"Paddy Griffith revisited, a buffoon he is not...!" Topic

An interesting post. A buffon, no (IMHO), but clearly someone with strongly held views. He is a strong defender of the British army in WWI and makes a good case, which he, (again, IMHO) takes too far. I have always found him worth reading. As with all authors, you should examine what he says seriously and critically.

Sorry aercdr, I was in the process of writing a longer post, but I accidentally hit "post" when I only had the title written! My reference to "buffoon" is in response to one of the postings below in which he is called exactly that.

Campaigner

Greetings all.

I patiently read through the posting below about the discussion and opinions of Paddy Griffiths's books and the validity of his arguments.

The two main books in question, "Battle in the Civil War", and "Battle Tactics of the Civil War" are the targets of this discussion.

I would like to say up front that I am convinced that those who try to condemn his work and attack his conclusions, are doing it from the standpoint that it challenges long-held notions and ingrained beliefs in living historians and Civil War buffs and scholars, and quite simply they can't accept it because it goes too far in putting a complete spin on what they have always held to be true of Civil War combat. Like anything else, if we have been accepting a whole set of perceived truths and for years and years, it is very difficult to openly and honestly accept something new.

And yet, these two books did exactly that for me, and I will explain in detail why.

I began reenacting in 1984. I was 13 years old. During that time, I began to get a sense of "common Civil War knowledge" among living historians, scholars, and all who professed an interest. Over the next 24 years, I also became intimately familiar with how living historians explained their hobby and explained the war to spectators and other Civil War enthusiasts. I listened to numerous lectures and spectator educational presentations, and gave them as well. I particularly began to see distinct patterns in the details and the very vocabulary in which these presentations were delivered to the public.

And I grew up in this hobby seeing one particular detail show up in every single presentation that was given by a reenactor, and it went something like this:

"OH, Civil War weapons were way ahead of the tactics. Back in the old days of the Revolutionary War, you could only shoot 50 yards. NOW, because of the minie bullet and the rifle musket, Civil War soldiers could shoot 500 yards. Men were suddenly being killed at farther distances. And yet they still marched in straight lines any way. The carnage was horrrrrrible because of that!!"

Hmmmmmm….I heard this speel SO OFTEN over the years, with frighteningly repetitive vocabulary that I realized it was just taken as part of the "reenacting presentation gospel", and I had never ever heard it questioned or challenged. It was presented along with the other major cliches of every reenactor show and tell I saw – there were no left or right footed shoes ever, soldiers had to wear them in(not always true), all hardtack was moldy and food was always horrible(a misconeption completely over-exaggerated by reenactors), and that all soldiers lived in big A-frame tents on campaign(I won't even go there).

I realized that this speel was almost on auto-replay, it was almost like a rewind and replay.

And so that's when I began to delve deeper and commit myself to being a better living historian, and give more discriminating and balanced presentations to the public. In doing so I began to question the "cliche gospel" of these presentations. And it was from then on that I truly considered myself a living historian.

This was only reenforced when the PBS series came out in 1990. There's Shelby Foote, the Lord of Civil War Lore – and again, sure enough, in crept the cliche speel. "The weapons were way ahead of the tactics."

Park rangers at Gettysburg, same thing- "Rifle muskets allowed soldiers to shoot up to 1,000 yards, it revolutionized the battlefield and casualties sky-rocketed."

And ultimately, my question to all of them was…..really?

I first came across Paddy Griffith's books in 1998, and I purchased them both. In my opinion, they are two very important works on the Civil War because they unmask and disspell for me this long-held notion of the rifle musket being the long range killer of the 1860's.

First, to those who say his book are based on bad research and bad math, I would like to know what they are referring to. He uses first-hand accounts and soldier's own recollections of battle, as well as regimental and army statistics as thoroughly as any author. He admits himself his lack of use of the Official Records, but that has to be taken in context…VERY few authors of Civil War books of any topic can fully utilize or even partially utitilize the official records, they are too massive. When a series is organized like the Time-Life Civil War series, there are greater numbers of people available to delve into the official records. Individual authors cannot do so to that extent. And what's more, Paddy didn't do anything in his research that other authors haventdone. He used soldiers own quotes and recollections, available statistics. People have attacked the tables in his books, pointing out mathematical errors. Um, I have encountered typos and errors in tables in many Civil War books, and apart from the fact they may have been nothing more than typographical glitches, or a percentage error, it does NOT change the strength of Paddy's argument. If you need to go into a table to attack an author and discover one of his tables should have had 33.5% instead of 34.5% and based on that you condemn his math and his research, then you're missing the bigger picture and avoiding the point.

Paddy's bibliography in the back of his books are filled with sources used by many authors, and Paddy leaned on numerous excellent sources and information. To say his books are based on "bad research" is pretty misleading.
Without trying to defend every single point Paddy makes, I will simply focus on the rifle musket and how it fit into Civil War combat. I admit that I do not agree 100% with EVERY single thing Paddy says in his works, but in the case of the musket specifically, his efforts to challenge the long-held belief in it as the new long-range killer that madethe battlefield a bloodbath, in my opinions his books are dead ON.

In essence, Paddy is saying some really simple things about Civil War combat, and they just happen to fly in the face of what we've been told and what we've read previously.

That's why some despise him so much.

Paddy's main point is this – what the rifle musket was technologically, vs. how it was ACTUALLY USED, is the chasm that needs to be focused on! First of all, Paddy is far from the first author to bring up the fact that when you look at soldiers diaries and their own works, they are filled with numerous references to how close Civil War formations were during fire-fights in numerous engagements. He is also far from the first author to draw the conclusion based on his research that in reality, Civil War infantry engaged eachother typcially atsmoothbore ranges, and in many cases well BELOW even smoothbore ranges, not the maxium potential "500+ yards" cliche so often bragged about by living historians.

There is nothing flawed in Paddy's research when he points out that there are repeated time again, references and statistics that show that Civil War soldiers made up armies that engaged at ranges that made the technological advantages of rifling and new range potentials a moot point. To put it simply – if two battlelines are firing into eachother at 75 yards, the advantages in range that the Springfield or Enfield might afford vs. the clanky smoothbore, are not that dramatic.

There is nothing flawed in Paddy's works when he points out that in theory, rifle muskets rear leaf sights were sighted up to 1,000 yards! But in reality, this potential never even came CLOSE to being realized on the battlefield. Quite to the contrary, he points out quite correctly and accurately, that indeed Civil War armies were not trained in individual rifle skills, let alone in the skill of utiltizing a rifle's rear sight. You had a simple situation of the newest and most accurate rifles being used by armies in a war in which massed close fire was STILL the way in which commanders would conduct battle, and if those armies were not opening fire until they got to withing 100-150 yards, then in reality is was still an "old smoothbore" type war so to speak, but with rifled muskets! That's not that difficult to understand.

He is certainly not the first one either to point out still further that well up into 1863, even the eastern armies had a mixture of fire-arms. There is nothing flawed in this part of his research. I can go to a dozen different author's books and find references to the multitude of caliber and types of weapons in the Army of the Potomac in 1863 for example. Paddy is far from the first to point out that in the eastern theatre, there were good chunks of both armies that were carrying smoothbores right into the major battles of that year. And he is absolutely correct went he point out in his tables that smoothbores were still in use in large numbers.

Now, one of the things I would like to ask those who cannot accept Paddy's arguments are this – if Civil War armies supposedly "started to kill eachother at 400 yards on the battlefield"….ummmm what did the formations carrying smoothbores do? If for example, "Smith's" brigade had four regiments with rifle muskets, and two other regiments carrying a mix of smoothbores and rifle muskets, and one regiment carrying only smoothbores – did that brigade stop at 400-500 yards and start blazing away because the "rifle musket revolution" had begun???? It's ridiculous. Of course not. That brigade had to do what the rest of the army did by default any way….they got into a Napoleonic smoothbore range so that all their weapons could have a chance to count and cause hits in the mass-fire exchange.
And Paddy is certainly not flawed when he points out that Civil War commanders as a whole were very reluctant to open fire at anything beyond 250 yards. It was simply toofar away for combat conditions. They didn't feel confident that they could effectively deliver fire until they got much closer.

He also makes a point to show that the rolling country and broken wooded terrain of most major Civil War engagements didn't afford fields of clear fire for the supposed "new killing range" of 400+ yards, even if the armies had wished to do so. Anyone who has visited a Civil War battlefield can understand this. Even in the assumed "more open" battles of Gettysburg and Antietam, you had rolling ridges and undulations that prevented any kind of "new range" fire. With formations marching over rolling and dipping ground, there was little if ever an opportunity to utilize the rifle musket at this supposed new killing range. Indeed, Antietam is a prime example of this. The ground there is so dramatically rolling in some places, you could not get a clear range of fire beyond 50 yards, let alone 400.

And in wooded battles like Chancellorsville and the Wilderness, it was even worse. The rifle-musket advantage was completely cancelled out in those battles. In the Wilderness, artillery was stifled, and infantry formations were lucky to be able to fire 50 yards in fron of them.
So really for me, Paddy's books hit me like a bolt of lightning because he spoke of breaking that misconception that I had always heard and I had always assumed to be true. So I simply say based on what I have read over the past 25+ years, combined with the arguments he makes, his arguments should be taken seriously by living historians and Civil War scholars and buffs alike, before they give the "speel". For me, Paddy simply said "hey wait a minute", and really revealed some truths about Civil War combat that have been difficult to accept, really because they challenge much of what was written before. But that not should not be the reason people use to condemn his books or his arguments. In my opinion, he is absolutely right – the rifle musket did not have the impact on Civil War combat as it has been so often presented to the public and in books. The Civil War was a late Napoleonic War in which modern weapons were used at smoothbore ranges. Period. And he doesn't just toss that off like he's got nothing better to say. He backs it up with solid information about how Civil War soldiers were trained, the military doctrines of the armies themselves, and the psychology of the commanders who led them.

In conclusion, Paddy's main point and most effective argument can be summed up like this: Civil War armies did shoot eachother and kill eachother in great numbers, and Civil War battles were very, very bloody affairs. But they were not bloody because of a "new killing range", but because Civil War armies did what all Napoleonic armies had done. It was massed fire at close ranges and for long periods of time, resulting in masses of wounded, and a lesser number killed. It wasn't the rifle musket that "caused" high casualties, it was the nature of how formations engaged eachother. The rifle musket was state of the art muzzleloading technology on the eve of the Civil War….but it was USED as the previous generation's muskets – in line, up close and for mass effect, not for individual skill or study of range.

I personally praise his works because I believe they correctly disspell once and for all the cliche gospel that has become written in stone!

Campaigner

Campaigner,
I agree with you the anti-Griffith complaints are more emotional than statistical. He does interpolate from the diaries (adrennalin measurements are not always accurate)but they convey the situation. Aimed fire is not part of a CW battle, I describe the action as "point" at the enemy. Still the improved range/accuracy had to increase the lethality of battle simply because when fired, a bullet went truer, farther than before. The bloodbath images are all of close combat: Sunken Lane(s), Spotsylvania County, and Cold Harbor. Only Franklin comes to mind for the other opinion but that is a "should never have happened foolish assault". Good for you standing up for Paddy!

Campaigner,
I made the same point, albeit briefly, in the previous thread[s]; to whit:

the rifled-musket was capable of greater things, but overall the volunteer soldiers of both sides were NOT trained to take advantage of the weapon's capability.

eg; distance estimating and proper use of the rear sight.

Those that became capable were then used in more specialized roles of skirmishing and sniping…..but the vast majority did not attain this capability.

I believe the recent Earl Hess book, "The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat – Reality and Myth" also goes a long way to explore the situation and helps set the record straight in this regard and generally supports Griffith's assertions as well. BTW, Mr Hess has also studied the use and developments of field fortifications and trenches in the ACW and notes here he does have some disagreements with Griffith's assertions on the importance of field fortifications [see page 7 of The R-M in civil War Combat].

Mr Hess lays out the same scenario above; the reasons and why they are open to challenges and addresses them.

I recommend the book highly.

Campaigner,

Excellent post. I would also add that there is scant evidence of Civil War soldiers of either side actually receiving marksmanship training. If regiments were routinely engaging each other at kinematic ranges (500+ yards) than you'd think that there would be ample documentary evidence of long range marksmanship training, instruction for officers on estimating range, etc. Even with the sharpshooters, they pretty much took men who already knew what they were doing. And while of course everyone's ancestor was Daniel Boone and a crack shot back woordsman, it was probably with a shotgun and its unlikely they were taking down deer at 300-400 yards (who does that today over iron sights?).

I think the biggest cardinal sin commited by Griffith was saying that the American Civil War wasn't the first modern war, introduced no tactical revolutions and provided no lessons that any European army really needed to learn. These points are debatable, but are definitely fighting words amongst American reenactors, wargamers and history "buffs" who take such things personally.

I'd be careful in putting too much reliance on small arms effectiveness and long-ranges. In WWII and even today, killing is difficult with small arms when the range gets around 300m and greater. Too expect even trained and well-armed soldiers of the ACW to dominate the battlefield at ranges over 300m is a a stretch. Throw in a bunch of smoke after a few volleys and it gets even harder.

Just a point to consider.

Kelly,

Well said, you summed up very well Paddy's arguments. I do believe Paddy also eludes to this in one of his books. Even in WWII and up into Vietnam, with rocket launchers, automatic small arms, and grenades, etc. the average range of a combat fire-fight was something around 100 yards and often under! Now think of that…if we take the rifle musket Civil War cliche and apply it to modern wars, then Vietnam fire-fights should have taken place at ranges of a half-mile and never under that right?…after all M16s and AK47s could easily shoot that far! You see how ridiculous the notion starts to become when one automatically assumes that weapons were used to the very limit of their potential and range as if armies were fighting on a flat level soccer field with no distractions or terrain restrictions.

The unavoidable fact remains: the idea that Civil War formations fired off volleys at 400+ yards at eachother with "new killing range" effect is a myth. The effectiveness of a rifle-musket volley at that range would have been negligible, assuming that the volley did not miss completely, as would have been most likely. It's one to think of these ranges while sitting reading a book – it's another to stop and think about the ranges when you are actually outside and have a point of reference. The next time you go to Gettysburg or Antietam, have a friend and yourself pace out 400 yards between the two of you, and see how far it looks in reality, and you'll understand.

Campaigner

I have live-fired Springfield rifle musket a couple times in my life. I recall that targets about four feet square were set up, and ranges were 25 yards in one case and 50 in the other.

Let me tell you something about the reality of open iron musket firing. It ain't that easy. Even at ridiculously close range of 25 yards(absolute POINT BLANK range for mass volley fire), I was hard-pressed to hit the target as an individual rifleman, it's surprising how quickly the end of the barrel "fills up" the target perspective-wise when you're pointing it. And I was taking my time loading, probably only firing one carefully aimed shot every three minutes or so. I came close to the target, but never actually struck it. At 50 yards, forget it. At 50 yards, I began to have trouble with not only horizontal aiming, but I was firing too high and shooting over the target. But it FELT like I was pointing properly, but the reality was I was aiming high and the bullet was rising above the target before it got there. This problem is alluded to OVER and OVER again in soldiers letters and diaries. Volleys being delivered too high was so common, that one of the most common injuries suffered by Civil War soldiers was being struck on the thumb and fingers of the "ramrod" hand. I.E., when soldiers were in line volleying and loading, the opposing line would often fire too high, and end up hitting the enemy in the thumb or hand as they were reloading and their hand was high in the air pushing down the rammer.

However, this also drives the point home. If I had been firing into an opposing battle line, and wasn't aiming too high, I would have hit SOMEONE. Not perhaps my intended specific target, but I would have hit someone in the formation, thereby knocking them out of the fight.

And that was the whole point to massed volley firing. It wasn't about aiming specifically and hitting specifically. It was about getting enough bullets in the air to hit enough of the enemy in their line before they did the same thing to you.

And from the live firing I did, I can easily appreciate how a massed volley from a formation with rifle muskets would have to be done at closer ranges. Beyond 100 yards even, I can see how formations would have had the tendency to aim too high, it's a natural feeling to want to aim the musket higher, otherwise you feel like your shooting into the ground. But in reality, that's why commander always told their men to shoot low, because of the nature of the bullet and how it would rise. If you aimed at a man's knees, the bullet would rise and hit him somewhere higher in a vital area. If you started out aiming at his upper portion, you'd shoot clear over him.

Why do you think so many Civil War flags are so badly shot up? Because the opposing soldiers trying so eagerly to shoot down the enemy color guard were aiming too high or too hurredly and shredding the flags!

Think about it.

Campaigner

At 300+ yards, the concept of aiming the musket at the right angle in the air, getting the arc of the bullet right so that it plunged down properly on a target, was way too sophisticated a process to be integrated into a Civil War fire-fight.

The only way to kill properly with massed volley fire was to do it so close that soldiers could essentially "aim straight and level"- that is, close enough so that even if soldiers did aim high, the bullet has no chance to rise enough before it strikes home. The volley travels fast and relatively flat for a split second and strikes home, being too close to do anything else. Level volley firing up close for maximum hitting power and maximum number of casualties, without the contstraint of men worrying about height or arc.

And to achieve that dynamic and make volley fire effective for men who were only trained in the loading steps and speed of firing, you gotta do it at 100 yards or under, well under.

Seems like Paddy's on to something.

In 25+ years, I have yet to come across any reference of any soldier or officer in any battle, alluding to men in line formation exchanging volleys and utilizing their rear sights to judge distance. Not one.

I've seen references to individual snipers utilizing them of course when picking out a specific target like an enemy officer or general, but that's it.

I for one in part agree with the statement that "the weapons were way ahead of the tactics…" …well maybe not WAY ahead. But the assumption that the tactics evolved to keep pace with weapons development, and that is why casualties were so high is patently false, in my humble opinion.

If there was anything that served as the basis for a revolution in the relationship between tactics and small arms, it would have to be the adoption of consistent and regular marksmanship training.

Wrote a paper on the various rifle-muskets in college and as part of it went out and fired a Brown Bess, a Springfield, a Mississippi rife and a couple of others that escape me right now. At a 100 yards I could regularly hit a double sheet with the Brown Bess. With a Springfield I could hit a 10" target nearly a 100%. Was able to hit man size targets at 200 and 300 yards fairly easy also.

Now, that said, no one was firing at me (smile). I was not cold, hot, thirsty, being knocked into by others, etc. I will state that I'm a good shot with all weapons, so that may be my real point.

Unless one is trained and practices, no weapon is accurate. I well remember once while acting as a range office watching several trainees firing their M16 rifles at targets in the wrong lanes (and missing).

I believe it was at Cedar Mountain (?) that a volley by the 1st Virginia (standing and waiting) is supposed to have totally missed a charging Union brigade at less that 100 yards (they immediately broke and ran). They were standing on the edge of a open field, firing up slope at the Union troops that came over the crest and missed entirely.

Dan

Well said Campaigner. I frankly blanch at the "weapons were ahead of the tactics therefore engagement ranges were longer" school of thought. Were the rifled muskets "superior" to their smoothbore contemporaries? Well… you have two BIG problems: Visibility and target acquisition. Let's start with the second problem first. Targets beyond 200 yards are hard to see effectively enough on iron sights. Can an unscoped rifle shoot out that far and beyond? Sure, in terms of ballistics it's no problem, the issue is being able to accurately and reliably place the shot on target to make shooting at such ranges practical.

The other big problem is visibility. The smoothbore and rifled muskets used black powder. Now black powder generates a whopping great amount of puffy clouds of white smoke. Even with as slow a fire rate as slow as 3-4 rounds a minute you'll pretty soon have enough man made "fog of war" to effectively block line of sight making such precision engagements impossible.

Campaigner,

Thanks for the thoughtful post. I've read much of what Paddy Griffith has written and consider it to be thought provoking and a useful contribution to an endless debate. It seems to me that the undercurrent of his Civil War thesis is to refute those who claim that WWI generals (i.e. the British) ignored the lessons that they should have drawn from the American experience. By arguing that the American Civil War was not fundamentally different than previous encounters, he seeks to dismiss the point. It is a thesis that he carries into his Battle Tactics on the Western front.

Personally I think that Paddy's works are always exceptionally good, if only for the fact that he is not afraid to challenge accepted "facts". His work on the Great War is a classic example of that, and having read that I have gone on to read a huge number of other books – some in agreement with Paddy, many taking the opposite point of view.

What I can say is that prior to Paddy's work on the subject there was almost universal acceptance of the "Oh What a Lovely War" school of history. Agree with him or not, Paddy does encourage fresh thought and debate on subjects that have been mired in half truths and stereotypes for generations.

To my mind that makes him a very great historian indeed.

I think Paddy does – as many academics do – go overboard pushing his case.

Nosworthy also notes that only specialist troops were able to properly use the longer range of minie balls. But I think that even at smoothbore range, the minie had a longer point-blank range. Otherwise, why did smoothbore armed troops use the first chance they got to re-equip?

So the old story of being under effective fire for 400-500 yards is just that, an old story. But within the last hundred yards, the minie would be more effective. Grant noted in his Mexican War days that someone shooting a musket at you from more than 75 yards was more likely to hit the moon. I don't think that would be true of a minie-ball rifle musket. And that would give defenders some edge, though not what the standard claim has been. Trash the standard claim along with all the 'firsts' claimed for the ACW, like ironclads, railroads, etc.

But Paddy claims a lot that's disputable. I found his Art of War of Revolutionary France very interesting but required more than a dash of salt.

The unavoidable fact remains: the idea that Civil War formations fired off volleys at 400+ yards at eachother with "new killing range" effect is a myth.

Union General John Sedgwick fell at the beginning of the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House, on May 9, 1864. His corps was probing skirmish lines ahead of the left flank of Confederate defenses and he was directing artillery placements. Confederate sharpshooters were about 1,000 yards (910 m) away and their shots caused members of his staff and artillerymen to duck for cover. Sedgwick strode around in the open and was quoted as saying, "What? Men dodging this way for single bullets? What will you do when they open fire along the whole line? I am ashamed of you. They couldn't hit an elephant at this distance." Although ashamed, his men continued to flinch and he repeated, "I'm ashamed of you, dodging that way. They couldn't hit an elephant at this distance."Just seconds later he fell forward with a bullet hole below his left eye.

The effectiveness of a rifle-musket volley at that range would have been negligible, assuming that the volley did not miss completely, as would have been most likely. It's one to think of these ranges while sitting reading a book – it's another to stop and think about the ranges when you are actually outside and have a point of reference. The next time you go to Gettysburg or Antietam, have a friend and yourself pace out 400 yards between the two of you, and see how far it looks in reality, and you'll understand.

The .58 Caliber Enfield is set for a maximum range of 1200 odd yards (I want to say 1250 but it's early Sunday morning and my mind is still fuzzy).
There's only one realy way to see if yours/and Paddys argument is true.
Find a volunteer…
Have him stand in a field.
Find approx 50 men with Springfields, or Enfields that are trained to shoot live fire.
Put them in single or double line formation.
Make sure that they are approx 400 yards away from their target.
Give them the command to load and fire by company.
Oh, and make sure that the volunteer target test subject doesn't run away or drop the ground and hope that one of those buzzing balls doesn't find it's way into his flesh.

Yeah it's a stupid answer, but honestly, while Paddy makes a convincing argument, the fact is that the weapons were advances, it took a while to shake preconceived notions, and that there were waaaaay too many variables. Not to mention the simple fact that I think Paddys Europeanism comes into a bit of play here. Unlike some of the great battlefields in Europe, many US ACW battlefields are NOT 300-400 yards of open treeless ground.
So in a part of this, the reason that there were no 300-400 yard shots was simply because there wasn't enough open ground.
Now…true at Picketts Charge…true in some areas of Sharpsburg, but look at most fights…Cold Harbor, Wilderness, Perryville, Richmond, When troops hit open ground, the shovels came out and the field defensive works came up. First Manassass taught them that…especially by 63.
He does bring some interesting arguments to the table, unfortunately though, (and I am not knocking him), there are simply waaaaaaaay too many variables.

Murphy wrote: "The .58 Caliber Enfield is set for a maximum range of 1200 odd yards"

Can you see out to 1200 yards? 1000? 7000? Could you even tell the difference without a known point as reference? If not, don't feel bad, as you probably don't have any training in such work. And neither did the rank and file in Civil War armies.

"There's only one realy way to see if yours/and Paddys argument is true."

Cute, but anecdotes (like the Sedgewick example) are poor substitutes for sound research. Please point me in the direction of documentary primary evidence referencing units training for long range musketry, range estimation, etc. Heck, evidence of any non-sharpshooter marksmanship training would be nice. The almost universal reports of soldiers shooting high would indicate that soldiers did not know how to use their sights well, if at all.

"Unlike some of the great battlefields in Europe, many US ACW battlefields are NOT 300-400 yards of open treeless ground."

Griffith is actually one of the first historians to stress this point, that the 500 yard kill zone wasn't routine in the ACW because few engagements took place at that range.

"He does bring some interesting arguments to the table, unfortunately though, (and I am not knocking him), there are simply waaaaaaaay too many variables."

I concur, though I still don't see which combination of variables supports the myth of Civil War soldiers anihilating each other at 500+ yards due to their Springfields and Enfields.

I highly, highly, and I repeat highly doubt……that the example of Sedgewick being killed just after his famous quote, had anything whatsoever to do with a long-ranged aimed volley, or an infantryman's aimed shot specifically at Sedgwick. And there's only speculation that he was even killed by a "sniper's" bullet. The same goes for Reynolds at Gettysburg. It always makes a better story to have a noble general felled by a hidden "sniper". Yes, snipers did exist in the Civil War, but were so few and far between, that their impact on the war as a whole is nil.

Indeed, after the battle of Gettysburg, even battlefield photographers understood the dramatic value of capturing an image of a sniper, and those famous photos that for so long were captioned "dead rebel sniper in his nest at Devil's Den", have of course since been discovered to be nothing more than an ordinary dead rebel infantryman that the photographers moved about 40 yards to that spot for dramatic effect, to get their famous "dead sniper" image!

It is much more likely that these generals were felled by a stray bullet flying high from some volley exchange or simply the multitude of lead in the air from the battle, soldiers firing at will, etc. taking place nearby.

When one considers that something in the order of 150-200 or so rounds were fired for every hit on a Civil War battelfield, one can quickly surmise one fact – there was an awful lot of innacurate lead flying through the air! And since officers and generals were on horseback and sitting ten feet off the ground, and soldiers were tending to fire high, you can imagine the scenario.

Campaigner

Can you see out to 1200 yards? 1000? 7000? Could you even tell the difference without a known point as reference? If not, don't feel bad, as you probably don't have any training in such work. And neither did the rank and file in Civil War armies.

The 105mm M68 Main Gun System on the M60A3 has an approx maximum range of 60 odd miles…
yes…60 miles…theoretically…
What you do is back the tank up onto a 45 degree ramp, level out the main gun, manually crank the crunyone bearings as far as they will go without stripping, crank in all elevation on your ballistics computer pull the vehicle onto level ground, manually elevate the gun tube to it's maximum elevation, (You've thereby "tricked" the computer and gun system into thinking "it's artillery"), and then you select HEP, but load APDS (Sabot) instead. So you can now shoot a 105mm tungsten steel dart penetrator waaaaaaay further than you could ever see it.
Will you hit anything? Probably not…

As a reenactor, history major, live black powder shooter, etc…I've found it interesting how we as "modern day researchers" seem to "know all about" HOW "they did it back then". We all like to think of ourselves as "professionals". Unfortunately the ones who were the true professionals have all died, so we won't get the answers we need in this lifetime.

Murphy,

Thanks for the reminder on the A3. I was a 19E when I first came in the army and was in the Excellence in Armor program. Still not sure what that has to do with the Civil War. If anything, I think it supports Griffith's (and campaigner and my) point that a kinematic capability of a weapon does not a tactical revolution make.

I never claimed to "know all about HOW they did it back then." That's why I like to look at primary documents and let the 'true professionals' do the talking. If they envisioned, planned, trained and executed to have regiments engage at 500+ yards, they certainly didn't leave much evidence of that fact. This is contradicted by the Franco-Prussian armies just a few years later who very much did evision, plan, train and execute long range fire – and left posterity the written evidence to prove it.

I think many American history scholars and American history enthusiasts are insulted when this topic comes up, because they hear it as saying that the men who fought the Civil War were unsophisticated mobs made up of mindless hordes. They take it mean that the American Civil War soldier wasn't intelligent, and that it takes something away from them to say they engaged in a close-range slugfest without proper aiming.

Nothing could be further from the truth. It takes nothing away from the valor, courage, and endurance of the men who wore the blue and gray. The armies of that war were made of men from all walks of life and all professions.

It is entirely about that those men had to fight under a doctrine and philosophy that they had little control over.

I too never claimed to "know all about HOW they did it back then", I rely on the written record and educating myself to very best extent that I can, and then form reasonable conclusions based on that. And I agree, if the armies of the Civil War engaged in routine combat at 500+ yards of volley warfare, I have yet to read about it….from any source contemporary or otherwise.

Just a quick suggestion: rather than saying that firefights occurred at 400 yards, is it not possible that troops attacking may well have had to cover a 'beaten ground' of long-range rifle fire before getting close enough to get involved in a firefight? This would have been a difference between ACW and Napoleonic warfare, and might have resulted in some attacks stalling before they could effectively be developed.

"It seems to me that the undercurrent of his Civil War thesis is to refute those who claim that WWI generals (i.e. the British) ignored the lessons that they should have drawn from the American experience."

I'm not sure that the ACW, APW or FPW had anything to inform Generals of the Great War. There were no magazine fed rifles with smokeless powder, no quick firing artillery, no barbed wire, no machineguns and perhaps most importantly, no flankless entrenched positions. The 2nd Boer War of course had most of these in plenty, which was why the BEF operated with 5m intervals in 1914 whereas the French and Germans tried to refight the FPW and the Russians the RTW with twentieth century weapons. The lessons which the Generals of 1914 should have been looking at were those of the RJW, but of course that was fought by savages far away…

In any case, even that wouldn't have helped much. A flankless front manned in greater density than Waterloo and the very first war in history where battle casualties exceeded those from disease, and the daily tonnage of ammo consumed exceeded that of fodder, was a novelty for everyone concerned.

>The 2nd Boer War of course had most of these
>in plenty, which was why the BEF operated
>with 5m intervals in 1914 whereas the French
>and Germans tried to refight the FPW and the
>Russians the RTW with twentieth century weapons.

Martin, I don't agree with this.

French figthing in Morrocco before WW1
never operated otherwise than with large
skirmishing intervals, because rebellious
tribes did the same and didn't enjoy any
numerical superiority during French attacks
but the opposite.

Regulation wise, skirmish deployment, which
was the ONLY figthing mode in 1914 for all
armies I've look upon period regulations
(French, Germans, Japanese, Russians)
called for intervals from 1 to 5 paces,
depending on the tactical situation
to be dealt with.

The British found out in Boer War that
a skirmish interval of 5m worked for
having enough firepower over vastly
outnumbered boers while still being able
to OUTFLANK them.

Certainly, figthing a defending + isolated enemy
with a 4 or 3 vs. 1 ratio and attacking
at 1 or 2 paces intervals makes no sense.
Attacking the same foe with a 2 vs. 1
ratio at best is an entirely different story.

Basically, if you attack an enemy defending
at a 5m intervall (platoon frontage of
200/250m) with the same interval and same
weapons, while unable to outflank him,
this doesn't work.
No matter if your reserves can show up later,
he will shot them as soon as their enter his
fire zone, notwithstanding that your troops
have to advance, that is to stop firing when
doing this.

All armies in 1914 operated with various
skirmish intervals, platoons and coys deploying
in successive, 100 or 200 meters distant, and
often checkered lines, depending on the
tactical context.
1 pace interval was for full assault, larger
intervals (2 to 5 paces) were used for
reccon skirmishing, urban figthing, or
defense.

There is IMHO no evidence of any British
tactical mastership over Germans in 1914,
beside the ability to inflict huge losses
upon a full attacking foe without proper
artillery support (Mons), which any army of the
time could do with fair trained, well
motivated troops.
When Germans units could outflank a smaller
BEF and enjoy a fair artillery support like at
Le Cateau, their FPW like tactics did marvels.

The BEF advance was stopped in mid-September 1914
on the Southern slopes on the Chemin des Dames
ridges where the Germans had settled to stand
their grounds.
If you take a look on period battle maps
East and West of the BEF sector, you'll find
that the French did the same, no more, no less.
All made no further gains, whatever
interval they choose to fight with.

If you can point out any instance during early WW1
where BEF troops could skirmish at 5m
intervals against defending German troops
while being able to outflank them and thus
advance, I'd be happy to learn about it.

If you were attacking a defending enemy
with 5m intervals while being unable to
outflank him, nor enjoy local firepower
superiority, you were stopped dead.

We've already discussed BEF losses for 1914
(90.000 end November 1914 ?), compared them with
German losses (division wise) and found them not
to be impressive in any way.

>The lessons which the Generals of 1914
>should have been looking at were those of
>the RJW, but of course that was fought by
>savages far away

I can direct you to dozens of articles and
reports published in the military press
before 1914 about RJW, including translations
of memoirs and regulations/reports from both sides
since I've read them and (fortunately) still has
many to look upon.

These reports urged most developped nations
to issue MG's down to battalion level (something
the Germans were late to do untill
1911) and invest in true 'rapid fire' field guns
and howitzers (the Germans adopted a new mount for
their 7.7cm, aka Neu Art 7.7cm lFK, and modified
their 10.5cm howitzer aka 10.5cm lFH 98/09)

Fact is that Russians had more artillery than
Japanese, and 80% of casualties were from
infantry fire…talk about ignored lessons

Lastly, post-RJW Japanese army was held in high
regards by all period military, I've still
to find mentions of savages about them in
books/articles mostly authored by high ranking
officers.

I was perhaps exaggerating for dramatic effect;-) Years of lions led by donkeys tends to lead the that….

You told so ;-)

When I read his Civil War book, what struck me was the method in which he used only the evidence that would support his theory. In short, I thought his book was written as a thesis in search of evidence.

MJ

I've read the book by Hess, and I'm now slogging through the one by PG. The book by Hess is a very good read, it makes some excellent points. I enjoyed reading it and recommend it without reservation.

Thus far the Griffith book occasionally has me wondering what he's trying to say. As an example consider this statement from page 68: "Thus Pope had not expected Jackson to appear on his flank and rear at Second Manassas, ….."

At Second Manassas Jackson was squarely in Pope's front, it was Longstreet that launched the surprise attack. Now, if Griffith was talking about the manueverings before the actual battle of Second Manassas he should have plainly said so. Perhaps he refers to the startegic manueverings wherein Jackson got into Pope's supply depot, but why mention such an event when the topic sentence of the paragraph makes it clear he aims to make a point about "tactical intelligence" as opposed to "strategic intelligence." It seems to me that when one writes in opposition to a traditional and widely accepted view, clarity must be paramount.

There were other examples, but that's the one that best illustrates my concerns about his approach. I dislike saying this, but thus far Mr Griffith's writing style reminds me of Robert Leckie's – partisan and highly judgemental. I'm about halfway through the book and still waiting for more precision in his thesis (as in the Hess book). Maybe he'll pull it out in the final chapters.

I would also recommend reading the Griffith book, but I'd provide a couple caveates.

I guess I'm writing in opposition to the manner in which a book opposing the traditional view has been written and structured – my written opinion is not a defense of the traditional view.