"Artillery" Topic

I KNOW I'm tempting the Gods, but I found this while browsing (as usual) for something else, and thought it was worth sharing…

wtj.com/articles/napart

Oh well,…

It's OK, you didn't say 'bricole'

oh…

/smack kawasaki

They should have put Kevin's book in there under recommended reading.

The article is an interesting overview.

Well, it would be appropriate given that this article is just another lot of half-baked North American tosh. I see Lichtenstein isn't even mentioned nor the great Russian batteries. WTJ is fuill of conventional wisdom, but scratch the surface and the secondary sources to see what nonsense underpins it.

INCOMING!!!!!………..

Seriously, Byrhthelm, thanks for pointing this out to us. I can appreciate why an (elite) gunner should want to keep artillery on the agenda here.

I shall now go and read the article with both interest and the best critical/analytical faculties I can muster.

spelling Gribeauval as Grimbeauval is an indication for a quick job.

@Dave Hollins

"nor the great Russian batteries."

Who are these, please ?

Unless you are thinking that with so many pièces (per fantassin, per metre of battle line, etc.) the Russians did have the effect of a great battery, I do not know of the same finesse and tactical skill, especially in the attaque, for the Rusian artillerie, as led the French to form there great batteries in the attaque.

By 1811-1815, one can say that the Russian artillerie did not fail to have excellentes pièces (may be among the best of all nations), and one can not say that the officiers were with out literacy nor any training, nor can one say that there was a lack of rounds, nor (above all) can one say that there was a lack of quantity.
In the defense, it is hard to see a better artillerie, especially with the common practice to make a field works, and to move only up on ordres or to an Other World.

But still, one may say, with out more than an usual fear of a correction, that there remained a lack of tactical skill in the attaque, in comparison to the French.

Just the opinion of one man, OK ?

- un ami

Dear Un Ami
The use of Russian Artillery in defence and the amount that they were able to take to the field was astounding. As already shown by you, the M1805 system was superior in many ways to the M1765 Gribeauval system in weight and maneurability. The AnXI and the M1808 modifications did in some part balance the quality of the ordnance.

I am not as convinced upon the Grand Battery as many writers. It was in many ways a regression into siege warfare. The French M1803 6-pdr had a larger calibre than other 6-pdrs so it could fire their ammunition so the sacrefice of windage and accuracy. To compensate it could be argued was the Grand Battery. By sheer weight of shot you deny the enemy a particular area of ground. If he stands there he would be devasted. It did not always work. The tactics used by the French became blunter.

It is always difficult to appreciate the workings of the Russian Artillery when you deal with mainly French sources. Certainly at Eylau the firepower of the Russian guns was admired and feared.

It is always interesting listening to the tactical brilliance of the French Artillery but you are pointed to a few occurences and these were of the 1805-07 period. The think that amazes me is that the French were so good with such a poor assortment of equipment that relied upon captured ordnance and the so-called poor M1803 guns/equipment. If it was so poor why did the great Artillery General and Emperor endorse the new ordnance. There is something that does not ring true for me.

Stephen

The French employment of the new artillery tactics introduced by Senarmont at Friedland in 1807 were used until the end of the Empire and were noteworthy and tactically decisive at Raab, Ocana, Wagram, Lutzen, Hanau, Ligny, and at Waterloo after the French cavalry charges. However, the employment of French artillery to seize the tactical initiative and being used as the main effort on the battlefield did not occur until 1807. Prior to that the tactic was not employed. That was Senarmont's innovation and one that was copied in the Grande Armee after that when possible. It was another arrow in the quiver.

French artillery tactics were always aggressive, the French being willing to lose guns, something the Russians would not do, in order to gain an advantage on the battlefield. Regarding the French in comparison to the Russians tactically with artillery you might want to look at what General Sievers said about the French after the 1807 campaign, which is contained in the Zhmodikov's excellent books on Russian tactics.

I would suggest you take a look at the artillery tactics in some more depth, probably the correspondence of Drouot and Senarmont for a start, which is contained in Girod de l'Ain's book on Drouot, Eble, and Senarmont. None of the allied armies employed artillery in this manner, which made it an equal maneuver element with the infantry and cavalry. And French doctrine from at least 1778 emphasized infantry and artilery coordination.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Good point Kevin,

I am just reading Maude's "The Leipzig Campaign:1813 and on page 109-111 he speaks of Marmont's demand for reinforcements at Leutzen to which Napoleon replied, "Tell your Marshall he is mistaken, the decision lies at Kaja, not at Starsiedel". He had deemed the battle not yet ripe to unleash his own reserves until he was sure the enemy had already committed his.

Quote :

""The time had now come for the final knock out blow and Drouot with 60 guns of the Guard artillery galloped out to the front, and unlimbering at case shot range began to tear the very heart out of the Allied army, whilst the whole Infantry of the Guard followed in rear, sweeping along with it all that still had life in the sorely shattered III Corps. The Allies gave way on all points….""

This does show the aggressiveness of French tactical use of their artillery in this battle which is repeated in many others. I really don't see this with allied armies.

I do think as war gamers many of us tend to not play out this grand tactic of the French all that well and fail to understand its full impact on the enemy. I know myself in battles I will bombard the enemy then when I feel I am ready I will launch the final attack marching through the guns which are still 600-800 yds away. This gives the enemy time to recover and shore up the line.

If on the other hand the gun line is marched forward to canister range and unlimbered while the infantry remain behind and then opens up the enemy will suffer more for it morale wise and when they waver the Infantry can take over from a distance of less than 300yds or so.

War gamers ar so frightened of losing guns from enemy fire on the way up that they tend to shy away from doing so thus missing a great opportunity to cause havoc at close range. sure guns might be lost but I think the success of the tactic far outweighs the loss of a few guns.

however, if rules are very destructive with artillery fire as in the casualties they cause a gamer cannot expect this tactic to work and thus the tendency not to commit themselves to employing such a risky enterprise as moving limbered guns 500yds towards an enemy who could shatter them battery after battery.

Like I have said on other threads gunfire round shot at longer range 500-1000yds is more destructive than psychological while canister should be more psychological than destructive at short range. Understanding this one sees why the French employed their artillery as such in their attacks such as at Leutzen and other battles.

Regards,
Shane

KFK writes

"I would suggest you take a look at the artillery tactics in some more depth."

I would suggest you do the same especially on the Prussian Army where you are seemingly out of your depth and very prejudiced, just read the massive three volumes of Malinowsky & Bonin, Decker and Tempelhoff before you jump to your sweeping coonclusions.

@Kevin F Kiley

"the French being willing to lose guns, something the Russians would not do "

In 1805, yes.
In 1807, often.
In 1812, no.

One is sure you are knowing the ordres on the General major Aleksandr Kutaisov at Borodino battle (who had also managed his guns aggresivly at Eylau). So by 1812, the idea of the Russians on the losing of guns was similar to the French, one of the many sujects were there was reform in Russia modelled much up on the French methodes. But if the General major Aleksandr Kutaisov did have a good skill, one will also note he had no ready replacement up on his death at Borodino, and Kutuzov did write of this as a problem in the battle.

One will know that you do know well the General major Aleksandr Kutaisov, since in your excellente book you do give his "General Rules for Artillery in a Field Battle" for anglo-phones.

:-)

@Shane

The General major Kutaisov did counsel to send a few rounds at 1000 metres to bother the ennemi and tomake the guage of the range and the wind and the ground, but not too much, and to open the great firing at 600 metres. He did also counsel to kill the cavalerie and infanterie in the defence and to also target the artillerie of the ennemi in the attaque.
If you do not have the book of @Kevin F Kiley, one could reccommend it as a good general introduction to some of the detailes of the artillerie for anglo-phones.

- votre ami

@summerfield,

"the so-called poor M1803 guns/equipment."
"There is something that does not ring true for me."

One can only agree, dear colleague.

That there was opposition to the making of the new pièces, this we see in a general way. But what was the reasons for this ? I would wish to see the original comments and reccommendations (in French language) to see what the issues were in the truth.

These may not have lain up on the designs of the guns, but up on training or a doctrine, industrial capacitie, funds available or some other things.

To look at the designs, it is hard to not see the technical improvements. And the 8-pounder did seem by then not of the best use-fullness.

- votre ami

@Shane

"moving limbered guns 500yds towards an enemy"

No, the limbering takes too long and the horses will be killed. It is done with men to drag up on a rope on in a **** over the shoulder. The guns do stand in sections, some to fire while the other moves.It is very much like a modern practice and quite interesting to do in a wargame.

If your associates do not study the Frenches (and mine do not since I do play them), they will be surprised to see this technique, even the second and third and later times to some extent.

You must have horse in support.

If you have only infanterie, and the ennemi has a good horse, the they may take the guns (after a great loss). But if they can only turn up on the guns by giving a flank to your horse, then you will have them repeat the charge of the British Light Brigade or give you the chance to take the flank.

If the ennemi does come with infanterie, then your horse will either put them in square (a beautiful target) or will take the flank of a column.

So, put your horse in support a little to each side, with some fantassins directly behind the guns to launch the final attaque after your guns have closed to fire several cannister.

YOu may not always win, but almost always, given OK terrain and numbers, you will cause your target section of the ennemi battle line to move, which you knowing this in advance then gives you many advantages to make a surprise result up on the ennemi.

Very clever, these Frenches, isn't ?

:-)

- un ami

hi Un ami,

Quote :

""The time had now come for the final knock out blow and Drouot with 60 guns of the Guard artillery galloped out to the front, and unlimbering at case shot range began to tear the very heart out of the Allied army, whilst the whole Infantry of the Guard followed in rear, sweeping along with it all that still had life in the sorely shattered III Corps. The Allies gave way on all points….""

This is from maude, he is telling us the guns "limbered" galloped towards the enemy and then, "unlimbered" so this clearly states no such thing as manhandling or prolonging the guns was doen. It was by dragging the guns forward by horses that the guard artillery attack at Leutzen occured…correct me if I am wrong.

Regards,
Shane

@Shane,

The guns of the French garde were not moved at all once deployed at Lützen.

The guns were placed on a hills north east of Starstiedel, to the west of Kaja. Here they could fire up on the infanterie of Wittgenstein and Yorck that defended Kaja and the cavalerie of Wintzingerode, which was attacking Marmont. In each case the range was 750 to 800 metres (not too close, but OK for Frenches howitzers).They were supported in the movement by the vieille garde à pied and a large cavalerie, of both the garde and ligne. "Vous protégerez ces batteries, dit l'Empereur aux vieux soldats, et si l'ennemi se présente, vous m'en rendrez bon compte !".
So, a countre attaque against the vieille garde was not too likely to work.
At the same time, 16 bataillons of the jeune garde did also attack Kaja, under the ordres of the duc de Trévise, le maréchal Mortier. The Empereur did see them off to start the attack in his person. They did clear the village.

It was said at the eulogie for the sage Drouot that l'Empereur did say he did barely arrive on the hill in time, even at a galloping. May be there was a worry that the horse attacking Marmont would break through and occupy the hill, to ruin the plan to open the ennemi battle line at Kaja.

So, over all, a very good finesse in tactics for the French.

The real question was why was Kaja being held in such strength if the hills to its west were not also at least under a strong fires, if not also occupied. A Bagration or a Kutuzov may be would not be making this error, isn't?

Here is a nice map, with a zoomify:
link

- votre ami

My original point was about battery size, since the WTJ presents it as some kind of French development, whereas the Russians used 70gun batteries at Eylau. The French do indeed regress to Jemappes and simple bombardment with the Grande Batterie at Wagram – reports from the following days show these pieces were badly shot up themselves and famopusly, Guard infantry were used to maintain the crews, implying siugnificant loss of trained gunners. Gunners take quite a lot of time to train, so you cannot just thropw them away.

As for Senarmont, I think we have done this enough times – he was pulling guns up supported by infantry. The stories are claims deriving solely from Senartmont himself.

Dear Un Ami
I find it strange that the Prussian Army is dismissed on the one hand for the supported arms principle and the French applauded for the same thing.

I am looking at the practicalities of the guns and their use. Yes there is time in my life to look at the flowing poetic words. I am researching German States Artillery and very interested in the Russian.

The tactics used by the French in the later period with their guns does not seem much better than the coalition. Was this training, horses or something else. I know that is a sweeping statement but it has come from years of studying the maps.

Waterloo is a classic example that most know about. Why did the French horse artillery not support the cavalry attack. The Grand battery was ineffective. Also the number of rounds was relatively low it seems. Number of rounds fire being unreliable.

French artillery tactics seem to be different from those of the coalition certainly in the early period but was there a convergence on the part of the Russians and Prussians in forming Grand Batteries.

I always find it so interesting the question of Hanau and so misunderstood by those who have only read the French sources. Wrede had only just formed his Corps. His artillery were not of the same calibre. He lost as badly as he did as he ran out of ammunition. Austrian and Bavarian guns had different calibres. It was a two day battle and he was there to delay the French and where was the pursuit from the victors of Leipzig. He underestimated his opponents. The number and quality. The Bavarian cavalry charge was initiated as the Bavarians guns were without ammunition.

Look at the road that he was to block. It was not the one crossing the river to Hanau. He had to deploy in front of the river to block the road the French were taking. It is interesting when you get the maps out.

The uncovering of the guns was an old tactic and had been used for any cavalry supported by artillery since the 7YW if not before.

It is to weigh up in the mind the command decisions that can be made. Would it have been better for Wrede to sit behind the river and watch the French Army march by. He was expecting stragglers and a competant pursuit. I do not understand why this did not occur.

Stephen

@Dave Hollins

"whereas the Russians used 70gun batteries at Eylau"
Yes. And likely this was seen as too few. By 1811, each corps (usually 2 divisions of infantrie and 1 division of cavalerie légère) did deploy of 80-90 pièces of 6-pounder and 12-pounder guns, and 10-pounder and 20-pounder licornes. Plus the guns with the cavalerie réserve. Plus the artillerie réserve. And these not counting often 1-2 pièces per 12 held above complement in many batteries.
But the value of an artillerie can not be measured only in quantity, or we would see the "amazing Russian legendary artillerie" even with European authors (it shows thus to Russians some times). In fact, the measure of quanity is often conveniently for gotten, especially by anglo-phones, may be becasue the British artillerie was so very few.
I think our colleague @summerfiled does lead us to a make a more careful appreciation.

@summerfield
"The tactics used by the French in the later period with their guns does not seem much better than the coalition."
Some times. Our colleague @Shane did lead us to to look at Lützen, and there we see such a finesse of tactics of artillerie in the attaque and such an eye for ground and the way in which the ennemi could put himself in a false position. As you do write, and I did note to our colleague, it is needed ot carefully look up on the maps and know the ranges, the laying and state of the ground and the deployment of the targets.
In the defense, there seems little or no advantage to the French in tactics of artillerie in comparison to the later Russians, and one supposes thus also the later Prussiens, nor more over the British (who seemed quite good in this, but with so few guns).
But in an attaque, I think we can se some better skill among the French, some times.
But may be not at Waterloo. There are two main questions, and you do touch them both.
The first is the artillerie à cheval. The excellente Adkins is the first I have read that in detaile does try to place these pièces on the battle field. He does so sythetically …. by substraction, to account a number of guns here or there -- and by assumption, to put a number of guns where they are most likely located. It is not purely convincing. But, try then your self to find these pièces organically (by a direct réference) ! I did thus, and did fail. Also, their losses were low. They may not have been so deployed as did Adkins measure out. May be not at all. And, as you do write, not with the French cavalerie charges.
The first thing to say of the Grand Batterie is that it did not move. It did sit, as did the Grand Batterie at Lützen. But Wellington did not have a false position, but an excellente one, and a bombardement did not really suffice. Did the ground not serve for an advance (too wet, too rolling, too obstructioned) ? Did Napoléon and Soult not understand the map and the topographie (as does konjecture the brilliant Belge, M. Coppens) ? For fear of the need to fight the second set of Prussians and the Russians, did Napoléon wish not to lose his guns or gunners ?
The second thing to say is that the guns at Waterloo were may be too few in the Grand Batterie, and the rounds fired too few, as you do mention. One will compare Borodino. We will think that this because the deployment of the Britsh did not offer sufficient targets, with the felicitations thus to Wellington -- and may be again for a fear to have to fight again. One may note that the great firings in the attaque by the French did tend to be when it was hoped to end a campaign (Eylau, Freindland, Borodino), or when forced (Leipzig), but not of a start to one.
For Hanau, I have not done the careful study that you do counsel. It is painful, as the soldats bavarois have changed sides, which can only give one a strong emotion to think about.
To make some general comments.
Wrede did not undertake positions to block the road. He did undertake to defend Hanau and his own lines of communication. He should have paved the road to Frankürt with the bodies of 50 000 Autrichiens before he did let the French pass. But instead, he had much of forces and his guns on the wrong side of the Kintzig.
Then as if to compound his error, he did fight at the line of the woods, but this did impair the advantage of cavalerie and artillerie he did have, when this would be best done in the plain to the north and west of Hanau above the Kintzig.
In such false dispostiton, with such an lack of willingness to fight his command to its death to block the French, Wrede was much defeated before the action did begin. The grand batterie of the French in this case was only 50 pièces, not much more than 1/2 the number of guns of a Russian corps. So not so much.
But Wrede did fight as did an Autrichein, not as a Russian nor as a Prussien, nor even as a British.

OK, I do think the fast for Lent is making me write too much !

:-)

- votre ami

Dear Un Ami
Excellent analysis. I just have not seen a proper statistical study upon situations other than Waterloo. Yes Atkins does this in part.

The number of guns the Russians used and were able to transpart was astounding. Interesting, the number of guns stayed almost constant from 1812 to 1814 but the numbers in the cavalry and infantry declined. So the proportions increased. The Russians allocated batteries with their allies to compensate.

About Hanau, Wrede was unclear as to which side of river was the line of retreat. He had no ammunition reserves. The Corps was formed by former enemies.

Stephen

Ami is right to some extent, but especially for saying that the Wagram/Lutzen batteries were static, focusing on sheer firepower. Contrary to one myth doing the rounds, Gribeauval and du Teil did not forsee mobile tri-arms tactics before horse artillery was devised by anyone – their emphasis is on guns working with the artillery. Indeed, the failure of the horse batteries to do much at Waterloo simply shows the nonsense of claims that French horse artilelry was supposed to support cavalry attacks – they didn't because they could not keep up and even if they had been able to, there was not much point stopping and setting up for firing only to find the cavalry had gone.

As so often, it is back to the 7YW. L's Austrian guns made the Austrian artillery more mobile in its bigger calibres, so the field weapon could be more than a simple battlefield 3pdr pop gun. Frederick brought in his horse guns to be even more mobile – the aim was simple: to get decent calibres and howitzers into key positions quiickly.

The French go a different way – sticking with over-heavy guns, they gain some manoeuvrability, but as du Teil states, it is support the infantry and by 1792, there are stiull no horse guns. Look at the first two Revolutionary battles – the Cannonade of Valmy and then Jemappes, where in a classic version of the WW1 bombardment, the French heavy guns pound the Austrian centre and after one failed assault in assault columns, they try again in the Meusnil-Durand heavy column and break through. Lesson – lots of guns to smash up the enemy centre, while threatening the wings in 7YW style to draw men from the centre. In a fair fight, such as the following battle of Neerwinden, the French came off worst and the Austrians (who never used artillery as a main weapon allegedly) brought gun batteries up with small cavalry escorts (hence the name of the guns – but apparently this wasn't done by the Austrians) to smash up French heavy columns.

What the French htenm do afterwards is simply an extension of theor philosophy – get lots of guns to key points, especially to smash up the centre. As armioes become bigger, so there is more artillery and the batteries grow. Assault columns are only really workable by well-trained troops and by 1809, the French have burned theirs up, so it is back to he heavy columns. French artilelry philosophy does not change and it is different from the Allies', but it was not about mobile batteries following cavalry around.

"moving limbered guns 500yds towards an enemy"

No, the limbering takes too long and the horses will be killed. It is done with men to drag up on a rope on in a **Bleeped text** over the shoulder. The guns do stand in sections, some to fire while the other moves.It is very much like a modern practice and quite interesting to do in a wargame.

Aaargh! Manhandle guns 500 yards (metres) while under fire? Thanks, but… er, no thanks. It is hard enough manhandling a 25pdr or 105mm light gun across 50 yards or so of hard standing, let alone across country while trying to avoid the incoming!

Seriously, though, I just can't see it happening, limbers are a must for such a move. Apart from anything else, who is going to carry the ammunition – the gun detachments? Infantrymen pressed into service?

And although outside our period by a few years, the Bengal Horse Artillery (2/3 and 3/2 Tps Bengal HA)certainly carried out rapid, aggressive moves against a much superior Sikh artillery at Gujerat 21 Feb 1849.

Dear Helm
Bricoling is possible over distances of a mile at a strong walking pace. It is much easier if the lead horse is taken off and attached to the font of the guns (as in Schlepseil) or using the limber a Prolong through the lunette ring.

The guns can be moved with only two horses at the trot. We dared not get up to a canter. The trail would act like a sled. The gunners would make their way as best they could to the next position either on horse or foot. The ammunition caissons would follow up. This method especially the Schlepseil method would only endanger two horses in simple harness.

The guns in the Schlepseil method would not even have to be unhitched to allow the gunners to fire. I must say I would not try that with horses.

The speed of movement by bricole is too slow in wargames rules as we have moved the 12-pdr across country faster than the line infantry advancing.

Ammunition would be the issue. But with the use of ammunition mules probably by this time the danger to the Caisson would be reduced considerably. Napoleon supported Marmont upon this innovation in 1803.

Interesting that most the HA were 8-pdrs in 1805 rather than 4-pdrs. The Foot Artillery seem to have the 4-pdrs and 12-pdrs. It is strange when going through the OOB for Austerlitz.

Stephen

Stephen

Stephen

Oh yes, it's possible, but…

Having had experience with modern(ish) field pieces I wouldn't want to do it, especially under fire, and when encumbered with buckets, sponges, portfires, drag ropes, hand spikes and… well you get the picture.

You lack the necessary speed into action – the longer you spend walking about the battlefield, the less time you spend hurling projectiles at the enemy.

Yes, it could be done but at what cost – not just in casualties taken?

Now this artillery thread has really got going it's a treat to sit on the sidelines and listen in.

@summerfield

Thank you for your very kind words, dear colleague – but it was in effect you, your own self, who did pose the interesting questions.

"About Hanau, Wrede was unclear as to which side of river was the line of retreat. He had no ammunition reserves. The Corps was formed by former enemies."
If you refer to the Kintzig, a deployment north and slightly west of Hanau will remove this question.
If you refer to the Main, if the French did cross to the south at Hanau, they would cut off Wrede, but be trapped them selves against the Black Forest lands, as they did need to gain Frankfürt.
If Wrede did not have a single round, he did have 50 000 sabres and bayonettes. The bavarois would obey, as they did have a great sense of honour and an ordre from their government. If they would have rebelled, it would in any case be to have stayed with the French. Wrede would know this better than do we.
His place was a stride the road to Frankfürt, even if this was the last place he did occupy in this World.

One will compare the General Raevsky at Saltanovka. Ordered to attack the corps of the great maréchal Davout with his 12th Division, to shield the line of march of the Army of Bagration, the General Raevsky did attack all day, leading countless advances. At the end, there was no more ammunition, and so they advanced with only their bayonettes, the General at their head, flanked by his own young sons. Wiith the youngest, only 6 or 7, he did hold his hand.
And the Army of Bagration did escape to join the 1st Western Army.

"Interesting that most the HA were 8-pdrs in 1805"
It will be likely OK if there is a short campaign in good weather over a limited distance with good forage …. as it was un northern Italie !!
It is not ony the modern generals who will so well prepared to fight the last war, one might think.

:-)

----------------------------------------------

@Dave Hollins
"Indeed, the failure of the horse batteries to do much at Waterloo simply shows the nonsense of claims that French horse artilelry was supposed to support cavalry attacks – they didn't because they could not keep up "
Of course the coul d "keep up". It was the specific idea.

"and even if they had been able to, there was not much point stopping and setting up for firing only to find the cavalry had gone."
Unmasking the guns after putting the ennemi infantrie in square and screening or actually moving up on the ennemi cavalerie. It is again the specific idea. Even Russians, even cossaks, did do exactly this.
May be not possible too much without killing the horses with a not pure horse artillerie, as did use the Autricheins – but other wise it is the standard methode when using an horse artillerie with a cavalerie.
May be not executed correctly at Waterloo.
But still, it is the fundamental idea when working with a cavalerie.

"What the French htenm do afterwards is simply an extension of theor philosophy – get lots of guns to key points,"
It is not so simple to know even the key points, as these will be the un-occupied key points that can be used to effect on the ennemi. It is a matter fo great finesse to find these, as the obvious ones will not be un-occupied.

- votre ami

With Luetzen Maude states the French Guard Artillery galloped forward and deployed within canister range with the Guard Infantry advancing behind the guns. This clearly says, "Galloped" which implies horses obviously so I fail to see how they were dragged, prolonged, manhandled etc when this is clearly stated by Maude.

Is the author incorrect or missing something? I don't think so because as Helm says, dragging guns all that way forward would exhaust the crews totally.

Also Maude clearly states 60 guns of the guard galloped forward. Again, is Maude wrong ? votre says this did not happen…

Shane

Dear Shane
Translation should be at the canter. (Petit) Gallop is Canter in French. Even so this is quite fast. We broke the cap square and a wheel doing this with our 12-pdr across country. The horse team enjoyed that. By the way there are no breaks on a limbered gun so it can be fun stopping.

Prolonged and by Schlepseil could be at the canter. We have tried that over 500m. Quite alarming having a slewing cannon behind. Now I know what it is to deal with chariots. Both these methods are fast and do not require limbering. They expose far less horses to fire and easier to cut away the traces.

Stephen

Stephen

Dear Un Ami
The battle of Hanau was a lost cause from the start. Only the Austrians contingent had ammunition and they were on the right flank. The Frankfurt road was blocked by the Bavarians. Only the 12-pdrs could be resupplied by the Austrians.

Infantry and cavalry without artillery support cannot stand against concentrated artillery fire upon the valley floor with no protection. It was a feat to carry the fight on for two days.

It is interesting when you look deeper at the story and think of logistics.

Stephen

I have seen no evidence that the French used the schlepseil. The prolonge was in the inventory during and after the wars. If an artillery unit did not want to expose its horses to enemy fire, it would not unhitch a horse or horses from a gun team and attach them to a single field piece in order to advance it. The French would advance over short distances by man team, and over longer by either prolonge or with the piece limbered up.

For Lutzen, General Flahaut, who commanded part of the Guard infantry assault after Drouot's artillery assault had ruined the allied center, stated:

'The Emperor ordered four Imperial aides to accompany the troops of the Guard selected for the attack. I accompanied General Berthezene at the head of the Fusiliers of the Guard. This brave general and his fine troops had earlier attacked and routed the enemy from their positions around Kaja; the men comprising the Fusiliers were all veteran soldiers, and their discipline and elan were no match for our adversaries; the Fusiliers were supremely confident of victory.'

'The signal to advance being given, our brigade moved out, and eventually passed by the left flank of the grand battery. The discharges of these pieces was deafening, and the smoke covered the field, obscuring our view. Our battalions were formed in attack columns of two pelotons width and rapidly traversed the ground already devastated by the day's fighting. We passed over the wreckage of entire regiments which had been cut down by our guns. At times, the enemy dead and wounded were so thick that our men's feet did not touch the ground. My horse hesitated often as it looked for firm footing.'

'The enemy could not withstand our advance. They fired a vew, sporadic volleys, broke ranks, and fled before our bayonets. His majesty can be pleased with the soldiers of the Guard who carried this attack into the heart of the enemy line.'

Sincrely,
Kevin

'I would suggest you do the same especially on the Prussian Army where you are seemingly out of your depth and very prejudiced, just read the massive three volumes of Malinowsky & Bonin, Decker and Tempelhoff before you jump to your sweeping coonclusions.'

Interesting that you should bring this up, as the discussion was about the French and the Russians.

The only outstanding Prussian artillery commander of the period was von Holtzendorf. The Prussians had the worst artillery arm of the main belligerents of the period. They didn't have an artillery school until 1791 nor a unified artillery system until 1816. The 1812 Regulation, which is excellent (and I have a copy) was concerned mainly, if not exclusively, on the battery/company level, and Prussian command and control of artillery at the corps level was poor, and at the army level could be said to be nonexistent, as they had no artillery reserve.

Haven't we had this conversation before?

Sincerely,
Kevin

Thx Kevin,

That little snippit of information proves the French system of aggressive artillery use in attacks where they advanced to close range, fired off huge volumes of fire and finally ordered the infantry to mop up. The cavalry then being ordered later to pursue the beaten enemy.

None of this was acheivable without aggressive artillery attacks of which Napoleon was the master. It is a pity the same was not done at Waterloo for the French but Wellington had choosen his ground very well indeed. The entire aspect of French aggressive artillery use was made mostly nul and void that day regardless of the continual shelling.

Many of the more flat battlefields of 1813 offered much more ideal platforms for Napoleon's tactics to work well as was the case at Luetzen and many other fields.

Shane

Dear Kevin
Please look at the plans of the AnXI and the M1808 modifications. You will see point for attaching the pair of horses. These can be seen at Fort Nelson and Musee de l'Armee etc.. It was another use of the prolong rope and attached through the swindletrees.

I accept that this was not possible for the M1765 Gribeauval carriages. As you will realise that the art of war had moved on. The AnXI tubes were a great advance in both clean design, ease of manufacture and lightness.

The Artillery Arm of Prussia was hindered in 1813 by the plundering of the Berlin and Magdeburg arsenal then selling of the ordnance to Poland. In addition the removal of the horizontal boring machine from Berlin. There were important advances in the Prussian Ordnance design that has been ignored. Remember the new guns of 1812 were codified into the M1816 System.

Prussia had Corp level artillery commanders so could co-ordinate the concentration of batteries. The Prussian Army had used what it had learnt and surpassed the French in many areas. Artillery cannot win the war on its own. It is like saying, the Air Force can win the war on its own. Look at Spanish Civil War, WWII, Korea, Vietnam and the Gulf War.

It is combined arms. This is where the French were lacking on so many occasions in the post 1812 period. The number of lost opportunities. The loss of flexibility and articulation. Wellington would have been swept away by the 1805 French Army at Waterloo. At Borodino there was again a lack of enterprise and co-ordination.

Now I am unclear as to whether it is the size of the army, quality or the generals/marshals had become war weary. There is a tendency to match the height of the glories of Napoleon with those of a different era where the training of all sides was lacking.

The 1812 regulations were written for a purpose to get across the combined arms roles. It was not an al-encompasing manual. You can go to Gassendi and get lost in the 1500 pages. It was a how to guide and was effective in that. Napoleon caused the birth of the General Staff system and this is was a new way of war.

Stephen

Stephen,

Give me page numbers in a French artillery manual to reference to see how it was employed. I submit you won't find it. That was an old method of employment which was obsolete. I've seen the pieces in the Musee de l'Armee and unless I'm mistaken, it doesn't say that.

The Prussians never surpassed French command and control capabilities nor in organization and tactics for artillery until after the wars. They later employed what they learned from the French, but during the period they were behind the power curve.

French artillery employment post-1812 was very effective as was shown at Lutzen, Hanau, Ligny, and Waterloo as already mentioned. You are again in error here.

'Artillery cannot win the war on its own. It is like saying, the Air Force can win the war on its own. Look at Spanish Civil War, WWII, Korea, Vietnam and the Gulf War.'

Who said it could? You are creating a strawman argument again with no documentation to back it up. 'Experiments' with reenactors does not hold the same weight as material for the period by actual artillerymen and school trained artillery officers with combat experience.

Since you brought up the Gulf War, I was an artilleryman on the ground in that conflict. US artillery, both Marine and Army was very effective there, and it was grossly outnumbered in gun tubes on the ground. Our artillery outclassed that of the Iraqis because of target acquisition and fire control (command and control and combined arms). The only reason allied air hit more targets is because they had a 37 day head start. I was a fire direction officer at the regimental level and coordinated the fires of five artillery battalions plus a rocket battery. That doesn't count the air that was called in. The French artillery principles that made them superior throughout the Napoleonic period was command and control, infantry/artillery cooperation that was taught in the French artillery schools, and the quality of their school-trained artillery officers. That last asset was something the Russians and Prussians did not have.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Thank you Kevin,

That was what I suspected, ill coordination or zero coordination in the Allied armies is what I feel was the problem with their tactics. They had grand batteries but they were not used aggressively nor coordinated with Infantry attacks very well at all.

The Austrians I feel were better at this to some extent, is that a fair assumption?

Shane

@Shane

"Also Maude clearly states 60 guns of the guard galloped forward. Again, is Maude wrong ? votre says this did not happen"
Dear colleague, I did not say it did not happen. I said that they did go [at a gallop (really canter), if you wish] in to the firing position, and then did not move at all. The firing location was not then occupied, nor under much or any ennemi fire. They rode up and unlimbered. And then did not move.
So, in this case there was no question of how to advance the guns once deployed, as they did not advance.

Also, it is very long for cannister range (750-800 metres), as you see on the map. But some of the cavalerie attacking Marmont may have come closer, more to a cannister range. Or, perhaps it is another translation problem, as it is an excellent position to fire the French case shot, especially from the howitzers.

- votre ami

Maude states the French guns rode up to case shot range and blasted the allied positions. He does not state the exact range so I cannot add to that. If it is 750-800mtrs then I would be shocked, I would believe it would have been more like 3-500yds at the most.

again I think you originally misunderstood me and that is our problem atm.

and yes. Maude states, "galloped" but I have the sense to understand it would have been more like a canter, at best.

@Shane

1. OK re gallop vs. canter, now we see the same thing
2. Also, since we now see that the guns did not advance in to the ennemi once deployed, it removes the question of how this type of advance was done (with limbering or not)
3. So we have the question of range.
You did write:
"With Luetzen Maude states the French Guard Artillery galloped forward and deployed within canister range"
And then you did write:
"Maude states the French guns rode up to case shot range and blasted the allied positions"

I do not have the Maude. I do not know what he said about range. On the map (see link provided) it is clearly 750-800 m, unless the cavalerie attacking Marmont did come closer at some time. This is perfect range for a French case shot, especially from howitzer. It is really too long for cannister.

:-)

- votre ami

Votre,

I will again post to you the exact quote from Maude….please read it, I cannot say anything more than have you understand these are not my words. You must decipher them for yourself…

Quote :

""The time had now come for the final knock out blow and Drouot with 60 guns of the Guard artillery galloped out to the front, and unlimbering at case shot range began to tear the very heart out of the Allied army, whilst the whole Infantry of the Guard followed in rear, sweeping along with it all that still had life in the sorely shattered III Corps. The Allies gave way on all points….""

Is this now clear to you ?

Shane

If you do not believe the range is case shot range then you must take that up with Maude, not me ;-)

@Shane

Thank you very much, you can see then why one could be come confused when you did write:
"With Luetzen Maude states the French Guard Artillery galloped forward and deployed within canister range"

Thank you again,

- votre ami

sorry Votre, slip there on my part

KFK wrote

"The only outstanding Prussian artillery commander of the period was von Holtzendorf. The Prussians had the worst artillery arm of the main belligerents of the period. They didn't have an artillery school until 1791 nor a unified artillery system until 1816. The 1812 Regulation, which is excellent (and I have a copy) was concerned mainly, if not exclusively, on the battery/company level, and Prussian command and control of artillery at the corps level was poor, and at the army level could be said to be nonexistent, as they had no artillery reserve."

You clearly show your ignorance on that subject, read the books I did recommend and refine your opinion, Malinowsky & Bonin would be quite helpfull for a start.

Maude is a secondary source from 1908, the same period as Petre when UK authors were swallowing all the post-1871 French propaganda about the Nap wars.

Ami – where did this charging off with the cavalry happen then? It is "like marching to guns" – it is a tale that has grown out of the actual aim of moving guns to critical positions quickly. The unmasking of guns and blowing squares away rather omits to mention what has happened to the cavalry – in the time it takes to set up the guns, they will be 1/4 mile away. The opponent just has to gather some cavalry and it is all over for the artillery.

Kevin's quote says simply: "The Emperor ordered four Imperial aides to accompany the troops of the Guard selected for the attack. I accompanied General Berthezene at the head of the Fusiliers of the Guard…. 'The signal to advance being given, our brigade moved out, and eventually passed by the left flank of the grand battery. The discharges of these pieces was deafening, and the smoke covered the field, obscuring our view. Our battalions were formed in attack columns of two pelotons width and rapidly traversed the ground already devastated by the day's fighting."

It is just the standard French approach of moving up batteries in front of infantry, blowing holes in the enemy line and putting infantry columns through them. It is a prototype of WW1, but there is no mobility or finesse in it.

I agree, in the glory years 1805 – 1806 the French used their artillery completly different, one would almost see in a classic support role of the French Infantry; thanks to the excellent infantry Napoleon dominated the battle field, later the whole French Army became a clumsy instrument of war.

Dear von Winterfeldt
You have summed up the evidence. Again a real analysis of the artillery usage is required. We have had the wonderful prose and the poor translations of the French with that of the units. The statement of 700-800metres as maintained by some authors cannot be by looking at the maps and considering the ranges of projectiles.

I accept Kevin's point that the Gribeauval guns were unable to use horse power in the movement of the guns with the muzzle forward. This was a sensible method used by most othernations. The French having to turn the guns through 180 degrees on the Prolong rope. I was referring to AnXI and M1808 modified carriages. The manuals that he refers to are those produced in the 1780s for Gribeauval equipment although reprinted in English as translations no doubt.

All I was saying was looking at the artillery piece and see the uses of the various parts.

The introduction of guns of larger calibre than the opponents for the abject use of captured ammunition increases the windage and so the accuracy. The AnXI bores were slightly longer.

The co-ordination attained in 1813-15 by the Russians and Prussians seemed to have been ignored. The Russians and Prussians used their artillery in large gun concentrations as well as in support of the infantry and cavalry. I find it strange that there is the statement of no army reserve for the Prussians. In 1813-14, the Prussians were part of a coalition Army. Were army reserves that relevant with the job they were doing. I find it strange that the feet of arms perfomed by the Prussians in a number of defeats and turning them in victories is ignored.

Comparing 1805-07 French Artillery to the later period is like chalk and cheese. Both contain calcium but I know which I would prefer to consume.

Stephen