"A real WW2 battle report!" Topic

HG 76. THE FIRST VICTORIOUS CONVOY. DECEMBER 1941 ©
By Mal. WRIGHT.
The battle for Convoy HG76 from Gibraltar to the UK in the middle of
December 1941 was overshadowed by momentous events taking place in the
Pacific and Asia. But in the fighting during this passage, we can clearly
see the beginning of tactics and measures for 1942, which would lead to the
decisive convoy battles of mid-1943 and the ultimate defeat of the German U
Boats.

But at this dark time, convoys sailed in expectation of heavy loss. The
loss of many warships of all categories was pushing the Royal Navy beyond
tolerance. Merchant ship sinking's were also reaching alarming proportions.
The United States was now in the war, but its effect not yet felt. The
availability of escorts had improved only slightly, as more and more new
vessels entered service. This gave the opportunity for older ships to be
modified in ways that increased their value as ASW ships, improved AA
capability etc. There seemed as yet, no counter to the wolf pack tactics
employed by the German U Boats except lots more escorts but their
availability would be still some time off.

Due to the proximity of occupied air bases in France, from which the
Luftwaffe could locate them, the Germans were particularly savaging convoys
between Gibraltar and England. French Atlantic ports from which the U boats
could sortie were also close at hand for the ever-growing numbers of
submarines being churned out by German shipyards. German surface attackers
could also not be discounted.

When HG-76 sailed from Gibraltar three factors would make its passage
particularly difficult. One was that German agents in Spain could see the
assembly of convoys and report when they had left. This gave the Luftwaffe a
good idea of where to look, after considering convoy speed and weather
effects. The second factor was the Fw200 ‘Condor' aircraft and others,
operating from occupied France. In addition to picking off some ships
themselves, the Condors were locating and reporting convoy positions, which
enabled U Boats to assemble for an attack. The third was the inevitable
concentration of U Boat boats that could be directed to a convoy to engage
Wolfpack tactics, once it was located at sea.

Wolfpack tactics consisted of concentrating several submarines around a
convoy. The first boat to make contact took up a shadow position and
transmitted regular signals so that other U Boats could home in on it. To do
this the shadowing boat had to remain on the surface. If it dived, even a
slow convoy would soon out run it, because the boats lacked sufficient
battery power to maintain higher speeds below the surface. While on the
surface it could also transmit its homing signal. Even when other boats came
up, they would be forced to stay on the surface by day, unless they could
get far enough ahead to dive and wait. If the convoy altered course, dived
boats could miss it altogether. Therefore the heart of Wolf Pack tactics
required one or more boats to keep visual contact, home the others in, and
wait for night. Because submarines sit so low in the water, it was very
difficult to see them from surface ships. A U Boat could take up a position
from which it could see the convoy on the horizon, and be relatively sure
that it could not be seen in return. Even early radar did not change this
much, because its range was quite short, and the ‘return' from moving wave
tops created so much clutter that a small distant target would remain
invisible. Advantage therefore lay with the submarine as long as it could
keep its distance.

After dark the German boats would attack on the surface. As other than
perhaps a basic time, there could be little other co-ordination. The boats
came in individually, but the presence of several of them was enough to keep
the convoy escorts dashing about to drive them off. While engaged in this,
an escort chasing one U Boat might well leave a gap through which another
could safely proceed to attack. After a few hours of attacks, a previously
tight escort screen could become badly scattered.



Being low in the water when viewed from a surface ship, submarines had
a huge advantage at night, even when on the surface. They saw the convoy and
its escorts against the lighter night sky, but in reverse, they were always
against the blackness of the night sea. This made them almost invisible to
the naked eye until very close. Many passed within 500 yards or less, quite
unseen. Cloaked in this invisibility U Boats ran in on the surface, using
the higher speed of their diesel engines, in which situation they were
faster than the merchant ships. In some cases they were faster on the
surface, than some of the escort ships. But if forced to dive, this speed
advantage was lost, because on their electric motors they would soon lose
contact. Additionally ASDIC, the main British detection device, could only
locate them while dived. If U Boats were on the surface ASDIC was useless.

Early Radars did not help a lot. The wavelengths they operated on were
not conducive to picking up small objects against the clutter of return from
the sea itself. Additionally a submarine with the surface ships behind it
would be lost in the radar returns from them, even if the escorts were close
As equipment improved, more and more submarines were being picked up on
radar. But that depended on if the escort even had radar in the first place.
Many still did not. Contacts rarely took place over 4,000 yards. Some were
missed entirely. Therefore in the period in which HG-76 sailed, radar was of
some help, but not able to entirely solve the problem of detection of
submarines at night.

Most of the early U boat aces had achieved their kills by being able to
slip into convoy ranks. Here they could pick off their targets more easily,
then dive deep below the ships. Once dived, they allowed the convoy to pass
overhead, thereby making their escape. Even while in the ranks of the convoy
circumstances favoured them. Large propellers create lots of bubbles, which
burst underwater, creating what is known as ‘cavitivity'. The noise of these
bubbles made sound detection difficult. But in addition the disturbed water
cause a wall effect for active sonar/ASDIC pulses to bounce off. The deeper
the boat went under a convoy, the less this would effect the searchers, so U
Boat commanders knew to remain at a depth where the wall of disturbed water
would help.

HG-76 had some things in its favor, which the Germans had not
previously encountered. First was the presence of the little Escort Carrier
HMS AUDACITY (Commander. D.W.McKENDRICK) This ship had been the German
merchant prize HANNOVER. After a very basic conversion to an Escort Carrier
she commissioned as EMPIRE AUDACITY. The first ship of the type, to join the
Battle of the Atlantic. Few aircraft were available to operate from such a
small flight deck and she went to sea with three two plane sections of
Martlet 1's, designated Red, Yellow & Black flights respectively. On passage
to Gibraltar the little auxiliary carrier had proved successful against the
Fw200 Condors but suffered some losses herself. Her own AA armament was
quite meager and more along the lines of a merchant ship. A gun tub aft, and
below deck level, contained a 4" gun for surface use. Along her sides were
four 20mm AA guns.

Her Martlet aircraft were quite good fighters. These were certainly quite
capable of handling Fw200 Condor's. But the Mark 1 version could not carry
bombs of any kind. This meant they were of limited use against submarines.
But it was to their great advantage that U Boat commanders did not know this
It would be a daring captain indeed; who kept his boat on the surface in
the hope the attacker had nothing serious to attack with. Therefore if a
Martlet came diving at them firing its machineguns, most enemy captains
would take the safe option and dive to avoid bombs. Forcing them to dive was
one of the very things required. Once down, they would be sure to lose
contact with the convoy. They also had to proceed at their slower speed, and
if an escort was available to follow up the sighting, the U Boat could well
be detected.

For the return voyage with HG-76 only four Martlet aircraft were still
available. Some Swordfish of 812 Squadron ashore at Gibraltar due to the
loss of the fleet carrier HMS ARK ROYAL were to be transferred to her. This
proved impossible, as she did not have facilities to operate them. Actual
surviving crewmembers of ARK ROYAL were aboard the AUDACITY when she sailed,
but not the aircraft. These same Swordfish aircraft did fly in support of
HG76while it was in range of Gibraltar. As a result the Germans thought they
were aboard. In addition the ship had now been renamed HMS AUDACITY.

The second and perhaps most important factor in favor of HG76 was the
36th Escort Group under the command of Commander F.J. WALKER (RN). This
officer had been an ASW expert between the wars, when this was an
unfashionable branch of the service. He had been passed over for higher
promotion and had spent the early part of the war in great frustration,
watching the growing "Battle of the Atlantic". This was the very type of
warfare he had trained for, trained others in, and held strong ideas about.
The defensive tactics then in use were quite against the ideas he held.
Walker was an advocate of a more aggressive posture when dealing with
U-boats. He advocated taking the attack to them, instead of waiting to be
attacked. Despite memos and pleas, he had failed to convince his superiors
that his radical ideas were the answer.

In March of 1941 after much pleading for a command, he was sent to sea.
In September 1941 he was appointed to HMS STORK. This also made him the
senior officer of the 36th Escort Group, which also comprised HMS DEPTHFORD
a pre war sloop, and seven war built flower class corvettes. No action
occurred during the passage to Gibraltar in severe weather conditions, which
the convoy reached without loss. At Gibraltar his escort group was detailed
to escort HG76, a convoy bound for the UK. Walker wanted the chance to use
tactics he had been theorizing about for years. The Admiralty apparently
expected him to obediently follow doctrine. He had other ideas and fate was
about to give him the opportunity he had been waiting for.

Walker's own ships comprised two sloops. STORK, and the older DEPTFORD.
He also had the Flower class Corvettes RHODODENDRON, MARIGOLD, CONVOLVULUS,
PENTSTEMON, GARDENIA, SAMPHIRE and VETCH. Off Gibraltar, the 36th EG formed
up with HG76, and were reinforced by the arrival of AUDACITY The Catapult
Ship SS. DARWIN was also with the convoy. This ship had only a single
aircraft on its catapult and was to be reserved for emergencies as the pilot
had to try to make it to land once launched, or failing that, ditch in the
sea.

The destroyers STANLEY, BLANKNEY and EXMOOR also joined and were placed
under his command. Due to their shorter range, the latter two ships would
only stay with him for a few days. STANLEY was ex USS McCALLA, one of the
50 WW1 vintage flush deck destroyers transferred from the US Navy the
previous year. She had recently received a major refit that involved
removing her forward boilers and two of the four funnels. The spare space
was used to greatly increase her operating range, accommodation and improve
sea keeping through reduced top weight and the addition of ballast. Her anti
submarine equipment was also updated, the number of depth charges increased,
and her meager AA increased.

BLANKNEY and EXMOOR were units of the recently completed HUNT II type
escort destroyers, with an excellent Heavy AA armament with which it was
hoped to keep the Focke Wulf Condors at bay. STORK, although designed with
low angle 4.7" guns in 1936 had been completed with a very similar AA
armament to that of the Hunt Class vessels.

The Flower class corvettes were poor in AA defense and speed, but well armed
for ASW work. Most had been recently completed, being part of a huge wartime
program to provide more anti submarine escorts for merchant convoys. As such
they were efficient U Boat killers, inexpensive, and able to be built in
large numbers.

While at Gibraltar they had learnt of the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbour. The US Navy was reeling from the sudden blow and would take time
to recover. It seemed as if everything was going against the Allies at sea,
with the loss or merchant ships having become critical. But Walker was about
to step into the Bullring at last.


The convoy sailed on December 14th and consisted of 32 ships arranged
in five columns. Convoys were always wider than they were long, to make
submarine attack more difficult, and the work of escorts easier. Following
the ideas he had fruitlessly been recommending to the Admiralty, Walker
arranged his escorts in two screens, one close to the convoy and one further
out. For the first time the U-boats would encounter a double layer of
escorts through which they would have to penetrate. This was not without
some risk to the convoy as both screens were consequently quite thin,
although compared to some early convoys, this one had a strong escort.

Force H based on Gibraltar formed a ‘Hunter Group' from its destroyers
and sent them to sea first. It comprised of the British destroyers GURKHA,
FOXHOUND, CROOME, and the Australian Destroyer NESTOR. They commenced
sweeping the area ahead of the convoy, outside Gibraltar. This precaution
paid off. NESTOR sank U127 (Hansmann) with all hands, 35 miles off Cape St
Vincent on December 15th. However the group could not assist any further
than assisting the convoy to clear the immediate area of departure after
which they turned back to rejoin Force H, which was in need of them. Warned
of the departure by agents in Spain, Doenitz ordered the U-boat pack
SEERAUBER (Pirate) to position itself for an attack.

HG76 remained unsighted until U131 (Korvettenkapitan Arend Baumann)
fell in with it during the late afternoon of the 16th. He reported, then
dived to let the convoy pass over him, intending to follow along behind and
make reports. Due to hydrophone equipment failure he accidentally came to
periscope depth in the middle of the convoy but after initially attempting
an attack was forced to dive deep to avoid being rammed. He was apparently
not spotted. U67 and U108 also attempted to approach the convoy but were
forced to dive by aircraft and could not locate it.

Two Fw200 of 1-KG-40 from Bordeaux had also sighted the convoy in the
failing light of the 16th and made a report. Although spotted in the
distance by STANLEY the other escorts did not see them. Fighter controllers
on AUDACITY doubted the report, choosing not send Martlets to investigate.
At this time U574 (Oberleutnant zur see Gegnalbach) and U434
(Kapitanleutnant Wolfgang Heyda) were off Spain, both on their first war
cruise and headed to join U131.

Once astern U131 surfaced in darkness and made another sighting report.
Heyda continued to make hourly reports to Lorient from where Doenitz
directed four other U-boats to head to the area. Walker was well aware he
had been spotted due to Admiralty warnings based on their radio intercepts.
He request the AUDACITY provide dawn and dusk sweeps with her aircraft at a
distance of about 20 miles around the convoy. It was the practice of U-boats
to maintain contact at maximum visibility while calling others in. Although
the seas were very choppy and there was quite a lot of cloud cover overhead,
visibility was quite good at sea level. The weather would remain much the
same for most of the voyage.

At 0900 on the 17th aircraft from AUDACITY reported the shadower was 22
miles off to the port of the convoy. Because of its entirely machinegun
armament, the fighter was unable to do more than scare U131 into a crash
dive. Of course the U-boat commander did not know the fighter had no bombs
and was not going to wait around to find out.

The Martlet then climbed high enough for a radar fix to be made on it,
which established the exact location. This was the chance Walker had been
waiting for to test his theory of "offensive" escort. Calling for EXMOOR,
BLANKNEY, STANLEY and PENTSTEMON to join him, he raced toward the contact in
STORK. The good wishes of the Convoy commodore went with him in the form of
the signal ‘GOOD HUNTING'. This formed the idea for the ‘A HUNTING WE SHALL
GO' theme song adopted by Walker's later 2nd Support Group. By now U108 and
U107 were also now in contact but had remained unsighted.



Meanwhile U131 had attempted to avoid further detection by aircraft, in
moving closer to the convoy, and diving from time to time. But faulty
hydrophones failed to warn of the approach of PENTSTEMON and STANLEY, both
of which gained contact. They heavily damaged the boat with depth charges.
U131 went down to 600 feet and moved away at five knots in the hope of
getting as much distance away from the attackers as possible because
Chlorine Gas was slowly leaking into the boat and they would eventually have
to surface. Following his ideas for hunting U-boats Walker put his escorts
out into a search line and commenced the search. When U131 did pop up two
hours later, STANLEY immediately sighted it and Walker ordered his units to
close and fire as soon as they were in range. In the meantime a Martlet (Sub
Lt.Fletcher) of Black Flight dived on the submarine to strafe it but was
shot down and killed. On this occasion the U-boat commander had little
choice but to fight off the aircraft as he attempted to out-run the escorts.
Persistent Chlorine gas prevented him diving. His need to proceed at full
speed left a tell tale wake, making the boat easier to see from a distance,
and some of his attackers had improved radar. Running fully surfaced, he was
easier to detect than when laying low in the water to sneak into a convoy.

The Escorts commenced fire at 14,000 yards and after twenty minutes of
shelling at rapidly closing ranges, the crew of U131 could be seen going
over the side. Pentstemon and others picked up the survivors. STORK led the
escorts back to the convoy, which they rejoined at 1730. Walker had made
his first kill, using tactics of going out to meet the U-boats instead of
waiting for them to attack. Even though AUDACITY was down to three Martlets
high hopes were held for future co-operation between aircraft and escort
vessels

i113.photobucket
com/albums/n217/gallopingjack/Art%20Work/HG76fulldetail.jpg

Despite information from U131 having ceased, and that boats now ominous
silence, U434 still sighted the convoy just after midnight and immediately
made a contact report, before taking over as the shadow vessel. U434 was ten
miles from the convoy, running on the surface at dawn of the 18th when it
fell foul of the unexpected outer escort screen in the form of STANLEY. The
destroyer turned to attack immediately, despite her ASDIC giving trouble and
warned Walker. DEPTFORD with EXMOOR and BLANKNEY were ordered to race to her
aid.

Accurate depth charge patterns from STANLEY and BLANKNEY had dealt the
U434 her deathblows before the other escorts could even arrive and she
bobbed to the surface, with her crew tumbling out of the conning tower and
into the water just in time. Within minutes the U-boat had rolled over and
slipped beneath the waves. U434 crew joined the prisoner of war bag along
with the men of U131. Walker was delighted to be able to signal the
Admiralty that they had so far sunk two U-boats without loss to the convoy.

The same morning two Fw200 Condor aircraft attempted to close the
convoy at 1130 but were spotted when still low on the horizon and were
chased off by the fighters of Black Flight. The guns of both jammed,
allowing the Germans a lucky escape. During the afternoon however, EXMOOR
and BLANKNEY, reaching the end of their fuel endurance, were forced to turn
back to Gibraltar. The latter took 45 prisoners with her as the fighters
again carried out a sweep.

Not long after, in the gathering dusk, PENTSTEMON sighted a U-boat on
the surface ten miles off the port side of the convoy. This was U107
(Gelhaus) who sent off a contact report at 1819. Walker ordered CONVOLVULUS
to join her sister ship in the hunt, but as it was getting very dark, he
decided to keep STORK close to the convoy with the rest of the escorts.
U-67 (Mueller-Stockheim) was closing the convoy at the same time and
attempted to torpedo CONVOLVULUS as she moved to obey her orders. The
corvette was near missed, immediately counter attacked and drove U-67 off.
The crew of U107 were thankful able to avoid detection.

picture

Since making contact late on the 16th U574 had waited for a pack to
assemble, but after witnessing the destruction of U131, dropped well astern.
After dark on the 18th the boat closed to an attack position. At 0400 on the
19th U574 was closing the rear of the convoy when it sighted a destroyer,
which had also seen the U-boat and was turning to attack. STANLEY blew up
in a sheet of flame when hit by torpedoes. It is likely that the forward
magazine was detonated and it was expected there would be few survivors.

Although shocked by the loss, Walker, not knowing where the U-boat was,
ordered the escorts to perform "Operation Buttercup". This was a tactical
idea of his own, that he had trained his group in. The escorts turned
outward from the convoy, firing star shell and snowflake on every bearing
the U-boat might use as an escape route. Shortly after STORK picked up a
positive submarine echo. This was U574, which had been forced to dive due to
the Buttercup tactic. An attack with a ten-charge pattern followed. Walker
was still turning to attack again when U574 surfaced, badly damaged, but
attempting to escape on the surface. After sweeping the decks of the
unfortunate U-boat with gunfire, the STORK turned in and rammed her just
forward of the conning tower. The escort continued on over the rolling
U-boat and finished her off with a pattern set shallow. Some of the Germans
were already in the water when these charges went off and did not survive,
but five were later picked up. A search located 25 crew from the STANLEY and
these were also taken aboard.

While in the middle of her rescue operation STORK observed an explosion
from within the convoy. . This was the SS RUCKINGE a ship of 2,869 (gross)
tons. U108 (Schonder) had sneaked in and scored a kill. This was the first
loss to the merchant ships of the convoy. Three U-boats had so far been sunk
which was an amazing feat for that time of the war. In the Atlantic convoys
were being decimated in night attacks, often without any loss to the U Boats
Wolf packs seemed to be unstoppable and ship losses had reach frightening
levels.

On the down side, STANLEY had been sunk and STORK had damaged her ASDIC in
the ramming of U574. The sloop had bent her bows so badly she could no
longer steam at full speed. AUDACITY had however been lucky, with one
torpedo narrowly missing her during the attack.
During the same day the Luftwaffe attempted to re-establish contact
with the convoy. In the morning a pair of Fw200 Condors approached, but Red
Flight intercepted them. Sub Lieutenant Brown destroyed one in a daring head
on attack. The other fled into the clouds chased by Sub Lt. Lamb and was not
sighted again. During the afternoon another Fw200 was spotted by STORK,
which passed on the information. Sub. Lt. Sleigh of Yellow Flight tried some
stern attacks before changing to a head on, as Brown had done. This tactic
downed the Condor, but in doing so the Martlet was damaged. Sleigh returned
to the carrier with part of the Condors wireless aerial wrapped around his
tail wheel.

At dusk an AUDACITY Martlet sighted a U-boat 15 miles to port. This was
U107 (Gelhaus), which had been able to stay in touch with the convoy.
Gelhaus took his boat down and although hunted by DEPTHFORD, MARIGOLD &
CONVOLVULUS could not be located. This was fortunate for the Germans as U107
was directing the arrival of U108 (Scholtz), U71, U751, & U567 (Endrass),
all of which were being homed in on HG76.

Kapitanleutnant Endrass, commander of U567 was a holder of the Knights
Cross and one of the few remaining early aces. He was 1st Lt of U47 (Gunther
Prien), when that boat penetrated Scapa Flow, famously sinking the
Battleship ROYAL OAK. Doenitz placed great faith in him and signaled the
closing U-boats that Endrass was on the way, hoping this would boost morale.


While returning to the convoy the escorts were mistaken for the enemy,
and many of the Merchant ships fired snowflake rockets. The convoy up was
lit up brilliantly in the darkness. No attacks developed despite this error,
and in fact the next day, the 20th also passed with only one incident when
Red Section Martlets attempted to catch a Condor. After a 55-mile stern
chase they were forced to give up at let the speedy Fw200 go. During the
same afternoon another Martlet sighted two U-boats ahead, but the alerted
HG76 altered course, thereby avoiding any contact with them.

December 21st also passed without attacks for most of the daylight
hours, but several U-boats were sighted. Two were 25 miles astern,
exchanging personnel across a plank when surprised by the ever-busy Sub Lt.
Brown. He strafed them before they could dive, but without apparent damage.
Walker detached four of his escorts, including DEPTFORD to pursue the pair
but they evaded further detection. At 1130 two other U-boats were sighted to
port of the convoy. MARIGOLD and CONVOLVULUS were detached to pursue, again
without any contact being made, but the U Boats were forced to dive. Shortly
after another was sighted off the port bow shadowing the convoy from about
10 miles out. At 1500 yet another U-boat was sighted. The night of the 21st
to 22nd was promising to be very dangerous.

HG76 was now turned onto a more direct course for the Western
Approaches. The Germans obviously knew they were there, so it made little
point to sail a longer, diversionary route. As HG76 had been followed for
several days, it was hoped the radical course change after dark, might fool
some of the gathering pack. At dusk AUDACITY went to her night procedure of
zig zagging well clear of the convoy. Walker recommended the port side, as
being the safest, but McKendrick preferred the starboard. He went off
without escort as having had two escorts turn back, one sunk and one now
damaged; the convoy could not spare a screen.

Walker took two escorts with him and staged a mock battle off the port
rear side of the convoy hoping to repeat the success of the previous night.
By the use of snowflake and starshell he hoped to trick the U-boats into
hurrying to the wrong spot in the darkness. Unfortunately the merchant
ships of the convoy believed this to be a real attack and commenced firing
snowflake as well, which left them brightly lit up and spoiled the diversion
Walker then raced back to rejoin but as he did the ANNAVORE, of 3,324 dwt,
rear ship of the center column was hit. U567 had already closed for the
attack and the Norwegian tanker exploded into flames.

Instead of sweeping astern for the attacker, Walker then made a
tactical mistake by ordering another ‘Buttercup' be carried out. HG76
merchant ships fired snowflake again, and AUDACITY was silhouetted against
the bright flares. Ten miles out to starboard of the convoy, U751
(Korvettenkapitan Gerhard Bigalk) could not believe his luck. The small
carrier was brightly silhouetted and he immediately torpedoed her. AUDACITY
was hit aft just as her officers were completing their evening meal in the
wardroom. Out of control the ship continued to steam in circles, badly down
by the stern. Her 4" gun was aft and being awash could not be trained.
McKendrick ordered engines stopped to avoid collision and the little carrier
floated helpless in the darkness for twenty minutes. Anxious eyes scoured
the darkness watching for another attack. There were high hopes the ship
could be towed to safety. Escorts rushed to the area but before they could
arrive, AUDACITY was finished off by U751. The U Boat came in so close she
was fired on by one of the 20mm Oerlikon's of the Carrier. Shortly after,
two torpedoes, struck AUDACITY in the bow. She sank ten minutes later.

As escorts dashed about the site of the sinking, searching for
survivors, the DEPTFORD spotted a U-boat on the surface and fired star shell
STORK raced in to help. A series of heavy depth charge attacks followed,
which in turn brought on another underwater explosion. U567 (Kapitanleutnant
Endrass) had been destroyed with all hands. Walker's escorts were unsure of
the kill, although oil was sighted. Tensions were running high, when shortly
after, DEPTFORD accidentally rammed the STORK at slow speed. Damage was not
severe, but the ship's brig was wrecked, killing two of five U-boat
survivors locked in it.

U67 also attacked but missed her target; the CAM ship DARWIN. The boat
was forced to dive when illuminated by starshell. Her bad luck continued
when an escort raced in to attack. Forty-one depth charges shook the
helpless U-boat for the next two hours as RHODODENDRUM plastered her, with
some extra help from DEPTFORD. She was not able to surface until 0430, when
it was found she was trailing oil. Machinery defects, forced her to withdraw
well astern of the convoy.


By dawn of the 22nd of December 1941, HG76 had lost two of its merchant
ships, the auxiliary carrier and one escort, but had sunk four submarines, a
score, which up until that time was unheard of. STORK and DEPTHFORD were
damaged, depth charges were running low and various other equipments such as
radar sets had started to fail. The sinking of AUDACITY meant fighter cover
had also been lost, along with early warning of U-boats on the surface
nearby. Help was on the way for both sides, but the convoy position was
starting to favor the British.

German boats U71 and U125 made contact, having being diverted from
missions to the US East Coast But this was offset by reinforcements sent
from Western Approaches. VANQUISHER and WITCH were V&W class destroyers
converted to short-range Escorts. They soon joined the screen as welcome
helpers. A Coastal Command Liberator, from Number 19 Group, patrolled around
them for several hours during the day. At 1600 it reported two U-boats
stopped on the surface 25 miles astern of the convoy. One was U67, which
after assessing her damage, reported to U Boat command in Lorient.

Now however HG76 was nearing the UK. In London the Admiralty decided there
would have to be a re-think about tactics. Walker's aggressive style had
worked and communication with Western Approaches Command commenced before
the convoy even reached port. Prime Minister Churchill was delighted that at
last in these dark days, a convoy had forced the attacking U-boats into a
one for one, swap. As far as the merchantmen and their valuable cargoes were
concerned it was a two for one swap in British favor.

During the night, a very heavy sea hit the SS OGMORE CASTLE. The crew
panicked, convinced they had either rammed a submarine or being damaged and
abandoned ship. The highly embarrassed men went back on board and the ship
resumed its place in the convoy just before dawn, after the Corvette
CONVOLVULUS found the merchant ship quite undamaged. After days of strain
and tension, the merchant sailors were near breaking point.

From dawn of the 23rd U751, U125 and U71 attempted to penetrate the
escort screen but were driven off by the alert and determined escorts.
During this action U751 was badly shaken and barely managed to elude the
destroyers VETCH, VANQUISHER and WITCH. Coastal Command was now maintaining
heavy air patrols as the range from UK airfields steadily diminished.

Seeing the struggle coming to an end German U Boat command in Lorient,
ordered the damaged U67 home at 0921. They then went on to direct the
remaining U-boats elsewhere. It was time to seek out easier targets, as the
struggle around convoy HG-76 had proved far too costly.

By the afternoon the convoy was safely in the control zone of Western
Approaches and the Commodore signalled to STORK, "Despite the loss of
Audacity and Stanley, you have won a great victory. On behalf of the convoy
deepest congratulations and many thanks." The victory was a great Christmas
present for the morale of all crews embroiled in the Battle of the Atlantic.

Walker's report on the proceedings of the convoy was anxiously awaited.
On the 6th of January 1942 he attended a special meeting at the Admiralty
with the Director of Anti Submarine Warfare during which his tactics were
examined, his advice sought and his new approach considered. Until then his
ideas of aggressive defense of a convoy had been quite at odds with
Admiralty doctrine and practice. While a commander ashore he had been unable
to convince his seniors of his ideas on how to tackled the U Boat menace. As
a commander at sea, in charge of an escort group, Walker had been able to
prove his theories. They were listened too, taken note of, passed on, and
became standard practice for escort groups.

Captain Walker would later go on to command the famous Second Support
Group that sank a hefty score of U-boats as the Battle of the Atlantic swung
against the Germans. The ships under his command always enjoyed a high
priority for repair and refit. His signature tune "A hunting we will go"
greeted him from shore on his return from successful sorties. Before his
untimely death from natural causes on July 9th 1944, he had been present at
the sinking of 25 U Boats. The previously "passed over" officer was
re-instated in the seniority list and had won the DSO four times. He was to
have been made a Knight Commander of the Bath and promoted to flag rank
after August 1944. Unfulfilled Admiralty plans for his future included
command of a carrier group being prepared for deployment to the Far East.


Mal Wright
Non-torsii subligarium

Yikes, that's alot to read. I got about a third the way down and moved on. I did print it to read later however. It is a nice write up from what I did read.

Mal, great write up. You should dress it up some and publish it. Maybe illustrated with a couple of your paintings.

I read it all. Fascinating. Thanks for that!

Yes, definitely nice write-up. Those convoy escort guys sure had it hard.

On a side note, I think that old recurring thread on British ship / airplane / tank names being better than other nations' is finally laid to rest by 'Convolvulus'. I can just imagine veterans of that ship telling their grandkids about their War service, and the kids thinking they'd gone dotty…
-Kle.

Well, to get names like HMS Avenger and HMS Iron Duke, you have to suffer through a few names like HMS Morris Dance…

"Mal, great write up. You should dress it up some and publish it. Maybe illustrated with a couple of your paintings."

Someone seems to have done that already. He will hear from my Solicitors!