"Representing howitzers" Topic

Just a quick one: Do many Napoleonic rules simulate the odd howitzer or two that accompany artillery batteries, or are shells usually brought into the game only from all howitzer batteries?

Thanks

No

…and no

I account for them in great detail in my own set of rules

Good for you

I think Carnage & Glory II (on top of a particular casualty table) gives a chance to howitzers to set cover on fire.
Nigel Marsh would be able to explain it all in detail.

Most of the sets at battalion/regiment/battery level I have played have some special rules for howitzers. Typically along the lines of an increased likelihood of starting fires in built up areas but sometimes also rules for indirect fire and shrapnel effects.

Nick

And that's exactly the problem with the way most Napoleonic rules handle howitzers.

Increased chance of fires, yes. That's one of the howitzer's major functions.

Indirect fire? No. All field artillery fire is line of sight in the Napoleonic era. You can't see it, you can't shoot at it. If by "indirect" you mean high angle, still no. Most howitzers of the period couldn't be elevated over 7 or 8 degrees, meaning that, at extreme range, the impact angle was about twice that. Mortars were for firing over walls, etc., and they were siege weapons.

By "shrapnel", I presume you mean shell fragments. A black powder shell didn't produce many, sometimes as few as two, usually five to eight. Shrapnel proper (aka spherical or time case) was a British monopoly during the Napoleoniic wars, and waas fired from both guns and howitzers. Postwar tests showed that howitzers were essentially useless with shrapnel due to their low muzzle velocities.

>"Postwar tests showed that howitzers were essentially useless with shrapnel due to their low muzzle velocities."<

Why is that? I would think a lower velocity would make it easier to properly cut the fuse to make the shell/shrapnel burst just where you want it to.

To elaborate on my point above: Say you cut the fuze so as to burst the shell 2 seconds after the piece is fired. The higher the velocity the farther it will travel in 2 seconds, making it harder to guess where it will be at that time. (That is, if you miscalculate by, say, .10 of a second a higher velocity will take it farther from the target in that .10 of a second.)

Shrapnel burst fuzing (as opposed to 20-th century time fuzing) has less need of exact timing. With a Shrapnel shell, you just want the shell to come apart (relatively gently) in mid-flight, and the balls inside continue to fly pretty much along the same line-of-flight as the shell would have. The explosion of the shell does not give the shrapnel balls their impact velocity, but rather the velocity of the shell does.

With 20-th century time and VT fuzes, the timing must be more exact, since it is the bursting charge that propels the fragments (note, modern shells use *fragmentation*, not "shrapnel", which has however become something of a semi-official slang term for "fragments"). Modern shell fragmentation patterns are pretty much a sphere around the point where the shell bursts; the pattern of a real Shrapnel shell is a narrow cone with its apex at the point where the shell bursts, the balls fanning out along the line of flight.

So, short answer: yes, rmaker is right, that the lower-velocity shells make for less effective Shrapnel, since the shell's velocity is more important than accurate timing of the fuze.

I would think that, once the shell has burst, the shrapnel (small shot inside) would spread more the farther they travel, thus bursting it too soon could diminish their affect; and certainly bursting too late (such as after it has buried itself in the mud) would not be much help.

Arms and Equipment of the Civil War by Jack Coggins says, "Spherical case (shrapnel) was used against bodies of troops, usually at ranges from 500 to 1500 yards. The fuzes of the period were so crude that spherical case was seldom used when targets were rapidly closing and opening the range." I doubt that the fuzes had somehow gotten worse in the half-century between the Napoleonic Wars and the ACW.

Also, would not a higher-velocity gun run the risk of bursting the (rather thin) shell within the gun tube?

More accurate fuze timing is always a Good Thing, and yes, the timing will make for a tighter or sloppier pattern. Fuze function close to the target is good, early fuze function is bad since it spreads the balls too far, and late fuze function is real bad since the shell will hit the ground before it opens.

No, fuzes did not get worse between 1815 and 1865. Artillery fire at moving targets should never use time fuze (even today). It was not until the invention of VT fuze in the 1940's that artillery could get reliable air bursts over moving targets.

As far as shattering the shell in the barrel, the wall of the shell is thicker and stronger in a gun shell than in a howizter shell of the same caliber. They are not going to manufacture a shell that is going to risk bursting in the tube. The gun shrapnel shell will have thicker walls and proportionately smaller bursting charge; but the bursting charge does not need to be big, since all it does is open the shell to let the balls keep flying in a cone. Remembering that the balls are propelled by the shell, not by the bursting charge, once again the gun's higher velocity makes the gun shrapnel more effective than howitzer shrapnel.

And the problem with low velocity is that, after the burst the balls need to be travelling fast enough to reach te target with enough energy to cause casualties – usually not the case with howitzer shrapnel.

rmaker --

Do you have a reference for the "postwar experiments"? I'd be interested in seeing what they did to figure all this out: what calibers of gun and howitzer did they test, how were the tests conducted, etc.

I see that the conversation has irretrievably shifted from representation of howitzers. To it I can add nothing but that the Newburry rules, the first I used, calculated their impact separately from the rest of the battery.

On shrapnel

The basic fault of the early shrapnel was timing. The work on perfecting the shrapnel was long lasting, even though very intense, since it was considered a supreme weapon. And also secretive. For example, shrapnel was introduced into the Prussian army in 1831, but its specifications were only known to commanders of artillery brigades. Even after ten years artillery officers were not permitted to know results of test firings. Also, the fuse of the Prussian shrapnel was not properly protected from moisture, and were unreliable.

Another problem appeared with the introduction of the breech loading rifled pieces. In them the fuse could not be ignited by the explosion of the charge of the gun. Therefore a new fuse was invented, which ignited by the movement of the round. Until its introduction (in Prussia in 1870, Austria-Hungary 1875, Russia and France 1877) some rifled breechloaders used almost useless shrapnel with impact (propper word?) fuse.
That is why the Prussians did not carry shrapnel rounds on the campaign against Austria. In that war the Austrians used rifled muzzleloaders, and had considerable success with shrapnel.
In the Franco Prussian war only several Prussian batteries were armed with shrapnel with new fuses, while the French used even worse fuses than the Austrians for their muzzleloders, and were not as successful.

Also, I seem to recall that I have read somewhere that the problem with early explosion of shrapnel in older models was not so much a fault of the fuse, but that the friction of the balls within the case, which were not separated from the powder, caused it to be unreliable.

Cant find it now.

At longer ranges, and broken terrain, you cannot "bounce" a round shot into the enemy, you have to "drop" it on or just in front of them. At that point, you might as well have the shot explode for the potentially extra effect. Howitzers probably spread cannister better, and may have been faster to load. So they represented an enhancement at short and long range, and a deficit at medium ranges. It seems this was optimal in some mix between 1/6 and 1/3…

NSN

I read – somewhere – of a French opfficer in the Peninsula who was hit by spent shrapnel. He had a lot of minor facial wounds, ugly but not disabling. I guess it curtailed his amorous adventures.

As an aside, the Napoleon gun of ACW fame was a gun/howitzer. It was a gun that could fire explosive howizter-type shells too, so batteries could be all one type of gun. No high-angle fire was involved. I read this in Nosworthy's 'Bloody Crucible of Courage', but can't recall the technical data.

Hi everyone.
I'm developing a ruleset for tactical-level Napoleonic wargame on hex mapboards with miniatures.
Have got a question as to artillery vs target on higher ground.
Is my assumption correct that a cannon on flat ground couldn't shoot at targets on a hill because the elevation capability of cannons of Napoleonic era was limited?
And is it reasonable to give this ability to howitzers only? So only howitzers can shoot at targets on a hill, and without any limitations.

Agree even Empire allows fire starting but that's it.
And I like suspect everyone fills out their batteries with the right artillery pieces.

Kirk Yaro I did do that as the Prussians have a pure howitzer battery.

the Rule set from the period Kriegspiel has different effects for the type of guns.

Napoleon mixed his batteries due to experience's like Nerlinden (spelling/) where an Austrin battery on the hill fired down on the French all day and could not be engaged. As the young Lt wrote his mom " it was totally unfair".

A mix battery had better effect at every range. Shell was 1.5 effect at long range and the Howitzers where more effective with case (2x?) so a mixed battery should have more effect on most targets.

But this is a deep subject.

reading Krieg at least get you to realize what the Prussians thought.

Regardless whether rules 'allow' them or not, model them. There is no purpose not too.
You are not usually (most games) not playing 1:1 so it is irrelevant.
Really no reason to allow inefficient rules to inhibit what we understand was common usage.
As a contrarian, rigid adherence to ridiculous formulae is begging for an alternative opening to be made.

I see.
But what about shooting at targets that are on higher ground? Could howitzers do it? From any range?
And cannons couldn't, right?

Agree with LORRDGHEE to look at artillery in the Kriegspiel and I would include the +1828 amendments in this.
Howitzers also have a defensive role as well, cannister for self-defence for the battery and for support of nearby troops.

Can anyone recommend any study of firing at targets at higher and lower heights.

Firing from higher to lower means less bounce and there must be a limit to how low the barrel can be depressed. This probably creates a dead zone which cannot be fired into. ( Which have led some to suggest why La haye sainte was not bombarded).

From lower to higher there is perhaps an upper limit to the height and distance that can be hit. Example here is Busacoa where the French artillery could not provide support.

Thank you for the advice, Mike the Analyst.
Although, the information about the Battle of Bussaco I could find in open sources didn't give any details about the usage of French artillery against higher ground…

another fellow member from this forum might tell us that those two howitzers might be kept in "reserve" at battery level in case of a threat from skirmishers / cavalry … and positioned on the right / left flank for that purpose ..

ie. real life security measures vs wargaming practices …

best regards

Typical European battles were fought on gently undulating terrain. No massive elevation changes meant all artillery – guns and howitzers could be used.

Now for the edge cases – deeply intersected terrain offers different problems and corresponding solutions:

Waterloo – French Grand Battery had to be deployed on a ridge opposite the Anglo-Dutch defensive line – or they'd not have been able to hit.

Spain – the French usually put their larger pieces on elevated ground in order to hit the Anglo-Spanish/Portugese on their opposite hills.

However, guns on hills can have dead ground area in front. You don't need to hit them with artillery – just move some infantry into the dead ground and take the battery from there.

This doesn't work against enemy that are deployed on the military crest – which is the lowest elevation that can engage approaching enemy with no dead ground in front.

This comment really belongs to earlier times – but I'll shove it in for show:

Howitzers fire shells on a particular trajectory – basically shallow rise and then steep drop-off. This means that you can 'lob' shells into dead ground – such as trenches, siege-works covered ways, and – I'd argue – woods and villages.

It appears that grenadier battalions' battalion pieces were often howitzers – giving them superior dead-ground clearing capability.

As Cdr Luppo alludes:

French divisional batteries kept their pair of howitzers back as reserve – once the enemy had approached within a certain range. In any case shell fire is moot as it'd be difficult to keep changing fuse lengths as the enemy closed in. So they'd change to canister and be kept as a reserve against flank attacks.

Post-1811 Russians did something similar with their light batteries – one section of two 6pdrs on each flank of the jager brigade, with one section of 10pdr unicorn gun/howitzers as reserve on the most threatened flank. The other three section with the second heavy infantry brigade (in the third line).

>>another fellow member from this forum might tell us that those two howitzers might be kept in "reserve" at battery level in case of a threat from skirmishers / cavalry … and positioned on the right / left flank for that purpose ..

I'm yet to read ANY original info that states such.
What is the source of this cosmetic makeover….??

The Russians- fired cannister at large and in damp/ snow- eg Eylau- read Yermelov.
d

G'Day Dave,

I don't know anything about cosmetic makeovers

But according to the general principles and the system for artillery:

There is always a reserve for a battery of which are two pieces or a section. How the battery commander positioned his battery was up to the particular circumstances involved.

Normally it was the howitzers that were keep in reserve, but this was dictated according to particular circumstances. Nevertheless it was possible for two cannons to be in reserve instead of the howitzer section.

First priorities of fire, and the primary threat were always considered when forming a battery or massed battery.

The number one priority of fire was against a body of troops charging the battery.

The primary threat to a battery was the enemy skirmisher.

When protection of the battery was involved; the French considered that the howitzer was best used against a body of troops charging the battery, cavalry, and skirmishers, instead of ball.

The howitzer was to be kept in reserve as in accordance to the mission previously stated. This of course doesn't mean that the main portion of the battery won't help in firing at a body of troops charging the battery or skirmishers.

there are two types of cavalry charges that can be conducted on artillery:

1…La charge en ligne

2…la charge en fourrageur (par escadron or peloton) or deployed squadrons or pelotons into open order.

While this does not constitute a charge you also have a peloton dispersed en tirailleurs, which could harass a battery.

The possibility of splitting the howitzer section was against the general principles, so as to have a howitzer at both flanks of a battery. The reason for this is; in the French artillery regulations there is no such manoeuvre for a colonne par piece, except when in defile, in a village, on a bridge, or in the woods. Then after leaving the defile the section then goes back to colonne par section. Even when a battery is forming en bataille, it is done by colonne par section.

NOTE: Now at the Battle of Hanau according to Favé, we find that Drouot has innovated for the first time a colonne par piece. Because of this, after the Napoloenic era many artillerists advocated for the colonne par piece.

When a battery manouvres en colonne par section, the tube has one caisson follow behind it. In the event that the caisson is empty, it will leave the battery to go have another full caisson replace it. However the empty spot is left open, thus wasting space in the colonne.

The position of the howitzer section; may be on the left, right , or center of the battery.

Best Regards
Art

>>I don't know anything about cosmetic makeovers

Ohh Art, you smooth devil you… :>]

Thanks for that. While I will accept your technical detail possible, I guess most battles didn't require such finesse.

I also can't see the artillery arm [acting as] as 'defensive' one when we primarily see IT as the attack arm 'par excellence'- ie long range snipers… (perj.) [I mean spitting/ reducing its firepower etc.].

Perhaps it is time we had a modern treatise on Artillery methods, ohh wait…
regards d

SHat,
You have Dessales noting that principle of Reserve for massed artillery
in this case perhaps a dangerous use of those reserves in relation with *security* and one purpose of that reserve, ie. dealing with an eventual unexpected threat.

"Au moment où avait repris le feu de mes réserves, je ne voulus pas laisser un immense intervalle entre elles et mes canons de 6. J'envoyai mon aide de camp dire aux officiers qui les commandaient de se joindre à la gauche de la batterie. Il était trop tard ! L'infanterie, chargée en arrière par une cavalerie formidable, est rompue. Elle arrive pêle-mêle avec l'ennemi sur la réserve d'artillerie dont le feu est paralysé par la crainte de tuer les nôtres. Je n'ai que le temps d'ordonner un changement de front, l'aile droite en arrière sur la pièce de gauche."

---

When the fire of my reserves had resumed, I did not want to leave an immense gap between them and my 6 guns. I sent my aide-de-camp to tell the officers in command to join the left of the battery. It was too late ! The infantry, charged in the rear by a formidable cavalry, is broken. She arrives pell-mell with the enemy on the artillery reserve whose fire is paralyzed by the fear of killing our people. I only have time to order a change of front, the right wing back on the left piece.

Best regards

G'Day Eric

When you read Dessales, it may be credited to General Ruty and the Chef de Bataillon Bobillier, for causing a portion of the massed battery, to get over run.

Of course even General Dessales admits that he did not heed the warnings of Chef d'Escadron Waudre, who stated that the Allied cavalry were preparing to charge.

Best Regards
Art

Good Day Art !

Yes, of course, about Ruty / Bobiler to be credited for the "snafu"

i was trying to provide an practical example of the reserve idea / notion

wee need to dig the artillery system of 1800 and find out the whole thing as suggested in an earlier post. many thanks for your precisions..

with my best regards ; )

Just wondering if mean canons de 6 translates to 6 pounders?

@Mike the Analyst
Yes – it does.

Hi Art
I am sure we have discussed this before, but where was Chef d'Escadron Waudre positioned to spot the Allied cavalry preparing to charge?
Kind regards
Allan

G'Day Allan,

General Dessales states that the 3 x 12 pound batteries were on the left, the three divisional batteries (minus Durutte) in the middle with their divisions, and the horse battery on the right.

This gave General Dessales 54 canons instead of the 80 canons he was supposed to command.

Hope that helps

Best Regards
Art

Hi Allan,
"where was Chef d'Escadron Waudré positioned" ? seems he was on the right..

"Le chef d'escadron Waudré, qui commandait mon artillerie à cheval, vint me prévenir qu'à l'extrême gauche de l'ennemi des masses considérables de cavalerie se formaient, me demandant s'il ne devait pas en rendre compte à l'Empereur.»
Je lui répondis : «Retournez à votre poste, car l'Empereur n'est pas homme à laisser quelque chose à prévoir (..) ..
---
"Squadron leader Waudré, who was in command of my mounted artillery, came to warn me that on the extreme left of the enemy considerable masses of cavalry were forming, asking me if he should not report it to the enemy. 'Emperor."
I replied: 'Return to your post, for the Emperor is not a man to leave anything to be foreseen (..)
---
there is a recent article on French artillery at Waterloo (2020) :
PDF link

best regards

Hi Eric
If Waudré was on the right (but still on the Belle Alliance ridge) I am puzzled how he could see the Allied cavalry. He must have been at least 1000m from the ridge, which was higher than his position and would have surely concealed any Allied cavalry movements. Unless, of course, the Allied cavalry advanced over the ridgeline then halted to reform.
And thank you for the link to the article. I realise some of it is speculative, but it is a very neat summary!
Kind regards
Allan

Good Day Allan,

perhaps we need a little diagram showing the french massed artillery, the elements composing that massed batteries, and the known position of the various actors ? your precision about "the Allied cavalry advanced over the ridgeline then halted to reform" might be a good explanation .. or is it a matter of right & left ?! ; ) lol

Question : do you happen to have some period plates with battery/batteries types of deployment ? especially showing that idea of reserve(s) kept ready for threats ?
i have a lot of books on artillery but they are generally missing such plates / diagrams. i'm specially interested in plates for en bataille, en batterie, echelon deployment ..

Best regards

Good evening Eric!
I did have a rather boring Sunday lined up tomorrow, but now I have a task! ;-)
I will see what I can produce by way of a draft sketch and post a copy here for comments.
Kind regards
Allan

G'Day Allan,

When making your planche for the massed battery at Waterloo, remember that it did not have an appui mobile in accordance to the principles.

I used to consider the 85e Ligne, that was left on the far rigth by Durutte to protect his divisional guns, as the appui mobile for the massed battery, but they were not.

The Dutch Cartographer Craan shows eleven batteries on his map of Waterloo, placed at intervals along the front of I Corps but the eleventh battery must be Durutte battery.

The distance between batteries is due to the fact that the massed battery was positioned in from of d'Erlon corps, thus permitting a battalion to execute a passage through.

When creating a planche for une masse batterie en echelon, due to the lack of an appui mobile or appui fixe, use Seroux masse batterie at Friedland.

En batterie: the average distance between each bouche a feu is 25 pas. Anything less than 25 pas and the battery is a good target for the enemy artillery, and harder to work within the confined spaces of each bouche a feu.

Marcher en bataille: the average distance between each bouche a feu is 6 pas , 12 pas, 25 pas, 50 pas, or even 100 pas. These different distances are known as au quart, demi-distances, distances entieres, double distance, quadruples distances.

As for your question concerning Waudré, he maye not have been with his battery when he observed the cavalry forming, "qu'à l'extrême gauche de l'ennemi des masses considérables de cavalerie se formaient", or it is also possible that he had been informed by someone else.

Best Regards
Art

First attempt:
link

This doesn't answer the OP's question – but it does show Russian (1812) employment of light batteries and their unicorns:

Le Breton "I hope this shows up OK." 09 Sep 2017 10:49 a.m. PST:

TMP – French Skirmishers – Per Brigade or not

>>You have Dessales noting that principle of Reserve for massed artillery…

I'm not a fan of the 'theory of use' and where we don't see documented the actual battlefield use…

My problem is thus:
- Company's manned in general, 8 pieces.
- they worked as two gun sections.
- N. according to some witness, wanted them reduced to 6 pieces as being 'sufficient' for the job. He did so to a large extent in 'experimenting' (ie playing with) his Garde (a la Frederick der Grosse) etc.
- then we are down to 4gun/ 2 howitzer or 5g/ 1H.

You then tell us that 'doctrine' was to detach those sections for 'defense/ reserve' caution', further diminishing the effective firepower.

I remember reading an adage some time ago, perhaps from another time entirely- "it is not up to the guns to defend themselves, but he who commands them should ensure their security."

~Stoppage- that thread eluded me several times over and glad you have found it, if converging a couple of issues ;-)

cheers
d
[Painting N. adversaries en masse again…]

@1984

I've been searching for that particular thread for MONTHS. Pleased you enjoyed the re-discovery!

I believe that period artillery companies/batteries/whatever were configured to fulfil a variety of roles.

- Enemy at long range, spoiling missions – howitzer shell
- Enemy approaching – guns roundshot, howitzer roll-shell
- Enemy close range – guns canister

Infantry supports cannot be relied on – so use the howitzers for the reserve.

>>configured to fulfil a variety of roles.

Oh no doubt about it; in any era (even my fathers own North Africa and Italy service), but to expect 'adherence' to one of many principles for the sake of it is to forgo all the advantages the arm offers. I don't believe military men at any time squandered an opportunity…

It does seem that licornes/unicorns were indeed there to be used as self defence shotguns (Yermelev).

Well, most [gamer] rules give a bonus for 'support' troops and only a fool flits off and leaves a battery at risk.

I did throw my horse company onto a hill in advance of the flank cavalry to enfilade enemy, and had miscalculated the range, so their only target promptly charged and broke them! [Crap double 1's !]. The cav swept back and broke him, so i guess it was ok…

cheers d

My masterpiece of a grand battery – two artillery brigades – was ridden down by the reformed cuirassier division that it had blown away the previous turn. (Empire III).