"How do we come to troop ratings?" Topic

I'm always curious exactly how people rate troops.
TMP link
I ask for thoughts on a random troop quality.

However some say "NO! Historical ONLY"

How do you know?

Now if a unit did something wonderful give them a high rating is one argument- even if they were new recruits, 'the dice must have ran for them', so we will give them a better chance of repeating that, is fine up to a point, but what about the vast majority who we hear nothing about because they were never brought to a crisis point. Or worse, had one 'good' or one 'bad' 'roll' that they are remembered for? Perhaps when 'Jackson stood like a stone wall' it was because he had just screwed up his command roll! "HOLD- no advancing"

"Imperial Guard- Quality A". Why? In many battles they were used as a 'coup de gras'. If they had been placed in the line would they have been as effective? Are they trading on the fact that they were always used as the 'final blow', and in fact any unit would have had the same effect (until at least their reputation gives them a bonus due to fear).

Because in general terms, some units just performed better than others.

Sure, there were exceptions – somedays "elite" units did poorly, or "poor" units did well. But it is possible to evaluate a unit's *overall* performance and assign a quality.

Perhaps this rating could be viewed as a commander's expectations for a unit's performance…?

If you look at the Falklands war you will see the British army sent their finest units in to battle, they needed to win so the best troops were sent. That says alot about the use of combat effective fighting units in crucial situations and how military thinking is that run of the mill line units might not achieve what elite units will or at least expected to achieve…

Shane

Let me start by stating this is a slippery slope once you start down it.

Experience: This one is fairly straight forward. You either got it or you don't. Of course experience in one type of situation does not necessarily mean you become "experienced in all situations".

Training: You're either trained or you're not. Again pretty simple.

Physical condition of the troops: Here's a toughie. Some of the best troops in the world can be run down, diseased or starved to a point where their combat effectiveness is physically impaired.

Mental condition of the troops: Another difficult factor that will change from day to day and has more than a little to do with physical condition of the troops. The two are interrelated.

Low level leadership. Factors like organization, training and experience should be considered.

Upper levels of leadership. Factors like organization, training and experience should be considered.

Adaptation / acclamation to temperature / weather conditions.

These are all matters that one can consider.

Or you can say these guys are typical. These guys are a bit better and these guys didn't measure up. All other things being roughly equal. You see, it often isn't necessary to rate every possible variation.

Special scenario rules are IMO better for those special situations.

mjc

I just went through this problem with some friends in Barbarosa game. Russian morale is pretty good, but training was awful. Germans were defeating toy armies for a year.How do you dumb down the capacity of one side without throwing in a lot of extra rules and complication? It is odd to consider: more complexity to make one side (Russians) play dumb. My suggested solution is to put a flag set on the lead tank (platoon commander). Pass skill checks for every platoon action. Fail the skill check: the tanks don't do anything, or move randomly. Tankers must burn one of their two actions just looking at the platoon commander. Something had to be done: My friend is such a good player, he made the 1941 Russians into a German-eating machine. That just wasn't the case in 1941.

It's not an easy thing to do realistically, but I will say that it's always more interesting to play a game where some units are good and some are bad rather than every unit just being the same.

there are basically 2 criteria IMO.

1/ Direct comparison – "A" fought "B", and "A" won and the ancient authors tell us it was because "A" had veterans and "B" had raw recruits. It seems reasonable therefore to class "A"'s troops as better than "B"'s.

1a/ Indirect comparison – "A" fought "B" and won, "C" fought "B" and lost. We are told this is because "A"'s troops were well trained or veterans or whatever, and "C"'s were not – so we grade "A"'s as better than "C"'s.

2/ Inference – we have no combat comparisons to make, but we know that troops were modelled on a type we do know about, or trained the same, or were equipped the same, or were used in the same manner, etc. So we make a leap of faith and grade them the same/better/worse depending upon what information we have.

for the Old Guard, for example, we know that they were experienced soldiers and were considered an elite. We know that they were often used for he coup de grace against troops who were already shattered, but also that they ultimately failed against troops who were steady, and that some stood and fought to the last.

It might be instructive to try to figure out how long the guard columns at Waterloo stood against het British lines compared to other French columns in other battles, such as Busaco.

So a logical grading might be that they are no different in combat capacity to other units, but have higher morale so might stick around longer if things are going badly.

We also know that their defeat caused a morale shock to the French army – so that might be somethign that the rules simulate too.

I realised it was a can of worms before I opened it, but 'Morale' is so fundemental to what we do, and it seems to be the elephant in the room (table) that no one talks about (for the sake of a common frame I suggest we adopt the old A=elite to E=worst rating).

Some it is obvious- the Falklands, where an outnumbered army attacked one that had a much shorter resupply line, and, apparently, often better equipment (because if you are a military dictatorship there is one group of people you throw money at), the army with the professionalism leadership and history held it's nerve longer.

Others it is harder, though we would probably manage a guess- was the Iraqi army of '91 always a D/E, or was it a C/D bombed into disorder?

But how do you rate troops at say Salamanca? Wagram? Stones River? Cannae? Tewkesbury? Many units were not tested, because they did not receive any 'attention' different to those stood either side. Or one unit shone, but truth be told the next regiment along would have done the same.

Often it is the D/Es that stand out- if you find a unit is green then that is usually easy to agree that they will probably not be as effective in their first battle. But what is an A or a B?

It is fairly easy to argue (I won't say agree) that the Ox and Bucks were A or B at Pegasus Bridge, but what about the 6th Airborne? Conventional wisdom is Para=Good, but many in para units- British and American- volunteered because the pay was better.

I find

(no idea where those last 2 words are from)

Largely it seems to be down to a combination of things-Experience, training,experienced strong leadership , confidence in leadership, and confidence in ones own and ones comrades abilities and when ALL of these things are present, then you have an elite unit. If any one of them isn't present, then you might have a unit which believes itself elite, but doesn't quite cut it…and there are a lot of those.

Differences can be more or less depending on the level of battle as well. Morale can play a different role or have a less (or greater) impact at the platoon level than at the higher level battle. For example, in France 1940, some units fought hard, well, and to the death while other units on either side did not put up as much of a fight, or were given orders to retreat or do something else. So the platoon level battle can be won and a units morale performance can shine but still go to waste because the higher level command lost its nerve or made mistakes.

So those ratings for a unit could theoretically vary depending on the sub units.

Just another 2 cents.

One of the problems I have seen is with unit ratings is that many rule writers use them to replicate historical outcomes. For example, the 1805-07 French tend to be rated just this side of supermen in many rules. The Russians, Prussians and Austrians of the same period, not so much. I tend to think that the quality of the individual troops and units on both sides was somewhat closer together. To be certain there were units that were a cut above on both sides, but for my money the big difference was very superior French command and control that made the difference. Napoleon was able to introduce fresh troops when and where he wanted to a much greater extent than the allies. I don't think that most rules do a very god job of simulating this aspect of French superiority and instead take an easier route and simply rate the troops better.

Another .02 worth.

I think you have to look at the question like this: wine gets better with age, but then when it is drunk it is gone, once gone it has to be made once more and aged. Remembering wine should always be sipped to the end of the glass, not gulped down like beer.

I see troop quality in the same way, it takes time, training and experience in combat and campaigning to build a fighting unit and once eaten up by constant battle it gets to a point where it no longer is battle worthy and will quickly deteriorate to such a degree where is must be taken from the line and sent home for rebuilding.

The length of time this process takes depends on many factors which are not so easily quantifiable. But they are discernable and recognisable to even a layman of the period, or any period for that matter.

Training – The number one factor is training of course, training and the quality of that training helps to build a solid foundation for the unit to work with. Giving it a stable base to build on so to speak, a unit with poor training will have a hard time of it usually but does not mean that unit cannot reach the heights of combat effectiveness only a well trained unit reaches. Time, exposure and command come into play at this time which can make or break a poor unit into a fine fighting unit or disintegrate it to oblivion. Training competency is directly related to the unit's and individuals ability to survive the rigors or war and campaigning.

Drill – There is a great difference between Training and Drill; Training is the full scope of skills taut to the soldier from its officers and NCO's for survival while Drill is the teaching of commands and manoeuvres on a battlefield to train the men to work as a single entity or component of a single entity in a cohesive manor in order to best be able to destroy an enemy unit while maintaining its own survival as a cohesive ordered body. If the competency of Drill in a unit is lacking this directly affects its ability to react instinctively and decisively to enemy actions and changing situations. A unit caught in a changing situation and unable, or too slow to react will perish or at least collapse to a point where its survival is at risk. Drill and its constant repetitiveness to the soldier builds and creates a distinctive response that becomes innate and natural, it is this automatic response that is the number one factor for a unit's survival on a battlefield. Without it the unit is not battle worthy or affective and a liability to not only itself but all those around it. A formation lacking in formal Drill procedures and adequate training in them cannot expect to function long under battlefield conditions once the firing begins. It is also severely restricted in its own evolutions it is capable of carrying out and limited in scope to counter against enemy actions and reactions. Troops of lesser Drill capability are only fit for garrison or defensive postures behind fortifications at best on a Napoleonic battlefield.

Interestingly with Drill many armies used it to meet the needs only of that country in that only parts of drill were used and others discarded or unused. Not every nation used Drill in its entirety but instead only the manoeuvres and formations that nation deemed sufficient to learn for their style or confidence. Some nations who needed to get men to the battlefield tended to forgo many formations and drill movements in order to more quickly teach the recruit only those deemed necessary to their survival. It was thought others would be taught later on when time was available. Even musketry practice was lacking in many nations to a sufficient level. But what Drill bred into soldier was the essential quality of Discipline; it is with discipline that a soldier will obey orders unquestionably and without fail…

Discipline – This quality is the number one factor to drive into a soldier to keep him at his post, to keep him in his rank and obeying ordered shouted in battle. Without discipline men quickly turn into rabble and mobs unable to carry out orders or unwilling to if discipline is severely lacking. An undisciplined unit is a dangerous unit capable of acts of insubordination or worse, mutiny. What is worse is a lack of discipline under fire can cause the collapse and eventual rout of a unit. Modern armies relegate Drill to the sole sanctity of the parade ground these days but during the Napoleonic and similar eras repetitive Drill instilled not only the robotic subservience to carrying out complicated manoeuvres and evolutions, it also had the two fold effect of Drilling into the soldier the unflinching ability to carry out orders unquestioningly.

On a parade ground with a mass of men all standing motionless at attention in ranks it is very easy for an NCO or officer to notice the slightest movement. A slip of a finger, a cough or the twist or nod of a head becomes as noticeable as dogs balls and although the nco or officer might not see exactly which individual is making the unauthorized movement he can easily be drawn to the relative location and instil that discipline. A soldier might do better to take heed to that, the slightest movement is very noticeable, especially when all others are motionless. Now, there are very serious and valid reasons for cramping down on this lack of discipline.

In battle under fire men can and do panic, nerves fray and men begin to lose control of their ability to maintain their composure; instilling a form of discipline through Drill is the very thing that quashes this to an extent. Men who are seen to look left and right in line of battle or fidget are prone to being the first to lose it when the stuff begins to hit the fan, reducing this in these men by trying to instil in them a sense of discipline can go a long way to reduce this. A unit under fire and beginning to take casualties is often still maintaining a good sense of order but if an individual soldier begins to find it hard to cope or several at the same time are in the same position they will be seen to look up and down the ranks for signs of others doing the same. If they find this in the faces of others it gives them justification to panic that little bit more, before you know it a cancer spreads along the ranks and men begin to waver, falter and slow down. Soon cohesion begins to collapse and the more casualties caused the more this fear grips the individuals that cannot help but look left or right. Those that have been drilled to face forward and look ahead will ignore this but those who become overwhelmed by what their eyes are seeing worsen the situation causing others trying hard not to become affected to begin to react the same way, before long chaos takes over and morale plummets, the unit is lost and rushes to the rear one way or another.

Experience – is another important factor, the more exposure to combat conditions and hardships a unit has the better conditioned it is to stand in battle for longer periods. A unit that is Raw/Green in the battle line for the first time is going to be a very nervous unit at best and only its training and officers/NCO's can keep it in that line for any length of time. If the situation becomes overly hot on its own personal front it will take every effort of their commanders and training to keep them from breaking, not an easy job. However, troops have to be blooded as they say, this is usually done on purpose to test the unit's mettle and give them a taste of combat. It is done to get them used to the idea of being shot at and to inner them to battle casualties so that the "shock" of battle is lessened for the future.

Officers & NCO's – This is a very important factor in the life and effectiveness of a combat unit, poor quality people in command will in all probability bring about the demise of even a good body of men. Good officers and NCO's can mean the difference between surviving battle and total destruction, there are too many cases of fact to dispute this, look at the intervention of a Dutch officer at Waterloo with the 69th Regiment (from memory) of foot and what happened to them as a result. Good reliable men who are well trained and combat efficient can be destroyed in a matter of minutes if led by dolts who do not understand combat in the period they are fighting in. An officer who hesitates or does not understand how to "read" a battle is going to cause problems sooner or later.

History is full of situations where perfectly good combat units were sent into battle in less than ideal circumstances under leaders who were les than able of competent enough to lead them. The resulting outcomes of many of these situations are very well known throughout recorded history just as much as great leaders on the other side with their superior leadership brought about accolades and success due to superior qualities of these men to lead in combat. The one area that is often overlooked is the quality of the junior officers and NCO's it is these men that personally command the individual companies within a battalion and keep the unit from becoming a rabble, if these men are not up to the task a battalion of even the most Elite turn into a mob incapable of efficient combat worthiness. The destruction of a unit by combat and its strength reduction to casualties is directly related to the losses in this area, as the unit's strength dwindles the loss in junior officers and NCO's is comparable. It the loss of these lower leaders is greater than the loss of men combat effectiveness and cohesion deteriorates rapidly, especially from units where the leaders lead from the front. This becomes a real problem in many combat nits as the loss of even one of these men can be a major blow to a unit's effectiveness and even its morale. Their loss is many times keenly missed and it takes years to bring a replacement to the same level of expertise and competency.

Acclimatisation – Troops sent off to distant locations usually have to become acclimatised to the conditions presented to them in the new region. This process takes time and usually sick bay cases increase dramatically or even worse. This reduces the combat effectiveness of the unit and causes its strength to wane which is sometimes the difference between being able to take their place in the line as a combat ready unit. Units decimated by disease or sickness due to a lack of acclimatisation can be so great as to wipe a unit out before it ever fired a single shot in anger. The degree of this lack of acclimatisation depends on the region they are occupying and the precautions taken by their commanders and leaders. If this is lacking the result is usually decimation to some degree which reduces the unit's ability to be affective in combat.

Fatigue and battle fitness – Campaigning is the number one conditioner for men to endure marching and constant lengths of time on duty. Training has much to do with building a good base for this but actual states of war and active campaigning is the crux of making a soldier a soldier. Men who have had years of experience under campaigning conditions have a much greater chance of survival in the long run and can cope with Fatigue and battle weariness that builds in every individual soldier. If a man is constantly exposed to fatigues over a long and constant period of time he will become battle fatigued no matter how long he has served or experienced he has become. Younger, less experienced men are much more susceptible to the fatigues of war and succumb more readily. This directly relates to Strategic Consumption but its causes are often as a result of constant war often resulting in mental fatigue which can consume the individual to a point where he no longer is capable of going on or cares. When men arrive at this junction it often means the difference between life and death. Often this is the result of dramatic climactic conditions but also the length of time under those conditions or simply a break down of the body due to excessive lengths of time on the march. Combine them all together and you have what is called "Strategic Consumption".

Strategic Consumption – As stated above this can be from Battle fatigue but there are other causes many and varied. Firstly you have fitness or lacks thereof, a lack of battle fitness will severely affect a unit's ability to march, fight and stay intact as an effective fighting unit while on campaign. A unit for example living in central Bavaria for 3 years getting fat off the land no matter how combat affective they might have been is going to find themselves in a very hard situation if ordered to march to Poland or central Spain for the next 3 to 6 months. Getting fat on abundant food sources begins to make the soldier and invariably his entire unit lax when finally they leave such a good post, having to learn or relearn how to gain supplies or even a sudden lack of supplies at the level they had become accustomed too can have dire consequences for a unit on campaign in sparse regions. Looking for example at the Bavarians in Russia of 1812 it is known their Strategic Consumption was the highest of all German contingents in Napoleon's army.

Another cause of Strategic Consumption is the quality of its Recruits or Replacements, poor quality, too young or even lame soldiers can be a burden and hindrance to the maintaining of a combat affective fighting force. If this rate of Attrition due to these factors rises too high too quickly it can render a unit ineffectiveness very rapidly. This exposes it to premature and higher chances of collapse if it finds itself in dire situations in battle. This is something constantly on the minds of Officers and strategies are often put in place to prevent this but often not at all that well or not at all. A unit that shows its inability to cope with a situation is a point or apprehension for Officers and often adjustments are made to accommodate this in order for the unit to better cope with its hardships. This is a two edged sword and can actually work against the unit in the long run. The officers are faced with the decision, do we push them to weed out the lame and sick or do we ease off on them to allow them to cope as a single entity? The resulting outcome is often as good as it is poor, wise decisions are often made from multiple previous mistakes having been made.

As said earlier, Climactic conditions often play an important factor in strategic consumption often with dire horrific consequences. We only have to look at 1812 to understand this point. It is often said that the heat of the Russian summer had more of an effect than the following winter ever did. Units at Borodino on the French side were averaging 50% effectives in the ranks of most units! This was due to a few reasons, the heat for one of course but also lack of supplies coupled with the speed of the march for another. All this goes without saying, it is well documented enough to explain it here. However, another important factor much over looked is Homesickness. This factor is an ever consuming point for the individual that no amount of campaigning, Drill, Training or experience can overcome. Homesickness is an overwhelming feeling that often the young recruit cannot overcome and often succumbs too one way or another. Whether it be through desertion and returning home, death on the battlefield or even blowing ones brains out because a feeling of helplessness over comes him. The closer a unit is to the man's home the more probable the soldier will desert through homesickness and go home. Training camps were and even now often positioned well away from residential areas well away from civilized regions to create a sense or alienation to ward off excessive desertion rates. Desertion will never and was never fully controlled and men continued to desert even when located hundreds or even thousands of miles from home. However, when it is understood of the immensity of distance between home and his current location the average soldier is often put off the idea of desertion as his chances of success are often very low with increased chances of being caught or killed in the attempt to leave or along the road dying of exposure or other more horrific deaths alone.

As the French army advanced into Russia via Poland and it was known where the men were going the desertion rated dramatically increased, if you were going to desert it was better to go sooner than later for if left too late you would find yourself deep inside Russia and lesson your chance of survival. The ones who arrived at Borodino and fought were men who had overcome that and psychologically beat the mental condition of homesickness, their sense of duty overrode their desire to go home and the further east they marched the less likely they would have had the chance to desert and survive anyway. Spain was similar, the harshness of that land and its inhospitable climate and terrain for much of the region gave way to many desertions for one reason or another amongst which was to become bandits. However, once the local population began to turn on the French that prospect became less desirable.

The Russians are an interesting case in all of this; their army suffered deserters but usually for different reasons. The average Russian soldier was not a peasant, he was lower than that, and he was a serf. As a serf he was owned by his lord and usually living in miserable or at least simple poor conditions, joining the army for many was actually a step up in the world. Compared to those of central and western Europe the Russian soldier was already hardened by his typical life on the land and army life actually agreed with him. He could dream of pillage and worse on occasion and get paid to do it. The realities of army life were still hard and many did desert to become bandits like any other army. Those of central and western Europe on average was different, to join the army was considered a step down on the social ladder and meant living in harsh dangerous conditions. The average western European was not cut out for army life, like most soldiers even today, he had to be made into one.

Recruits and Replacements – another factor in Unit quality is the watering down of veteran combat units with new raw recruits and replacements. The more added the more watered down the unit becomes until it is no tougher than the day the unit first marched out in its bright new pretty uniforms worn by fresh faced well drilled recruits probably several years earlier. This watering down is inevitable with most line units as the men leave the ranks for one reason or another. The replacements although they may be well drilled (if lucky) are not acclimatised to combat and campaigning as the veterans are who have been fighting for months or even years. These new recruits, if numerous enough can be a serious liability to the rest of the veterans and so much so that they are resented or shunned on occasion; they are going to die anyway, why waste time teaching them how to survive? On a battlefield these new men can be easily scared and cause incidents which can endanger the integrity of the unit and even cause is demise if numerous enough and the situation dire enough. Combat veterans want to survive battle and don't want that compromised by green horns.

This is not always the case and old veterans can actually go the opposite way and protect and nurture the new recruits but if the influx of raw men is too great the job is seen as just too large for the veteran to bother. Units in this situation need a good strong cadre of junior officers and NCO's to support, train and drill these men quickly and to a level that will give them the best chance of survival on a modern battlefield. Without it they often do not last long.

Supplies – This is a major factor in warfare and is a constant changing one, a unit at home can become fat, lazy and used to an abundance of supplies, foods and other fortifiable items of contentment that a sudden lack of them often causes a shock to the entire unit as a whole. This shock can be devastating to the unit's morale, fitness, disease resistance and overall well being of the unit. The more the men are used to plenty the less they are able to cope with sparsity. If however, this is given as a gradual adaptation over a period of time then the men are more able to cope and come to terms with their change and be in a better frame of mind to adapt to this. A sudden jolting change for the worse often results in an equally sudden jolt in disease, sickness, homesickness and overall strategic consumption.

What is also interesting is the flip side to this, if a unit, now totally inured to hardships and depredation is confronted with a sudden overabundance of supplies, food stuffs and other items of comfort he often finds he cannot react with self restraint. Gorging begins and animal instincts of self preservation take over. The thinking becomes one of, take it all or you will miss out. No matter what rank, what level of training of experience this is an individual thing based on the depth of depredation the soldier has had to previously endure before the find. It often leads to its own problems such as drunkenness to the verge of death, total lack of alertness or care for the current situation leading to surprise contact by an enemy who can attack when is least expected or even cared about and even fighting within the unit or between units fighting over the same source of supplies.

I do not propose to know all about being a soldier but I do feel what I have written (although long winded) encompasses much of what makes a good or bad soldier on many levels. I was myself a soldier in my youth and although I never saw action I did observe much and take in a great deal of what surrounded me in those days of boot polish and parade grounds and of speaking to veterans all to ready to impart their knowledge to me and others around me. I am very thankful I never had to face what they had.

Regards,
Shane

Troop rating:
It's called seat-o-the-pants. No other explanation is possible. :)

"It's called seat-o-the-pants."

Or you go down the Dupuy route, whchi actually works quite well for operatinal games.

1967 IDF with a CEV of 2.1 vs the Egyptians, so just make the IDF units twice as combat effective as Egyptian ones of the same size and you suddenly find Israeli armoured brigades tearing right thruogh Egyptian divisions as if they weren't there…

Yes, that is replicating the historical result, but I would hope relicating historical results is what we are about. It is still quite possible for the IDF to completely screw up of course, as they have a far lower tolerance for casualties.

If you look through the Field Manuals for the US infantry, (which were on the web in outdated version,) and work through the different types, you would quickly find some reasons to rate some troops differently.
One infantry type clearly had more low level command and less double roles for each officer/NCO.

Does anyone want a paper hat for guessing it was the 'elite' Rangers who had that strongest command structure?

The more "veteran" a soldier, the more likely that he knows when to run and save his skin?

Mike

Geez Louise Shane: I'm not even going to try and read all of that. How about keeping your posts shorter? Shorter, more readable chunks are easier to digest, IMO.

Actually I think I am going to try and read all Shane's post. However he seems to be defining troop quality, rather than little tin men quality.

Bagration has put his finger on it, what I was trying to say. Designers ramp up certain units because they did well on the battlefield, without regard to whether their effectiveness is due to generalship (ie us) rather than because of the unit.

How many Guards units (of whatever period) are given an A/B rating along side their C fellows on the table. Yet often they are Guards because of Ceremonial and Historical reasons. In 'Wellingtos Army in the Peninsular' Reid states

although invariably comprising 'good' regiments, including the [KGL], it [1st Division- Guards] was regarded as a social rather than military elite

How many times has a Guards Division been given a A or B "Because they are Guards".

Is today's Coldstream Guards any better than the Worcestershire & Sherwood Foresters Regiment (29th/45th Foot)?

Why did the writers of F&F Western Battles rate Connells bde better than Crufts or Beattys at Chickamauga?

AHH! To much to read at once! Good post though.

The more "veteran" a soldier, the more likely that he knows when to run and save his skin?

(seeing if UBB tags work on this – is there a help somewher that tell you how to quoet & stuff??)

Some rules have this – the old WRG WW2 set from 1988 made it easier to neutralised well trained troops because they were more likely to "hit the dirt" than most others – who would therefore take more casualties for being moving under fire for longer.

Sorry bout that guys, when I write the information tends to begin flowing and before I know it I have written a novel or two…Yes, I was speaking from a troop quality perspective.

On troop quality I would strongly suggest from a games point of view that the British Light Division was better than the Guards Division, I might get shot for that but it is what I believe. The Light Division was called upon to do all manor of tasks constantly and were always in the thick of it. They had more exposure to action and personally that is what makes an Elite formation for my mind. Exposure to Action.

You can have all the training, Drill, and supplies you want but combat experience is what makes soldiers Elite.

Well trained and drilled recruits may be called Elite and may be able to manoeuvre well and quickly but they are still raw.

Experienced men with years of service learn the drill and training along the way and can manoeuvre well and quickly and ARE Elite through exposure to action.

If you look at this through the British vs. French question you will see a contrast between the two nations. The British are fairly low in the early years overall for experience but slowly gain that from 1809-15 so they should increase in experience or Eliteness over those years on average.

The French on the other hand start off with many combat veteran well trained and experienced formations only to decline over the years to a low in 1814. This steady decline reaches a point where it makes a cross roads with the British or passing point of experience. I feel this point was probably about 1811, the French declining while the British were ascending.

You have to remember the French were at their best probably at Eylau 1806 to Frieland 1807 but began to decline after that. The British army probably came to its peak around 1812 but by then the French were well and truly sinking fast. In 1811 the French still had massive numbers of well experienced veteran units but when Napoleon pulled many of them away in later 1811-12 the French army left in Spain could not match it with the British.

As for the other Armies such as the Prussians, Russians and Austrians they are a little harder to figure out.

The Prussians were a truly professional army in 1806 but were caught in a time warp against an ultra-modern army which ran the pants off of them. The later army was much less professional in 1813 but accounted for itself reasonably well..go figure, Patriotism and nationalism goes a long way.

The Russians some say was a much better army in 1805-07 than the later army organization, I think I remember reading even Napoleon thought so. But the army of 1812 did exceptionally well modelling itself on a similar French system but it had totally exhausted itself defending its homeland and in 1813-14 it was a mere shadow of its former self. It was still a force to be reckoned with but was clearly incapable of making up its losses before Paris fell.

The Austrian army is a completely different fish; it was a professional army which tried to reinvent itself time and again. Everything it tried was either half baked or not taken on board by various Austrian Generals who felt they knew better. Many modernizations and changes were made but never fully implemented in any one campaign. Their best chance was in 1809 where their army was at its peak but they did fail in the end, only just. By 1813 they were a much lesser quality army made up of many raw recruits who were prone to collapse and the Austrian generals knew this. They were large but cumbersome and slow moving. Only time would weed out the sick and lame and only combat exposure would gain them the experience they needed. By 1814 they had improved and accounted for themselves pretty well in the end.

Shane

I disagree that Veterans are more prone to more fire and moving slower. history is full of inncidents where raw troops are hit and stunned. They walk into an ambush and get slaughtered. The Veteran many times will see it coming or have an idea of it before it hpapens. He has learnt this because previously he was a raw recruit and hit by an ambush and paid dearly for it. He had learnt to read the battle and what happens.

An idea I have been toying with is what I call, "Shock". troops hit with shock become stunned or pinned or paralized so to speak. Shock occurs usually at first contact and the lower the quality of the troops the more prone they are to suffering Shock. They become paralized and unable to respond with any type of coordination, return fire or movement. They are effectively pinned to the ground. In the case of Napoleonics they simply begin to waver or faulter, forward movement is not possible.

Lots to work out with this but it is an idea, based on the levels of Eliteness of the men.

Shane

That's an interesting idea. What that leads to is 2 ratings Morale and Experience. Experienced troops are harder to ambush, but may suffer from worse morale test mods because they recognise the hopelessness of the situation. Green troops may not realise how bad things are, but may still break easier because of fear.

I agree with you about the Light Division. Perversely enough Light troops often carried more than the 'Heavies' (ie line) as they were expected to work away from the main army, and so be self sufficient.

Preconceptions is something that is in play in rating troops- though often borne out by experience. I would give a modern British Para or Marine unit a higher rating, purely because they have a reputation for toughness, and a selection and training process that re-inforces that image. The men see themselves as a tough elite, and strive to live up to it- "I'm hard because I'm tough, and tough because I'm hard"

Dupeys work on Combat effectiveness is helpful.

Personally, I'll take Historical evidence as a basis for effectiveness.
Spartans had all the training, the experience, the esprit-de-corp and historically that carried through into being freaking good.

Totenkopft SS had all the good gear, a superiority complex, snazzy uniforms etc, and when stuffed into trucks in column along a road near Arras against Matilda MK 1's it all counted for nothing. They got shot to bits and instead of deploying in cover and denying the ground, they just ran like gurlz.

>>>>Totenkopft SS had all the good gear, a superiority complex, snazzy uniforms etc, and when stuffed into trucks in column along a road near Arras against Matilda MK 1's it all counted for nothing. They got shot to bits and instead of deploying in cover and denying the ground, they just ran like gurlz.<<<<

This was 1940 and they were still as yet mostly untried. They were ambushed and got hammered, the Middle Guard suffered the same in 1815 at Waterloo, ambushed and hammered, can happen to the best troops as it can happen to the worst, the worst just cop it much much more but is not spoken about as it is mundane information. When it happens to Elite or Guard troops it becomes front page news…

Shane

no – they ran like any other sensible soldier caught in the openby machineguns from tanks they couldn't posibly fight against.

In fact with their 37mm guns over-run they actually formed tank hunting groups and tried to stalk the British tanks – with predictable lack of success and heavy casualties.

That's better than 290 or so New Zwealand soldiers of 22 Bn captured ar Ruweisat ridge in 1942 – it only took 8 panzers to force them to surrender after their 4 x 6 pdr AT guns were KO'ed.

If infantry with no AT weapons could deny ground to tanks there'd be no need for AT weapons!!

Oh and the SS trops that ran were a supply column…….

I game using the French as this is my army of choice but I do admire the British for several reasons. Throughout recorded history I have noted many times the British will send in their best troops constantly into the front line. I admire this trait in the British, they know how to use their Elite to their best advantage and do so successfully nearly every time.

The French Old Guard were always kept in reserve because Napoleon did not want them destroyed, yet in 1813 and especially 1814 they had to be used time and time again will great effect. There mere presence at Planecoit in 1815 of just two battalions was enough to cause the retreat of 14 Prussian battalions! This says allot about the effect Elite bodies of men have on the enemy morale.

I think the British generals have always known this and used it to their advantage throughout history, reputation often precedes the units of Elite and creates a nervousness and lowering of Morale of the enemy having to face them.

I advocate that this should be factored into a good set of rules where lower quality troops become intimidated by Elite formations and suffer some kind of disadvantage whether it is via morale rolls or hesitation at least. We do this in our system and it does make a difference even if the Elite troops cost a lot of points to purchase in points battles.

Regards,
Shane

oohh, and lower quality units fighting alongside top quality Elite or Guards of the same army are actually given a Morale boost for the confidence they have while they are near.

The downside being that if the Elite formation suffers its own adverse morale affects this works doubly so against lower quality friendlies…

It took mopre than "the mere presence" of the Old Guard to drive back eth Prussians – they charged them at bayonet point without firing, with the suport of Lobau's corps and the 8 Bn's of Young Guard.

There were a total of 20,000 French there by that time – whereas much of the Prusian Corps was still arriving – teh 14 Bns ejected were the initial force.

However the Prussians had themselves just fought those 8 Bn's of young Guard and ejected them from the village, and of course teh Prussian army was mostly conscript and had been recently badly handled at Ligny and Wavre, so was hardly an elite force!!

so the situation is a little less clear cut than a short sentence might convey….

I have been involved in a similar discussion about the effectiveness of Japanese troops in the Sth Pacific and how to rate them for FOW.

After their initial rush of victories their performance dropped off to a point where Australian troops were killing them in ratios of 10 – 20 to one, even when there wasn't a great deal of difference between their relative supply and support levels.

How do you get any sort of representation of this in a wargame?

actually this is not correct, the Young Guard had already been ejected by the Prussians in Planceoit, they were rallying when the 2 Old Guard btlns attacked.

The 20,000 French you speak of were not at Planceoit at all, they were facing the Prussians right across the right flank. They were not facing the 14 btlns of Prussians inside Planceoit at all. The 20,000 French were Lobu's corps and attached forces facing the entire Prussian line at this time.

You are correct with the less than Elite Prussian btlns facing the Old Guard but my point is that two btlns of Elite troops ejected 14 btlns of Prussians out with no trouble at all. Reputation caused the slump of morale as much as previous losses they suffered.

Madmike, I agree, the Aussie troops were initially Militia or choco soldiers as we call them. They were outnumbered 10 to 1 on the Kokoda trail against Imperial Japanese Marines which were considered the Elite of the Japanese forces. The aussies not only stopped them but pushed them back across the Owen Stanley range with the aid of toughened combat veterans newly arrived from the Middle East.

This phenomina is hard to relate on a war games table and how you portray it is difficult without upsetting some kind of balance in the rules.

I designed a WWII system years ago which was based on a similar basing system to FOW today. I decided to base the soldiers on stands depending on their suposed Eliteness but the overall firepower of each stand being identical to look something like this :

German
Commandos – 2 figures per stand
Waffen SS – 3 figures per stand (certain Divisions)
Fallshimjagers – 3 figures per stand
Wermarcht – 4 figures per stand
Volkgrenadiers – 5 figures per stand

British
Commandos – 2 figures per stand
Infantry – 4 figures per stand
Paratroopers – 3 figures per stand

Russian
Guards – 4 figures per stand
Siberian – 5 figures per stand
Infantry – 6 figures per stand

American
Rangers – 2 figures per stand
Paratroopers – 3 figures per stand
Big Red One – 4 figures per stand (when veteran)
Infantry – 5 figures per stand

It worked well and the games were fairly balanced. All troops no matter how Elite fired off the same chart with no +1 crap to any unit etc…If a hit and KO was scored it knocked out one enemy Element out no matter what size or experience it was.

We liked it.

no they were not – see link – Lobau's corps, the old guard and Young guard were all around Placenoit, which was where all the action was taking place – it was a fairly sizeable village perhaps 1000 yds across.

The 2 old guard Bn's were not alone – the 8 bn's of young guard that had retreated from Placenoit and had also counter-attacked along with elements of Lobau's corps – so it was absolutely NOT 2 Bn's vs 14.

The link is to the Wespoint Atlas map of hte Nappy wars – teh full set of them is at link – it's a worthwhile link to bookmark!

then we will have to agree to disagree

When writing about troop quality or assigning a level of Eliteness as game designers we have only the history books to go with and eyewitness accounts which many times are very tainted or abstracted. What's more is that as with any news, mundane news does not sell and this is no different when discussing combat engagements etc.

What I mean is this; most information written about battles are incidents of note which stand out and are usually written about in extra detail depending on information available. However, the more mundane combat which can take up 80-90% of a battle which rages for hours or even days is forgotten in the mist and fog of time. It is deemed not exciting enough to remember so is left out of the usual history books or accounts.

Now, this exciting stuff where extraordinary events took place on centre stage, are often quick and or decisive points or stages of a battle tending to take on a depth and highlighted importance far beyond their place in the battle because they sound far more interesting. The telling and re-telling of these exploits and situations tend to push the longer less exciting happening of a battle to the third page if not the back of the book if you know what I mean?

This is clearly demonstrated with regards to exploits of individual regiments in particular battles which could easily have been the exact same outcome had another regiment of formation been at the right place at the right time…The very regiment of formation might never do anything special ever again or it could have even spent several years on campaign completely out of the lime light doing nothing other than typical mundane service as required any regiment of formation but because it was there at the right place at the right time and did its duty or more it is remembered and often suddenly given accolades as an elite formation because of one charge or one heroic defence etc. why ?

That is the question no one can really quantify convincingly enough to give me any confidence what they are saying is correct. You have to understand that men are men and any man is capable of heroic deeds one day and craven fear the next. There is no rhyme or reason to it, it really just depends on the circumstances and the decisions made on the spot by men and their desire to do their duty or more to the point not stopping long enough to question why they are doing what they are doing. For once a soldier stops to ask this question fear gains a hold on him and he suddenly realises the danger he is in. Troops often tell of combat how they did not think about what they were doing; they just got on with it….

When a soldier does this and does not stop long enough to think about it he is more likely to do his duty and even more, this is when individuals, units and formations suddenly go beyond the expected level of duty they were required to perform. Once this occurs history is made and books are written.

This is why I believe in a kind of Shock test for troops under combat situations like Morale tests but more so about the men not scumming to Shock of combat. What I mean is, if a unit is given a shock test and passes it they can go on to carry out incredible deeds of valour but if failed they are then become vulnerable to the outcomes of Morale tests and probable mediocrity as in 80-90% of the fighting in any battle.
I am working on a system where this shock survival is based on the Eliteness of a unit with all units no matter what level of Eliteness (or lack thereof) being capable of such deeds of valour if they pass the Shock roll. I am also proposing that the differences between shock rolls be small differences regardless of the levels of Eliteness of the individual unit involved.

The main component of a shock roll will be sudden losses not extended battle losses, I am thinking along the lines of a percentage of the unit suddenly lost in a single combat turn as a direct colation to the level of the Shock roll. This depends on a few factors which I am yet to work out but really want to get this right. I also think a passed Shock roll should be small, only as much as 10-20% at best depending on the unit involved. If it passes, it will go on to perform deeds of valour far greater than was expected of it.

Now, going back to Eliteness gradings of troops and how they come about Bargration is correct, they tend to come directly from books simply because they tell us this regiment or that regiment did a great deed, therefore it must be a cut above the rest or is Elite. In cases even at the time the men regarded certain regiments to be better than others after these exploits. It you cut out a lot of this grey area you can easily come up with certain factors which are fixed to a point and others which are changing. Troops can be graded then more accurately.

First of all it has to be made clear that there has to be a tiered system of Eliteness, levels or upgrading or even downgrading for that matter. Secondly the differences between each grading should NOT be great. The more grading levels your rules have the less differences there should be between each grade and so on. Thirdly it must be remembered that a man is a man and although there are great differences between statures of individual men in one on one combat when placed in mass formations this difference is not so pronounced.

There are always exceptions to every rule and in combat these can be great. For example, if a unit is formed because the men are expected to be of a certain height or stature then one can expect these men will account well for themselves in melee or close combat or even be intimidating to the enemy due to size. Or another unit might be formed on the basis of Experience therefore that unit might gain advantages in Morale or other points. Another unit might be built on a basis of title and thus because of their higher title are given better rations and thus are better nourished and thus healthier and in better condition. Or you could even have a unit which has a combination of these advantages or even all of them. Point is, once you arrive at a set of requirements for assigning a level of Eliteness you can more easily decide what level of Eliteness you will give certain units.

Regards
Shane

Last Hussar,

>"Imperial Guard- Quality A". Why?
> In many battles they were used
> as a 'coup de gras'.

Please, 'Coup de GRACE' :-)
'coup de gras' means 'fat blow' <LOL>

Hyperforiegnism anyone?

link

What sets the British army apart in terms of organisation is the 'Battalion System' which has been decribed as its greatest strength while at the same time being a weakness. You join a 'club' with its own histories and traditions that go back sometimes 350 years. While this engenders great esprit de corps, it can lead to lack of flexibility.

What makes an army rather than just an armed rabble is discipline both as a unit and as an individual. Training means you do it right, discipline means you trust your comrades to do it right too. It is this that makes the recognised elites the elite- such as the 8 SAS (Bravo 20) vs 100+ Iraq.

Shane what do you see as inaccurate on the West Point Map?

!. Establish a set of parameters based on the mechanics of the rules. For example a number of different morale classes or melee abilities.

2. Convert the parameters into various ratings with what constitutes reaching a particular rating. Military experience helps in a number of cases based on the era being researched.

3. Review historical data without a bias slant. Research experience helps here. For example: Locating difficult to find resources. Compile data in the different categories.

4. Formulate a rough draft of the unmodified lists. Compare these lists to other nationality lists based on your rules.

5. Modify the raw lists based on game mechanics and other factors to ensure playability.

I am not saying the WP map is wrong, I am saying the idea that 20,000 french men fought inside Planceoit for control of that village that you imply.

Lobou's corps fought North East of PLanceoit during the afternoon eventually being forced back to it late in the afternoon. Lobou used the village as his anchor point to his right flank by placing an entire brigade inside only to have them relived by 8 btlns of Young Guard around 6pm that evening.

The young Guard were eventually forced out so badly that they were stremaing up the slope towards the Old Guard reserve with lead elements of the Prussian forces coming out of the village up the road. Napoleon sent two Old Guards one after the other in to counter this threat about 15mins apart with the lead btln of chassuers driving back the onrushing Prussians. When they became heavily engaged the second btln, that of Grenadiers came in and drove the Prussians with the bayonet back through the village taking the church and graveyard. Meanwhile the Young Guard had NOT rallied and their commander was disparing at his inhability to do so. Eventually all 14 btlns of Prussians of whom many btlns were actually Fresh and over 800 men strong were driven out and cleared form Plancoit. The Young Guard now rallied re-entered the village and held it with the Old Guard.

All of my information is found in Adkin;s book amongst many others, it might pay you to read it and study his maps…
When the Old Guard launched their attack, the Young Guard had NOT yet rallied!!!

Shane

We make it up out of whole cloth, and then try to find some justification for our decisions.

"After their initial rush of victories their performance dropped off to a point where Australian troops were killing them in ratios of 10 – 20 to one, even when there wasn't a great deal of difference between their relative supply and support levels.

How do you get any sort of representation of this in a wargame?"

Isn't this doctrinal? Where their bravery and or elitism actually worked against the Japanese. Sitting in a spiderhole waiting to be grenaded, charging wantonly in suicidal attacks against superior firepower – brave but ultimately foolhardy and tactically even strategically inept.

Trouble is that the ability for men to 'stand and take it' or climb the parapet and walk forward with bayonet level is too often rolled into a single factor which also represents their tactical military effectiveness.

Mark touched on another point that bothers me about some rules and that is tying combat capabilities to morale. Just because a unit can 'stand and take it' so to speak should not automatically qualify that unit for better combat ratings, in my opinion. I think uncoupling these different facets of unit performance can provide a more three dimensional representation of a given unit.

6. Giveyour finishedliststo arules sharpshooter who isfamiliar with your system. See if he canspot any obvious holes or ratings thatare 'off'. Accept the feedback!

7. Run some playtest games and see how the ratings work. Do all troops even if you have to use 'substitutes' for somearmies. Accept the Feddback.

8. Modify the ratingsbased on playtesting feedback. Then morer playtesting andfeed back.

9. Ready nowfor the demos and 'informal convention playtesting. Conduct some SMALL scenarios of the minimum number of playeres needed. IF they cannot run the game without your help after a few games the rules may be aproblem. Army list problems maystick out. Spending afew minutes having custom building armies excercise by independent players will also prove helpful. Accept feedback!

Simple: I rate everybody first, then make Templars better than everybody else =D

KT – aye, until Pope Clement V and his Inquisition turned up… :o)

Quite impressed with this thread, and will come back to it when I get more time. Just a quick mention of an old SPI boardgame (the hex-and-diecut-counter sort) caled 'Drive On Stalingrad' – an absolute monster to set-up – but one thing I always liked about the combat were the Red Army Rifle Divisions were all 'Untried' – the Axis player wouldn't know their strengths until he attacked them, whereupon the counter was flipped. Some had reasonable attack and defence factors – some were dire. I still remember losing Rostov to an advancing Panzer Division when the three untried Soviet Rifle Divisions flipped to show Attack / Defence of 0 / 0; 0 / 2; and 0 / 4 – really annoying…..

Maybe there could be some wargame rule or mechanism play-test to try this?

Shane,

"On troop quality I would strongly suggest from a games point of view that the British Light Division was better than the Guards Division"

Very good point Shane, most certainly correct and not just from a games point of view either and still is correct of course….

DB