"Battle Tactics of the Civil War by Paddy Griffith" Topic

Re-reading through this right now, not sure if I agree with all of what Paddy says. Anyone else read this? Any opinions on it? Can anyone recommend books to compare & contrast Paddy's arguments. Thanks!

Try Brent Noseworthy he makes a better case.

I'll second Nosworthy's "Bloody Crucible of Courage." Which of Griffith's conclusions do you disagree with?

To me, it smacked a little of Molte's "brawl between amateurs".

I do think the rifled musket made some difference, just not as much as is often claimed in American histories of the ACW.

I also think the increased digging in later in the war was not just a product of engineer officers.

Here are a couple of reviews of the book,

`Battle Tactics of the Civil War' by Paddy Griffith Source reviewed
in `The Journal of American History, Vol. 77, No. 1, (Jun., 1990),
pp. 314-315' by Perry D. Jamieson.

"Griffith's interpretations run counter to ideas found in decades of
historiography on his subject…"

"Students of military history might expect a work that tries to
refute so many of its predecessors to be based either on recently
discovered sources or on a more thorough analysis of known documents
than other scholars have offered. He introduces no new primary
sources and in fact the most basic one of all, the Official Records,
never appears in his footnotes. Griffith includes this fundamental
work in his bibliography, with the explanation: "I have not used
[the Official Records] because I could not have done so
systematically in the time at my disposal."

"His statistics on the ranges at which Civil War units typically
engaged in combat, critical to his argument… are based on what
Griffith himself calls "admittedly somewhat random" research."

`Battle Tactics of the Civil War' by Paddy Griffith reviewed in `The
Journal of Southern History, Vol. 56, No. 4, (Nov., 1990), pp. 757-
758' by Edward Hagerman.

"… Griffith makes a case that the anticipated impact of the rifled
musket was exaggerated; yet he acknowledges that this flawed
anticipation led infantry theory and doctrine to make the transition
from massed volley to aimed fire, to introduce the military jog to
increase mobility, and to place increased emphasis on the role of the
extended skirmish line…"

"He notes for instance, that the Civil War success rate in frontal
assaults was, in fact appreciably lower than in the Napoleonic War."

"In general Griffith should have modified his strong conclusion that
the Civil War was a Napoleonic War in order to accommodate even his
own qualifications on his conclusions"

see the recent Earl Hess book on the Rifle Musket in the Civil War, though he states up front, his findings support Griffith's, that yes the rifle musket had a far longer range, BUT, few total soldiers were actually TRAINED in estimating ranges, nor aiming the piece properly; that coupled with the markedly different [from smoothbore musket] trajectory of the minie ball [creating two beaten zones with a significant null/safety zone in between] meant the effective use of the rifled musket was negated to a performance not dissimilar from the smooth-bore…eg; ok on targets about 100 yards out.

And thus, the myth of large range force projection of infantry units didn't happen.

Different story for skirmishing and sniping, where experienced soldiers became closely acquainted with their weapon's idiosyncrasies in order to prevail on the battlefield.

He's a baffoon and his 'work' is badly flawed with weird math and BAD research. Read Attack and Die. That's okay… although there are parts in it that I don't agree with but…

Paddy tends to challenge people with interpretations that are different from received wisdom. For some, he provides an opportunity to think. For some, he provides an opportunity to attack.

Allen

I would say that some folks do both. I have read the book a few times. There are some parts that I was interested in and had me reading more about. However, some of his assertions backed up more by his own musings or limited research raised all sorts of red flags to me.

Thanks,

John

SImilarly, read his Battle Tactics of the Western Front. While I have read most of his works and found value in them, he seems to have started with a conclusion and then marshalled his arguments to support his thesis.

I have always enjoyed Paddys books, although he does like to shake things up a bit.

"read his Battle Tactics of the Western Front"

I don't have any particular problems with this one, it is certainly a lot more restrained than e.g. 'Mud, Blood and Poppycock' which is a dreadful book. The British did get better at attacking after July 1916, quite a bit better, for a variety of reasons. I don't think there is anything particularly controversial there (unless you subscribe to the 'lions & donkeys' or 'psychology of military incompetence' school of course).

In Duffys '1916 The Somme through German eyes', the Germans make similar observations – that the British become almost as good as the French at attacking.

I recall reading a book about Caporetto years back. British and French divisions were sent in to stem the Italian collapse. A British division took a position from the Austrians rather handily. Then a French division attacked and routed an Austrian unit. They were very tough against Austrian units.

I am not an ACW specialist, but i know something about the european wars of the period 1848 – 59, and his conlusions about the minierifle type weapons sounded very much like the experience on the european battles. It had an influence but mainly as an irritation on the longer distances. The battles were still fougth at short distances. And the european armies did not find any great use of field fortifications, except of course sieges or artillery in prepared positions. However one of the great debates on tactics at the time was that the range of infantry fire now had the range of the typical short range ammo for artillery. This is one reason for the artillery in the wars often shot at longer distances in the nap wars, and why shrapnel became popular.
So for me his conlusions about fortification being a doctrine thing instead of a necessity sounds reasonable, but i am interested in arguments against.

I'm not an expert on the ACW, although I've wargamed it with enough ACW enthusiasts to know that many of them have strong opinions, often based on things they read thirty years before and have never really examined. In particular, many of them have a very tenuous knowledge of contemprory European warfare; this, combined with a strong sense of partisanship for 'their' war, means that they are very enthrenched in their views.

I think this is what Paddy (who I've known for 25 years, and have walked some of the Georgia/Tennessee battlefield with him) was concerned to take issue with. Whether he is right in every detail, I certainly can't say.

Indeed, most of his books have an iconoclastic element; he likes to get people to consider whether what they've always believed is entirely true. he's also one of the most innovative wargamers of his generation. he has a PhD in history, and taught at Sandhurst for some years, as many will know.

None of this makes him 'a baffoon', as the comically spelling-challenged Avidgamer alleges.

I thought the artwork was the best part of the book.

I've wargamed it with enough ACW enthusiasts to know that many of them have strong opinions, often based on things they read thirty years before and have never really examined. In particular, many of them have a very tenuous knowledge of contemprory European warfare; this, combined with a strong sense of partisanship for 'their' war, means that they are very enthrenched in their views.

Jack, I've had the same experience several times over, if you remove the words "ACW" and "European" from the quote. It's a problem with most wargamers I suspect. As is poor speling.

The book got me thinking about things that have been taken for granted and I started checking a few things out on my own. It's been years since I read that book. Since then i have gradually come around to agreeing with several of his assertions that I had disagreed strongly with at the time, primarily his view of a unit's willingness to close (call it morale or elan or whatever) being more important that firepower. I still think he's wrong about field fortifications.

I also have noted that he, Nosworthy, and a few other modern historians go out of there way to debunk any notion of the ACW being a war of "firsts." In many ways they are correct, in other they are not. The ACW was fought using Napoleonic derived tactics and strategy and the infantry warfare portion was essentially Napoleonic in nature. And I have come to agree that the rifle musket didn't impact battles as much as is taken for granted, primarily because fire was not opened until smoothbore range. Hess is fairly convincing about this in his latest book. I especially like his tabulation of opening ranges in battles and provision of sources for the tabulation.

So I give Paddy his due for providing a thought provoking book.

"So I give Paddy his due for providing a thought provoking book"

Which I think is his main intention, same with the WW1 book.

For those Paddy fans who may have missed this one:

Item: 1-13730
Griffith, Paddy (illustrated by Peter Dennis)
BATTLE IN THE CIVIL WAR: Generalship & Tactics 8.5x11, many b/w line drawings, tables, charts. 1 vol, 48 pgs 1986 UK, PADDY GRIFFITHS ASSC color softcover $16.00 USD

And if you're looking for the WWI book:

Item: 1-41530
Griffith, Paddy
BATTLE TACTICS OF THE WESTERN FRONT The British Army's Art of Attack 1916-1918, study of the evolution of British tactics from the slip-shod techniques of the first half of the war to a sound offensive in the second half, biblio, index. 1 vol, 302 pgs 1994 NEW HAVEN, YALE UNIV PRES NEW-dj $50.00 USD

Other Griffith books online at onmilitarymatters.com or at the shop.

Dennis from OMM