"Recurve composite horse-bow vs longbow?" Topic

To clarify for Mike, et al: 00-79 means that on d100 if you roll 00-79 the unit has "D" morale; but if you rolled 80+ the unit has "C" morale (this single roll assigns morale level for the whole game/battle/scenario). "9 or better" refers to the actual morale test/check in the game, say, for taking casualties, or standing in front of cavalry: it means on 2d6 you need to roll 9-12, or the unit fails.

Crowd dynamics was a factor, no doubt of it. But to place emphasis on the French crowding in the middle to keep from "sliding" off on the flanks, is just ludicrous, and denies the ground to the English just as well.

It does not – the English were not moving – standing on difficult ground (of any description for those who require perfect detail!) is not the same as moving on it.

Certainly the English moved forward, but were able to do so unmolested, under no threat, and to then deploy as they wished.

Hence the effect of the ground on the French and English was different for they were making different use of it.

And I grow weary of repeating this, but the main mass of English archers would be standing around with nothing to do but watch the battle, if the English men at arms were in one mass in the center. You can work this out easily enough for yourself: measure on a map how much of the archer wings are within 150 yards of the French, if they are massed in a column down the high "ridge" center of the field. All the archers outside of 150 yards would have had zero effect on the French, and c. half of them would never have even been within range of flight arrow harrassment of the EDGES of the French column. The upshot is that recent "scholars" have gone with the new "insight" of crowd dynamics and decided the English men at arms must have been all in the center, despite clear eyewitness description to the contrary: the only practical way for archers to work with the men at arms is to put them on the flanks of smaller groups of men at arms well within effective range: otherwise too many archers are simply occupying ground and their bows are useless, being too far away.

I'm not sure what yuor point is. If archers were along het whole line, and yet only the centre struck the English then that supports the contention that the archery had little or nothing to do with the failure of the flanks to come to contact.

Crowd dynamics makes no claims about the disposition of the English – it only explains why the French crowded into eth centre.

But Agincourt was won with a preponderance of archers, with arrows, then hand weapons, backed up by men at arms: not the other way around (despite how the original chroniclers make it sound to please their noble patrons).

WITH a preponderance of bows certainly – but the defining weakness of the French attack – the crowding that made tehm so vulnerable to flank attacks etc., was not caused BY the bows nor archery nor arrows.

As for that other person who missed the point – crowding can occur for many reasons – and terrain is now a well known factor.

my comments about troops who had ben crowded due to combat were to illustrate the – which is the same regardless of cause – not to say that the cause was the same.

Sheesh! :/

Hi

I am lost as to your assertian. You seem to imply that all the french casualties were caused by melee or being crushed because of mob crowd dynamics that somehow did them harm.

I am sure you don't really mean what you imply.

could you please explain?

R

Crowd dynamics was a factor, no doubt of it. But to place emphasis on the French crowding in the middle to keep from "sliding" off on the flanks, is just ludicrous, and denies the ground to the English just as well.

It does not – the English were not moving – standing on difficult ground (of any description for those who require perfect detail!) is not the same as moving on it.

Al, you're obviously "wedded" to this idea extremely: recall, that the English had to move hundreds of yards through the very same field as the French, and they had to get into a defensive position, lay stakes, maneuver through them to attack, get back behind them again, etc. The sources say nothing about the ground affecting the English ability to attack. The only stated effect of the ground on the French was the mud which slowed and exhausted them.

I'm not sure what yuor point is. If archers were along het whole line, and yet only the centre struck the English then that supports the contention that the archery had little or nothing to do with the failure of the flanks to come to contact.

Eh? The ONE uncontested detail about the archery is the effect of arrows on horses. I could take what you say here to mean that there was no flank attack because the ground defeated it?!

I can make little sense out of this response of yours. You seem to be implying that the English deliberately allowed their wings of archers to stand there with nothing to do after the mounted attacks were driven off.

You obviously prefer to take a modern spin as enlightening, and toss out virtually all the details provided by the original sources, especially including the three men who were THERE. To go with your support of the crowding in the center, I would have to literally ignore a wealth of eyewitness descriptions.

…the crowding that made tehm so vulnerable to flank attacks etc., was not caused BY the bows nor archery nor arrows.

You claim that the French crowded into the "flat" center of the field, creating their own compression. Earlier, the difference, between a mob crushing together and a body of trained men organized to compress for cohesion in a battle, has been explained: the French were not ignorant of the drill required to achieve and maintain a solid attack formation: the sources describe them pausing to reorder their formation before pressing on. The sources also describe the arrow "storm" making them pause and even withdraw a little before pressing on. To ignore the fear of the arrows drilling into them relentlessly, and impacting with greater damage as they drew within the advanced wings of the archers, is very close to being blinded by a singular idea, Al.

"You can work this out easily enough for yourself: measure on a map how much of the archer wings are within 150 yards of the French, if they are massed in a column down the high "ridge" center of the field. All the archers outside of 150 yards would have had zero effect on the French,"

You are out of step, sir. Rocky and I agreed a while back that effective longbow range is ~250yds.

250 yards is the ultimate distance a longbow volley can reach; but bodkin range is much shorter because the missile weighs more. Any chance of piercing French armor has to be well within 150 yards.

"250 yards is the ultimate distance a longbow volley can reach; but bodkin range is much shorter because the missile weighs more. Any chance of piercing French armor has to be well within 150 yards."

Then how do you explain (as Rocky will confirm) that the engagement range at Agincourt was ~220yds? If shooting with flight arrows beyond 150yds is ineffective (as your comments above would suggest) then why did they bother?

The evidence I have tends to refute your view:
A 1.9oz arrow achieved ranges of 344 to 360yds
A 2.0oz arrow achieved ranges of 317 to 329yds
A 3.0oz arrow achieved ranges of 251 to 260yds
A 3.3oz arrow achieved ranges of 250 to 272yds

The 3oz plus arrows would be the bodkins, shooting well over 150 yds.

You seem to be disagreeing with yourself now:
"Sure sounds to me like shooting was engaged in just as soon as arrows could reach the target. John Keegan also interprets the opening distance between the two armies as 250 to 300 yards, with the flanking wings of archers (those opposite the French cavalry) closer than this and any archers in the woods closer still."

Then how do you explain (as Rocky will confirm) that the engagement range at Agincourt was ~220yds? If shooting with flight arrows beyond 150yds is ineffective (as your comments above would suggest) then why did they bother?

Shooting at horses was the opener. Although the horses could not be killed or even practically wounded out of the fight at that range, the arrows had to hurt, making the horses jump and scream: and the French couldn't take that just sitting, so they attacked: just what the galling extreme range shooting was supposed to cause to happen.

The 3oz plus arrows would be the bodkins, shooting well over 150 yds.

Not sure about that. Iirc, bodkins were c. 4 oz, not 3. And besides, those stats are for 100+ lb modern longbows, are they not? In which case, we would be arguing full circle back to 70 lb or 100 lb longbows at Agincourt….

"And besides, those stats are for 100+ lb modern longbows, are they not?"

No, it was a MR approximation.

You contradict yourself:

"You can work this out easily enough for yourself: measure on a map how much of the archer wings are within 150 yards of the French, if they are massed in a column down the high "ridge" center of the field. All the archers outside of 150 yards would have had zero effect on the French,"

"Shooting at horses was the opener. Although the horses could not be killed or even practically wounded out of the fight at that range, the arrows had to hurt, making the horses jump and scream: and the French couldn't take that just sitting, so they attacked: just what the galling extreme range shooting was supposed to cause to happen."

On the one hand you say, archers beyond 150yds would have had zero effect on the French, but on the other hand you say that they were shooting at the horses at extreme range, which presumably had more than zero effect on the French!

You know what I meant, unless you're being deliberately obtuse. French on horses and French on foot present an entirely different target since large areas of the horses were exposed to arrows.

Interestingly, however, our rules make no distinction between mounted and dismounted as far as the armor weight of the target is concerned: i.e. a "heavy" on foot remains a "heavy" on horseback. Playing Agincourt, we just assume the French charge as a historical fact and perform it (to destruction, again and again: it has never in my experience worked). The French cavalry die off quite easily enough by getting bogged in the mud (limited to a slow trot), fetching up against the stakes and getting shot at as they try to work their way through to melee: too many massed longbow shots! They cant't take it. What's left to melee (assuming that they don't rout first) is flanked and cut down by masses of swarming yeomen.

"You know what I meant, unless you're being deliberately obtuse. French on horses and French on foot present an entirely different target since large areas of the horses were exposed to arrows.

Interestingly, however, our rules make no distinction between mounted and dismounted as far as the armor weight of the target is concerned: i.e. a "heavy" on foot remains a "heavy" on horseback."

I think you've just proved my point.

I don't see your point.

Some would argue that an unarmored horse makes the combined horse and rider more like an "unarmored" target. But our premise is that arrows are very small weapons to bring down a large animal like a horse; it takes quite a few of them and some time to take down a horse; outright death is very rare. The most vulnerable part of cavalry is always going to be the rider. So a simple game mechanism is to just ignore the horse and treat the armor class as that of the rider. It seems to work.

In the case of long range "galling" bow fire (with "flight" arrows), the riders would be practically invulnerable, but the horses would feel the bite of arrows and become almost incontrollable just standing there taking it. Thus the decision to charge the longbowmen at Agincourt.

"I don't see your point."

You said:
"All the archers outside of 150 yards would have had zero effect on the French,"

and then proceeded to conclusively demonstrate that that was NOT the case!!

You said:
"All the archers outside of 150 yards would have had zero effect on the French,"

and then proceeded to conclusively demonstrate that that was NOT the case!!

Talking about the French INFANTRY.

The only historical affect the extreme range shooting had on the cavalry was to gall the French into a charge; then they got murdered at pointblank range.

Besides, my original point was against the theory that the English formed a single, center battle of men at arms: and I illustrated that point by showing that many archers in the wings would have been outside any shooting range at all. Even allowing a 700 yard front (much narrower than most historians even consider), the outer, rearmost ranks don't come into extreme range until the French are almost 100 yards away from the English men at arms. This arrangement would waste a sizeable portion of English fire power: whereas, if organized into three battles of men at arms, each with its advanced wings of archers, Hal V would have disposed of three separate commands, effectively like having command control over three smaller autonomous armies, each capable of defending itself or supporting the others. The modern theory of a single central battle of men at arms, and two ponderous wings of archers, makes the English army less mobile than the French, which had no less than five separate tactical units (and the first and second battle of dismounted men at arms had attached missile troops as well): the way the modern theory would have it, the English army is just one enormous tactical unit with only one possible deployment facing at a time, which would of course be military stupidity of the highest order.

"Talking about the French INFANTRY."

That's not what you said. You just said "the French".

"The only historical affect the extreme range shooting had on the cavalry was to gall the French into a charge"

But that is still an effect.

"Besides, my original point was against the theory that the English formed a single, center battle of men at arms: and I illustrated that point by showing that many archers in the wings would have been outside any shooting range at all."

Well there I agree with you (up to a point). My view is that the English men-at-arms formed in three bodies, with archers in the gaps between, on the flanks and also in front of the men at arms. This means that the entire frontage presented by the English army could engage with archery as soon as the French came within range. And indeed, why should they do anything else, since the whole aim (excuse the pun) was to beat the French with archery, if possible before they reached the men-at-arms.

If I got a couple of six inch nails, could I nail the "Effective archery debate" to this one?

Yes.

And it turns out that Mike and I agree after all. I guess I am done here as well.

Got a question, when speaking of ranges such as 150 yards and 250 yards, how are thee ranges obtained? Are they direct fire ranges or arching and plunging fire?

Rich

Boy, the discussion between longbow and composite horse bow (the subject of this post) didn't even last one page.

Rich

Doug "if organized into three battles of men at arms, each with its advanced wings of archers."

Mike, "My view is that the English men-at-arms formed in three bodies, with archers in the gaps between, on the flanks and also in front of the men at arms."

what would stop the French foot from carving their way through the archers in gaps and taking the English men-at-arms from the rear?

Rich

Got a question, when speaking of ranges such as 150 yards and 250 yards, how are thee ranges obtained? Are they direct fire ranges or arching and plunging fire?

Rich

250 yards is absolute reach, with a drop of c. 56 degrees. 150 yards is the practical limit to a bodkin arrow, which can penetrate armor; definitely less than 200 yards en masse

what would stop the French foot from carving their way through the archers in gaps and taking the English men-at-arms from the rear?

That is the argument of the ages: why didn't the French simply attack the entire line? (When you try this in Agincourt variants, the French sometimes win.) Reasons usually center on class consciousness: the French nobility would not demean themselves by acknowledging the presence of common yeomen, and wanted only to attack their peers. Or on the effects of the arrow storm: the French crowded away from the arrows, and concentrated on breaking through the English men at arms as a result. Lately, the ground is blamed for making the French move in one compacted mass (but this doesn't fly, for the reasons I have given above).

There is mention of the stakes in front of the yeomen. It is sometimes assumed that the archers "in the gaps" were not enstaked; but I haven't been able to determine why this assumption is reached. It seems to me that the arrangement of archers as the "wings" of each battle of men at arms would provide all of them with an equal tactical arrangement, i.e. with stakes: if there were archers out in front as well (not at all improbable), then they no doubt retreated before the enemy and got behind the stakes as well.

Hi

a couple clarifications: the table above is a projection for a 150# bow,

2 flight arrows are less effective not INEFFECTIVE at max range they will still do a mm of steel.

I hate the keyboard on my laptop when I am on the road(in denver..

No mention of stakes? So, the whole bit of planting, sharpening, pulling up, advancing, replanting is like a myth?

The french MAA didn't simply carve through the bow and attack the way outnumber british MAA, because the closing part would cost them dearly in that whole "bodkin through armor" part.

R

Hi

Oh, and the initial question was answered right away, the comp bow is 20 to 30% more efficient at a given drawweight, meaning a 65# comp bow shoots like a 100# longbow.

And the next 3 pages were arguing again about the magic english longbow, or in rich and al's case, complete uselessness.

Rocky

No no. Don't include me. I have nothing to do with this argument. I don't know nothing about shooting any bows. The only bow I'm even acquainted with is the bow tie. And I can't even work one of those.

Rich

"the table above is a projection for a 150# bow,"

It is not a projection. The data was obtained from an actual test shoot.

The question was, why didn't the French men-at-arms simply attack the archers in the gap between the English men-at-arms battles?

1. It seems to me that the arrangement of archers as the "wings" of each battle of men at arms would provide all of them with an equal tactical arrangement, i.e. with stakes.

The archers were protected by the stakes. I don't understand this one. We know the archers went out through and came back through these stakes. What's to stop the men-at-arms from doing the same thing? After all the stakes were only identified with protecting archers from mounted troops.

2. Reasons usually center on class consciousness: the French nobility would not demean themselves by acknowledging the presence of common yeomen, and wanted only to attack their peers.

If this were true then it would be true for the mounted nobility as well. And yet we have documents from the campaign showing that noble mounted troops were specifically assigned to ride down those common yeomen. Besides the dismounted French were cramped together due to the forests on either flanks. There would have been no room to avoid the archers.

3. Or on the effects of the arrow storm: the French crowded away from the arrows, and concentrated on breaking through the English men at arms as a result.

4. The French MAA didn't simply carve through the bow and attack the way outnumber British MAA, because the closing part would cost them dearly in that whole "bodkin through armor" part.

Fear of ye olde bodkin storm. And yet at Constance (1356) the French men-at-arms simply stood there with the arrows doing little harm until the archers to run out of arrows and went and hid behind the English men-at-arms. At Nogent (1359), the French were more aggressive. The dismounted French nobles went right at the archers, broke and drove the archers from the field. At Auray (1364), the English archers couldn't stop the French dismounted men-at-arms with bowfire. So, they dropped their bows and fought hand-to-hand. Unfortunately the chronicler doesn't tell us the result of that fight between archers and French men-at-arms. The same was true at Cocherel (1364). The archers and their bow fire was simply unable to stop the French dismounted attack.

Given that the archers, with their bodkin storms, were unable to stop the French dismounted men-at-arms at Constance, Nogent, Auray, and Cocherel, why do you think the archers at Agincourt would have better success? Why wouldn't we expect the French to simply drive through archers, like they did at Nogent, then swing around and hit the English men-at-arms from the rear?

Rich

The archers were protected by the stakes. I don't understand this one. We know the archers went out through and came back through these stakes. What's to stop the men-at-arms from doing the same thing? After all the stakes were only identified with protecting archers from mounted troops.

I don't recall which of the original sources says this, but it makes no distinctions of stakes only in front of the archers: could be a generalization, could also be alluding to stakes across the entire English line. After the cavalry were driven off, the dismounted French presented no threat that stakes would seriously impede, and of course, then the English army seems to have abandoned the enstaked lines and gone over to the attack.

2. Reasons usually center on class consciousness: the French nobility would not demean themselves by acknowledging the presence of common yeomen, and wanted only to attack their peers.

If this were true then it would be true for the mounted nobility as well. And yet we have documents from the campaign showing that noble mounted troops were specifically assigned to ride down those common yeomen.

This has always been the weakness of the "nobles only wanted to fight nobles" argument, imho. I ascribe to the compression caused by fear of the arrows enfilading them as the dismounted French men at arms advanced: that, and I think it highly likely that the French knew beforehand, clearly, just how few English men at arms faced them: by deliberately breaking them first, the archers would be easily swept away by hand combat. I think that the dividing into three attack columns to target the English battles of men at arms was a deliberate plan.

Besides the dismounted French were cramped together due to the forests on either flanks. There would have been no room to avoid the archers.

Unless you are prepared to dismiss a clear eyewitness description, that is exactly what the French first battle did: avoid the archers and concentrate on the English men at arms.

Fear of ye olde bodkin storm….

Given that the archers, with their bodkin storms, were unable to stop the French dismounted men-at-arms at Constance, Nogent, Auray, and Cocherel, why do you think the archers at Agincourt would have better success?

Your examples are all early battles, when the French were still mostly bearing shields, and more importantly, the English archers were not as numerous as in later armies. Unless the archers are very numerous, the volley effects will be much slower to inflict, allowing an enemy to close.

Why wouldn't we expect the French to simply drive through archers, like they did at Nogent, then swing around and hit the English men-at-arms from the rear?

That's what they tried with the mounted attacks: a swift close to the archers, ride them down, then attack the English men at arms in the rear while they were engaged from the front by the dismounted first battle. The mounted attacks failed on the twin dilemmas of too few mounted troops and too many archers. (One variant of Agincourt that I tried successfully for the French is to leave the entire first battle mounted: the men at arms that ride against the archers suffer rather badly, but they do arrive at the stakes: the archers facing them cannot weaken the cavalry going up against the English men at arms, and these latter are quickly disposed of, allowing the cavalry to swing left and right and roll up the flanks of the archers.)

"Your examples are all early battles, when the French were still mostly bearing shields, and more importantly, the English archers were not as numerous as in later armies. Unless the archers are very numerous, the volley effects will be much slower to inflict, allowing an enemy to close."

So, if I'm reading you correctly, you're saying the archers had much less affect against the French in earlier battles because the French carried shields. Well the next obvious question is "Why did the French do away with their shields?" That sounds kind of stupid. You know about armor, correct me if I'm wrong, if the French got rid of their shields it was probably because they didn't need them anymore to protect themselves from the English archers. That sounds logical to me. Or, can you think of another reason why the French would throw away their shields?

I have another question. If I read you correctly, you're saying the effect of the archery depends on the number of archers firing. Doesn't it also depend on the number of men you are firing at? For example, if 1,000 archers are firing at 3,000 men the casualty rate should be lower than if they were firing at 500 men. I agree with you that the number of archers in these earlier battles were less than at Agincourt. But then the number of French men-at-arms were also fewer. So, I don't really think you've answered my question.

"That's what they tried with the mounted attacks."<i/>

Yes but I'm not talking about the mounted attack. The question was "Why wouldn't we expect the [dismounted] French to simply drive through archers, like they did at Nogent, then swing around and hit the English men-at-arms from the rear?" So, you haven't answered my question.

Rich

Well the next obvious question is "Why did the French do away with their shields?"

They didn't "do away" with them. Agincourt saw some "pavised" men at arms in the front ranks, but by 1415 most of the weapons were two-handed to get through the heavier armor and increasing steel plate; it was a development going on. The main reason, though, why Agincourt worked was the combination of factors: first of all the field was nasty to advance through, giving the English arrows even more time to take effect, and there were far more archers at Agincourt than in any of those 14th century battles you mention. More archers and more time to employ them means more casualties; it really is that simple.

The question was "Why wouldn't we expect the [dismounted] French to simply drive through archers, like they did at Nogent, then swing around and hit the English men-at-arms from the rear?" So, you haven't answered my question.

Because they DIDN'T. The mounted attack was supposed to do that.

You can't transmit standing orders to 5,000+ men at arms on the instant and change the tactics: the French had worked out their battle WEEKS in advance, and pretty much followed it according to plan, to destruction, of course.

I agree that if the French had remained deployed to engage the archers all down the line that the battle could/might have gone differently: it has when refought with that option as a wargame sim.

Hi

"For example, if 1,000 archers are firing at 3,000 men the casualty rate should be lower than if they were firing at 500 men."

Not really, unless in the first example, your thou kill more than 500! This all gets into my previous discussion with mike on "beaten zone".

R

"They didn't "do away" with them. Agincourt saw some "pavised" men at arms in the front ranks, but by 1415 most of the weapons were two-handed to get through the heavier armor and increasing steel plate."

You're saying the pavised men-at-arms were in the front rank. But the sources said the front ranks had shortened their lances in order to strengthen them so they could drive a opening in the English line. If they carried lances they probably didn't carry shields also. If you could send me the source reference on that I would appreciate it.

"The main reason, though, why Agincourt worked was the combination of factors: first of all the field was nasty to advance through, giving the English arrows even more time to take effect, and there were far more archers at Agincourt than in any of those 14th century battles you mention. More archers and more time to employ them means more casualties; it really is that simple."

But as I said before, logically this doesn't hold true. It is not the number of casualties but the number of casualties as a ratio of total number of soldiers. If you have 100 archers firing on 100 men and they inflict 10 casualties – 10%, we can determine the impact of the firing. Now we have 1,000 archers firing and obtaining 100 casualties. We still don't know the impact until we understand how many targets there were. If we have 1,000 men being fired on that is still only 10%. Thus while there are more archers, their effectiveness was no greater than the 100 archers. A simple increase in archers won't do it.

"You can't transmit standing orders to 5,000+ men at arms on the instant and change the tactics: the French had worked out their battle WEEKS in advance, and pretty much followed it according to plan, to destruction, of course."

Well, we are in luck. We just happen to have the "standing orders" for the Agincourt campaign. It was discovered several years ago stuck in an old book. We can actually go back and see what the "standing orders" were. To begin with, the French expected the English to be formed up with all the English men-at-arms in the center and the archers on either flank of the men-at-arms. They certainly didn't expect the formation you are describing. In the center of the French formation were dismounted men-at-arms. On the flanks of these men-at-arms were crossbowmen. On the flanks of the crossbowmen were mounted men-at-arms. The mounted men-at-arms were to strike and takeout the archers on the two flanks of the English men-at-arms. The crossbowmen were to fire on the English men-at-arms while the dismounted French men-at-arms attacked the English men-at-arms. There is no mention of forming three columns.

In the actual attack, the crossbowmen did not support the attacking dismounted French. Then partway through the advance, the French formed three columns. This not in line with the standing order. It sounds like, rather than following "standard orders", they were winging it. Since the archers were the weak points in the battline, as shown by the earlier battles and given they were not following "standing orders", why didn't they take out the weakest part of the English line?

Rich

Hi

Rich:" If we have 1,000 men being fired on that is still only 10%. Thus while there are more archers, their effectiveness was no greater than the 100 archers. A simple increase in archers won't do it."

Huh?

If you mean "percentage" effect, it might be worse using the artillery model and "beaten zone", in that the multiple hits go up. But in real hard numbers, the casualties will go up in number with more archers.

And as we are talking about multiple volleys, hundreds of thousands of arrows, the casualties on ONE volley are the issue, it is the cuumulative effect.

So, back to the first, not sure what you are discussing here.

Rocky

If you could send me the source reference on that I would appreciate it.

It's from Monstrelet, Le Fevre and Waurin (Curry,"The Battle of Agincourt, Sources and Interpretations"). Although it doesn't specifically say the "pavised" were in the front ranks, it would only make sense to put them there. However, it makes little or no difference, since the majority of men at arms by that period were not using shields anyway.

A simple increase in archers won't do it.

I'm not sure what your point is. If Curry's analysis of the documentation is correct, there were actually on the order of 7,000 longbowmen. And the French first battle was between 5,000 and 8,000 men. That's a huge amount of arrow fire for a target that size.

Since the archers were the weak points in the battline, as shown by the earlier battles and given they were not following "standing orders", why didn't they take out the weakest part of the English line?

I'm going to guess that, seeing the best armored troops just sent packing (the mounted attacks), the French first battle wanted nothing to do with that! What went wrong was the timing: the mounted attacks were supposed to be occupying the attention of the archers while the first battle of dismounted men at arms advanced. Instead the attacks were piecemeal. The first battle was moving up, even as the cavalry came routing back, some of the horses crashing through them.

Rocky, "So, back to the first, not sure what you are discussing here."

Doug outlined his vision of the battlefield setup having the archers between the English battles of men-at-arms and on the flanks of the line as a whole. My question was, given that the French could not be stopped by the archers and in fact drove the archers from the field, why didn't the French men-at-arms simply drive through where the archers were and take the English in the rear.

Accord to you and Doug the answer was the fierce bodkin storm. However, since this fierce bodkin storm failed to keep the French men-at-arms from driving them from the battlefield, why didn't the French drive the archers from the field as was done in at least 4 other battles. Doug's answer was there were more archers at Agincourt. This is only significant if the number of French men-at-arms stayed about the same. But they didn't. The increase in archers was balanced by an increase in enemy men-at-arms. There were more casualties with the increase in archers. But the significance of those casualties don't increase because those casualties must be spread over more French men-at-arms. So I'm left here without an answer as to why the French men-at-arms didn't attack the archers drive them from the battleine and take the English men-at-arms in the rear? They did it in the past and was successful. Why didn't they do it at Agincourt?

Rich

So I'm left here without an answer as to why the French men-at-arms didn't attack the archers drive them from the battleine and take the English men-at-arms in the rear? They did it in the past and was successful. Why didn't they do it at Agincourt?

And I am giving you the most plausible answer: the timing was off. The mounted attacks were assigned the duty of occupying the longbowmen on the wings. Instead, the cavalry vanished, the longbowmen shot up the French first battle as it advanced to attack the English men at arms, then attacked them hand to hand as well. There was never an opportunity for the French to alter their attack plan once it was launched.

Now, when you play it with the dismounted men at arms allowed to attack the archers, the French might win. Their morale has to hold up first: as the longbows will almost surely cause enough casualties to require a morale check: but once over that hurdle the second turn of melee puts the longbowmen at a decided disadvantage and they lose the melee rather quickly versus plate armored men at arms (as you point out citing earlier battles).

Hi

Again, I am a little confused. You keep saying "archers driven from the battlefield.

At agincourt?

Or other battles? If the latter, that evolves into the discussion and point I keep making that "longbows aren't magic and do vary in quality". The way I read agincourt, the arrows did the killing and crushing morale problems on the french attacks with secondary MAA fighting.

So, other battles? Which and what?

R

My question: "So I'm left here without an answer as to why the French men-at-arms didn't attack the archers drive them from the battle-line and take the English men-at-arms in the rear? They did it in the past and was successful. Why didn't they do it at Agincourt?"

Doug's response: "And I am giving you the most plausible answer: the timing was off. The mounted attacks were assigned the duty of occupying the longbowmen on the wings. Instead, the cavalry vanished, the longbowmen shot up the French first battle as it advanced to attack the English men at arms, then attacked them hand to hand as well. There was never an opportunity for the French to alter their attack plan once it was launched."

I drew up a sketch of the English and French lines of battle.

link

A is the battle-line as you have described it following the Gesta. B represent the French battle-line contained in their standing orders. C is the French battle-line broken into three columns as you suggested again based on the Gesta. And D is how historians have envisioned the French attack as described by the Gesta.

Battle-line A shows the archers in the center of the English battle-line. As has been shown at Constance (1356), Nogent (1359), Auray (1364), and Cocherel (1364), English archers were simply unable to stop or even seriously impede the French dismounted attacks. And, in some cases the archers were driven from the field by the dismounted French men-at-arms. The inability of the archers to standup to the attack of the French men-at-arms clearly indicate that when it came to hand-to-hand combat having archers in the battle-line one creates weak points in the battle-line. My question is why didn't the French attack these weak points, drive the archers away and take the English men-at-arms in the rear?

Doug's response, There was never an opportunity for the French to alter their attack plan once it was launched." , ignores the fact that the standing orders were to attack as a single unit. The French altered this plan after they had launched their attack by forming three columns partway into their advance on the English. Their standing order has the French formed as in B. Part way through the attack they shift into C.

This shows quite clearly the French were able to alter their plans even after their attack was underway. So Doug's assertion that they couldn't alter the formation once the attack was underway is clearly inadequate. Not only that, but Doug's view of the three columns have the French purposely avoiding the archers. And, as they advanced on the English men-at-arms offering their flanks to be fired upon by the archers. So, I keep coming back to the question: "Why didn't the French attack the weak points in the English line where the archers were positioned. Why did they purposely change formation, avoid the archers and allow the archers to fire into their flanks?"

Rich

I said previously:
"My view is that the English men-at-arms formed in three bodies, with archers in the gaps between, on the flanks and also in front of the men at arms. This means that the entire frontage presented by the English army could engage with archery as soon as the French came within range. And indeed, why should they do anything else, since the whole aim (excuse the pun) was to beat the French with archery, if possible before they reached the men-at-arms."

You asked:
"My question is why didn't the French attack these weak points, drive the archers away and take the English men-at-arms in the rear?"

My answer is that the archers in front of the MAA could withdraw through them, the archers in the gaps conform to this movement, thus forming a second line, so that if the French were daft enough to attempt to take the MAA in the rear they would be in turn attacked in the flank or rear by the archers.

Incidentally, your diagrams show the archers in a wedge formation. There is very little, if any contemporary evidence for such a formation and a number of scholars have now dismissed it as a possibility.

Hi

Guys…. lets start a different thread specifically on this subject.

Your vision on Doug's three columns isn't correct.

What I suspect is going on is what I call "napoleonic" thinking. Terms and ideas from the late 18th coloring the discussion.

Might call it "discussing the HYW". Your four examples are 75 years earlier, mostly, than Agincourt. I admit i am not off hand familiar with them and need to look them up. But my point is that this is no longer about compbows versus longbows, but, again, archery in the HYW.

So, lets kill this and start anew with your REAL interest.

R

I started a new one on the Medieval Discussion Board: Battle-line at Agincourt.

Rich