"Lessons of SCW" Topic

Its a commonplace to say the Spanish Civil War was a dress rehearsal for World War Two.
If so what lessons were learned by the participants and the observors?
The Germans didnt seem to learn that their airforce would prove inadequate.
The Soviets seem to have lost their way between the 2 conflicts.
Did anyone learn anything?

Well, one of the main things that I've heard quoted as having been learned is the Condor Legion's flight experience. The Luftwaffe might have been ineffectual by the end of WW2, but they seemed to have be doing pretty well during the Blitzkrieg. The whole concept of aerial bombing was developed & perfected during the SCW, wasn't it? & I think the German early vehicle designs were testing in Spain, right?

Did the Soviets actually send troops, or just equipment? I think they might have had military advisors in Spain, but not much more, did they?

Can't really point to a specific lesson learned for the Italians though.

What about combined arms, infantry supporting tanks & visa versa? Was that something developed during the conflict?

I think Soviet pilots and planes ruled the skies in Spain for over a year. Towards the end, when the Condor Legion got ME-109s things changed. Its a bit of a myth that the Nationalists ruled the skies for the entire war.
If there was a lesson in strategic bombing to be learnt do you think the Germans learnt it?
Their planes and strategies lost them the Battle of Britain.
If the italians needed to learn anything from the SCW it was to keep out of the next one: clearly they didnt.
I hate to sound like a wiseacre but the concept of the SCW as a rehearsal for the next war seems a little too pat.

I concur in part with Raducci. More than a rehearsal it was a prologue or first act of the WWII.

However not all the lessons teached are actually learned. None, for instance, paid attention to the problems to capture cities well defended. Or, perhaps, they did but in the wake of German triumphs during Blitzkrieg phase they forgot. No city, but Warsaw, was actually defended against the German onslaught… so it is possible that the combatants forgot the strongpoint value of a well and stubbornly defended build up area.

Strategic bombing they learn a lot bombing Madrid and Guernica. For example, they learnt that to cause a firestorm in a town, first it was neccesary to launch a wave of bombers armed with penetrating bombs -not HE to avoid rubble- and then a second wave equiped with incendiaries. However, Hitler decided for other approach to his air force, more devoted to tactical support than to strategic bombing…

Other problem is the failed strategy of the Battle of Britain. As the German were defeated we know that their strategy was faulty, but it was? I am not so sure, or to be more precise the initial strategy -destroy the RAF and its bases- was sound and the Lutwaffe had the machines needed to implement it. Though when they switched the target to terror bombing of cities they threw all their advantages through the window, as the German bombers hadn't enough payload nor range nor endurance to actually try a devastating blow against Britain cities. Richtofen, however, had warned Lutwaffe general staff of that problem -small payload- after his experiences of bombing Spanish cities, so they actually were or should be aware of the problems involved. Perhaps this is a lesson that could have been learned but it was ignored instead… or, as some scholars point, Germany hadn't the industrial capacity in the early 40's to produce strategic bombers, so they made a choice for tactical bombers: cheaper and still multipurpose for the perceived strategic needs.

"the concept of the SCW as a rehearsal for the next war seems a little too pat".

I concur. I think it's a statement too easily made with the gift of hindsight. It's also used as an apologetic excuse by historiuans from the democratic powers that were caught off guard in 1939/40 – namely Britain and France.

Every major country sent military observers and more than just the Russians, Germans and Italians sent military advisors. The lessons observed or experienced were not necessarily the same as lessons learnt.

Mark

Raducci,

Air superiority is the SCW fluctuated enormously.
At first the Republicans had the advantage because of numbers and the influx of French fighters. The German Heinkels 51 redressed that somewhat but not much.
Much more important was the arrival of Italian planes (CR32) and pilots which firmly put air supêriority with the Nationalists, until the Russians started supplying I-16s.
Later again, air superiority went back to the Nationalist with the arrival of modern fighters like the BF-109.

@basileus 66,

Very accurate assessment.
I do believe that the Germans, or better the Axis forces, refined their combined air-land operations somewhat in Spain. Of course you're right, they never picked up the warning from Richthofen and others that a more strategic bomber was absolutely neccesary. General Wevers' death might also have to do something with that.

Now, regarding the Battle of Britain I am almost convinced that if the Luftwaffe had continued destroying RAF bases, the results might have been entirely different.

It wasn't as much the infrastructure- easily repaired in most instances- or even the planes, but the lack of pilots . A war of attrition would have proven desastrous for the RAF.

Even with the limited bombload and range of their tactical bombers the Germans could have achieved their goal if they had stuck with their original plan.

Something most British members won't like reading but take a long and hard look at who deliberately started bombing who's cities first.
With a megalomaniac like Hitler the results were very predictable…

"Did anyone learn anything?"

The Russians did not send combat units per se, but they did send an awful lot of advisors.

One lesson learned by both sides was that modern (ie Pak 36 and similar) anti-tank guns were devastatingly effective against modern (ie Pz I, T-26, BT-5) armour. This prompted to Russians to develop various prototypes of 'shell proof' tanks, including the A-32 which became the T34. The Germans were vindicated in their belief that the principal enemy of the tank was the anti-tank gun, the foundation of their panzjager tactics well into 1943.

Tank-infantry cooperation generally was fairly disappointing in the SCW, although the offensive which cut the Republic in half was a proto-blitzkrieg.

The results obtained by ultra-modern monoplane fighters compared to biplanes were very encouraging. Monoplane bombers were however found to not require any escort as they could fly faster than most fighters.

"Something most British members won't like reading but take a long and hard look at who deliberately started bombing who's cities first. "

Errr, that would be…the Germans! Along with gas warfare, unrestricted submarine warfare and flamethrowers. All courtesy of WW1. The inhabitants of Warsaw might also have something to say about it in WW2.

"Did anyone learn anything?"

Yes Martin, you're quite right; the Germans did indeed start bombing British cities – and all the other activities you list – in WW1.

Even if we limit who started what to WW2, German bombed Warsaw, and Rotterdam long before the RAF bombed German cities.

The first attack on Berlin was made by bomber command after a German bomber jettisoned its payload (accidentally) on London. Unaware of it being a mistake, Britain retaliated in a raid composed of twenty five (I think) planes.

And the inhabitants of Rotterdam.
Some random points….
Wasn't the bombing of Guernica an accident? And in spite of the propaganda made from it, weren't relatively few of the inhabitants killed? If Terror Bombing was a lesson learned from the SCW it was a false one because no belligerant in World War Two achieved victory through it with the exception of the A bombing Japanese cities.

Raducci,

I doubt Guernica was an accident. Perhaps not totally deliberate, but the intention was to destroy the city as it was a hub of communications in the Northern front.

Effectively, the number of people killed was not as big as said in the time. Probably about 290-320 people and 1,000 injured. However, mind that Guernica had a small population in 1937: 3,000 people, that, may be, rose to 4,000 the day of the bombing. That means that the loses would have been almost the 10% of population killed and 1/3 injured. A terrible toll. Moreover, the city burned to the ground. Perhaps as much as the 90% of the town buildings burned or were destroyed trying to stop the fire. The most relevant lesson, from a military point of view, was that it proved the possibility of create an artificial firestorm in a city.

Besides Terror Bombing was useful or not as strategic weapon in WWII, what is clear is that SCW teach lessons about how to implement it.

Best

Possibly the germans learnt a lot from what has been said about the use of tactical air support, antitank weapons and combined ops, maybe not so much about strategic bombing.

I'm also of the opinion the British learnt that air power was becoming increasenly important so Churchill stressed the importance of better fighters and better trained pilots as he states in his memories.

I doubt Italy learnt anything from the SCW, but I think its because the fascist elements in the army rather than the true professionals that were largely ignored.

Well if nothing else the British did learn much from the experiences of their returning International Brigade members…although (as usual) the establishment refused to accept they knew anything useful. The British Home Guard manual and special warfare training centre was aLmost exclusively written and staffed by ex-Brigadistas, much of their guerilla and irregular warfare training for the home guard later went into Commando training, which was put to great use.

Here at least something useful was learned for the continuing war against fascism- of which the GCE/SCW was merely the start.

Graham

Hi

Of course they learned, but some of the lessons were wrong.

The italian airforce learned that they had the best airforce in the world with the CR32 and Fiat G.50 for escort and airsuperiority, and the SM bombers too fast to be stopped. So the italians sat on their "success", not realizing that technolgy would continue to advance.

The germans DID learn that the "finger four" was superior to "vics" but everyone ignored it. And they also observed that their HE51s while looking as good as the other bipes, were obsolete and continued developing new fighters. But with the "bomber will always get through" didn't consider that this might change!

The russians learned a lot, put promply "purged" the guys who came home with that knowledge.

Rocky

Didn't the Germans start bombing cities by accidentally bombing Dublin?

The Italians did seem to learn a fair bit (surprising things, like that infantry perform better if they receive rudimentary infantry training on how to use lmgs and simple flanking attacks.)

Spreading this knowledge through the rest of the Army was another thing, however… The officers had enough to do in WW2 just trying to keep up with organising and supplying the huge numbers of men that were mobilised.

Rockyrusso is right about the Soviets. Stalin thought all participants in the SCW to be infected with foreign ideas and purged them all.

Baileus your Spanish arent you? So you probly know more about Guernica than me.
But were there any air raid precautions taken by the people? Were there shelters? Sirens? Were there AA guns?
Was the emergency services organised?
For the people who died there it was no doubt awful but I wonder if the results of the raid were exaggerated by the Republicans for propaganda reasons.
I mentioned Rotterdam above. I got curious & looked it up. 1000 victims of the German attack. Another myth of Terror Bombing?

I have some reproductions of Spanish newspapers of that date with news about the bombing. I can have a look at the diaries again tonight to check about the propaganda.

Something curious: in the nationalist newspaper it says that it was an action from the communists and claimed the nationalist planes did not flown the day of the bombing.

The bigger the lie…

I've been checking several newspapers of the time: Euzkadi May 5th 1937 & April 27th editions – El sol, April 28th – ABC from Madrid (Republican), April 28th – ABC from Sevilla (National) April 30).

The Republican newspapers do not seem to exagerate on the event as they refer to the destruction of the village and that it was a crime directed to the population because the claimed objectives (the weapons factory in the village and the bridge) were untouched and the bombing was directed against the civilians. There are no mention of number victims in the newspapers. There is also frequently mentioned the fact that fighters shooted civilians trying to escape the village.

The basque newspapers mention it more frequently as Guernica was an emblematic village for the basques. The differences with the number of deaths came much later the war was over.

The national newspaper and oficial version from Franco HQ is just a lie: the red army burned the village before retreating.

What it seems to be exagerated is the British and French newspapers as they condemn directly Germany of the bombing and seems it was used like a political weapon against Germany rearming.

Raducci. "But were there any air raid precautions taken by the people? Were there shelters? Sirens? Were there AA guns?"

There were a couple of air raid shelters and an alert system with observers. There were no AA guns.

"I mentioned Rotterdam above. I got curious & looked it up. 1000 victims of the German attack. Another myth of Terror Bombing?"

Guernica is a symbol of the war directed against the civilians, and that's its worth. And I think it's a big worth.

There has been more bloody bombings like Tokyo firebombing raids, London, Dresde, Berlin, Stalingrad, Hiroshima, etc. Or crimes against people like Cambodia, Warsaw, China, etc. But in its time and maybe for political reasons it became a symbol of the killing of civilians.

I do not mind with Guernica being a symbol representing all the bombings talked above. If Guernica is debunked then there must be another one to remind of these victims.

Rotterdam 1000 dead? So I guess that isn't very many is it?

How many dead in (say) London or New York would it take before it was considered anything worth mentioning then?
So 1000 dead is nly a myth of terror bombing, mmm.. I will have to rethink my definition of terrorism.

"Stalin thought all participants in the SCW to be infected with foreign ideas and purged them all."

Well he obviously missed a few or M.M. Popov wouldn't have ended up commanding the Leningrad Military District.

My pardon, Bruntonboy.
I didnt mean to sound callous.
I know I can forget its people were talking about in these discussions.
Certainly the victims of Guernica and Rotterdam have my deepest sympathy.

Hi

Popov survived by not pointing out to his superiors that by his exposure to western ideas that he "knew better". Largly, though, the experienced officers were purged.

As for the "terror". It was assumed then that the purpose of all armies and airforces was to cow the populace into surrender. And both sides produced their own bits of propaganda reflecting this.

As we used to say in the 60s, "War isn't healthy for children and other living things".

Now, can we get back to the discussion?

rocky

Rocky Terror worked to a degree I think in World War Two.
It is the reason the Dutch government folded so quickly even tho their army was fighting well.
nd I think it was at least partially behind Reynaud's craven actions. So I guess the threat of terror bombing, if not the reality was learned in the SCW.

No problem raducci, it's just as wargamers we sometimes talk of "minimal" casualties and uch like in a rather glib manner and we tend toforget just what a tragedy even one death is to those concerned.

Adios!

Hi

Rad, the point I am making is that all war involves terrorizing the populace.

Genghis's "pyramid of skulls"?

The zepplins?

Babylon's assertians to its neighbors in 2500 BC?

R

Good point, Rocky.
Im going to have to think about it.
How about Wellington in the Peninsula who purposely worked at not terrorizing the locals?
Or the Allies in Italy in World War Two who were generally helpful to Italian civilians?
Im inclined to say your generalisation holds true for Civil Wars and for most wars of conquest but not necessarily every war.