nate7163 | 22 Feb 2008 8:56 a.m. PST |
Long post warning I used to be a fan of the Young Napoleon. (Ducking for cover) I had always thought that he was to slow, far too arrogant, even for a General. But, what cannot be denied is the skill displayed by the man in organizing and training the AOP. However, his behavior during the Second Manassas campaign with regards to sending troops to Pope is as close to high treason as it gets. I honestly think that is not dealt with properly by historians. Had he not found the Lost Order American history may have been dramatically different. (Thanks pzivh43 for bringing that point up on the Antietam thread) How do you talk about his record without it turning into a flame war? How do you do that? He is so hard to talk about. The potential this man had is just short of remarkable. But he did not live up to that. I think his political leanings had something to do with it. I also think that he genuinely wanted to avoid heavy casualties, maybe to a fault. He was pro, Antebellum, Union. I do not think that he was overtly racist, a product of his times. But it is impossible to deny that he wanted to return things to the status quo. Had Clausewitz, rather than Jomini been better known maybe, just maybe, his thinking may have been different with regards to fighting an offensive war. Once again I just don't know. I am a little suspicious of how he tried to spin things after he was removed. The mammoth report that he submitted to the War department is at times filled with pettiness. His version of things is fundamentally different again in the Century Magazine. The officer corps bore his finger prints until the end. There is something to be said about the morale effect he had on the troops. The effect the rumor of his return had prior to Gettysburg is also interesting. I do think that he was shaken by the ferocity of the fighting during the Seven days, but I don't that it was cowardice. I don't ever want to know what that was like or for that matter know how I would react to those bloody days. Not making excuses, but I think it is part of the story. I am curious what all of you think. Please, I do not want this to degenerate. What are your thoughts on the man and his legacy? |
Dan Cyr | 22 Feb 2008 9:19 a.m. PST |
One can give him credit for building the AOP after 1st Bull Run, establishing morale and creating the various departments that would keep the army supplied during the war. That said, his inability to be a "general" rather than a CEO of a large group of people, did him in. His physical fear of combat (reported on several occassions), his inability to use and understand military intelligence, his fear of the opposing forces and most ugly, his political slant and personal delusions of power make him a sad and lost individual in the history books. He, like Dugout Doug of another time, lived on a reputation not deserved. Self serving, unable to grasp what exactly it was that people did not like about them, they both went to their graves convinced that they were right (and all others were wrong). Dan |
McKinstry | 22 Feb 2008 9:43 a.m. PST |
While not a physical coward by any means he was certainly an intellectual and moral one. His almost manic aversion to movement, his willingness to believe the most ridiculous numbers put forth by Pinkerton and his terror at the thought of losing any of 'his' men all point to a man who while aspiring to generalship, simply couldn't handle the life and death reality of mid-19th century warfare and chose to retreat into a fantasy world of vast mythical enemy armies, a commander in chief forcing him into combat with a flawed badly outnumbered army and a shadowy army/congressional conspiracy out to get him. That and he was a jerk with classic short man syndrome. |
nate7163 | 22 Feb 2008 10:08 a.m. PST |
After many years of thinking about this very topic I still can't crystallize my thoughts on him and his legacy. Everything that both of you have said is absolutely right. But he looms large in any discussion of the war. Maybe it is part of the shared memory of our, Civil War. I think it is absolutely impossible to separate it. I just don't know how to place him. It is interesting that he brings up much of the same emotion that discussions of R.E. Lee do. There is something to be said about that. Nathan |
Dn Jackson | 22 Feb 2008 10:35 a.m. PST |
Well, as an army commander he was a complete failure, Against Robert E. Lee. But I can't help but wonder what would have happened if Johnston had not been wounded. His sole offensive action, Seven Pines, was poorly planned and executed, (as were most plans this early in the war), but he had showed no real aggresive intent before that, (or indeed, after at Atlanta). It's possible Mac may have laid siege to Richmond and won the war. That said, I agree with the above, he should have destroyed Lee at Antietam and only his own incompetance at field combat saved the ANV. |
rusty musket | 22 Feb 2008 10:49 a.m. PST |
I remember seeing a book on Amazon that supposedly defended McClellan and laid much blame on Lincoln. I am not a big fan of revisionist history though, at times corrections have merit, so I did not buy it. Does anyone know of a book that defends McClellan and did it make any valid points? |
rusty musket | 22 Feb 2008 10:56 a.m. PST |
I think I found the book. The author is Russell Beatie. The book is The Army of the Potomac : (and something about McClellan's Penninsular campaign). This is the third volume in a multivolume set by Beatie on the war in the east. |
Man of Few Words | 22 Feb 2008 12:03 p.m. PST |
I value Winfield Scott for bringing professionalism to the US Army, but it was not the degree which we have today. Both Mac and Lee passed throught the "Scott Military Acedemy" as well as West Point. The different results must lie with the internal person. Nobody else achieved what McClellan did with organizing an army from chaos, though Joe Hooker scores well in that endeavor. Both of them failed to see the innate military power they had and were defeated by Lee with half that power. Perhaps they thought too much about their responsibilty and were over-whelmed by it. The sucessful Grant only regreted one battle, Second Cold Harbor. Lee's alledged comment was that he was not concerned about his oponents' actions except McClellan. The war was more then dressing like soldiers and the two best practioners of it, Lee and Grant, were noted for their personal gentleness and care. McClellan never understood and didn't handle the difference of reality from desire. |
nate7163 | 22 Feb 2008 12:40 p.m. PST |
Man of Few Words, good point about Hooker, but he did well as a corps commander. And you are right, the job Hooker did at restoring the AOP after Fredericksburg was tremendous. I think that the lack of 'responsibility' at the corps of command was something Hooker thrived in. Not unlike A.P. Hill did as division commander vs. what he did at the corps level. The way Little Mac handled Scott is something that I had forgot. Maybe that was the first sign of the personality flaws that would manifest latter that year. Nathan |
nate7163 | 22 Feb 2008 12:43 p.m. PST |
corps level of command, stupid fat fingers |
terrain sherlock | 22 Feb 2008 1:37 p.m. PST |
A small point on the Peninsula Campaign.. Mac had a decent plan.. but based on an incorrect map. His advance was to be covered on the flank by a river. Unfortunately the river ran perpendicular to his advance.. This sorta screwed up the plan..:-) |
docdennis1968 | 22 Feb 2008 2:13 p.m. PST |
A little bit of sympathy for Mac at Sharpsburg. He knew the Order of Battle of the ANV and a lot about its deployment. What he did not know was the actual shape the ANV was in as to "real" unit strengths and how many men had stayed behind from crossing into Maryland. His intelligence was flawed by assuming the Regts, Brigades and Divisions were similiar to his own troops strengths. But that was what his information was. He also wanted to believe it too much probably also! When the battle was joined he agressively attacked with succesive Corps from the right. He utilized arty well, he kept a good reserve ready to exploit. Unfortunately every move seemed to run up into a CSA force able to check him. WE know how thin and brittle the CSA really was, how close to breaking, but HE did not! Since he believed the CSA were there in greater numbers than reality, he felt stymied. Hills late arrival was the last straw for Mac. How many of us would have read the situation differently, if we had the pre battle estimates (totally wrong of course) Mac had? He had his virtues and his faults, but Antietam was not won because of faulty estimates of CSA strength that ANY ACW General could have made, and many did later! |
Man of Few Words | 22 Feb 2008 3:53 p.m. PST |
A little disagreement with docdennis. McClellan knew the dispersal of Lees's Army, true, but he never considered that the losses to fatigue, weather etc that he had, also affected his opponent. Mac's plan for Antietam sounds good but he left execution to his subordinates. Same habit as Lee but Mac stayed away from the point of conflict vs Lee, so lost the morale force of his commands. Also, he just never used all his units. The real Napoleon used his Old Guard sometimes. Reserves are meant to be used. For the record, I am a fan of McClellan but I am also a fan of Bragg. Generalship is more than winning battles! |
Man of Few Words | 22 Feb 2008 3:58 p.m. PST |
Follow-up to Dn Jackson: Good point about face off with Joe Johnston. McClellan and Johnson were very much 'Old School" of maneuver to success. War had become less polite. Lee had a foot on both sides of this divide. Grant was totally on the modern side of it. |
nate7163 | 22 Feb 2008 5:10 p.m. PST |
To further a point made by docdennis1968 pertaining to the Maryland Campaign. When he did have Lee's Lost Order he moved fast by McClellan's standards. Granted he lost a full day while he over planned and over analyzed what to do. But he did move aggressively. I don't think he can be faulted for the slows Franklin developed on South Mountain. The attacks up Turner and Fox's gaps were ferocious and sustained, fairly uncharacteristic for him. He did employ his artillery well at Antietam, but lost a day. That one day, the 16th could have changed it all. That battle was one of the better run by him. Not saying by any stretch of the imagination that it was a masterpiece but it was once again very uncharacteristic of him. That is what had me as a fan of his for a while. At the back of the War College Guide to the Battle of Antietam there is a discussion of how over taxed the supply lines had become. It got me thinking. The AOP had fought 3 major campaigns over the course of 6 or so months. They had lost an enormous amount of supplies when Old Jack captured the stores at Manassas Junction. Who knows how much was still in route or at Fortress Monroe. Maybe, just maybe for once in his life he was telling the truth that he could not move. Much of this last argument wilts when one realizes that Lee and his army had done much of the same, albeit they had gained supplies via the AOP. Good stuff guys, I really am enjoying this. Nathan |
Man of Few Words | 22 Feb 2008 6:09 p.m. PST |
October was spent re-equiping AOP. Some descriptions had them more ragged then "ragged rebels". |
Dn Jackson | 22 Feb 2008 6:25 p.m. PST |
"A little bit of sympathy for Mac at Sharpsburg. He knew the Order of Battle of the ANV and a lot about its deployment. What he did not know was the actual shape the ANV was in as to "real" unit strengths and how many men had stayed behind from crossing into Maryland." True enough. But, he also knew through the order how dispersed the ANV was. Even if his estimates of it's size were correct he had the paper in hand to defeat it piecemeal, and he failed miserably. Even if Lee outnumbered him 2 to 1, he could have used the Lost Order to fall on a piece of Lee's army and crush it. He could still hear the cannonade going on at Harper's Ferry when the South Mountain fighting was going on so he knew that Lee had not had a chance to concentrate his army. As a field commander a complete flop. |
John the OFM | 22 Feb 2008 7:33 p.m. PST |
I usually give Mac little slack. However, in his shoes, I would be really hesitant to believe 100% in the Lost Orders. |
terrain sherlock | 22 Feb 2008 8:33 p.m. PST |
Re: the Lost Orders.. no, they were accepted as genuine.. one of the staff recognized the handwriting.. As for being "planted".. there was no indication of that. |
Milhouse | 22 Feb 2008 9:06 p.m. PST |
IIRC, Lee was asked after the war who was his toughest opponent and I believe he said McClellan. The other thing to consider is that ALL Civil War commnaders were on a bit of a learning curve. None had comanded more than a brigade before the war. Also, as Civil War scholars we all understand the lessons of Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg , the Wilderness etc. Little Mac did not have the benefit of having seen those actions play out. As I said on previous thread, he was young and insecure. Perhaps after a year as a corps commander and then taking overall command, maybe then he would have fared better. |
gamertom | 22 Feb 2008 9:10 p.m. PST |
McClellan's good points: Was excellent at getting troops trained and ready for war. Maintained good army morale while in command. Was fairly good as an overall strategic commander – much better than Halleck, but not as good as Grant in this regard. Made excellent use of amphibious operations during 1862 – seizure of New Bern is an example. McClellan's bad points: well covered in previous posts. Conclusion: the Union would have been much better served if he had not taken personal command in the field once he was appointed as overall commander. Re: his bravery, I don't think he was a personal coward based on his various exploits during the Mexican-American War as described in Timothy Johnson's "A Gallant Little Army." Reading that work made me appreciate how he and Lee followed different aspects of Scott's Mexico City Campaign. McClellan seems to have walked away with the idea that taking and holding key points was the best way to fight whereas Lee learned to hold the enemy in place with frontal diversionary attacks while moving around a flank for a decisive blow. re: Antietam, there's an interesting essay in Gallegher's collection "The Antietam Campaign" published in 1999 regarding McClellan's concerns with the substantial fraction of his forces at Antietam that were comprised of newly raised volunteers. These green units simply did not fight as well as the more seasoned ones. Lee's force was mainly very seasoned troops while McClellan's were not. It would be interesting to develop a comparison of capabilities to see if McClellan actually out numbered Lee in actual fighting capability (i.e., develop a Dupuy numerical comparison). Just looking at the overall numbers doesn't tell you the full story. |
Milhouse | 22 Feb 2008 9:11 p.m. PST |
Oh and as for Hooker, as I said on a different thread, I belive his failures at Chancellorsville can be partly attributed to him being knocked senseless by an artillery round. He performed well later in the war and partially redeemed himself. |
Agesilaus | 22 Feb 2008 9:40 p.m. PST |
I am no defender of McClellan as a field commander, but here are a few thoughts. He did not just "reorganize" the Army of the Potomac as his successors did, he invented it. After Bull's Run there was no "Army" of the Potomac. The 75,000 men called up to defend the capital were mostly 90 dayers. Virginia alone could field more trained militia than the entire regular army of the U.S.A. and the South got more than their share(by population) of the trained officers. The Army that Mac built in a short time was nothing short of miraculous. The other point that I see all the time is the high regard, and fierce loyalty that the veterans of the AoP had for him. It's in their letters. These are very enlightening, because they are not influenced by hindsight. |
Dan Cyr | 22 Feb 2008 9:51 p.m. PST |
One does not have to be a physical coward. Mac made it very clear that he did not like the front lines. Note his removal of himself and staff during any battle of the Seven Days, going so far as to spend several days on a ship while his army fought for it's life. Perhaps it was an inability to handle combat stress, but he was no Hancock (who I admire). Dan |
nate7163 | 23 Feb 2008 10:14 a.m. PST |
Some thoughts, Milhouse, I have often thought that your point about the learning curve was one of the reasons Antietam was so bloody. I really think that it was the first time both armies really knew what they were doing. gamertom, had not thought of it that way, would have to agree that he would have been a very good chief of staff. You are right, substantial portions of the XIIth corps were very inexperienced. A lot of them were 90 day troops. Your points about how McClellan and Lee taking different parts of Scott contribute to the differences with regards to how they viewed command and warfare is the story. History is full of examples of armies fighting the last war! Agesilaus, the fact that he created an army from that mess alone is truly remarkable. I don't know if anybody else on the Union side could have done the job he did with that army. Gentlemen thanks to all you for your thoughts and comments. At the end of the day I am still unsure in my mind at least how to place him. As always TMP never fails to impress.Good stuff!! Nathan |
nate7163 | 23 Feb 2008 10:16 a.m. PST |
Dan Cyr, I have always wondered how dif. the war may have been had Hancock been placed in command of the AOP. Nathan |
Dan Cyr | 23 Feb 2008 4:57 p.m. PST |
Antietam was so bloody because the AOP at that time was not the army of six months prior (many units had reached the end of their enlistments and gone home) and not the army of six months later having been bloodied. Many, many Union troops at Antietam were green, barely able to march in formation, let enough experienced as to how to manover and fight. Read of the attack at the Cornfield to grasp how bad they really were. Numbers that show the AOP to heavily outnumber Lee there don't tell the whole story. Hancock, as well as Reynolds were more aggressive than Meade, and one could make a case that they'd have been more willing to attack Lee at and after Gettysburg. Even Hooker and Burnside were willing to attempt offensives against Lee, which Mac would not, and could not due to his limitations as a general and a man. The best that can be said for Mac was he made few errors, but then nothing ventured, nothing gained. Dan |
Man of Few Words | 24 Feb 2008 2:58 p.m. PST |
That reminds me of a story about Joe Johston: He was a great marksman. When he went hunting people expected him to make the biggest bag. His friends would shoot at anything but Johnston always had a reason for not firing. The dogs were in the way, the wind would carry the bird too far, etc. At the end of the day, his friends had fired a lot but had shot a lot of birds and had all round good time. Johnston had hit what he fired at but they were few. Still, more important, tholugh, his record as a marksman was not tarnished. Now who asked what would've happened if Johnston had not been wounded, Dn Jackson? |
Milhouse | 24 Feb 2008 3:47 p.m. PST |
Sam Watkins ("Company 'Aytch" 1st Tennessee) was quite fond of Johnston and was not pleased when he was relieved by Hood. |
DJCoaltrain | 24 Feb 2008 8:46 p.m. PST |
Dn Jackson 22 Feb 2008 9:35 a.m. PST Well, as an army commander he was a complete failure, Against Robert E. Lee. IIRC – Post war, General Lee was asked which Union General caused him the most concern, "General McClellan" was General Lee's answer. |
DJCoaltrain | 24 Feb 2008 8:56 p.m. PST |
rusty musket 22 Feb 2008 9:49 a.m. PST
Does anyone know of a book that defends McClellan and did it make any valid points? This link will take you to three books about the Antietam campaign. The man who wrote them taught graduate history at George Mason University for a number of years – his specialty was General McClellan and to a lesser degree the Antietam campaign (he grew up in the vicinity). I took a couple courses from him while a Grad History student at George Mason University. He took us on a tour of the Antietam campaign that traced the path of the ANV and the AoP as they moved toward Antietam. link |
nate7163 | 25 Feb 2008 7:36 a.m. PST |
DJCoaltrain, I am sure that you are aware of how much pressure is on you in graduate school to come up with new interpretations. I had seen one of those books but did not buy it. I think I went with the group of essays edited by Gary Gallegher(sp)Might check it out, nice to read stuff that differs from the dominant historiography. Nathan |
DJCoaltrain | 25 Feb 2008 10:06 p.m. PST |
"Sounding the Shallows" is chock full of data that gamers find relavent, but is often ignored in history texts. There is an almanac and a gazetteer for the campaign. Plus a very robust ANV OOB that discusses the range of troops available to Lee on 2 September. Apparently no one knows for sure. It also contains notations as to which officers commanded what when they were killed and when they were wounded. The AoP strength is not mentioned – not within the scope of the study. At any rate the trilogy was money well spent for me. I do take issue with a couple of Harsh's assertions/conclusions, but overall a good read. "Confederate Tide Rising" and "Taken at the Flood" won, respectively, the 1998 Peter Seaborg Award and the 1999 Jefferson Davis Award. These books focus on Lee and the Confederacy during the Antietan Campaign, but that also means Gen McClellan is in there also. As a grad student in his class I did a short paper on McClellan during the campaign. Professor Harsh is proably "The Man" when it comes to the Antietam Campaign. |