"More musings on Waterloo (semi-long)" Topic

Napoleon's understanding of Wellington would be based on reports given by his marshals that had been fighting the man for years in Spain. Knowing that he was going to be fighting Wellington, it makes perfect sense for Napoleon to put Soult in a position where he was constantly available to the Emperor but not directly fighting his nemesis.

Wellington's playbook, from Soult's perspective, would have been that Wellington retreats when his flank is turned. He will refuse to fight until conditions are in his favour. He is not afraid to give ground and always protects his lines of communication.

Napoleon would know Blucher from personal experience. He knows that Blucher will fight tenaciously and will fight and fight again. Blucher does not maneouver except to go forward. That does not mean that he can dismiss Blucher by any means. It requires that he never count Blucher out but also know that he will accept almost any fight offered. He also believed that Blucher was an advocate of the 'fight anyone but Napoleon' campaign so would have believed that if he was offered an opportunity to fight a Marshal instead of Napoleon, Blucher would take the Marshal everytime.

Given then what Napoleon thought he knew of these two men, his decisions seem to be the right ones. It could also help to explain Ney's hesitation at Quatre Bras. Ney would have wanted to get the British to commit to a fight. You cannot do that if you throw everything in quickly. If Ney had played his hand then, he believed, the British would have fallen back and he'd have had no chance for a victory. Now, there are plenty of other reasons for Ney's delays at that battle (no staff, no intelligence for example) but might it also have been a ploy to get the British to commit?

In the end, Wellington did fall back from Quatre Bras and this is exactly what Napoleon and Soult would have expected. It would go some ways toward justifying Napoleon's confidence at breakfast on the morning of the 18th. Also, at Ligny, the Prussians fought with the determination that Napoleon would have expected. Everyone was following their playbooks.

But things went wrong.

Blucher *should* have rallied, turned about, and fought Grouchy. The Marshal was supposed to follow close to keep giving Blucher someone to fight. Nothing about Blucher's past behaviour would have suggested that he would have marched instead to the aid of the British when given such a juicy target. Did Blucher ever show such a tendency to march to the Russian and Austrian allies? No. The Prussians fought their own wars.

So Napoleon, on the morning of the 18th, is still thinking that his problem is trying to force Wellington into a fight. He thinks he has that and he can delay, take his time, have a parade, because it is all about calling Wellington out. If the French had sprinted across the battlefield early in the morning, his enemies might have read the French as too confident and begun to withdraw. This theory would also go a long way toward explaining why Ney was so anxious to see the British retreating. It is what they expected. The French thought that they were trying to pin the British.

If we remember the mind games that Napoleon played at Austerlitz, I think we see him trying the same thing at Waterloo.

Sometime around lunch, Napoleon switched completely from optimistic to depressed and hopeless. It is often put down to sickness. Bad strawberries. He was always prone to mood swings and temper tantrums so it could also have been that what turned him around was the realization that Wellington had, in fact, humbugged him. Wellington had no intention of fleeing and now the French were committed to a fight that they couldn't win. He had thrown the dice and lost. Worse still, Blucher had also refused to follow his playbook and was not doing at all what was expected of him. He had read them both completely wrong.

That had to be devastating to a man who so believed in his own superiority and destiny.

What threw napoleon for a complete loop was something that Blucher and Wellington had that Napoleon, being Corsican and a cutthroat politician by nature, could not appreciate. Blucher and Wellington trusted each other completely. Napoleon counted on them both acting in their own best interests and they beat him with friendship.

Interesting observation. Sounds like a good paper.

Thanks very much for an analysis which, at first reading anyway, strikes me as being straightforward, consistent and convincing; liked especially the weight you give to psychological factors.
I do, however, disagree very much with your final paragraph. Blucher would have been unwise to trust Wellington completely, even though he had Wellington's word of honour that the Allied army would accept battle if supported by at least one Prussian Corps; Wellington had orders both to flee for the coast if facing defeat, and to swear falsely to the Prussian command that this was not so. Secondly, when one considers the conduct of Napoleon towards Saxony in 1813 (i.e. after the defections) and compares it to Wellington's treatment of the Portuguese peasants displaced and forced to labour on the Lines of Torres Vedras, the irony of Wellington's daring to say that Napoleon was "not a gentleman" becomes the more pointed. So, I cannot agree with your use of the word "friendship" (unless it be in that special sense, "the enemy of my enemy is my friend"); both Britain and Prussia, like the other ancient monarchies, were prepared to put their "national ambitions" &c aside temporarily until Napoleon's France had been crushed, allowing the aristocratic elites to continue to lord it over the majority of European humanity as they had for centuries.

Mind you, I did like the rest of the analysis.

Well done. I like it. Thought through and seemingly more realistic that blaming the whole thing on Napoleons stomach condition, or calling it "The Prussian Victory" or saying Wellington just got lucky.

Napoleon lost. He wasn't an infallible wargod but just another man.

Fresh insight! Thanks for sharing.

It makes a great deal of sense, but I agree with R le D about the friendship part. I think the bottom line is that Wellington and Blucher both knew that their best chance, perhaps only chance, of defeating Napoleon, or at least avoiding ignominious defeat, was to gang up on him. Otherwise, W would not have stayed to fight all day, and B would not have hurried to W's support.

As for Blucher wanting (supposedly) to avoid fighting Napoleon himeself, how would Blucher know whether Napoleon was with Grouchy or with Ney at any given time?

malcolm

There are a couple of areas in your argument that I would recommend you look at in greater depth, particularly regarding Blucher and the decision-making process of the Prussian army. In essence you have missed Gneisnau and the whole Prussian General Staff reforms that placed far greater emphasis on the role of the Chief of Staff than in the Anglo-Allied or French armies. When it comes to ‘trust', Gneisnau certainly did not have a great deal of faith in Wellington's personal undertakings, but had to co-operate due to Blucher's sense of personal honour more than anything. That said it is he, not Blucher, who manages the army, as opposed to leads it and acts as a figurehead: the brains to go with the heart.

As for Blucher's tendency to retire before Napoleon, his reluctant acceptance of the Trachenbrg plan calls into question whether he would favour any option beyond attacking given no constraints imposed upon him. Personally, I think h would not have cared whether it was Napoleon or a Marshal, but Gneisnau would have done.

The Prussians did not ‘fight their own wars', except disastrously in 1806, although it was generally others helping them (1807 and 1813) rather than the other way around. In 1813 the Prussian army was wholly integrated into those of their allies, and the intervention of 2nd Corps at Kulm is a good example of them acting as the decisive factor in a totally integrated allied battle.

K

The trust part comes down to both the British and the Prussians knowing that if the other did not hold, they could not fight against napoleon so they should fall back. Blucher and Wellington both had political leaders and advisors telling them to not trust the other nation.

So yes, they both knew that it was in their combined best interest if they both fought together but neither had any good reason to expect that the other would stand.

When I think of the Prussians fighting their own wars I think of Blucher in 1814. Though there were Russians in his force, I think of him as a rogue element fighting his own agenda and indeed not embracing the Trachenberg plan. I don't think Napoleon would have known Blucher's true feelings about the doctrine though so he had to assume that all his enemies were using it.

Very interesting indeed, Malcolm.

good stuff Malcolm…I very much like your interpretation of Napoleons strategic thinking.

Pete

Interesting read, good points made. This is how Napoleonic discussion should be! :-)

The description of Blucher as a Rogue Elephant certainly appeals…

Hi malcolmmccallum!
I very much enjoyed reading your post, well written and informative.
Just a quick note on my inderstanding of "Ney's hesitation". I often feel (this is personal opinion, based on my own reading and understanding) that the idea of him "hesitating" is only true when you take his decisions into hindsight.
In fact Ney's orders where to stop Wellington from reaching Blucher, something he succeeded in doing. Sedcondly he was thrown in to command at the 11th hour with only three infantry divisions and three cavalry brigades against an enemy of unkown qauntity. Because having not been in command of the left wing before the morning of the 16th he could not have kept Reille and d'Erlons corps close by, and he could have had no idea that wellington would take so long to achieve numerical superiority.
Just like at Waterloo the Allies where pleased that Napoleon started so late, at the time of Quatre Bra, where Ney's primary task was to hold Wellingtons numerically superior (as far as he knew at the time) force in place the now infamous "hesitation" was probably more like a welcome pause. Just my two cents- though it is probably worth far less
cheers and happy gaming
Mark!

In addition to these points about Ney's having been given command so late, was it not the case that when Napoleon told him of the attached Garde Cavalry (as well as a Heavy Cavalry Division) he also warned Ney "not to use them"? Of course, the mere presence of such a force would have had some intimidating effect on Wellington, but it's another illustration of the constraints and difficulties Ney faced.

I like the essay but not sure I agree blucher would avoid napoleon. That was the plan for 1813 but he didnt seem to mind in 1814 or 1815 for that matter..

I was under the impression that Ney had been ordered to take the road intersection at Quatre Bras, not just "keep Wellington from joining Blucher." Not so?

True that Napoleon told him to use the Guards light cavalry only in emergencies, but was he not given command over both I and II Corps? And, if so, why did he not bring I Corps up sooner? And the rest of the heavy cavalry?

Ney certainly didn't hesitate in committing Kellermann's leading brigade unsupported against the allied center at Quatre Bras.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Hey don!
I'm under the impression that Ney's primary orders where to hold Wellington in place, this would make sense if indeed Napoleon was putting into plan his famous "central position" tactic. Ney only has to hold Wellington in place while Napoleon uses a far larger French force to deal with Blucher. If Napoleons victory had been complete (in other words if he had COMPLETELY destroyed the fighting capability of the Prussian army) then Napoleon can turn everything he has on the Allied force under Wellington though in all likely hood the Allies would have fled rather than face up to that un-aided. Rather than Ney's "hesitation" i think the real failure is d'Erlons corpse not turning up in time at either battle.
Anyway i'm digressing, the cross roads is only important as it can link the two armies,the French objective is to stop this from happening – as long as the Allies are stopped from meeting the prussians Ney achieves this. It's a classic example of one half of the overall tactics of the central position.
On a slightly random note: I personally find quatre bra/ligny more fascinating than waterloo, interested to hear your what you think
Cheers,
Mark

Regarding Mont St Jean, once Wellington had deployed, there was no real way he could retreat out of that position in the face of Napoleon's own deployed army without a great deal of risk.

I don't accept the argument that Napo had to delay the assault on June 18 for psychological reasons.

>"the cross roads is only important as it can link the two armies…"<

Yes, but did the orders say "prevent a link-up," or did they say "take the crossroads"?

>"So Napoleon, on the morning of the 18th, is still thinking that his problem is trying to force Wellington into a fight."<

I think this it quite possible. I seem to recall reading that N was somewhat surprised to find that W had actually stopped and formed for a fight. N might, even then, have felt that W was bluffing.

The reason for the delay on the 18th was to let the ground drain sufficiently to allow the artillery to maneuver off the roads.

Sincerely,
Kevin

If you have ever tried to drag a cannon through mud, allowing the ground to dry is a perfectly good reason.

I don't buy into the wet ground theory.

Firstly, think of the Napoleon at Toulon and the Napoleon at Jena, holding the lantern and helping the gunners to push on at all costs through the night. Think of the French at Eylau and at Berezina. They manhandled their guns under great stress. The campaign in France in 1814 had tremendous mud and the French soldiered on, force marching and pushing those guns forward at all costs. There was never any other battle in the Napoleonic wars where the armies sat casually apart waiting for the ground to dry.

Secondly, we can look to Mercer, a british Artillery Officer. Is it not peculiar that not only does he never once mention having the least bit of problems maneouvering his battery that morning but also, when he scratches his head wondering why the battle hasn't started, he never considers the mud and guns.

"Some thought the French were afraid to attack us, others that they would do so soon, others that the Duke would not wait for it, others that he would, as he would certainly not allow them to go to Brussels;…"

If there was anyone who would have had the idea that maybe, just maybe, the problem was that the ground was unsuitable, it would be an artillery officer.

The winter mud was significant in at least one 1814 at Vauchamps in February. Grouchy's horse artillery could not keep up with him because of the mud.

The rain and mud was also a factor at Dresden in 1813.

At Eylau, there was no significant artillery maneuvering by either side. Guns get stuck. And in Belgium the type of ground when wet you'd get your artillery stuck.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Mercer was not positioned where the French where. He was up on the ridge. How much of the water flowed ofof there, to where Napoleon wanted to move his guns. Not just the grand battery, but any guns that would accompany any attack.

I realoze it is not that far appart, but I have certainly had days when half the battery was stuck solid, and the other half could roll out just fine.

Perhaps mud is not the perfect explination, it just seems to make more sense than any of the other reasons put forth.

malcolmmccallum,

''Napoleon's understanding of Wellington would be based on reports given by his marshals that had been fighting the man for years in Spain''

Humm. Soult's advice to Bonaparte, to recall Grouchy was ignored. Reille's advice, to avoid frontal assault against British troops was also ignored. I think Bonaparte reckoned he knew better than them, and was therefore guilty of hubris.

''Wellington's playbook, from Soult's perspective, would have been that Wellington retreats when his flank is turned……..''

But Soult's last campaign was in the Pyrenees and France where he'd experienced the staying power of British infantry and case shot and their extra-ordinary effectiveness against French columns. Soult's experience was completely ignored by Bonaparte:

'You think that because he defeated you, that Wellington is a great general? I tell you, he is a bad general, the English are poor troops and this affair will be no more difficult than eating our breakfast!

''But things went wrong. Blucher *should* have rallied, turned about, and fought Grouchy. The Marshal was supposed to follow close to keep giving Blucher someone to fight''

This ignores the fact that after Ligney, and on the 17th, Grouchy pleaded repeatedly to be allowed to pursue Blucher.

''It could also help to explain Ney's hesitation at Quatre Bras. Ney would have wanted to get the British to commit to a fight. You cannot do that if you throw everything in quickly.''

You forget, that Napoleon needed speed if he was going to stop the British and Prussians combining. For these reasons, he was not right. The truth is, he was out-generalled. The obvious truth of which he spent the latter years of his life trying to circumvent.

I agree with you though, that he may have believed (against advice) that Wellington would retreat. But I think it more likely that he still didn't know where Wellington really was. On St Helena, one of Bonaparte's complaints was that Wellington was deployed 'wrongly' in front of the The Forest of Soignes. He wasn't. Bonaparte's orders on the morning of the battle, were for his corps to advance on Mont St Jean: an odd objective to say the least. He also failed to recconoiter the ground properly: Bonaparte's plan called for his right and left wings to keep pace with one another, which is clearly non-sensical with Hougoumont in the way. All this points to hurried plans and too little thought.

badger wrote:

"Perhaps mud is not the perfect explination, it just seems to make more sense than any of the other reasons put forth."

Don't look for monocausal explanations. It may have been the most important factor, but that does not mean that others did not play a part that led to the overall result.

Not specifically aimed at this debate but any historical analysis.

K

True, but, usualy human decisions are based off of a final thing that solidifys a thought.

And, as it was a hunman decision, it could have been nothing any of us have ever thought of. Maybe he was watching some lambs play, and did not want to disturb them with nasty cannon fire.

>"…Bonaparte's orders on the morning of the battle, were for his corps to advance on Mont St Jean: an odd objective to say the least. He also failed to recconoiter the ground properly: Bonaparte's plan called for his right and left wings to keep pace with one another…"<

So, do you think Napoleon didn't know that the Allied army was deployed in front of him, behind the slope/in the sunken road? Maybe he thought what troops were visible were just a rear guard and all he had to do was march to Mont St Jean?

"Blucher and Wellington trusted each other completely."
Errrrrr………..

Given that Wellington was the politician at Vienna shortly before who had signed up France and Austria to a pact against Prussia and Russia. Given that Wellington spent much of his time in Belgium trying to prise away as many German troops from the Prussians as he could. Given that Wellington promised to directly assist Blucher on the 16th (despite the fact it was impossible his cavalry & artillery could get anywhere near)….

It might be argued Blucher was in enough of a hallucinagenic trance to trust Wellington, Elephants, and Rip Van Winkle.
Somehow it appears highly unlikely his intelligent staff would have done, yet it was the staff (not the comatose Blucher) on the night of the 16th who moved so as to defeat Napoleon, should Wellington actually not weasel out of his commitments yet again, but somehow manage to hold a line long enough for the Prussians to enter on the flank and victoriously crush the French.

:>

lol, well said Jeff, love ya work ;-p

Badger

Now you know what makes us professional historians look older and dustier before our time…

K

K as an amatuer historian, I can understand. As a pro artyman, I can tell you that dragging multi-ton guns through the mud will definately make you look and feel old before your time.

Actualy, thats why I am typeing right now, I am just to stiff and twisted to get ready for work just yet.

Badger

I did re-enactment for many years and had to lug a few guns then, so although not nearly as draining as your experience I know where you are coming from.

K