTRY TACTICS 1860, v. 1-2
School of the Battalion: Article First: "To Advance in Line of Battle":

"587: The battalion being correctly aligned, and supposed to be the directing one, when the colonel shall wish to march in line of battle, he will give the lieutenant colonel an intimation of his purpose,…."

Hardee's forms are in all important ways were identical to Casey's and the French army's command control methods of the day. So was the cornerstone of US practices for decades, Scott's

INFANTRY TACTICS 1861, v3
Evolutions of the line, first published in 1840

Scott writes:

1716. In this instruction, a line of eight battalions, making a corps d'amrée of two divisions or four brigades, will be supposed; but the rules herein prescribed are equally applicable to a brigade, a division, or any number of battalions.

He echos Casey, Hardee, Dundas and ALL the regulations from 1750 to after 1900. The same is true of the details

"2218. [Pl. XLVI, fig. 1.] A line of eight battalions deployed and, and correctly aligned, will be supposed; the general wishing to cause it to advance in this order, will choose as the directing battalion the one which he may deem most favourably placed for the purpose; he will approach the battalion, and command:…

2233. Each subordinate battalion will maintain its interval on the side of the direction battalion."

About the practice of calling out the orders down the line from the directing or regulating battalion are described here, in the first lines of:

"General rules for command"

1729. When the general shall wish to cause a movement to be executed, he will give the general commands relative thereto. Each colonel will always successively repeat, and with greatest rapidity on their reaching him, those general commands, unless the general has given or sent to him orders to the contrary.

They are called down the line by colonels and all other officers. Then:

1732. The final command, or that which determines the execution of the general movement, will always be given by the general.

Scott says in in the first lines of :

Part Fifth
Article I

To advance in line of battle deployed, he says"

"2251. The general—in—chief may choose, as the directing battalion, either in the line that he may judge the best posted for the particular march…"

The general-in-chief being the commander of the eight battalions or a division of troops throughout the instruction as set up by 2218.

It really doesn't matter if I like this process, or if Shane dislikes this, thinking it 'herding sheep', it is the way things were done from battalion though divisional command.

Any rules attempting to simulate command control up through division and corps should in some way reflect this set of standard practices, providing players with the same challenges and controls provided actual Divisional, Corps and Army commanders.

Bottom Dollar wrote:

>>>>>>>>So, indeed, it sounds very feasible that the Grand Army and the Brits had brigade and division commanders who could control the entire length of a battle line from one end of it--the right most end. Was it possible that they would find themselves in a situation where it might make sense to regulate the line from the left ? Or perhaps even the middle ? Was it within their military doctrine or in their military capabilities to designate any regiment within the brigade or any brigade within the division as the regulating unit ? Or would that have just caused mass confusion ?<<<<

BD:
Yes, the regulations and practice provided for regulating/directing battalions on the left, right or middle. Scott prefers the middle, while Casey the right, but it really was up to the commander. During the Napoleonic wars, the SOP was the right, but again, left or center were at times chosen.

The only time it would create confusion is if the the brigade, division or corps didn't know who the directing battalion was. SOP allowed them to form up without much discussion and march out on the right unless told otherwise.

Obviously, the system had to be flexible, yet simple. It also allowed for many other things. With separate orders, every division or brigade could well have their own line of march and thus directing unit. And of course, that was one method of releasing smaller commands from a larger command: Changing the directing unit for the smaller command.

In many ways it was elegant, and why the post of honor, for the most experienced unit was on the right, from battalion up through divisions and corps. It was one reason seniority was observed so rigoreously--put the most experience officers in the most experienced companies, battalions, brigades, divisions and corps as the directing unit--putting the best where it mattered the most.

Scotsman,

I agree with your comments about regulating battalions and the fact that few, if any wargames actually represent this notion.

I would also point out that I have never seen a commercially available ruleset that portrays the manoeuvres that were actually performed by Napoleonic armies. How many rules would allow the deployment of contiguous columns, or would distinguish between open, half distance, quarter distance and close columns, left or right in front? This may be viewed as irrelevant by some, but was crucially important on the battlefield.

Shane wrote:
>>>>I don't know how much plainer or clearer I can say it. Others here might use a command radius for other reasons but for me and my own designed rules it is all about relaying of orders and the possibility of extended delay in acual activations, nothing more, nothing less. Why can you not see what I am saying?<<<<

Shane:
You have been plain. I have been responding a number of things, to the general notion of command radius as a mechanic as well as your particular interpretation. SO, I am not sure which comments you feel are focused on your specific ideas. The time and distance equation, I have responded to. When you say:

>>>relaying of orders and the possibility of extended delay in actual activations<<<<

I am assuming that you are applying the time=distance equation to that too? The speed of a horse in delivering those messages?

Shane wrote:
>>>>>>I have a question for you now : You spend a great deal of time here trying to discredit me in particular regarding the vailidy of using CR's what I want to know is, what gives you the credibility or credentials to do so? A couple of my fellow gamers in my group want to know, so do I.<<<<<

Credentials and credibility? I would hope that both, in this instance, would rely solely on the historical evidence I provide, and nothing more. I have made no conscious efforts I know of to discredit you. Certainly not my intention. The closest thing to it I can think of was when I said you didn't know much about simulation design.

I said based on your comments, and I linked my judgment specifically to those comments. I would have said something similar if you had claimed to paint just like Rembrandt, but insisted you didn't need to use canvas and oils to do it.

Functional simulations are not some vague notion folks entertain for fun or based on opinion. They are a technical craft that can no more be ignored in designing wargames than a Remote Control Airplane modeler can ignore aircraft design and aero-dynamics.

Simulation design is a well-tested technology, used by a wide variety of designers using a wide variety of mediums, from computers to and paper and pencil. At the heart of that technology are some fundamental concepts, structural givens that any simulation design has to follow to actually simulate anything.

Your comment about real bullets being required to simulate real war was so far afield from what simulations are about and how they work, I couldn't simply smile and say, 'to each his own', any more than you could if I said 'Napoleonic armies never used horses.' You would be justified in telling me that I didn't know much about Napoleonic armies.

Any credibility my comments might have in this regard is based on two things:

1. Evidence: Go on line and find any site that describes simulation design outside the hobby and you see a very uniform set of beliefs, concepts and methods laidout. I would be glad to provide titles, or the specifics of my statement.

2. I was a professional simulation designer for over twelve years, creating training simulations for education and business. I have also designed and published at least one wargame, the boardgame "Napoleon's Last Triumph" in 1984.

Overall, I haven't discussed your personal credibility, I have questioned the historical and simulation credibility [read evidence] of the Command Control radius mechanic in all its manifestations--at least the ones presented here and the ones I am aware of. This is both from a simulation and historical standpoint.

Personally, I encourage you to question my credibility any way you want. Just leave my family origins out of it.

Please, doubt my credibility at every turn and assume I have no credentials.

Ask for evidence, historical evidence.

Ask for evidence from the simultion design industry/community --from those folks who create simulations for a living. The ones who have to get it right to continue working.

As Voltaire said, : "I don't care what a man believes: I want to know WHY."

If I makes claims, I gotta prove they are based on something other than 'my word' or that I'm a nice guy. That isn't the question here. I assume everyone on the list are great folks. In this case, it has to be about history and simulations, because that is are the topics of this discussion, yes? I doubt that your or my credibility could generate anything near as many posts, positive or negative, as the question of 'command radius.'

Scottsman,

I would be curious if you have played Legacy of Glory and if you liked or hated its command & control methods.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Bandit:

I have a copy of the rules, a decade or more old, but I have never played them, which isn't the same thing, is it?

>>>>>It may appear to Shane that the procedures I described are 'herding sheep',<<<<<

Okay TheScotsman,

Let me make myself perfectly clear to you and everyone else reading this, I never said what you are eluding to is likened to "herding sheep". What I meant was, you are telling everyone who uses CR's that "they" are herding sheep by the mere fact that they use a CR.

Please do not use my words out of context in future.

Now, what you speak about and are trying to get across are all valid points, I totally understand this and agree, I have already said as much. But you are continually lumping my use of CR's in with others who design CR's for controlling troops. I keep saying it and I will not stop saying it, I use CR's for linking the chain of command for order relay and nothing more but it just does not seem to sink into your head for some reason. You then take my comments out of context as though I am critising your thoughts and meanings.

If I take your points into my own system and put it into practice it becomes part of the troop movement process and not the Order relay and activations. Your points are all valid and totally understood by me and most other people here and used to some degree of accuracy or another. For me, as I said, your points become part of the movement rules regarding combat formations and maintaining relative position when on the move. It is still a command issue as such but more akin to controlling troop movements.

So, to explain what I mean, I use CR's for order relay using the distances between the command levels of the chain with each extra 500yds as a delay in the process to finally roll to Activate the command into carrying out the order. Once the order has been given the troops within that command become "active" and the player can then carry out the intended orders. This part of my system means the player moves the formation as desired (ordered) but maintaining relative position while doing so, that is, the troops remain in the position they are in relative in alignment to each other as they manouevre. The Commander (player) may re-deploy before he sets off but once done the troops must, as possible as can be, remain in relative position to each other.

Terrain features and Morale situations or even charges may cause the deterioration of holding units in relative position but this is when the brigadiers act on their own accord and can personally adapt or change their stance or formation to account for any crisis within his command as long as he continues to carry out his assigned task until completed or his command colapses.

I will admit I never took into account the "regulating unit" doctrine into the rules as such but using the "relative position" idea as found in Empire worked fine for me.

So, I do belive that Trajanus is correct, TheScotsman and I are debating two entirely different topics which have caused a lot of posts back and forth between us. I am talking about CR's used for time delay for order activations while he is talking about CR's being used as a controlling method as being incorrect when in reality it was all about the regulating units while manouevring.

I want to make it clear, and I do hope TheScotsman understands my stance here, my use of CR's has nothing to do with controlling troop formations and regulating their movement and control. I use CR's purely for time delay for activating orders and nothing more. I do NOT see your points about regulating btlns as being likened to herding sheep at all. I read your comments about "herding" previously as you discussed CR's as akin to controlling and herding which when I replied you mistakenly felt I was saying that your ideas and points were nothing more than herding sheep with was not my intent as all.

To summerise what I believe :

1/ My use of CR's – To calculate time delays for order relay and activations.

2/ The use of CR's in systems where they are used to control troops and herd them like sheep is not historically accurate.

3/ The idea of maintaining relative position or regulating btlns is correct historical. (I do not use regulating btlns as such but will take it on board).

4/ CR's for Order Activations is a totally separate game mechanic and task than the actual movement orders and mechanics in my system which have their own controlling points that have nothing to do with CR's.

5/ I am still not convinced TheScotsman understands my concept and meaning with my use of CR's and how I impliment them in my system.

6/ TheScotsman will continue to ignore my points and argue that I do not understand what he means and will continue to take my words out of context.

7/ I will contine to reinforce my points until he finally accepts that my use of CR's is a valid game mechanic for and only for the use I have given them, namely order relay and delay and NOT for controlling troops like sheep.

Shane

Captain Snort wrote:

>>>>>I agree with your comments about regulating battalions and the fact that few, if any wargames actually represent this notion.<<<<<<

>>>>>>I would also point out that I have never seen a commercially available ruleset that portrays the manoeuvres that were actually performed by Napoleonic armies. How many rules would allow the deployment of contiguous columns, or would distinguish between open, half distance, quarter distance and close columns, left or right in front? This may be viewed as irrelevant by some, but was crucially important on the battlefield.<<<<<<<<

CN:
Agreed, depending on the level of the simulation. All Napoleonic wargames would not have to show all those things, depending on how they represented the relationships between those things. For instance, because of the ease at which closed columns could go to fractions of open columns, etc. and back again, that might not have to be specifically simulated with a brigade or division level game, while right and left in front might…

As far as I can see, there are lots of ways to simulate those aspects of Napoleonic warfare, all of which could work very well.

I have not had time to get engaged into this excellent debate but if I can make one small contribution for now it is to add the concept of inversion (or rather the avoidance of inversion) which also plays a part in both the batallion level evolutions and the scaled up manoeuvres that apply to the brigade etc.

The idea of inversion comes from understanding the normal deployment practice of grenadiers to the right of the line and light company to the left with the others in their proper sequence. If you imagine a battalion in open column "right in front" (this means the leading company is the grenadiers followed by the first then second company etc.).

Now suppose this battalion needs to form line to the right you may suppose that all you need to do is wheel each company to the right as by being in open company the interval between the companies is sufficient to allow this simple wheel of each company into line. However this arrangement would give you the grenadiers on the left of the line and the light company on the left. The officers and NCOs would be in the wrong place – confusion potentially especially if you then need to make another redeployment.

The manual gives manoeuvres to reverse the column to achieve left in front and then form line to be in the correct sequence.

Take this up a level to the brigade or division and you have another reason for depending on formal and regular formation order and formation changes.

p.s. TheScotsman

Thank you for explaining your credentials, my only reasoning for asking was because you have been very vocal about how everyone else seems to be doing the wrong thing and you felt we all needed re-educating or something similar. People do not like being told they are wrong when they have been happily doing what they have been for years in games and actually having fun doing so. I think you know what I mean.

As for my own credentials I have none other than 30 years of war gaming experience, lots of books and research and a brain that functions and prosesses data like anyone else in the hobby.

My only gripe with you is your presistant view that CR's are false, or wrong is some way. We war game, we play in a hobby, we push little toy soldiers around and we do it in a way that is enjoyable for us. Telling us that we are somehow wrong because we use a game mechanic that you do not agree with is is your own problem. The fact that you do not agree with it means nothing because probably all of us who use it will continue to use it happily long after this thread dies and slides down the page and into the next.

You preach the evils of using the CR like a minister speaking to his congrigation but for me at least and sevral others here I might add, your not going to change anything. Your points will be taken on board regarding regulating btlns etc but people are going to continue ising CR's so why bother?

Shane.

The Scotsman,

I will reply to two points.

Bob C. wrote:
>>>First: The night before Salamanca, Wellington's only concern was retreating back to Portugal and if Marmont hand not screwed up that's exactly what he would have done. For a man whose order were so matter of fact, move your division forward and drive the French or better, move your division forward. What the commander asked how, he responded anyway but move them forward.<<<<

Bob:
I disagree heartily. That wasn't his 'only concern', nor had it been. Read Rory Muir's first three chapters of "Salamanca" or better yet, Wellington's despatches in the days before the battle, then we can talk.

>>>>Second: There are process oriented wargames, where designers just have to show everything, such a the precise location of brigadiers and outcome oriented games where designers are only interested in the brigade moving, not how it moves. Process oriented gamers take joy in showing how things occurred rather than the effects of what occurred. Outcome oriented gamers are more interested in the results rather than how they were achieved. A good example is that outcome oriented gamers are satisfied to roll the die for the effects of artillery fire, assuming the gunners were using the most effective type of round. Process gamers just have to make the decision regarding the type of ammunition used and need see the differing effects of the various types.<<<<

Bob: Are these your definitions? I understand "Result-oriented" and "Process oriented" games or simulations to mean something far different than the amount of detail in a game. If it your personal explanations, okay. I wasn't talking about either in reference to what CRs do or should do--the amount of detail isn't the question. We are talking about game mechanics, right? If your definitions are from somewhere else, I'd like to know where.

Good gaming to you too.

Mike Snorbens
''There's a lot more to it than that. I think you need to read the other 250 posts in this thread.''

I think, that if you think a battalion spread over two miles can make a co-ordinated attack on the word of command, you need to gen up a bit on acoustics.

Cheeky man!

Bottom Dollar wrote:
>>>>>A division of four brigades is advancing against an enemy line. They are in line abreast with the right brigade serving as the regulating unit. The division commander is with that brigade. The left most brigade is headed directly for a sizable farm house--say a chateau--with its attendant buildings, walls, hedgerows, etc.. so that, even prior to coming into contact with the enemy line, some adjustment of the brigade line will have to be made to through that sector and that means a loss of some time. The question is, will the divisional line need fixing ? If so, how is it fixed ? What if the player controlling that division decides that time is of the essence and there won't be any slowing the advance of the other three brigades to "fix" or straighten the alignment and therefore, the 4th brigade will simply have to catch up as quickly as possible. What are your penalties to either the 4th brigade, the other three brigades or perhaps the division as whole ? If any?<<<<<

BD:
Well, before I made a game mechanic/penalty for this, I would have to ask what the contemporaries felt were the penalties and what kinds of things they did to avoid/correct such situations. Certainly Devil's Den
was a similar obstacle for Hood's Division.

From what I have read, they might do several things: slow the entire line waiting for the 'detached' parts to catch up. They may leave them and hurry on, in which case the basic problem for the detached parts is whether to catch up, or become a separate command. You see several instances of this at Austerlitz, where battalions became separated from the main line by obstacles and combat and became their own command--or attached themselves to the nearest line. The 2/4th Ligne did this at Austerlitz, for instance. Ended up in St Hilaire's division.

I would think that should be the basic question for the players: Wait for the whole line to 'realign' or to move on, and then whether the separated part is going to try and reattached to the parent unit, or because of combat or other issues, find its own way. Those were the problems, and the divisional commander might try to intervene with his answers at any point.

>>>>Those same four brigades have now passed the chateau, whether they've gotten themselves into alignment is moot, as the enemy is advancing against the left most brigade and attempting to envelope it.<<<<

It may be moot to you, but it wasn't to the commander. The left most brigade would be expected to do three things: Keep alignment, refuse a part of the line to meet the attack and last, inform the divisional commander--assuming he doesn't know. Depending on the distances and LOC, he may have seen it coming from a long ways a way. The Brigadier on the left would have been expected to report anything threatening his left. If he didn't see it--surprise!

>>>>>>>The 4th brigade is about to be heavily engaged, how does your division commander assess the situation ? What is the correct alignment now or how is it corrected or fixed ? What if your divisional commander thinks the 3rd Brigade can support the 4th in fending off the counter-attack, while the 1st and 2nd brigade plunge ahead into a thinned enemy line ? Can two regulating units be created the same brigade or division ? Is this possible under your system of regulating commands ? If so, how does you division commander go about accomplishing that task?<<<<

Well first, you can see the advantage of having a supported line. Wellington ALWAYS had each of his commands supported from behind, each brigade and division by another of the same size.

The division commander would have no question about what the correct alignment is. If he is attacked from the flank and has no reserves, he probably would refuse the line, which would still maintain alignment. He certainly could create to separate commands with two separate regulating units. [This was difficult to do with a single line because you have to inform every battalion of the change in the midst or just before combat, while it was easy to do with two lines.

This is what always amazes me about history applied to games. Once applied, historical actions not only make more sense, but it is fairly easy to replicate because it was meant to be easy to replicate on the battlefield.

>>>>Aren't you in part, re-stating the obvious ? Don't most war games using linear tactics and grand tactics find ways of penalizing players who don't maintain the alignments of their brigades and divisions ? Like allowing opponents who keep closed up and organized, to do bad things to those who don‘t?<<<<<

In part, probably. We are talking about gaming Napoleonic battle, after all, and lots of game rules out there attempt to do that.

On the other hand, some miss the point while having some sort of game mechanic to represent the issue. It is like a rule that says the player gets hit in the head with a racket while playing tennis if they miss a shot. Is an accurate representation of game play because it provides a penalty for a missed shot? It would be far more accurate and easier to simply give the opponent a point.

>>>>>>I detect that you have a bone to pick with your Napoleonic colleagues who have assigned rigid command radii to upper level corps and army commanders?<<<

Could be. It depends on what they say it represents and how it is supposed to work. It can be a "hit with a racket" mechanic in reality.

>>>>I think Wkeyer identified it when he made the distinction between lower and upper levels of command. CR, abstractly speaking is readily applied to the lower… something else should or ought to be applied to the upper. Now I suspect that you're arguing this regulating battalion thing merely to argue against the way upper echelon command radii are used in some mainline Napoleonic systems, but at the same time your not entirely sincere about removing some kind of CR from all levels of play.<<<<<

I've got better things to do than 'merely argue.' I certainly agree that upper echelon command control [Army and to some extent corps] are quite different in many respects from the basic mechanisms of battalion through division. On the other hand, corps and army command control are shaped by those lower command procedures.

If I included corps and army command procedures in my satisfaction with command radius, it was only that others did first. I would be glad to discuss the processes there.

>>>>At the brigade level, these two points are exactly what the three inter-operating levels of CR accomplish in Johnny Reb III. Divisions and Corps in JR III are always assumed to be in command and control<<<<

Yes and no. First, it seems too complicated to represent a fairly uncomplicated process, and second, even though I agree that the third command process gets close to ACW practices, it misses three crucial points: 1. Only one end of [or point] in that line of units would be leading it, and 2. At the regimental level, such things as whether the line was right in front or left would be critical to maneuver and combat, 3. The consequences of being separated are not those of actual units in a brigade or regiment.

Scotsman wrote:

"Well, before I made a game mechanic/penalty for this, I would have to ask…"

Say again ?

After dispensing with the idea of using a regulating battalion mechanic as an alternative to command radius, I would make the suggestion that perhaps some of the upper echelon Napoleonic/Horse & Musket games could convert their CR mechanics to more flexible ones such as those seen in Johnny Reb III or Fire & Fury ? For example, allow for prescribed intervals between brigades and divisions for the maintenance of command & control even when the furthest most unit is out of a leader's CR.

Shane wrote:
>>>>My only gripe with you is your presistant view that CR's are false, or wrong is some way. We war game, we play in a hobby, we push little toy soldiers around and we do it in a way that is enjoyable for us. Telling us that we are somehow wrong because we use a game mechanic that you do not agree with is is your own problem. The fact that you do not agree with it means nothing because probably all of us who use it will continue to use it happily long after this thread dies and slides down the page and into the next.<<<<

Shane:
I am certainly not interested in destroying your fun, nor am I suggesting that you have to give it up if it brings you pleasure. I certainly am not interested in questioning your integrity. Nor am I attempting to convert you to anything.

And if I have been persistent, it is because I have yet to hear anything kind of history that supports the different kinds of CRs described. Lots of generalities of how it's supposed to be, but that's it. Just some actual examples would be nice--even abstracts have to have some basis in fact to simulate anything.

And I entertained a hope you might be interested in actually how reality is simulated--how a simulation works. You don't need me to find out such things. Lots of books out there on how to do it, most applicable to what you are attempting to do.

The two points I have been discussing are:
1.Whether CR actually represents the military history designers [and gamers] say it does, and
2.That it actually simulates what they say it does.

Now, you have definitely made two points that I have responded to:

1. You want to simulate Napoleonic warfare in some fashion,

2.That CRs in general and you mechanics in particular do that.

Neither the history we are discussing nor the methodology that make simulations work are not my inventions or something that I just 'like'. They aren't particular secrets that only I know, or based on someone's fun or 'likes', though they are used everyday to create fun simulations for the commercial market.

>>>>>You preach the evils of using the CR like a minister speaking to his congregation but for me at least and several others here I might add, your not going to change anything. Your points will be taken on board regarding regulating btlns etc but people are going to continue ising CR's so why bother?<<<<<

CR rules aren't evil, Shane--they simply don't do what folks claim they do. And I am confident that folks will continue to attempt simulating military history without knowing the basics of how simulations work, using Command Radius mechanics to simulate history that doesn't exist.

So why bother? Well, like that preacher you mention, I have a dream, a dream of a hobby where military history is actually simulated. The benefits would be far reaching.

When folks talked about simulating Napoleonic history, they would have a solid grasp of both simulation design and Napoleonic history. Not perfect or particularly detailed, just the basics applicable to war gaming.

Imagine the improvement in the RC plane hobby if suddenly, after not knowing, the participants learned about aerodynamics and aircraft design. Suddenly they would know why and how some model planes fly and some don't, and what it means for a model to be well-designed.

One thing I know for certain: If we all had a basic idea of both the history we want to game, and the methods necessary to simulate it, discussions like these would be unnecessary. And I imagine our games would be that much more enjoyable. Much like those RC model builders would find their hobby far more fun if all of a sudden they discovered the basics to aerodynamics and such.

Scotsman wrote:

INFANTRY TACTICS 1861, v3
Evolutions of the line, first published in 1840
Scott writes:

"2218. [Pl. XLVI, fig. 1.] A line of eight battalions deployed and, and correctly aligned, will be supposed; the general wishing to cause it to advance in this order, will choose as the directing battalion the one which he may deem most favourably placed for the purpose; he will approach the battalion, and command:…

…. and then when it starts to hit the fan, the battalion commanders will be prepared to exercise their initiative judiciously and as often as possible in conjunction with their commanding officer.

Scotsman, excellent research on the citations ! Thanks for posting them.

Jim

Scotsman wrote:

"Well, before I made a game mechanic/penalty for this, I would have to ask…"

Say again ?

BD:
Sorry. I simply meant that before deciding how to simulate a process, you have get a general handle on how it worked in real life. That's done by asking questions of how, why, where, when etc. That's all.

After dispensing with the idea of using a regulating battalion mechanic as an alternative to command radius, I would make the suggestion that perhaps some of the upper echelon Napoleonic/Horse & Musket games could convert their CR mechanics to more flexible ones such as those seen in Johnny Reb III or Fire & Fury ?

For example, allow for prescribed intervals between brigades and divisions for the maintenance of command & control even when the furthest most unit is out of a leader's CR.

Yes, that could work, just as long as it includes the supporting units that are also maneuvering off the directing unit.

Trajanus:

Sorry I didn't respond earlier. You could be right about the Shane and Scotsman disconnect. I haven't commented on some of what Shane discussed because I was focused elsewhere, but also because I haven't seen any evidence to support any particular approach.

My concerns at this point for command control at the Corps and Army level would be determining how often, why, where and when orders were sent. My initial impressions have been that:
1. Few messages were sent from corps and army HQs/commanders in a one hour period.

2. Many were simply requests for reinforcements or confirmations, rather than actual orders to do something different--in other words, respond to 'command and control.'

3. I am not clear on what corps and army commanders actually spent time doing during a battle, or whether it was 'command control' activities.

Suvorov sleeps at Novi, Napoleon kicks a Prussian drum around at Jena, Wellington is nowhere particular during Salamanca. At Vittoria, I think the third division operates for the entire day without ONE SINGLE RESPONSE from Wellington, though he is aware of it and watches it several times. I read of criticism of Ney at Waterloo during the afternoon, particular during the cavalry charges. He was too involved at the low levels. So, what was he supposed to be doing? Wellington is ordering individual battalions around, telling them what formation to be in [four ranks] at the end of the day. The Prussian Corps commanders are similarly engaged, as is Blucher.

Wellington choses to go himself, rather than send messages. Napoleon watches the Battle of Ligny from the windmill and sends how many orders during the day? I have yet to see any reports on that, but I count only four that I have read about.

When you look at brigade and division order books from the British [Where a copy of ALL orders were kept] the number during a day of battle are much lower, or non-existant, particularly compared to non-battle and campaign days.

So, I would want to know what is actually going on before criticizing or approving of command control game mechanics at the army and corps level, including command ranges and initiatives etc. Event the question of delayed or misinterpreted orders would have to be looked at. The question is how often did that happen in a battle? REALLY. What was the average. The designer of Grand Piquet claims it happened 50% of the time. I find that hard to believe, but who actually knows?

What do we actually know?

Okay Scotsman,

I get your point, now I feel more relaxed that your aim is not at me and what I do with CR's but what many other designers do with CR's. I accept this and will leave that issue alone now.

>>>>>Your comment about real bullets being required to simulate real war was so far afield from what simulations are about and how they work, I couldn't simply smile and say, 'to each his own',<<<<<

Just to let you know if you did not think so already, I was being very sarcastic. Of course simulating warfare is not about doing this. Just wanted to let you know this was said purely out of frustration only.

I do agree with you about the upper levels of General ship, what did they do when all the pre-battle orders were written and implimented? I have often thought about this myself and could only come to the same conclusions you have, they either requested reinforcements or got so bored that they jumped into the fray at the lower levels. I see this in many battles over that 23 year period and thought that if I were in their shoes I probably would have lept into the conflict also either through bordem or intervention because some point in the line was most critical to my plans.

I do think that the percentage of time for Corps or Army commanders for activity would have really depended on the level of failure of their plans, the more repulsed a generals forces are the more frantic he and his staff have to work in order to re-gain composure or make appropriote changes to adpt to any changes, call counter attacks, re-deployments, shifting of forces and or reserves to meet sudden or even gradual changes in the situations and so on.

If a General's plans go off without a hitch and glide along without the slightest mishap I am sure that general would indeed get bored and kick a drum around, take a nap or eat his lunch in the rear. But if the you know what hits the fan then the drum survives, he gets no sleep and is always hungry…

Shane

I think that Mike the Mug is right that inversion, just like left in front etc could be very important to some generals at some points in time. That brings me to another point about what I called "General's Job Description" on the VLB Yahoo site. I'm not discussing CR per se, but since I agree with the Scotsman that we need to have some knowledge about the actual history before we can figure out if our rules are doing what we say or think they are, I want to look at that issue some more.( BTW, if you wonder how some of these threads get so long, I can only say that is what happens when some of the VLB site inmates escape and wander into TMP…)

Most game battles are set up without reference to a campaign. There may or may not be some objectives or scenario presented to players for the particular game, but a typical set can lead to a particular perspective for the players that can lead to certain behaviors.

For example, players might "fight to the last man" since the game is self-contained. Maybe the rules will impose some kind of incentive or penalty to discourage such behavior – but the point is that the game set-up creates a artificial context in which players expect their tabletop generals to operate. When those generals are placed on the tabletop 500 or 800 yards away from the enemy line in a one-off battle, we expect them to be very busy guys, to react to every enemy move and figure out some clever way to devise a plan on the spot and send out orders, rally routers, lead attacks, and add to the morale of their troops.

Or, on the other side of the spectrum, we might assume that they realistically have little or no control over their troops, that every "plan" is doomed and therefore a General has little to do except guide certain units as best he can when they (or their subordinate commanders) decide to act or not act in a sort of random situation and that his job is not really related to the formation and movement of troops, (because they carried out "drill maneuvers" all on their own).

I am suggesting that if we look at command and control (and some its tools such as regulating battalions) in a broader context we might gain some insight as to why generals were issuing fewer orders than we expected, or might be carrying out tasks like controlling regulating formations instead of dashing around foiling enemy movements by sending off super-battalions in the flank all over the table.

I won't go into too much detail here, but will just give my own generalized interpretation of this (all based upon ideas I got from George Jeffrey).

1. Every general (actually every commander at any level) used the chain of command to "command" his own formation as one entity in response to the wishes of his superior (which were communicated to him via orders). He was merely the "representative" for that superior officer for this part of that superior officer's own command. Thus three brigadiers would each be acting for their Divisional general when they handled their brigades because the Divisional general could only be in one place at a time. The four Divisional generals were each there to carry out their Corps commanders wishes because their divisions really "belonged" to their Corps commander. They were there to use their chief's troops for his purposes, and if necessary under certain circumstances, to preserve those troops for their superior officer if their formations came under threat. All troops ultimately "belonged" to the highest ranking general present on the battlefield – in the big battles this meant the army commander, like Napoleon.

2. Generals were ALWAYS under orders. On campaign, in winter quarters, in movements leading to a battlefield, everyone was following an order. They kept following those orders until their superior changed the orders, or if some threat to their units (which meant a threat to the men who belonged to their boss!) required a need to change for self-preservation purposes. If that threat disappeared, they would revert to the orders they had been under.

3. Generals had their troops in "formations" that enabled them to move their troops as single bodies whenever possible, whether it was found in their "marching orders" or "order of march" between cities, or in the "grand tactical" formations they were in when they entering a battlefield, or as they were deployed into the line of battle on major battlefields. Call it SOP if you wish, but it meant that subordinate officers and their troops were already under some kind of orders and already in some formation.

4. Generals "control" their subordinates by telling those subordinate where to go and what to do. Those subordinates then "commanded" their own formations "as one body" using regulating bodies etc, or sent their own "controlling" orders to the net level down. That next level down would then be "commanded" as one entity, or might send "controlling" instructions another level down. The point being is that everyone at a given level was put somewhere or told to do something based upon where their own commander's superior wanted them, not where their own commander wanted them. One of the most important skills for a general was a coup d'oeil for the ground. The ability to figure out terrain, estimating how much ground to cover or frontage required, often from a ground-level-view, not knowing what is over the hill, was one of the essential skills generals had to have and use to create orders or carry out his orders.

5. In most major battles you will have an attacker and a defender. Major formations are deployed perhaps 1500 yards or even a mile apart, in hopes that the enemy will not interfere.

6. The battlefield commander (say Napoleon) looks over the situation and forms a plan, and then sends his orders down the chain of command; each level forming their own orders, formations, dispositions, etc trying to fit into that plan. So everyone is under some kind of orders from the word go (or continue the orders they were already under prior to the battle).

7. The attacker sends in his attacks in accordance with the plan. Generals and their troops are already in formations, generals are busy making sure their regulating formations are working right etc. There was plenty to do and supervise just trying to carry out orders. And if they reached tactical engagement range and became embroiled there, he had a lot to do keeping his own command intact or repaired, without launching new plans or ways to win the whole battle by himself.

The whole question of reserves, reacting to enemy threats, attacks breaking down, etc is another topic well worth discussing, but I'll stop here and save that for another time. But in the attempt to follow their orders and carry out their superior's "plan" (as rickety as it may be) they had plenty to do without dreaming up new plans and sending out tons of new orders.

I think we need more excessively long posts talking about how long we have been wargaming to justify our opinions.

Or maybe I could help cut to the chase by grabbing a ruler for people to just measure.

Cheers,

The Bandit

>"I do agree with you about the upper levels of General ship, what did they do when all the pre-battle orders were written and implimented?"<

This part of the discussion reminded me of something General Grant told his aide, Horace Porter, during the battle of the Wilderness: "The only time I ever feel impatient is when I give an order for an important movement of troops in the presence of the enemy, and am waiting for them to reach their destination. Then the minutes seem like hours." (Campaigning With Grant, p. 63.) On the next page, Porter says, "As the general felt that he could be found more readily, and could issue his orders more promptly, from the central point which he had chosen for his headquarters, he remained there almost the entire day."

NedZed: I agree with you about the problem of fighting to the last man, etc. In a one-off battle they never have to worry about saving something for the next round.

Bandit,
Let me cut to the chase.
1. Feel free to ignore my posts if they are too long for you (As should others). I am no fount of wisdom.
2. I promise to post nothing for a week beginning Saturday, so that should help reduce the number of posts and their length.
3. I haven't played Legacy of Glory, but I take it you have. I know it only by posts such as yours on this thread, and therefore cannot judge if it successfully achieves its stated design purpose or not.
4. You can decide for yourself if your opinions justify LoG, if it justifies your opinions, or if a new perspective might cause you to rethink your opinions.

Yours in hectoring pompousity and gravitas,

Ned

I can see how you can move a division forward just by giving one Bn an order (it advances, so the Bde advances, thus the divison advances)

How does a Div CO get a brigade to something different? Or a brigadier a battalion.

Consider Brigades

AAAA B*BB CCCC DDDD

B is the regulating Brigade, and * the regulting Bn in that Bde.

How does the Div CO (at *) get D to refuse the flank at the end of the march? Also How do you give * or B a unique order?

Hussar,

It would depend to a large degree on what the unique order you wanted to give to * or B was.

Having said that, you as Div CO would be with the Regulating Brigade CO (though why the heck you would pick this particular Brigade and Battalion escapes me) and in turn the Regulating Battalion, so you could order both directly.

Then as you and everyone else already knows where you are intending the Division be at the end of the march (they would have been told in advance) you send an aide to A and C letting them know what you are going to do and ride over to D to tell their Brigadier to refuse the flank when you get there.

Meanwhile every one carries on as before.

Okay Scotsman,

I get your point, now I feel more relaxed that your aim is not at me and what I do with CR's but what many other designers do with CR's. I accept this and will leave that issue alone now.

Shane:
I'm glad you're more relaxed, because you weren't a target of mine, though obviously it felt like it.

And I agree. I don't think the issue of command operations during battle at the Corps and Army level has really been followed. Often studies of order procedures etc. are focused on the campaign level, not the actual battle. The different histories that describe Napoleon's HQ Masion always detail Bertier and his staff's action during a campaign, rather than any days of battle.

WOW! What a fascinating discussion. My thanks to all!!!

It can be very difficult to carry on a discussion of this nature without people being offended by someone's comments that ordinarily might not offend if you could see the face of the person making the comment or their body language.

In my view there are a couple different philosophies going on here that may not be able to find any common ground, but may be able to influence the direction "the other side" takes when the next set of rules for the period is written.

Historical Simulations and War Games are two completely different animals in my view. It is obvious several of the more serious writers in this discussion prefer the Serious Simulation as opposed to the Gamer's view of something fun to do in a couple of hours that has a flavor of the period but is easy to learn and fun to do with like minded friends.

My profession is "combat decision-making simulation" so it is the very last thing I want to do when I "Wargame" with my friends so I lean heavily toward Shane's view, especially after having been bored to death with Chef de Battalion and Empire after the second edition. That said, I still enjoy our CLS derivative with traditional 30mm Willie, Stadden, and the newer 28mm's that are closer to 30's, …but perhaps that has to do with the company at our games rather than the game itself.

I'm surprised by one thing though… this recent discovery of the "Regulating Battalion", something CLS players have been using since I can remember since we have to write orders for each battalion, squadron, and battery two moves in advance, using one unit as a guide with the remaining units followings absolutely makes sense since it is easier to do "ditto" marks, …instead of rewriting each units orders.

Funny how wargaming can imitate life… I/S

Hussar wrote:
I can see how you can move a division forward just by giving one Bn an order (it advances, so the Bde advances, thus the divison advances)

How does a Div CO get a brigade to something different? Or a brigadier a battalion.

Consider Brigades

AAAA B*BB CCCC DDDD

B is the regulating Brigade, and * the regulting Bn in that Bde.

How does the Div CO (at *) get D to refuse the flank at the end of the march? Also How do you give * or B a unique order?

Hussar:
Good question. Part of the answer is in the actions that were allowable within the set of regulating unit procedures.

Battalions and brigades, as well as divisions were allowed to refuse an unsecured flank without orders. At Coruna, Napier mentions the far right battalion next to his refusing his flank. Napier leads you to believe it is a completely expected action, even though his brigadier is nowhere near them. Brigades could refuse flanks, and it would be a necessary freedom, otherwise it would be a waste of supporting units not to.

Of course, if he chose to, the Divisional commander could go to the flank and oversee any change. Remember that if the divisional commander was concerned about a flank attack [particularly if his division is on the exposed flank of the Corps], he probably would choose a regulating brigade on the exposed flank. That way, 1. He is more likely to be near if outflanked, and 2. The rest of the division won't move on ahead if the regulating brigade stops to take care of the threat.

That's what I understand anyway.

Ned – My joke wasn't aimed at you, I was actually poking at Shane, who I actually like quite a bit, but have been very confused by as it seemed like he was constantly defending himself against Scottsman who as far as I can tell was not attacking Shane …

Regardless, it appears the two of them have also determined they are not having an argument and thus the constructive nature of prior posting continues.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Long posts are fine for me, I prefer someone to fully explain what they think than someone to just make a comment in a line or two…

Shane, I wasn't actually taking a shot at people making long constructive posts, I was taking a shot at the bird walk about credibility and background. I am simply happy we've moved past it.

Cheers,

The Bandit

yup, agreed,

I am past it now, I am more interested in the Regulating Btln/Brigade for my "Movement Orders" section of my own rules now so I am following this part of the discussion closely as possible.

With my own system I already have very detailed regulations and stipulations as to what you can and cannot do when following orders from a "game" mechanic point of view but fall short on this part of it.

I did remember reading about for example, oblique attacks and how the forward btln was either to the left or right and all others followed suit so I am guessing this discussion is part of the same regulation used in other types of Movement Orders of all armies.

Shane

I/S wrote:
>>>Historical Simulations and War Games are two completely different animals in my view.<<<<

I/S:
I can see why you would say that, particularly when the purposes can be so different-particularly for you as a professional simulation designer and then wargamer. However, if you go to the dictionary you will see that ALL of them speak of wargames and simulations interchangably.;-j

Not that I hold to dictionary definitions… Historical simulations and wargames use the same types of mechanics, rules and concepts to create the same thing: An artificial environment in which to make decisions. Some may use computers, others little models on a table, some paper and pencil and some a physical environment with paintballs or lasers. The very same concepts, tools and outcomes are being employed in each--and both 'Fun' hobbies and "serious" military groups are both using them.

Many games are indistinguishable from 'serious' simulations, on a whole legion of topics. I know that because I created them and know many that did the same thing in a wide variety of subjects and purposes, in business and research.

>>>>It is obvious several of the more serious writers in this discussion prefer the Serious Simulation as opposed to the Gamer's view of something fun to do in a couple of hours that has a flavor of the period but is easy to learn and fun to do with like minded friends.<<<<<

I am not one of them. I don't 'prefer' Serious Simulations over 'fun' wargames. I enjoy a wide variety of games, all under the wargame umbrella, from fantasy, to Battle Cry on the table top, to 'serious' hobby wargames that claim to be simulations. I enjoy them all, and to be truthful, I dislike playing games that are proported to be simulations, but aren't in any shape or form.

What I prefer are wargame designers that do what they claim to be doing. I have a problem with those who claim to be creating games that simulate, recreate, mimic, represent, and illustrate history, but don't demonstrate any understanding of how simulations work or how history could actually be simulated. If a designer is just creating a fun game--more power to him. I enjoy those. If he's claiming that his game offers players 'accurate' historical challenges in some form, he is claiming to have created a simulation.

I/S, whether folks play for fun or 'serious' purposes has little to do with the actual tool. von Rieswitz created a fun game in Kriegsspiel though HIS purpose was very serious, training officers for war. His "serious simulation" has defined a great deal of the mechanics being used today in both wargames and ""combat decision-making simulations." There are several computer game companies that exist and prosper solely by taking the 'serious' simulations the military create, those "combat decision-making simulations", and package them as 'fun games.' The reverse is also true. The military has taken any number of commercial wargames and employed them successfully as 'serious simulations'--and that isn't counting the huge cross-fertilization of individual game mechanics that goes on.

If a designer says they are creating a historical simulation, it doesn't matter whether it is used 'seriously' or for 'fun', anymore than the shape of the hammer is different if driving nails or some child busting plastic models in the backyard. Same tool.

>>>My profession is "combat decision-making simulation" so it is the very last thing I want to do when I "Wargame" with my friends so I lean heavily toward Shane's view, especially after having been bored to death with Chef de Battalion and Empire after the second edition.<<<<<

Boring wargames and simulations are not synonymous. Sid Mieirs of Civilization 1-V fame stated that "Games are only a series of interesting decisions." Why can't combat decision-making be interesting? THERE IS NO INHERENT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WARGAMES AND SIMULATIONS. The only difference is the designer's purposes. To drive home this point here are three quotes from pure 'fun' computer game designers, engineers using simulations to do research, and then the former head of operations for the Defense Modeling and Simulation Office.

"A game is one or more causally linked challenges in a simulated environment"
--Ernest Adams and Andrew Rollings, "On Game Design".

"A simulation is the imitation of the operation of a real-world process or system
over time."
--Jerry Banks, Handbook of Simulation

"A simulation allows players to safely make real-world decisions and develop skills in an unreal environment."

--David Bartlett, former chief of operations, Defense
Modeling and Simulation Office.

If the simulation is boring, it's the outcome of bad design decisions, not a problem inherent with simulations vs wargames. If it was, then there would never be any cross-fertilization between the military and and commercial games.

As the vast majority of wargame designers, past and present, don't seem to have slightest clue what a simulation is or how they work, while perpetuating A LOT of misconceptions, it is not surprising that we have gotten fun games, but crappy, unfun, cluttered simulations. A simulation can be simply a game that offers challenges in an artificial environment modeled on a real environment. It is not required to be any more complex or boring than the best wargames.

>>>>That said, I still enjoy our CLS derivative with traditional 30mm Willie, Stadden, and the newer 28mm's that are closer to 30's, …but perhaps that has to do with the company at our games rather than the game itself.<<<<

Could be. As of yet, NONE of the wargames designed to be simulations have met all the basic requirements for being a functional simulation of anything, regardless of the history used. In fact, it is often hard to discover what they have done, visa vie history and war.

Example: Richard Hasenhauer claims in his introduction that his "Fire & Fury" wargame is "Historically Accurate", yet as far as I can tell he has never once explained what the hell that means or how his design achieved it. He claims that making a game both playable and historically accurate is difficult, but that he achieved both together. How he did that, or why it should be hard to do both is something else he has never explained.

Fun or the possible lack of it, simply isn't the issue. Simulations are a tool, and they can be used for different reasons. However, people have 'fun' for different reasons. I know more than one gamer that can't stand playing a wargame unless it is complex, requiring long play time. I don't get it, but their likes and mine have NOTHING to do with whether a particular wargame is a functional simulation or not. A functional simulation can be loads of fun while being no more complex than TSATF or "A Fist Full of Dice", depending on what the designer wanted to simulate and how well he did it.

Bandit,
"Ned – My joke wasn't aimed at you"

I owe you (and other readers) a big apology for my posting. I should know better than to quickly fire off emails without thinking after a cursory glance at a harmless post that just happened to follow mine. Mea culpa. There are enough misunderstandings around here without me compounding the problem. I am sorry, and also embarrassed by my behavior.

Sincerely,
Ned

welcome to TMP Ned

hehe you just joined the fraternity ;-p

There is a book by Decker, translated by Inigo Jones, about Divisional tactics available at:
link
Jones said he translated the book because there was no English work dealing with detached formations, so he translated Decker's book. In the text Decker says that Divisions in the Line of battle follow the regular rules, but that there were occasions when a Division might operate by itself away from the Line of Battle. It was for those occasions that he wrote the book. It is a very interesting book, especially when he talks about how to split up the artillery and place a certain proportion on each flank. He also talks about how terrain affects things.

Scotsman, You are accurate in your lengthy pronouncement that TDG's (basic military wargames) at their most basic level are "games" designed to sharpen the "situational recognition" portion of a commanders decision-making ability. You are also correct that they are truly games, …partially because there is no inherent danger built into them.

The "Serious Simulations" I refer to are nothing of the sort because they are "Live Fire" with all the inherent danger high speed metal provides, very real & simulated explosives, as well as modern military equipment operating at peak performance under "simulated" and real conditions in order to provide "real combat commanders" and their Troopers/Marines the most realistic training possible.

During a "Live Fire" exercise at Shugart/Gordon or on Range 11 there is quite a bit of simulation but the bulk of the work at JRTC or the NTC is much more dangerous than a simple table game among friends. To date I have not had to write a single letter to a fellow gamer's family extolling their virtues while offering my condolences, …but I have had to fill that requirement at work, …therefore I think I am qualified to note the difference between "Serious Simulations" and the Games I play for fun with friends.

I'm happy for you that you can quote Andy, Jerry, and Dave apparently from memory, …but that doesn't change the fact that I find rules systems by individuals who haven't experienced actual combat, read Napoleon's actual recorded words (or the words and letters of the luminaries of the period in question), trod the same ground as the combatants, and fired, plunged, or rolled the weapons of the period they claim to know so well, …to be boring at best.

Many rules sets are written by individuals who think they know what happens when armed men square off against each other with death on their mind. Most of them really haven't a clue, …which many in senior positions in Government would say is a good thing, sadly!

Sorry I strayed off topic, but that's just me, …and after all I am a self admitted idiot. I/S

I/S:

>>>During a "Live Fire" exercise at Shugart/Gordon or on Range 11 there is quite a bit of simulation but the bulk of the work at JRTC or the NTC is much more dangerous than a simple table game among friends. To date I have not had to write a single letter to a fellow gamer's family extolling their virtues while offering my condolences, …but I have had to fill that requirement at work, …therefore I think I am qualified to note the difference between "Serious Simulations" and the Games I play for fun with friends.<<<<

So, the difference between a wargame and a 'serious simulation' of combat is whether there is live fire and people can be shot? From the sounds of it, you consciously work to make your training exercises at many points something other than simulated. In other words, from the sounds of it, a serious simulation of combat is one that attempts to go beyond simulating combat as much as possible?

I can appreciate the importance and seriousness of what you do, but it sounds like you aren't trying to create a simulated combat environment, but a real combat environment as much as possible. It seems to me to be a different set of goals.

I can see why you might not want to go through that in your free time.

>>>>I'm happy for you that you can quote Andy, Jerry, and Dave apparently from memory, …but that doesn't change the fact that I find rules systems by individuals who haven't experienced actual combat, read Napoleon's actual recorded words (or the words and letters of the luminaries of the period in question), trod the same ground as the combatants, and fired, plunged, or rolled the weapons of the period they claim to know so well, …to be boring at best.<<<<

Again, I think that is a failing of the designers. Simulation designers, to do the job correctly, have to have an intimate knowledge of what they are simulating, whether it is Napoleonic history or current environments. How they get that knowledge can vary widely. An example is the flight simulator Red Baron I and II. Pilots from WWI, experienced in aerial combat vetted the game, as did modern pilots that flew those biplanes today. The designers didn't fly them. Yet, the designers did create a simulation that the veterans gave their seal of approval to as well as the men who fly the planes today. Are you saying that only men that have been in aerial combat could possibly create a functional simulation of aerial combat?

I quoted those folks [and not from memory] to show that the core function of both simulations and wargames are the same. The design purposes of both are the same.

Firing a smoothbore flintlock and marching with twenty reinactors doesn't provide the kind of experience you are talking about if you want to create a simulation of a Napoleonic battle. Yet functional simulations of Napoleonic warfare can be created all the same.

I would think that if the simulation did the job, how the designers got the right information/experience/facts would not be such an issue. And it wouldn't be boring. That is what simulation design methodologies provide--how to get the job done right.

I think poor design efforts over the last twenty years have left many with a poor opinion of simulation design in general and in the hobby in particular.

>>>Many rules sets are written by individuals who think they know what happens when armed men square off against each other with death on their mind. Most of them really haven't a clue, …which many in senior positions in Government would say is a good thing, sadly!<<<<

>>>Sorry I strayed off topic, but that's just me, …and after all I am a self admitted idiot. I/S<<<

It's only off topic if we aren't talking about rules capturing something of actual combat. I certainly would like to see wargames that claim to capture something real in their games to actually accomplish that.

I do have a question:
If you find poor simulations boring--ones obviously not designed by knowledgable folks, and you suspect it is more the good company than the game itself you find enjoyable in the wargame hobby [no criticism there], then have you ever had an enjoyable game experience with a wargame that you felt did capture some of 'the real thing' in the way you define it? [And just to make sure--that is not a sarcastic or rhetorical question.]

I/S wrote:
Scotsman, You are accurate in your lengthy pronouncement that TDG's (basic military wargames) at their most basic level are "games" designed to sharpen the "situational recognition" portion of a commanders decision-making ability. You are also correct that they are truly games, …partially because there is no inherent danger built into them.

I/S:
I meant to comment on this. I can appreciate the real training value in providing soldiers with the experience of actually being shot at, with the possibility of actually being wounded in the course of a training exercise. I can understand the very real and visceral difference between a wargame and a training exercise where situations are purposely set up where folks can die. A very serious distinction.

However, to say that physical danger is the difference between a 'serious simulation' and a wargame isn't one that is entertained by the simulation design community in general--or one I have heard from military folks, unless it has changed in the last six years.

It certainly is not the general definition of a 'serious simulation'. Any simulation used for something serious, from research and training, to making money is seen as a 'serious simulation.'

From my understanding, a simulation's fundamental value is that participants can develop skills flying helicopers without fear of crashing, build factories without having to spend millions to see if the design actually works, predict the weather without creating actual hurricanes, and practice combat tactics without getting shot--or enjoy the competitive and historical aspects of a Napoleonic battle without the powder burns. I certainly agree that such tools do not simulate *everything* or all the important things that would need to be learned in each of those situations. However, from the results, they do work, providing the opportunities to learn real skills and understand real processes in artificial environments.

While I can see the absolute necessity of combat exercises that involve physical danger. And there certainly is a deep emotional and physical difference in the experience. However, I don't think that is a technical distinction between a game and a simulation of war.

>>>> Example: Richard Hasenhauer claims in his introduction that his "Fire & Fury" wargame is "Historically Accurate", yet as far as I can tell he has never once explained what the hell that means or how his design achieved it. He claims that making a game both playable and historically accurate is difficult, but that he achieved both together. How he did that, or why it should be hard to do both is something else he has never explained. <<<<<

Well, since he and I discussed the Command Radius concept from F&F at length when I was designing AOE, I can give an explanation of that part of it if you are so inclined. Otherwise, such explanations are indeed welcome, but not to the extent I'd want the extra page count to drive up the cost of the rules :).

Regards, Bill Gray
ageofeagles.com

"I do have a question:
If you find poor simulations boring--ones obviously not designed by knowledgeable folks, and you suspect it is more the good company than the game itself you find enjoyable in the wargame hobby [no criticism there], then have you ever had an enjoyable game experience with a wargame that you felt did capture some of 'the real thing' in the way you define it? [And just to make sure--that is not a sarcastic or rhetorical question.]"

Simple answer: NO*

Complicated answer: Every so often I am able to attend a wargame convention to test one of the "wargame" scenarios we do for DOD's CPX program. I like to see how wargamers will try to "game" the TDG so I can tweak the "interactor" characters to achieve the maximum beneficial stress for the participants. We usually bring a small crew and one of the extremely realistic portable terrain sets so the gamers can be drawn into the scenario making their action and interaction with other players more visceral. When one of these "games" works, and the players begin to interact on a gut level, I find my enjoyment at its highest. Usually I hate to end that game but time constraints force an end to all good things. It doesn't happen every time, but often enough (perhaps one game per convention) for me to really enjoy.

"I can appreciate the importance and seriousness of what you do, but it sounds like you aren't trying to create a simulated combat environment, but a real combat environment as much as possible. It seems to me to be a different set of goals."

The object is to create the most realistic experience possible. Now, the problem with doing that for a large group over a large area (not on a table in a room) is that you have physical things to accomplish that influence the decisions, like bombs, rockets, rifle fire, machinegun fire, reaction to troop movements, equipment, etc., etc…
All that produces real danger, …even though it is a simulation of the highest order, it is still a simulation none the less. We use "sim-munitions" similar to paint ball rounds but definitely lethal and potentially destructive. This picture: picture is of the Shugart/Gordon live fire MOUT facility. The repair bill at the end of a live fire exercise can be quite expensive but that is part of the price for realism.

We also use table top "games" to allow participants the opportunity to view from above the mission on the ground. This picture: picture is of a portion of the S/G MOUTFAC that can be tied into a table game with this: picture portion of a table top TDG for an HVT extraction simulation that combines the table and the "real" environment.

*I have enjoyed our modifications of V/B Napoleonics large scale battles. We've done all the early campaign classics with as much accuracy as possible in the terrain and brigade strengths. All-in-all the games were enjoyable with acceptable results. I/S

The three most important words in the successful prosecution of war are: communication, …communication, …communication, in that order.

Those are the words of a USMC Major General (at the time he was the deputy commander of the Pacific Fleet) after a very successful table top Command Post Exercise (CPX) that clearly illustrated the need for the particular Marine Battalion's staff to improve the way they communicated up and down the chain of command.

picture

During the simulation (CPX) the Battalion was spread over their own facility having to communicate by radio or runner when the system broke down as a result of equipment failure or interference by the "judge" (me).

picture

In modern warfare time lost can't be made up, …there just isn't any way to get lost minutes back. Minutes and seconds make a critical difference on the modern battlefield (minutes cost lives) due to the "closure" rate of weapons systems currently in the arsenal of war.

During the Napoleonic era seconds were not as critical as they are now, but certainly time lost played a critical part in the success or failure of the great commanders. I believe if memory serves me correctly Napoleon commented on the importance of lost time many times.

This thread's original point dealt with command radius, which translates in reality to "time" or perhaps "ease of communication radius" if that is easier to visualize. It is a measure of the time it takes for a commander to exert his will on the formations under his command. Gamers want that to be instantaneous, but in reality it wasn't.

Our simulations/games are time based. Everything moves within the game at a fairly constant rate toward the inevitable clash of wills. How the players use the time they have to achieve their objectives is critical to their success of failure. It's that simple… I/S